[Senate Hearing 110-153]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 110-153
SECURING AMERICA'S INTEREST IN IRAQ: THE REMAINING OPTIONS
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
----------
JANUARY 10, 11, 17, 18, 23, 25, 30, 31, AND FEBRUARY 1, 2007
----------
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
S. Hrg. 110-153
SECURING AMERICA'S INTEREST IN IRAQ: THE REMAINING OPTIONS
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JANUARY 10, 11, 17, 18, 23, 25, 30, 31, AND FEBRUARY 1, 2007
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/
index.html
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
38-033 WASHINGTON : 2007
_____________________________________________________________________________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota
BARBARA BOXER, California BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire
BARACK OBAMA, Illinois GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
Antony J. Blinken, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Wednesday, January 10, 2007
WHERE WE ARE: THE CURRENT SITUATION IN IRAQ
Page
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 2
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Marr, Dr. Phebe, historian, author of ``The Modern History of
Iraq,'' Washington, DC......................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 10
O'Hanlon, Dr. Michael, senior fellow and Sydney Stein, Jr.,
chair, the Brookings Institution, Washington, DC............... 17
Prepared statement........................................... 21
Pillar, Dr. Paul, visiting professor, Security Studies Program,
Georgetown University, Washington, DC.......................... 31
Prepared statement........................................... 34
Said, Yahia, director, Iraq Revenue Watch, London School of
Economics, London, England..................................... 23
Prepared statement........................................... 28
Additional Statements Submitted for the Record
Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator from Maryland, prepared
statement...................................................... 92
Webb, Hon. Jim, U.S. Senator from Virginia, prepared statement... 91
------
Thursday, January 11, 2007 (a.m.)
THE ADMINISTRATION'S PLAN FOR IRAQ
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 95
Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from California, statement..... 128
Poll published in the Military Times......................... 159
Article from the Daily Telegraph............................. 160
Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator from Maryland, statement.. 147
Casey, Hon. Robert P., Jr., U.S. Senator from Pennsylvania,
statement...................................................... 150
Coleman, Hon. Norm, U.S. Senator from Minnesota, statement....... 121
Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from Tennessee, statement......... 126
Dodd, Hon. Christopher J., U.S. Senator from Connecticut,
statement...................................................... 110
Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, statement 123
Hagel, Hon. Chuck, U.S. Senator from Nebraska, statement......... 114
Isakson, Hon. Johnny, U.S. Senator from Georgia, statement....... 146
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, statement.. 118
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 97
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey, statement... 143
Murkowski, Hon. Lisa, U.S. Senator from Alaska, statement........ 141
Nelson, Hon. Bill, U.S. Senator from Florida, statement.......... 135
Obama, Hon. Barack, U.S. Senator from Illinois, statement........ 139
Rice, Hon. Condoleezza, Secretary of State, Department of State,
Washington, DC................................................. 99
Prepared statement........................................... 102
Responses to questions submitted by Senator Biden............ 161
Responses to questions submitted by Senator Lugar............ 170
Sununu, Hon. John E., U.S. Senator from New Hampshire, statement. 131
Vitter, Hon. David, U.S. Senator from Louisiana, statement....... 148
Voinovich, Hon. George V., U.S. Senator from Ohio, statement..... 136
Webb, Hon. Jim, U.S. Senator from Virginia, statement............ 153
------
Thursday, January 11, 2007 (p.m.)
ALTERNATIVE PLANS: TROOP SURGE, PARTITION, WITHDRAWAL, OR STRENGTHEN
THE CENTER
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 175
Carpenter, Dr. Ted Galen, vice president of Defense and Foreign
Policy Studies, Cato Institute, Washington, DC................. 218
Prepared statement........................................... 221
Galbraith, Hon. Peter W., senior diplomatic fellow, Center for
Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, Washington, DC............. 177
Prepared statement........................................... 180
Kagan, Dr. Frederick W., resident scholar, American Enterprise
Institute, Washington, DC...................................... 184
Prepared statement........................................... 187
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 176
Additional Statement Submitted for the Record
Serwer, Daniel, vice president, Peace and Stability Operations,
U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, DC........................ 252
------
Wednesday, January 17, 2007
REGIONAL DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 255
Haass, Hon. Richard, president, Council on Foreign Relations, New
York, NY....................................................... 264
Prepared statement........................................... 268
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 256
Nasr, Dr. Vali R., professor of National Security Affairs, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, Ca.............................. 272
Prepared statement........................................... 276
Ross, Hon. Dennis, counselor and Ziegler distinguished fellow,
the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, DC.. 258
Prepared statement........................................... 261
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Thursday, January 18, 2007
MILITARY AND SECURITY STRATEGY
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 327
Hoar, GEN Joseph P., USMC (Ret.), former commander in chief, U.S.
Central Command, Del Mar, CA................................... 342
Prepared statement........................................... 343
Keane, GEN Jack, USA (Ret.), former Vice Chief of Staff, U.S.
Army, Washington, DC........................................... 336
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 328
McCaffrey, GEN Barry, USA (Ret.), president, BR McCaffrey
Associates LLC and adjunct professor of International Affairs,
U.S. Military Academy, Arlington, VA........................... 331
Prepared statement........................................... 334
Odom, LTG William E., USA (Ret.), senior fellow, Hudson
Institute; former Director of the National Security Agency,
Washington, DC................................................. 344
Prepared statement........................................... 348
Tuesday, January 23, 2007 (a.m.)
ALTERNATIVE PLANS CONTINUED--FEDERALISM, SIDE WITH THE MAJORITY,
STRATEGIC REDEPLOYMENT, OR NEGOTIATE?
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 401
Gelb, Hon. Leslie H., president emeritus and board senior fellow,
Council on Foreign Relations, New York, NY..................... 404
Prepared statement........................................... 406
Korb, Hon. Lawrence J., senior fellow, Center for American
Progress, Washington, DC....................................... 418
Prepared statement........................................... 421
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 402
Luttwak, Dr. Edward N., senior fellow, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Washington, DC.......................... 410
Prepared statement........................................... 413
Malley, Robert, director, Middle East and North Africa Program,
International Crisis Group, Washington, DC..................... 427
Prepared statement........................................... 431
------
Tuesday, January 23, 2007 (p.m.)
ALTERNATIVE PLANS (CONTINUED)
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 475
Gingrich, Hon. Newt, former Speaker of the U.S. House of
Representatives; senior fellow, American Enterprise Institute,
Washington, DC................................................. 483
Prepared statement........................................... 487
Murtha, Hon. John P., U.S. Congressman from Pennsylvania,
chairman, Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations,
U.S. House of Representatives.................................. 476
Prepared statement........................................... 480
------
Thursday, January 25, 2007 (a.m.)
RECONSTRUCTION STRATEGY
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 525
Jones, BG Michael D., USA, J-5 Deputy Director for Political-
Military Affairs--Middle East, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Washington, DC................................................. 537
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 528
Satterfield, Hon. David, Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State
and Coordinator for Iraq, Department of State, Washington, DC.. 530
Prepared statement........................................... 534
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
``Families of the Fallen for Change'' letter submitted by Senator
Biden.......................................................... 574
Responses of Ambassador Satterfield to Questions submitted by
Senator Webb................................................... 576
``Contributions From Other Donors'' submitted by the State
Department..................................................... 579
------
Thursday, January 25, 2007 (p.m.)
POLITICAL STRATEGY
al-Rahim, Rend, executive director, the Iraq Foundation,
Washington, DC................................................. 589
Prepared statement........................................... 594
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 587
Dodge, Dr. Toby, consulting senior fellow for the Middle East,
International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, United
Kingdom........................................................ 612
Prepared statement........................................... 615
Kubba, Dr. Laith, senior director for the Middle East and North
Africa, National Endowment for Democracy, Washington, DC....... 606
Prepared statement........................................... 609
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 588
Talabani, Qubad, Representative of the United States, Kurdistan
Regional Government, Washington, DC............................ 597
Prepared statement........................................... 602
------
Tuesday, January 30, 2007
ALTERNATIVE PLANS: THE IRAQ STUDY GROUP
Baker, Hon. James A., III, cochair, Iraq Study Group; partner,
Baker-Botts LLP, Houston, TX................................... 647
Prepared joint statement of James Baker and Lee Hamilton..... 652
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 645
Hamilton, Hon. Lee H., cochair, Iraq Study Group; director,
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington,
DC............................................................. 650
Additional Statement Submitted for the Record
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, prepared
statement...................................................... 695
------
Wednesday, January 31, 2007
IRAQ IN THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT, SESSION 1
Albright, Hon. Madeleine K., former Secretary of State;
principal, The Albright Group LLC, Washington, DC.............. 730
Prepared statement........................................... 733
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 697
Kissinger, Hon. Henry A., former Secretary of State; chairman,
Kissinger McLarty Associates, New York, NY..................... 701
Prepared statement........................................... 704
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 699
------
Thursday, February 1, 2007
IRAQ IN THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT, SESSION 2
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening
statement...................................................... 755
Prepared statement........................................... 756
Brzezinski, Dr. Zbigniew, former National Security Advisor;
counselor and trustee, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Washington, DC........................................ 777
Prepared statement........................................... 780
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 757
Scowcroft, LTG Brent, USAF (Ret.), former National Security
Advisor; president, The Scowcroft Group, Washington, DC........ 759
Prepared statement........................................... 761
------
Appendix
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Barzani, Nechirvan, Prime Minister, Kurdistan Regional Government
of Iraq, Erbil, Kurdistan-Iraq, letter from.................... 797
Morrow, Dr. Jonathan, senior legal adviser to the Ministry of
Natural Resources, Kurdistan Regional Government; former senior
adviser to the U.S. Institute of Peace, prepared statement..... 798
Shafiq, Tariq, director, Petrolog & Associates, London, UK;
chair, Fertile Crescent Oil Company, Baghdad, Iraq,
``Perspective of Iraq Draft Petroleum Law''.................... 802
WHERE WE ARE: THE CURRENT SITUATION IN IRAQ
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WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 10, 2007
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G.
Lugar, presiding.
Present: Senators Lugar, Biden, Dodd, Kerry, Feingold,
Boxer, Bill Nelson, Obama, Menendez, Cardin, Casey, Webb,
Hagel, Coleman, Corker, Sununu, Voinovich, Murkowski, Isakson,
and Vitter.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Chairman Lugar. Let me call the hearing to order. If we may
have order in the committee room.
To the committee and to all who are assembled, let me
indicate that technically the Senate has not yet acted upon the
new chairmanships, ranking members, and membership of
committees. The Senate will do so fairly promptly this week,
but our business goes on in the committee. And it's my
privilege today, as the outgoing chairman of the committee, to
introduce my friend and great Senator, Joe Biden, who will be
our chairman and will preside over today's hearing. We will
assume he is chairman, and he will act as chairman today and
tomorrow and--through a very vigorous series of hearings on
Iraq and the Middle East that we have planned.
Let me just say that one of the strengths of our committee
has been the commitment of Senator Biden and Democratic and
Republican committee members to bipartisanship, but likewise to
very, very substantial questioning of American foreign policy,
regardless of which party--which President we have served
under. I'm certain that that will continue. It's an important
aspect that the face of America be as united as possible, and
we have attempted to further that idea, I think, with some
degree of success. For example, the India Nuclear Agreement
that was just concluded celebrated a significant strategic
development for our country with an overwhelming vote in this
committee and support of Members of the House of
Representatives who shared this bipartisan ethic.
So, with that introduction, let me just indicate I'm
delighted to welcome our new members to the committee. I'm
certain the chairman will want to do that, too. But it's
especially good to welcome him to the chairmanship, and I turn
over the gavel, which I do not see at the present, Mr.
Chairman. [Laughter.]
But, nevertheless, in due course that will be forthcoming,
too. [Laughter.]
Chairman Biden. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
Chairman Biden. Folks, let me echo the comments made by the
Senator. Technically, we vote in the U.S. Congress on the
organization. I am insisting on an open vote, not a secret
ballot, if you get the meaning of that. There may very well be
a secret ballot. We may keep him as chairman. I may vote for
him. [Laughter.]
One of the things that Senator Lugar emphasized is that all
of us on this committee, under his leadership and the brief
stint before that under mine and now again under mine, is that
we understand that no foreign policy in America can be
sustained without the informed consent of the American people.
And one of the overwhelming responsibilities of this committee,
which has legislative responsibility, but quite frankly, its
role, historically, has been more in playing the role of
providing a platform upon which to inform the American people
of the options--many times, difficult options--that must be
chosen by a President of the United States in order to conduct
the foreign policy of this country.
And this morning we begin the work of the new Congress with
many new Members, including many new members on this committee.
We welcome, today, new members--Senator Cardin, Senator Casey,
Senator Corker, and Senator Webb, and we're delighted they have
joined the committee. We also welcome veteran members of the
U.S. Senate who are new to the Foreign Relations Committee--
Senator DeMint, Senator Johnny Isakson from Georgia, Senator
Bob Menendez from New Jersey, and Senator Vitter, who I don't
see here yet, but I'm sure will be coming.
You join a committee that's tried to remain a place for
sanity and civility in what has been a very partisan and
sometimes polarized Senate over the last decade. We've not
always succeeded, but, quite frankly, when we have, it's
largely been due to the efforts of Chairman Lugar. I don't want
to make this sound like a mutual admiration society, but, to
state the fact, there is no one--no one in the U.S. Senate who
knows more about foreign policy, and no one who has contributed
more to American security than Chairman Lugar.
Today, we're brought together by a question that dominates
our national debate, and it really boils down to a simple
proposition. What options remain to meet our twin goals of
bringing American forces home and leaving behind a stable Iraq?
Over the next 4 weeks, this committee will seek answers to that
question. First, we will hear from the Bush administration,
then we'll hear from experts--left, right, and center--in our
government and out of government, from across the United States
and beyond our borders. Then we'll hear from men and women with
very different ideas, but who are united in their devotion to
this country and their desire to see us through this very
difficult time.
The Bush administration, as well as important private
groups and experts, have developed varying plans on how to
proceed in Iraq. Tonight, I will sit, as will all of you, and
listen to our President, and he will have my prayers and hopes
that his plan will be one that will ease our burden and not
deepen it. But it's a unique responsibility of the U.S.
Congress, and especially and historically the Foreign Relations
Committee in the U.S. Senate, to evaluate these plans, in
public, to help our citizens understand the very difficult
choices this country faces.
That's the best way to secure, in my view, as I said
earlier, the informed consent of the American people. For
without their informed consent, whatever policy we arrive at
cannot long be sustained.
I have my own strongly held views, as the witnesses know
and my colleagues know, about what to do and how we should
proceed in Iraq. There will be plenty of time for me to talk
about them in the days ahead. But, for now, I want to set out
what Senator Lugar and I jointly hope to accomplish as we put
together this agenda for the next several weeks, and how we
hope to accomplish it.
First, let me make it clear what these hearings are not
intended to be about. They are not about an effort to revisit
the past, point fingers, or place blame on how we got to where
we are. The American people spoke very loudly this past
November. They know that we're in a significant mess in Iraq.
But instead of arguing how we got into that mess, they want us
to be proactive and be part of the solution. They expect us to
help America get out of the mess we're in, not talk about how
we got there.
We will start by receiving the most up-to-date unvarnished
analysis of the situation and trends in Iraq and in the region.
As a matter of fact, we began that inquiry yesterday. As all my
colleagues know, and many people in the audience know, we have
a ``Secret Room'' in the Senate. It's called ``S-407,'' where
we're able to have unvarnished discussions with the most
sensitive information, requiring the highest clearance. And
yesterday, all of my colleagues and I sat there for a
considerable amount of time receiving a classified briefing
from all the major intelligence agencies of the U.S.
Government.
We continue that inquiry, the inquiry of determining what
the facts are on the ground today, with the experts who will
assist us in assessing the political, security, economic, and
diplomatic realities that are on the ground today in Iraq and
in the region.
We'll begin with Dr. Phebe Marr, who has given us her
valuable time and scholarship and insight for many years in
this committee and is one of the most welcome witnesses that we
have had in both administrations, all administrations. She is a
preeminent historian of Iraq, and she will provide a historical
overview. It is our view that by illuminating the past, we're
going to be better able to understand the present, and
hopefully better prepared to deal with the present situation.
Michael O'Hanlon, of the Brookings Institution, has also
graced us with his presence in the past, and he will focus on--
I'd put it this way--focus on the numbers. How do we measure
the current situation in Iraq? The trends, in terms of
security, the economy, and public opinion.
And Mr. Said, the director of the Iraq Revenue Watch, will
speak to us on the political dynamics inside Iraq. Who are the
main players? What are their interests? And what possible
scenarios could bring them together?
And then Paul Pillar, the former national intelligence
officer for Near East and South Asia, will address the dynamics
in the region. He has, again, graced us with his presence in
the past, and has been very valuable. The issue that we will
ask him to discuss is: What do Iraq's neighbors want? And how
can they affect the outcome on the ground in Iraq, if they can
affect the outcome?
The goal today, as it was yesterday, is not to discuss
policy options, although there are no limits on what any of the
witnesses can discuss, but it's to get at the facts, as best we
know them. We want this committee and the public to have a
strong foundation upon which to evaluate the principal policy
options that are being discussed in this country today.
Starting tomorrow and over the following 3 weeks, we will turn
to those options and ask: Where do we go from here? Secretary
of State Rice has graciously indicated she is not only ready,
but anxious, to appear before our committee, which she will do
tomorrow, after President Bush announces the administration's
plans, tonight.
The authors of every other major plan for Iraq will present
their recommendations, including those who advocate escalation,
those who advocate withdrawal, partition, federalization,
siding with one side or the other, strengthening the center,
and so on. The major authors of the plans--the authors of those
major plans will come and testify over the next 3 weeks.
As we hear from them, we'll also hear from leading
military, diplomatic, economic, and political experts, and we
will ask this country's senior statesmen and stateswomen,
former National Security Advisors, former Secretaries of State,
to help us put everything we've heard in context as we conclude
what will probably be the first round of hearings on Iraq.
The ultimate question for this committee is the question
that'll be on the minds of every American as we listen to the
President of the United States tonight. Will your plan, Mr.
President, or other plans, put us on a better path in Iraq, or
will it dig us into a deeper hole with more pain, and not much
to show for it? We pray it will be the former. But together we
have a responsibility and, I believe, an opportunity to help
put this country on a better path.
So, let's begin. Let me turn this over now to Senator Lugar
for any comments that he wishes to make.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
thank you for holding this important hearing and for assembling
such an excellent panel.
I would offer a special greeting, as you have, to Dr. Phebe
Marr, who has been a tremendous resource for the committee, and
for me personally. She testified at four different Iraq
hearings during my recent chairmanship, and also appeared at a
hearing held under Senator Biden in August 2002. Dr. Marr's
calm and authoritative analysis on Iraq is grounded in a
prodigious understanding of that country and a nonpartisan
outlook that is badly needed in this debate.
Dr. Michael O'Hanlon has also provided excellent testimony
before our committee in recent years. In 2005 and 2006, I wrote
a series of 15 ``Dear Colleague'' letters to--on Iraq to all
Senators. These letters introduced reports and documents that I
found to be particularly illuminating. The Brookings
Institution Iraq Index, a report overseen by Dr. O'Hanlon,
accompanied the first letter that I sent, and it provides a
remarkably detailed view of the economic and security situation
in Iraq. The Iraq Index is updated regularly, and I continue to
recommend it to any Member of Congress or citizen who wants a
thoughtful grounding in the facts.
I also welcome Mr. Said and Dr. Pillar, who are testifying
before this committee for the first time. We are grateful to
have them as a new resource at this critical moment.
Tonight, President Bush will give a speech outlining his
intended course in Iraq. In recent days, I have had
opportunities to talk to the President about Iraq. Among other
points, I underscored the need for a thorough effort to involve
Congress in the decisionmaking process.
United States policy in Iraq would benefit greatly from
meaningful executive branch consultations with legislators, and
from careful study by Members of Congress, that's directed at
dispassionately evaluating the President's plan and other
options. Members of this committee and the entire Congress must
be prepared to make reasoned judgments about what the President
is proposing.
Initially, the President and his team need to explain what
objectives we are trying to achieve: If forces are expanded,
where and how they will be used; why such a strategy will
succeed; and how Iraqi forces will be involved; how long
additional troops may be needed; what contingencies are in
place if the situation does not improve; and how this strategy
fits into our discussion throughout the region.
The American media is understandably focused on the
possibility of a troop surge in Iraq. But whatever may be the
final conclusion on this point, relative success or failure is
likely to hinge on many other factors and decisions. The
complexity of the Iraq situation demands more of us than
partisan sound bites or preconceived judgments.
With this in mind, this hearing, setting the terms of
reference for what is happening in Iraq, is especially timely.
I look forward to the insights of our distinguished panel and
to working with Chairman Biden and all members of this
committee as we continue our inquiry in the coming weeks.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Biden. Thank you, Senator.
Let me explain to the new Members of the Senate that the
way we proceed will be to hear from all the witnesses--and I'll
announce that order in a moment--and then open it to questions,
based on our seniority here.
This is a very important topic, to say the least. And we
could probably, with some useful benefit to informing
ourselves, spend 2 days with this panel alone. But my staff
tells me, in consultation with the Republican staff, that, as a
practical matter, we're going to limit each of us, including
myself, to 8-minute rounds of questions. I realize that is, in
some sense, is not sufficient to really explore in the kind of
depth you may want to. My experience is, the witnesses are
available to you, personally, after the hearing, and on the
telephone and in their offices, and occasionally, if you ask
them, they will make themselves available in your offices if it
works with their schedule.
So, I apologize in advance that there's not going to be the
kind of exposition that--if we were doing this as a seminar at
a university, we'd be able to spend a whole lot more time. But
the dictates of time make it difficult. So, we're going to
limit it to 8-minute rounds, if I may.
But, first, let me begin. And the order in which I will ask
the witnesses to deliver their statements will be Dr. Marr, Mr.
O'Hanlon, Mr. Said, and Dr. Pillar.
Welcome, again, Phebe, and we're delighted to have you
here. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF DR. PHEBE MARR, HISTORIAN, AUTHOR OF ``THE MODERN
HISTORY OF IRAQ,'' WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Marr. Senator Biden, Senator Lugar, I want to say how
delighted I am to be back again. And I can't commend you and
the committee enough for what I think has been a remarkable job
in the continuing debate on Iraq and in informing the American
public on it. It has seemed to me to be quite a wonderful
effort, I hope will continue with good effect.
I have been asked to address the historical context of this
issue. And let me say that 2007 marks the 50th year that I've
been involved in Iraq. I've done other things besides Iraq, but
it was 1957 when I first went to Iraq. And so, I have the
benefit of some historical hindsight in having actually been on
the ground through all of the regimes, including the monarchy.
Iraq has had a very rich and varied history, but one of the
things that has struck me as I have followed it as a scholar
and personally is the discontinuity of Iraqi history. And,
indeed, we're in the middle of another such period.
Actually, I'd like to address three questions this morning.
The first is: Where is Iraq today? What are the chief political
and social elements we face in Iraq? Second: How can we account
for this situation? To what extent is it historical? And, last:
Is this current situation likely to be lasting? Is it
transient? Is it remediable?
Iraq, since 2003, has undergone not one, but several,
revolutionary and radical changes of a proportion not seen
since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the formation of
the state in the 1920s. And I think the degree and nature of
these changes need to be recognized.
First has been a radical change in leadership. It's not
simply that Iraqi leadership and its dictatorship have been
decapitated, now physically, as well as literally, but that an
entirely new leadership group has come to power. The ethnic and
sectarian composition of that leadership has changed. Shia and
Kurds have replaced Arab Sunnis as the dominant group. And its
ideological orientation has also changed, from one that was
secular, nationalist, and devoted to a unitary Iraqi State to
one with differing visions of where Iraq should go. Overall the
leadership has a view that is far more dominated by religion
than it has been at any time in Iraq's history.
Since the nature and character of this leadership is
critical to our endeavor, I'd like to just take a few minutes
to indicate a few characteristics of these leaders worth
noting. They result from a study that I've been engaged in at
the United States Institute of Peace for the last couple of
years. I've attached a couple of charts to my written
testimony, and I think there's a special report coming out on
the Internet very shortly. But there are three characteristics
I'd like to call to your attention. One is inexperience and
discontinuity in leadership over the past 4 years. Some 75
percent of the current leaders hold national positions for the
first time. This makes for a very steep learning curve in
governance. Second is the divide between the leaders with roots
in the exile community, together with Kurds who have been
living in the north, separate from the rest of Iraq, and those
leaders who remained living inside Iraq under Saddam's rule.
These groups have different narratives of the past and visions
for the future. And third, and most important, the key leaders
today have been shaped by decades of opposition to the former
regime. Many spent years in underground movements or imprisoned
by Saddam, and lost family members to the Baath. Few insiders,
including professionals who simply worked under the Baath
regime, have made it into the leadership. The suspicion,
distrust, and hostility between these two groups is the core
dynamic driving much of the politics in Iraq today, making
reconciliation difficult.
A second fundamental change has been the destruction of
governmental institutions, the bureaucracy and the army, about
which much has been said. The institutions underpinned not just
the Baath regime, but Iraq's Government since its founding in
the 1920s. Both of these institutions were established under
the British, under the mandate, but had their origins in the
Ottoman period. Despite ups and downs and periods of
instability in modern Iraq, these two institutions remained the
backbone of the state until 2003. The collapse of much of
Iraq's bureaucratic and military structure have left a void
that, in my view, will take years, if not decades, to fill and
has left an enormous political, social, and institutional
vacuum. This vacuum is now filled, in part, by militias and a
new mix of parties and factions.
A third radical change is underway as a result of these
events: The collapse of the state as the Iraqis have known it
since its creation under international mandate in 1920. Iraq is
now a failing, if not yet a failed state, with a new central
government that has difficulty cohering and whose reach does
not extend much beyond the perimeters of the Green Zone. The
establishment of a government that delivers services to the
population--chief among them, security--is recognized as the
chief task before Iraqis and its foreign supporters. However
this issue of governance is resolved, the form of the Iraqi
State is likely to change fundamentally. How governance will be
reconstituted, power distributed in the future, is a big
question. But Iraq is not likely to be a unified state
dominated by a strong central government in Baghdad, at least
for some time.
A fourth revolutionary change has been the seemingly
radical shift in identity on the part of the population, which,
in extreme form, has led to this vicious sectarian war in
Baghdad and its environs, and to serious demographic shifts,
and an effort, not yet successful, to make this communal
identity territorial.
Many have seen these identities--Kurdish, Shia, Sunni,
Turkmen, et cetera--as longstanding, even primordial, a bedrock
of Iraqi society. But I think this is a misreading of Iraq's
much more complex and interesting history. The intensity of
these sectarian and ethnic divisions are more the result of a
collapsing order, a vicious incitement of civil war by al-
Qaeda, and political manipulation by politicians desirous of
getting power. They were also exacerbated by an overweening
central government and increasing persecution of the opposition
by Saddam's dictatorship. However, the events of the past year
have solidified emerging communal identities to an extent not
known before in Iraq. And only time will tell whether they can
be mitigated. This is likely to take enormous effort by Iraqis
and by us.
And, last, another profound change is becoming apparent:
The collapse of one of the Arab world's major cities--Baghdad.
Baghdad has played a major role in Iraqi history, not just
since the 1920s, but since its founding in the eighth century.
Iraq, with its two rivers and complex irrigation system, as
well as geographic openness to invasion from foreign territory,
has seldom flourished unless it has had a relatively strong
central government to harness its water resources and protect
its population.
When Baghdad has declined or been destroyed, as it twice
was by the Mongols, Iraq has fallen into long periods of decay.
But one must remember that, ultimately, that city and
Mesopotamia, now Iraq, have always revived.
Greater Baghdad now contains a quarter to a third of Iraq's
population and its highest concentration of skills and
infrastructure. Baghdad, as a city, is not lost, but its
revival and the return of its middle class are essential to
overcoming ethnic and sectarian divisions and the restoration
of a functioning government.
One last thought on the current situation, and this may
overlap a little with my colleague. Major ethnic and sectarian
blocs are already fragmenting into smaller units based on
personal interests, desire for power, differing visions and
constituencies. It's these smaller units, and the leadership of
the larger, better organized and financed parties, also
intermixed with militias, that will be making the decisions on
Iraq's direction. It seems to me that one way out of the
conundrum of communal-identity politics is to encourage
political alliances between these various groups on issues and
interests, such as oil legislation, commercial legislation,
regulation of water resources, economic development, and other
issues. This is a slow, laborious process, but it's probably
the only way in which some of the distrust and hostility
between the leaders and groups can be broken down and a new
political dynamic shaped.
Let me finish up by asking: Given this situation, what
prognosis may be made? I feel Iraq faces three potential
futures in the near and midterm, and it's still too early to
tell which will dominate. Given the grievous mistakes made on
all sides, this process is going to be very costly and time
consuming, and no one should expect a clear outcome in the next
2 years, probably even in the next decade. But helping to shape
the long-term future of Iraq in one direction or the other will
have a profound effect on the region and, I believe, on our own
security.
The first outcome is that Iraq will break up, as I'm
calling it, into its three main ethnic and sectarian
components--Kurdish, Arab Sunni, and Arab Shia--hastened by
ethnic and sectarian conflicts spiraling out of control. Unless
this division is shepherded and fostered by outside forces,
however, I think this outcome is unlikely, on its own. This
division is not historical, but has come to the fore in a
moment of history characterized by political vacuum and chaos,
as I've indicated. Such a division will pose real difficulties
in Iraq and is radical in its implications for a region in
which peace depends on tolerance and coexistence, not just
within Islam, but among ethnic and national groups. While this
breakup may happen, in my view it should not be encouraged or
brokered by the United States, especially if we want to
disengage our forces from the country. It will create more, not
less, instability in the future.
The second outcome is that Iraq may break down, a process
that is well underway. Rather than cohesive ethnic and
sectarian entities, the Iraqi polity will disintegrate into
smaller units. These will comprise political parties and
movements, militias, local tribal leaders, already mentioned.
In reality, this is the Iraq that is emerging, with different
local forces competing in an effort to establish control in
various areas of the country. This scenario, a full-blown
failed state, would cause serious problems for the region and
the United States. Indeed, I feel that the failed-state
syndrome may be spreading throughout the region, as events in
Lebanon and Palestine indicate. We may be seeing the breakdown
of the state system established in the region by the British
and French after World War I.
A third outcome would be to slow and gradually arrest the
decline, and for Iraq to gradually reconstitute a government
that recognizes the new identities that have emerged, but
learns to accommodate them in some new framework that allows
for economic and social development. It'll be easy to rebuild
this framework, I believe, if Iraqis do not divide
indefatigably on ethnic and sectarian lines, but, rather, work
within various groups and parties that are gradually
participating in the political system to achieve mutual
interest. Even if such a government does not control much
territory out of Baghdad or the Green Zone, it's better to keep
it intact as a symbol and a framework, toward which future
generations can work, than to destroy it and try once again to
establish another new and entirely radical framework.
Iraq is very far from achieving a new government that
works, and the collapse we are witnessing is likely to get
worse before it gets better. Only when the participants in Iraq
recognize, in this struggle for power, that they are losing
more than they can gain by continuing it, will it come to an
end. That may be a long time.
In the meantime, the best we can probably do is to help
staunch the violence, contain the struggle within Iraq's
borders, and keep alive the possibility that after extremism
has run its course, the potential for a different Iraq is still
there.
Others in the region should be encouraged to do the same, a
task which should be built on the fact that no state in the
region, or its leadership, wants to see the collapse of the
current state system, no matter how much in need of reform
their domestic governments may be.
Thank you for your time.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Marr follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Phebe Marr, Historian, Author of ``The Modern
History of Iraq,'' Washington, DC
I will be focusing almost entirely on Iraq's domestic politics, my
area of expertise, and hopefully bringing a little historical
perspective to bear, since I have been working on Iraq for some 50
years now. I would like to address three questions today. First, where
is Iraq today? What are the chief political and social characteristics
we face? Second, how can we account for this situation? And lastly, is
the current situation likely to be lasting? Or is it transient? Is it
remediable?
First, what can be said about the situation in Iraq today? Iraq
since 2003 has undergone not one but several revolutionary changes, of
a proportion not seen since the collapse of Ottoman Empire and the
formation of the new Iraqi state in the 1920s. The first has been a
revolutionary change in leadership. It is not simply that a regime and
its dictatorial head have been--not only figuratively but now
literally--decapitated, but an entirely new leadership group has come
to power. This leadership, brought to power essentially by elections in
2005, has now entirely reversed several of the characteristics of the
old Baath regime, and even the transitional regimes that replaced it in
2003 and 2004. It has changed the ethnic and sectarian composition of
the leadership. (It is now dominated by Shia and Kurds rather than Arab
Sunnis.) It has changed the ideological orientation from one which was
secular and nationalist, devoted to a unitary Iraqi state, to one with
different visions but far more dominated by religion. At the same time,
it has brought more women into power and in general is better educated.
The new leaders come, more often, from urban origin, whereas Saddam's
clique were more rural and small town born. But the change has also now
brought new men and women into power. They have three distinct
characteristics worth noting.
First is their inexperience and the discontinuity in their
leadership. Some 76 percent in this Cabinet and Presidency hold such
jobs for the first time. This has meant a lack of experience, a steep
learning curve, and an inability to establish links with one another
and with constituencies. Most have had little chance to gain experience
because of the continual change of Cabinets.
Second, the change has also brought a divide between a group of
leaders with roots in exile who have lived outside of Iraq and Kurds
who have been living in the north separate from the rest of Iraq on the
one hand, and those who remained inside living under Saddam on the
other. The latter include key elements now in opposition, such as the
Baath, as well as the younger generation and the dispossessed who
follow Muqtada al-Sadr. Some 28 percent are outsiders, now mainly from
Middle Eastern rather than Western countries; some 15 percent are
Kurds; only 26 percent are insiders.
Third, and most important, is the fact that the key leaders in
power today have all been shaped by years, even decades, of opposition
to the former regime. The heads of the Kurdish parties and the Shia
religio-political parties, such as SCIRI and Dawa, spent years in
underground movements; were imprisoned by Saddam; lost family members
to the Baath; and even fought the long Iran-Iraq war against the regime
from the Iranian side. Some 43 percent of the current leaders were
active in opposition politics. Since 2003, few ``insiders''--especially
those in any way affiliated with the Baath regime, such as
professionals who worked in education or health, Sunni or Shia--have
made it into the leadership. While many of this group are encompassed
by the insurgency, or support it passively, others in this group would
like to join the political process but are excluded. The suspicion,
distrust, and hostility between these two groups is the core dynamic
driving much of the politics in Iraq today, which makes a
reconciliation process so difficult to achieve.
In conjunction with this leadership change has gone another
fundamental upheaval: The erosion and destruction of the governmental
institutions--the bureaucracy and the army--which underpinned not just
the Baath regime but Iraq's Government since its founding in the 1920s.
Both of these institutions were established by the British under the
mandate, although both had their origins in the Ottoman period. Despite
ups and downs and periods of instability, these two institutions
remained the backbone of the state until 2003. Much has been made of
the destruction (or collapse) of these institutions elsewhere, and I
will not dwell on it here, but the profound impact this has had on the
current situation in Iraq must be appreciated. The disbanding of all of
Iraq's military and security forces, the removal of the Baath Party
apparatus that ran the bureaucracy and the education establishment (de-
Baathification), and, as a result, the collapse of much of Iraq's
bureaucratic structure, have left a void that will takes years--if not
decades to fill. While much of this structure--especially at the top--
needed to be removed, and a good bit of the rest had been hollowed out
and corrupted under Saddam's rule, the sudden and precipitous collapse
of this governmental underpinning and the removal of much of the
educated class that ran it have created an enormous political, social,
and institutional vacuum. This vacuum is now filled in part by militias
and a mix of new and often inexperienced political parties and
factions.
As result of these events, a second radical change is underway in
Iraq: The collapse of the state as Iraqis have known it since its
formal creation under international mandate in 1920. Iraq is now a
failing--if not yet a failed--state with a new central government that
has difficulty cohering and whose reach does not extend much beyond the
perimeters of the Green Zone in Baghdad and which does not, clearly,
command a monopoly over the official use of force. Indeed, outside of
the three Kurdish-run provinces, there is little provincial or local
government yet either. The establishment of government that delivers
services to the population, chief among them security, is now
recognized as the chief task before Iraqis and its foreign supporters.
However, before that is accomplished, the form of the Iraqi state
is likely to change fundamentally. For 35 years under the Baath, Iraq
was a unitary state which was part of the Arab world. Now it is one in
which ethnic and sectarian identities predominate and new and different
subnational groups, including militias, are emerging. The constitution,
drafted and passed in a referendum last year, provides for a radical
devolution of authority to federal regions, an issue on which many
Iraqis are divided and which may or may not come to complete fruition.
How governance will be reconstituted and power distributed in the new
entity that emerges from the current confusion is a large question, but
Iraq is not likely to be a unified state dominated by a strong central
government in Baghdad, at least for some time. In fact, a high degree
of decentralization--or even an absence of formal government in many
areas--may characterize Iraq for some time. The increasing fractures in
the body politic have, of course, raised the question of whether the
Iraqi state can--or even should--continue to exist, or whether it will
be divided into ethnic and sectarian or perhaps subnational components.
Should that happen, the results would be revolutionary indeed, not only
for Iraq but for the entire surrounding region, with implications
likely to reverberate for decades.
There have been other changes in Iraq that are almost as
revolutionary as these changes in leadership and the transformation of
the state. One has been the seeming change in identity on the part of
the population, which, in its recent extreme form has led to a vicious
sectarian war in Baghdad and its environs. This changing identity has
now led to more serious demographic shifts and an effort--not yet
successful--to make this communal identity ``territorial'' by carving
out more purely ethnic or sectarian areas. While the development of a
semi-independent Kurdish entity in the north has been taking shape for
over a decade under the aegis of the Kurdish nationalist parties,
carving out distinct Shia and Sunni areas--even emphasizing Shia and
Sunni identity as the fundamental basis of political loyalty--is new.
Many have seen these identities (Kurdish, Shia, Sunni, Turkman,
Christian, etc.) as longstanding, even primordial, a bedrock of Iraqi
society that has long been submerged, manipulated, or repressed by
foreign (British) or dictatorial (the Baath and Saddam Hussein) rule,
and have now come to the fore as a natural expression by the population
of their political aspirations. I recognize how compelling and
attractive that view is for people looking for an understandable
explanation of what is happening today, but I personally think it is a
misreading of Iraq's much more complex and interesting history. One
should be wary of reading back into the past what is happening today
and of assuming it is the necessary foundation of the future. These
intense sectarian divisions in Baghdad, where mixed marriages were
common, is new and is partly the result of collapsing order, a vicious
incitement of civil war by al-Qaeda, political manipulation by
politicians desirous of getting a Shia majority, and is now driven by
just plain fear and intimidation.
This is not to say that these ethnic and sectarian differences and
identities are themselves new; they go back centuries, but their
strength and their exclusivity have varied greatly over time. Ethnic
and sectarian identity in Iraq has always had to compete with far
stronger tribal, clan, and family ties. As Iraq modernized and joined
the international community in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, a middle
class espoused political ideologies imported from outside
(Nationalism--Iraqi, Arab and Kurdish--as well as Socialism and
Communism) and for years--right through the 1970s when Saddam stamped
them out they were the chief motivating factors of the emerging middle
class. In recent decades, Islamic visions competed with them, often
cutting across ethnic and sectarian lines.
An overweening central government and increasing persecution of the
opposition and repression by Saddam's growing dictatorship in Baghdad
are better explanations for these emerging identities. If Iraq and the
Baghdad government had been more attractive, open, and promising, it is
questionable whether these more exclusive and separatist identities
would have taken root. Kurdish nationalism has always been espoused by
the two Kurdish parties and their leaders (the KDP and the PUK), but
they did not dominate the north--tribal leaders on the payroll of
Saddam's government did--until Saddam's war with Iran and his
subsequent attack on Kuwait so weakened his government that he could no
longer control the north. Much the same could be said for the Shia-
Sunni divide, which he clearly exacerbated by relying on his tribal
Sunni relatives from Tikrit and then killing and repressing Shia when
they rose up in 1991.
Even so, these sectarian identities have never been exclusive nor,
until recently, expressed territorially. It was the power vacuum, and
the innovation of elections on a body politic still unaccustomed to a
peaceful competition for power, that provided the opportunity for
leaders to mobilize a constituency along these lines. Despite this, the
Shia bloc is politically divided. Sunnis, who have identified more with
the state they have dominated in the past, are only now coming to grips
with the idea of a ``Sunni'' rather than an Iraqi or Arab identity,
largely out of fear they will be marginalized or exterminated. The
events of the last year have solidified emerging communal identities to
an extent not known before in Iraq; only time will tell whether they
can be mitigated and overcome in the future. And this is likely to take
enormous effort by Iraqis as well as by us.
Last, a fourth profound change is becoming apparent: The collapse
of one of the Arab world's major cities, Baghdad. Baghdad has played a
major role in Iraqi and Islamic history not just since 1920s, but since
its founding in 762. It can be said that Iraq, with its two rivers and
its complex irrigation system, as well as its geographic openness to
invasion from foreign territory, has never flourished unless it had a
relatively strong central government to harness its water resources and
protect its population. Baghdad is the city that has provided that
function. Its high point came in the 10th century when it was a center
of learning and trade and integrated population and ideas from all over
the known world. When Baghdad has declined or been destroyed (as it
was, twice, by the Mongols in 1258 and 1402), Iraqi cohesion has ceased
to exist and it has fallen into long periods of decay. But one must
remember that, ultimately, the city--and Mesopotamia--always revived.
Today, the capital is in a serious state of erosion--from
insurgency, sectarian warfare, and population displacement and
emigration. Indeed, much of this decline predates our invasion. Since
floods were controlled in the mid-1950s, Baghdad has been inundated
with migrants from rural areas in the north and south, who created
satellite cities--urban villages--which changed the ethnic composition
of the city and diluted its urban core. The growth of Baghdad,
especially in the 1970s and 1980s, drained other areas of population.
Greater Baghdad contains between a quarter and a third of Iraq's
population and its highest concentration of skills and infrastructure.
However, even under Saddam, Baghdad began to lose its skilled middle
class, which is now beginning to hemorrhage.
This strand of Iraq's population, its educated middle class, must
be revived if the country is to get back on its feet. It is this class
which has, for the most part, submerged its ethnic, sectarian, and
tribal identity in broader visions and aspirations--political, social,
and cultural--and has greater contact with and affinity for the outside
world. Intermarriage among sects and even ethnic groups was
increasingly common in this middle class, which staffed the
bureaucracy, the educational establishments, and the top echelons of
the military. Unfortunately, under the long decades of Baath rule, this
class was ``Baathized'' to a degree, in order to survive, and has now
found itself disadvantaged, and under current sectarian warfare,
persecuted. And it is this class in Baghdad that is now fleeing in
droves, not just for other places in Iraq, but outside to Jordan,
Syria, the gulf, and Europe. While educated middle classes exist in
other Iraqi cities--Mosul, Basra, Kirkuk, Irbil--they are much smaller,
less cosmopolitan, and, now, far less mixed. They will not be able to
function as the kind of mixing bowl necessary to create interactions
between and among different groups, so essential in the modern world.
Baghdad as a city is by no means lost, but its revival (in more
modest dimensions) and the return of its ``mixed'' middle class are
essential to overcoming ethnic and sectarian divisions and to the
revival of a functioning, nonsectarian government, all of which is
critical to any decent future outcome in Iraq. However decentralized
Iraq may become in its future iteration, none of its parts will be able
to achieve their aspirations without Baghdad. And the weaker the
central government is, the weaker the economic and social revival will
be.
One last thought on the current situation. Before we give up and
hasten to assume that ethnic and sectarian identity will be the basis
of new state arrangements (either inside a weak Iraqi state or in
independent entities), there is one other political dynamic emerging
that bears notice. The major ethnic and sectarian blocs (the Kurds, the
Sunnis, and the Shia) are already fragmenting into smaller units based
on personal interests, a desire for power, and differing visions and
constituencies. None of the larger ethnic and sectarian units on which
a new regionalized state is proposed are homogeneous. These smaller
units have been galvanized by the three elections of 2005, and have
formed political parties and blocs. These blocs are themselves composed
of smaller parties and groups often now supported by militias. While
the militias have gotten most of the attention, the parties have not.
It is the leadership of the larger, better organized and financed
parties that now control the situation in Baghdad. More attention needs
to be paid to them and to their leadership, since they will be making
the decisions on Iraq's direction.
The most important of these parties are clear. In the north, the
Kurds are divided between two principal political parties: The KDP and
the PUK. Both parties are of longstanding, each with its own separate
military forces and political party hierarchies. Both are led by men
with monumental ambitions and egos. These leaders and parties, now
cooperating in a common constitutional venture, the Kurdish Regional
Government (KRG), have fought for decades in the past and are still not
wholly integrated into a Kurdish government. They could split in the
future. Kurdish society also has an emerging Islamic movement (the
Kurdish Islamic Union is a good example); separate tribal groups with
some stature; and ethnic and sectarian minorities (Turkmen, Christians)
with distinct identities and outside supporters.
In the face of a disintegrating Iraqi state and the chaos and
danger in Iraq, the Kurds have pulled together since 2003 in
confronting the Arab part of Iraq and are increasingly separating
themselves from Baghdad. However, the KRG in the north is not self-
sustaining economically, politically, or militarily, nor can it be for
many decades, and even as it moves in that direction, it faces the
long-term affliction of isolation, provincialism, and hostility from
its neighbors that could thwart its domestic development. Failure in
this experiment or a complete collapse of Baghdad could again fracture
the north and give rise to warlordism and tribal politics, as it did in
the mid-1990s. Kurds need to be given encouragement not only to nurture
their successful experiment in the north, but also to spread it to the
south and to cooperate in reviving Iraq rather than moving in a
direction of separatism.
In the Shia bloc, the UIA, there is even less unanimity. Several
political parties or movements dominate this sector and only pull
together under the increasingly weaker leadership of Aytollah Sistani,
who wants to keep a ``Shia majority'' in Iraq. Whether he can continue
to do so under the pressure of events is a large question. The major
Shia parties are clearly SCIRI, under the cleric and politician Abdual
Aziz al-Hakim, and the Sadrist movement under Muqtada al-Sadr, also a
minor cleric. The Dawa Party of Prime Minister Maliki is a weak third.
SCIRI, formed in 1982 in Iran from Iraqis exiled there, was
originally an umbrella group but has now become a party devoted to
Hakim and the furtherance of Shia interests. It has been heavily
financed and organized by Iran, and its militia, originally the Badr
Brigade (now the Badr organization), was originally trained and
officered by Iran. It has allegedly disarmed. It attracts educated
middle-class Shia, who probably see it as the best avenue to power in a
new Shia-dominated Iraq, but its leadership is distinctly clerical and
has ties to Iran. SCIRI's leanings toward clerical rule are drawbacks
in Iraq, especially for Arab Sunnis and Kurds.
Dawa has legitimacy as the founder of the Shia Islamic movement in
Iraq in the late 1950s, but it was virtually emasculated by Saddam in
the late 1970s and 1980s. Most of its leaders fled to Iran, Syria,
Lebanon, and Europe where they remained in exile for decades. Their
organization is weak and they have no militia to speak of.
The Sadrist movement is not an organized party. Its closest model
would be Hezbollah in Lebanon, and its leader, Muqtada, is erratic,
militant, and sometimes dangerous. He has few religious or educational
credentials, but he draws on his father's name and legacy. (His father,
the chief Ayatollah in Iraq, was killed by Saddam in 1999). More
important, he has attracted a wide following among poor, the
downtrodden and youth, who have not benefited from the changes in 2003.
He has emphasized opposition to the occupation, Iraqi unity, and the
fact that he and his followers are ``insiders,'' not exiles. His
militia, now seen by many in the United States as a major threat to the
new government, is fractured and localized, often under the command of
street toughs, and it is not clear the extent to which he can himself
command all of them. A smaller Shia group, al-Fadhila, also an offshoot
of the conservative Shia movement founded by Muqtada's father,
Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, bears watching; it has influence in
Basra.
These various Shia groups and their leaders are in competition for
power and have been for decades (especially the Sadrists and Hakims),
and it is not clear that unity can be kept between them. They also draw
on different constituencies and have somewhat different visions for the
future of Iraq. SCIRI, for example, espouses a Shia region in the
south; Sadr is more in favor of a unified Iraq. Dawa sits somewhere in
the middle.
The Sunni component of the spectrum is the most fragmented. The
Sunni contingent which has been taken into the Cabinet and controls 16
percent of seats in Parliament (Iraqi Accordance Front or Tawafuq) is
itself composed of several parties without much cohesion. Most
important is the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), a party going back to the
1960s and roughly modeled after the Muslim Brotherhood. While it
represents Sunnis, it is more nationalist than Sunni, and does have a
history and some organization. The second component, known as Ahl al-
Iraq (People of Iraq), is a mixture of secularists, tribal, and
religious dignitaries, such as Adnan Dulaimi. As its name suggests, it
has a nationalist focus. The third component, the National Dialogue
Council, is relatively insignificant. Even if these groups come hand
together on issues, it is not clear how much of the Sunni constituency
they represent. The Iraqi Dialogue Front, under Salah Mutlaq, a former
Baathist, who probably represents some of the ex-Baath constituency,
got 4 percent of the votes and sits in Parliament but not the Cabinet.
Whether these two groups can be said to represent ``Sunnis''--and how
many--is at issue, since much of the Sunni insurgency is still out of
power and presumed to consist in large part of former Baathists,
religious jihadis, and now indigenous Iraqi al-Qaeda elements. Bringing
some of these non-Qaida elements into the process is essential, but
expecting the Sunni community to stick together as Sunnis or to think
and feel as Sunnis is premature. Many Sunnis, long associated with the
state and its formation, think along nationalist lines, and have
ambitions beyond a mere Sunni region.
And one should not forget, entirely, the remnants of the main
secular bloc to run in the December 2005 election: The Iraqiya list,
headed by Ayyad Allawi. This group constitutes the bulk of the educated
Iraqis who think in national, rather than communal or ethnic terms.
Although they only got 9 percent of the vote and have little chance of
forming a government, they have positions in the Cabinet and could help
in contributing to a more balanced, nonsectarian government in the
future.
One way out of the conundrum of communal identity politics is to
encourage new political alliances between individuals and groups on
issues and interests, rather than alliances based on identity. This
will be very difficult, especially for the Shia, who see their identity
as a ticket to majority rule, but it can be done, and, to a certain
extent, already is being done. On issues such as oil legislation,
regulation of water resources, economic development, and some other
issues--even that of federalism and keeping Iraq together--voting blocs
can be created across ethnic and sectarian lines, in ways that benefit
all communities. This is a slow, laborious process, but it is probably
the only way in which some of the distrust and hostility between these
leaders can be broken down and new political dynamics shaped.
To the extent that educated professionals can be brought into
government to help shape these deals and bridge the gap, that will
help. Ultimately, state organizations and institutions can be rebuilt
under new management. While no new grand vision is likely to emerge any
time soon from this process, pragmatism may take root, and with it the
bones of a government which delivers services. If this happens, larger
groups of Iraqis will give their new government some loyalty. It is the
state--and effective governance--which needs, gradually, to be put back
into the equation, to enable ethnic and sectarian loyalties to be
damped down and to curb the insurgency. In this process, no two factors
are more important than reviving economic development (not just oil
revenues) and bringing back an educated middle class which has some
degree of contact with and understanding of the outside world beyond
the exclusive domain of tribe, family, sect and ethnic group.
Given this situation, what prognosis may be made? Is the current
situation likely to last? Or is it a transient stage? What is a likely
long-term outcome and what would be ``best'' for Iraqis, the region,
and the United States?
Iraq faces three potential futures in the near and midterm, and it
is still too early to tell which will dominate. All that one can say,
thanks to grievous mistakes made on all sides, is that the process is
going to be very costly and time-consuming; no one should expect any
clear outcome in the next 2 years and probably not even in the next
decade. But helping to shape that long-term future in one direction or
the other will have a profound effect on the region and, I believe, our
own security.
The first outcome is that Iraq will ``break up'' into three main
ethnic and sectarian components--Kurdish, Arab Sunni, and Arab Shia--
hastened by the ethnic and sectarian conflicts spiraling out of
control, and already indicated in the constitution. Many see this as
inevitable and (in the West) as a possible way to ``fix'' the Iraqi
situation and hence to reduce our deep military involvement. Iraq may
end up with such a division, but, unless it is shepherded and fostered
by outside forces, it is unlikely, for several reasons. This division
is not historical, but has come to the fore in a moment of history
characterized by a political vacuum, chaos, and shrewd political
leaders who have mobilized constituents on this basis--especially the
two Kurdish parties and SCIRI. But such a clear-cut division has real
difficulties in Iraq. One is that it does not correspond to reality.
Even in the Kurdish area--where there is more substance to the claim,
this identity is fostered by two leaders and two parties who have near
total control over their opponents and region. But these parties have
no clear borders recognized by neighbors, or by Arabs to the south, and
they will be challenged by all. And they do not have the economic
wherewithal for maintenance of a sustainable state, either in terms of
economic investment (some 70 percent of their income still comes from
the central government in Baghdad), ability to defend their borders, or
recognition. Independence, as many of their leaders recognize, may come
with a big economic price tag that their constituents may not
ultimately be willing to pay.
Elsewhere in Iraq, there is insufficient sectarian homogeneity to
form the basis of a state or even a region. Shia parties themselves
disagree profoundly on whether a federal state in the south--under Shia
religious control--should be established. SCIRI is forwarding this
project because it wants to control this territory, eclipse Sadrists,
and impose its vision on the Shia population. It is opposed by Sadrists
and other more secular Shia, and they will contest the issue, if not in
Parliament, on the street. Creation of such a Shia entity will pose
questions of its boundaries--and we already see sectarian strife in
Baghdad as a component of the struggle over who will control portions
of the city. This is also a new political principle and dynamic likely
to spread to neighboring states like Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, which
have a mix of Shia and Sunni populations, with immensely destabilizing
prospects. And it is an exclusivist principle. What kind of state will
it be? The leadership of SCIRI, with its strong clerical leadership,
its earlier reliance on its own militia, and its emphasis on a ``Shia''
majority, does not give confidence that it will be any more democratic
than its parent model in Iran. Moreover, getting a stable, recognized,
``Shia'' government in this region will be a long and contentious
proposition providing little stability in the south. If the Kurds are
unable to defend their borders themselves, how will the Shia be able to
do so?
But it is in Arab Sunni areas--with Anbar at its heart--that this
project fails abysmally. First, Arab Sunni Iraqis, whether the more
rural variety inhabiting towns and cities along the Euphrates and
Tigris, or their more sophisticated cousins--urban cousins--in Baghdad
and Mosul, have been nurtured for decades on Arabism and on loyalty to
an Iraqi state, which they helped create since 1920. True, some are
more religiously oriented than secular, but this does not detract from
their sense of nationalism. Getting Iraqi Sunnis to identify as Sunnis
is going to be a long and very difficult task, let alone getting them
to concentrate on governing a truncated ``Sunni'' federal area. And
they are surrounded by neighboring Arab countries with leaders and
populations who agree with them. And, as in the case with the Shia,
where will the borders of this entity be? How much of Baghdad will it
include? Will it divide the city of Mosul with Kurds along the Tigris
River? And what about Diyala province with its Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish
and Turkman populations? How is that to be divided up? While sectarian
cleansing in these areas is underway to an alarming degree, it is by no
means complete and in no way desirable. The results are not going to be
a homogenous Sunni area but a patchwork quilt. Moreover, unless the
sting of the Sunni insurgency is drawn, any map of Iraq shows that the
Arab Sunnis population control strategic portions of Iraqi territory--
which they can use, as they have been doing--to prevent both Kurdish
and Shia progress. Included in this territory are water resources--both
the Tigris and Euprhates; access to neighboring Arab countries, and
communications right across the center of the country, as well as
Iraq's ability to export oil through pipelines.
In the end, the creation of new entities--even regions--based on
Shia and Sunni identity is radical in its implications for a region in
which peace depends on tolerance and coexistence between Islam's two
major sects. I will not mention here the obvious implications for the
geostrategic position of Iran and its role in the region or the equally
obvious reactions from other Sunni-dominated states. While this breakup
may happen, it should not be encouraged or brokered by the United
States, especially if we want, ultimately, to disengage our forces from
the country. I believe it will create more, not less, instability in
the future.
A second outcome is that Iraq may ``break down,'' a process that is
also well underway. Rather than cohesive ethnic and sectarian entities,
Iraqi society will disintegrate into smaller units. These will comprise
the political parties and movements we already see, with their various
leaders and organizations; different militias; local tribal leaders and
warlords, criminal organizations that can control access to resources;
and, in urban areas, a combination of local groups and educated leaders
who command the necessary skills to run things. Some of these groups
and organizations may overlap--especially parties and their militias--
and they will function through some fig leaf of government. But the
territory over which they rule will vary and possibly shift as will
their command over Iraq's resources. This breakdown is almost wholly a
function of a collapse of the central government in Baghdad. The
process of building an alternative regional government in the wake of
this collapse is furthest advanced in the three Kurdish provinces in
the north, but it is not complete there by any means.
In reality, this is the Iraq that is emerging, with differing local
forces competing and engaging with one another in an effort to
reestablish control and primacy in various areas of the country. In
some cases these struggles are violent. But none of these local
warlords, militias, parties, or provincial governments--even if they
can keep a modicum of order in their territory--can achieve the kind of
economic development, security, contacts with the outside world, and
promise of a modern life and a future to which most Iraqis aspire. In
the meantime, organized criminal elements--and a myriad of
freebooters--are increasingly stealing Iraq's patrimony, while its oil
wells and other resources go further into decline. And in some areas,
such as Baghdad, the absence of government has led to a Hobbesian
nightmare of insecurity, violence, and the most vicious personal
attacks on human beings seen anywhere in the modern world. Iraq could
descend further into breakdown, as local warlords, militias, criminal
elements, and others assert control. This scenario--a full blown
``failed state''--is already causing problems for the region and for
the United States. Indeed, the failed state syndrome may be spreading,
as events in Lebanon this summer and now in Palestine indicate.
Needless to say, it is precisely the failed state syndrome that
produces the best opportunity for al-Qaeda and other jihadists opposed
to United States and Western interests to nest in the region.
A third outcome is to slow and gradually arrest the decline, and
for Iraq to gradually reconstitute an Iraqi Government that recognizes
the new divisions which have emerged, but learns to accommodate them
and overcome them in some new framework that allows for economic and
social development. No society can exist without governance, and that
is the root of Iraq's problems today. It will be easier to rebuild this
framework, I believe, if Iraqis do not divide, indefatigably, on ethnic
and sectarian lines, but rather work with the various groups and
parties that are gradually participating in the new political system to
achieve mutual interests. This does not preclude the emergence of new
parties, but none are on the horizon now. Such accommodations will
exclude extremes, such as al-Qaeda, and possibly some--though not all--
Sadrist elements, and it must include many of the Sunnis--ex-Baathists
and others--who are not yet in the government. This aim can be advanced
by pushing leaders in Baghdad to cut deals and make agreements on
issues on which they have mutual interests--across the ethnic and
sectarian divide. It is also essential to expand areas of economic
development; government services (especially security) and to bring
back the middle class and put them in positions of administrative and
military authority. Regardless of who is running politics, an infusion
of educated, experienced technocrats will help moderate the process and
push it toward the middle. Over time, new links and understandings may
become institutionalized and a government in Baghdad gradually take
shape. Even if this government does not control much territory outside
of Baghdad or the Green Zone, it is better to keep it intact as a
symbol and a framework toward which a future generation can work, than
to destroy it and try, once again, to establish a new and entirely
radical framework.
Iraq is very far from achieving a new government that works, and
the collapse we are witnessing is more likely to get worse before it
gets better. Only when the participants in this struggle for power
recognize that they are losing more than they can gain by continuing,
will it come to an end. That may be a very long time. In the meantime,
the best we can probably do is to staunch the violence; contain the
struggle; and keep alive the possibility that after extremism has run
its course, the potential for a different Iraq is still there. Others
in the region should be encouraged to do the same, a task which should
be made easier by the fact that no state in the region--or its
leadership--wants to see the collapse of the current state system, no
matter how much in need of reform is its domestic government may be.
SEAT DISTRIBUTION FROM THE DECEMBER 15, 2005, IRAQI LEGISLATIVE ELECTION
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Party Total seats Percentage
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shia Parties:
United Iraqi Alliance..................... 128 46.55
Progressives.............................. 2 0.73
-------------------------
Total................................... 130 47.27
=========================
Sunni Parties:
Accord Front.............................. 44 16.00
Iraqi Dialogue Front...................... 11 4.00
Liberation and Reconciliation Bloc........ 3 1.09
-------------------------
Total................................... 58 21.09
=========================
Kurdish Parties:
Kurdistan Alliance........................ 53 19.27
Islamic Union of Kurdistan................ 5 1.82
-------------------------
Total................................... 58 21.09
=========================
Secular Nationalist Parties:
National Iraqi List....................... 25 9.09
Iraqi Nation List (Mithal al-Alusi)....... 1 0.36
-------------------------
Total................................... 26 9.45
=========================
Minority Parties:
The Two Rivers List (Assyrian)............ 1 0.36
The Yazidi Movement....................... 1 0.36
Iraqi Turkman Front....................... 1 0.36
-------------------------
Total................................... 3 1.09
------------------------------------------------------------------------
MINISTRIES AND LEADERSHIP POSITIONS BY PARTY, PERMANENT GOVERNMENT, 2006
------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. of
ministries
Party +leadership Percentage
positions
------------------------------------------------------------------------
UIA........................................... 21 45.65
SCIRI..................................... 5 10.87
Dawa...................................... 1 2.17
Dawa Tandhim.............................. 3 6.52
Sadrists.................................. 4 8.70
Islamic Action............................ 1 2.17
Hezbollah................................. 1 2.17
Independent............................... 6 13.04
Kurdistan Alliance............................ 8 17.39
PUK....................................... 4 8.70
KDP....................................... 4 8.70
Tawafuq....................................... 9 19.57
Iraqiya....................................... 6 13.04
Independent................................... 2 4.35
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Editor's note.--The charts presented by Dr. Marr were not
reproducible. They will be maintained for viewing in the committee's
premanent record.]
Chairman Biden. Doctor, thank you. Thank you very much.
Michael.
STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL O'HANLON, SENIOR FELLOW AND SYDNEY
STEIN, JR., CHAIR, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. O'Hanlon. Thank you, Senator. It's a great honor to
appear before this committee today.
Chairman Biden. By the way--excuse me for interrupting--I
note that, in the interest of time, you've been unable to go
through the entire statements each of you had----
Dr. Marr. Oh, yes.
Chairman Biden [continuing]. Your entire statements will be
placed in the record for everyone to have available.
Dr. O'Hanlon. Thank you for the honor to testify today.
I think the numbers in Iraq essentially add up to what we
all, I think, are realizing in our gut more and more, which is,
the state of Iraq today is poor. As a person trying to maintain
an objective database on this for 3\1/2\ years now, I tried
hard not to use that kind of a sweeping conclusion for the
first couple of years. There was always reason to think that
the glass might be half full, or at least the data themselves
might suggest that you could find information that would allow
you to reach that conclusion. And we thought, as providing a
database, it was important for us not to prejudge where things
were headed. But I think it's increasingly clear that in Iraq
the situation is poor, that we are losing. One can debate
whether we've lost. I would agree with Secretary Powell's
characterization, that we are losing, but there is still hope
for salvaging something. And the degree of setback or degree of
an unfortunate outcome matters a great deal, even if we are not
going to wind up where we hope to be, on the scale that we had
hoped. But the data, I think, are very clear, and let me go
through just a couple of points to try to summarize why I say
that.
On the testimony I've prepared today, we have 18 security
indicators, 6 economic indicators, and another half dozen or so
political and public opinion indicators. The latter category
has some hope, has some positive element, but the first two are
almost uniformly bad. Of the 18 security indicators that we're
presenting for you today, 17 of them are either bad or, at
best, stagnant, in terms of the trend lines. Only one can be
said to be positive, and that's the one that I think,
unfortunately, is less important and less--itself, less
promising than we once hoped--which is the progress in training
Iraqi security forces, because even though we are making
technical progress, getting them equipment, getting them
training. We all know that their sectarian trends and
tendencies are growing, and one can't even speak, necessarily,
of a clearly improving Iraqi security force, at this time.
We've tried to guestimate about how many of the Iraqi security
forces may be not only technically proficient, but politically
dependable in some way. Very hard to come up with that kind of
a number. I've talked to people in the military and the
administration on this. I know you all have, too. But I think
that, at best, there are several thousand Iraqi forces that can
be reliably said to be politically dependable, even if there
may be 100,000 or more that pass at least a modest standard of
technical capability. So, the security environment is quite
poor.
On the economic front, of the six categories that we
summarize in our testimony today, only one of them shows any
real positive motion, and that's the GDP. But that, of course,
is essentially a top-down effect from high oil prices and from
foreign aid, and it doesn't necessarily reach all the middle-
class Iraqis that we need to reach.
So, this is why I conclude that things aren't good, and, in
fact, are quite poor, on balance.
Let me identify, very quickly, six categories, and give you
just a little bit of information on each of the six, and try to
do so quickly, because I realize it's easy to swamp people with
data. And, by the way, I should say, by way of background, not
all this data is of equally good quality. Again, those of you--
and most of you who have been to Iraq know how hard it is to
get information from the ground, and we also know that the
numbers--you know, the benchmarks may be off, and the trends
may be somewhat off. But I still think the overall gist of this
is pretty clear.
I should also say, our information is largely U.S.
Government information, but we also try to depend a great deal
on journalists working in the field, on nongovernmental
organizations in the field, and, to some extent, our own
research. But we are not in Iraq, with a lot of interns,
gathering data; we are primarily trying to compile and assess
trends.
First point of the six categories--and this is obvious, but
I'd better make it clear and get it on the table anyway--the
violence levels in Iraq have been escalating dramatically.
We've seen this again in the recent data. There is considerable
disagreement about how many people in Iraq are dying per month,
but it's probably in the range of 4-5,000 civilians a month,
which is at least double what it was just a couple of years
ago. And, frankly, in this broad semantic debate about whether
Iraq is in civil war or not, by that standard Iraq is very,
very clearly in civil war. The sheer level of violence makes
this one of the two or three most violent places in earth. And,
frankly, we're getting to the point where it even begins to
rival some of the more violent periods during Saddam's rule,
which is a terrible thing to have to say. It's not as bad, of
course, as the worst period of the Iran-Iraq war or of Saddam's
genocides against his own people, but it is essentially
rivaling--essentially--what I might say is the average level of
Saddam's level of violence over his 25 years in power, about 4-
5,000 civilians being killed per month.
One backup piece of information on this, or corroborating
statistic, the number of attacks per day that we're seeing from
militias or sectarian groups or insurgents is now almost 200,
which is an escalation of at least a factor of five from a
couple of years ago. So, the first point, again, is fairly
obvious, but, I think, worth emphasizing.
Second point--and Dr. Marr made this point, and we all are
aware of it--is the growing sectarian nature of the violence.
And here, I'm just going to highlight one or two statistics,
which come largely from Pentagon data bases. In the early 2
years of Iraq's war--or of our experience in Iraq since 2003--
there were very few sectarian attacks, maybe zero or one per
day, according to the Pentagon's best effort to tabulate. More
of the attacks were a Sunni-based insurgency against anyone
associated with the government, whether it was our forces,
Iraqi Shia, Iraqi Sunni, Iraq Kurd. The violence was very much
of an insurgent and terrorist nature. And zero or one attacks
per day were assessed as sectarian. Now it's 30 sectarian
attacks a day. Three zero. So, this is a dramatic escalation in
the amount of sectarian violence.
We have a terrorist threat, an insurgency threat, and a
civil war from sectarian violence, all at the same time. And I
don't want to make too much of the semantic issue here. If you
want to call it ``sectarian strife'' or ``large-scale sectarian
strife'' rather than ``civil war,'' I suppose we can still have
that debate, but the sheer amount of violence and the growing
political impetus to the violence from the different sectarian
leaders makes Iraq unambiguously qualified, in my mind, as a
place where we have a civil war today. So, I wanted to
underscore the sectarian nature of the violence.
Third point, related to the first two, is that, if you want
to put it in a nutshell, Iraq is becoming Bosnia. Ethnic
cleansing and displacement are becoming paramount. And here, I
think the statistics have been underappreciated in much of the
public debate, so far. So, let me try to be very clear on one
big, important data point; 100,000 Iraqis per month are being
driven from their homes right now. Roughly half are winding up
abroad, roughly half are moving to different parts of Iraq.
This is Bosnia-scale ethnic cleansing. I agree with Dr. Marr
that it would be preferable--and Iraqis certainly would
prefer--to retain some level of multiethnic society, and that
separation of the country into autonomous zones raises a lot of
tough questions. However, let's be clear about what the data
show. It's happening already. And right now, it's the militias
and the death squads that are driving the ethnic cleansing, and
the movement toward a breakup of Iraq. And the question, pretty
soon, is going to be whether we try to manage that process or
let the militias alone drive it, because it's happening;
100,000 people a month are being driven from their homes. Iraq
looks like Bosnia, more and more. That's my third point.
Fourth point, disturbing--again, not surprising, but
disturbing--middle- and upperclass flight. We have huge
problems of Iraqi professional classes, the people we need to
get involved in rebuilding this country, no longer able to do
so. To some extent, it's a legacy of the issue about de-
Baathification and the degree to which Ambassador Bremer
expanded the de-Baathification approach beyond what was
initially planned, but also, now, Iraqis are being driven from
their homes because of the amount of kidnaping of upperclass
individuals, much of it financially driven. And just one very
disturbing statistic: Physicians in Iraq. We now estimate that
a third of them have left the country or have been killed or
kidnaped in the time since liberation of Iraq from Saddam, 4
years ago. So, one-third of all physicians are out of Iraq and
no longer practicing. And that's probably, if anything, an
underestimate. So, middle-class and upperclass flight, or the
death of many middle-class and upperclass individuals, has
become a real challenge for putting this country back together
in any meaningful way.
Fifth point. And this makes me, I should admit in advance,
sympathetic to President Bush's planned--from what I
understand--planned focus on job creation in his speech
tonight. I think it's overdue. But unemployment is a big
problem in Iraq. And I think the Commander Emergency Response
Program, which we used, on a pilot scale, on a smaller scale,
in the early years, was a very good idea. If you want to call
it ``make work,'' that's fine. If you want to call it ``FDR-
style job creation,'' that's fine. I think that's what Iraq
needs today, because the unemployment rate is stubbornly high.
And even if job creation is not, per se, a good economic
development strategy, it may be a good security strategy,
because it takes angry young men off the streets. So, the
unemployment rate, as best we can tell, is still stuck in the
30-plus-percent range. Now, by developing-country standards,
that's not necessarily without precedent, but in Iraq it fuels
the civil war and the sectarian strife and the insurgency, and
that's the reason why it's of great concern, in addition to the
obvious reasons.
Last point, I'll finish on Iraqi pessimism. For the first 2
years of this effort, Iraqi optimism was one of the few things
we could really latch onto and say that the political process
plus the gratitude of the Iraqis that Saddam was gone--maybe
not gratitude toward us, per se, because they quickly became
angry with us, but gratitude in a broader sense--plus their
hope about the future, provided a real sense that this country
could come together, because the optimism rates about the
country's prognosis, among Iraqis themselves, were in the 70-
percent range for the first couple of years. Those numbers have
plummeted. They're still higher than I would have predicted, to
be honest with you. They still look like they are 40-45 percent
optimism, but they are way, way down from what they used to be.
And if you look at a couple of other indicators of Iraqi public
opinion, especially from a June 2006 poll done by our
International Republican Institute, only 25--excuse me, I'll
put it another way--75 percent of all Iraqis consider the
security environment to be poor--75 percent; and 60 percent
consider the economic environment to be poor. So----
Chairman Biden. Can I ask a point of clarification?
Dr. O'Hanlon. Yes; please.
Chairman Biden. Is that polling data, or that data about
pessimism, does that include the roughly 1 million people who
have been displaced or are out of country, or does it include--
--
Dr. O'Hanlon. It's a very good point, Senator. It does not,
as far as I understand. And, therefore, if you did address
these individuals who have suffered most directly, the numbers
might well be lower. But, in any event, I think the overall
gist, the trendlines, are bad. And when you ask Iraqis about
the security environment or the economic environment, they're
even more pessimistic than they are in general terms.
That's my overall message, and I look forward to the
conversation later.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. O'Hanlon follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael O'Hanlon, Senior Fellow and Sydney Stein,
Jr., Chair, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC
The year 2006 was, tragically and inescapably, a bad one in Iraq.
Our ongoing work at Brookings makes this conclusion abundantly clear in
quantitative terms. Violence got worse for Iraqi civilians and barely
declined at all for American and Iraqi troops. And the economy was
fairly stagnant as well.
Despite the drama of Saddam's execution in the year's final days,
2006 will probably be remembered most for two developments inside Iraq.
The first is the failure of the 2005 election process to produce any
sense of progress. In fact, 2006 was the year that politicians in Iraq
did much more to advance the interests of their own sects and religions
than to build a new cohesive country. (In a September poll, Prime
Minister al-Maliki was viewed unfavorably by 85 percent of all Sunni
Arabs, for example.) The second is the related commencement of Iraq's
civil war dating back to the February 22 bombing of the hallowed Shia
mosque in Samarra. While some still question whether Iraq is in civil
war, there is no longer much serious debate about the situation. The
sheer level of violence, and the increasing politicization of the
violence to include many more Shia attacks on Sunnis as well as the
reverse, qualify the mayhem in Iraq as civil war by most definitions of
the term. And the country has become one of the three or four most
violent places on Earth.
It is still possible to find signs of hope in our Brookings
statistics on Iraq: The numbers of Iraqi security forces who are
trained and technically proficient, the gradually improving GDP, recent
reductions in Iraqi state subsidies for consumer goods (which distort
the economy and divert government resources), the number of children
being immunized. But those same children cannot feel safe en route to
school in much of today's Iraq; that GDP growth is a top-down
phenomenon having little if any discernible effect on the unemployment
rate or well-being of Iraqis in places such as Al Anbar province and
Sadr City, Baghdad; reductions in subsidies are not enough to spur much
private sector investment in such a violent country; and those
increasingly proficient security forces remain politically unreliable
in most cases, just as inclined to stoke sectarian strife as to contain
it.
The performance of Iraq's utilities remains stagnant--not bad by
the standards of developing countries, but hardly better than under
Saddam. Oil production and electricity availability remain generally
flat nationwide. Fuels for household cooking and heating and
transportation fall even further short of estimated need than they did
a year or two ago, as does electricity production in Baghdad.
Despite some unconvincing rhetoric from President Bush in the
prelude to the November elections that ``absolutely, we're winning,''
most Americans now agree on the diagnosis of the situation in Iraq.
Former Secretary Baker and former Congressman Hamilton recently warned
of a ``further slide toward chaos.'' Secretary of Defense, Robert
Gates, stated in his confirmation hearings that we aren't winning, even
if he declined to go as far as Colin Powell and assert that we are
actually losing. Former Secretary Rumsfeld himself, in his leaked
November memo, recognized that Iraq was going badly and put out a
laundry list of potential options in Iraq that we may have to consider
to salvage the situation, including a Dayton-like process modeled on
Bosnia's experience to negotiate an end to the civil war.
Iraqis tend to share a similar diagnosis. According to a June 2006
poll, 59 percent call the economy poor and 75 percent describe the
security environment as poor. The security situation in particular has
only deteriorated since then.
Against this backdrop, dramatic measures are clearly needed. At a
minimum, we will likely require some combination of the options now
being proposed by the Iraq Study Group, the Pentagon, and others.
President Bush is likely to recommend several of these in his eagerly
awaited January speech--a massive program to create jobs, a surge of
25,000 more American troops to Iraq to try to improve security in
Baghdad, an ultimatum to Iraqi political leaders that if they fail to
achieve consensus on key issues like sharing oil, American support for
the operation could very soon decline.
Our Brookings data suggest rationales for each of these possible
policy steps, even if there are also counterarguments. Coalition forces
have never reached the numbers needed to provide security for the
population in Iraq, and indigenous forces remain suspect--in their
technical proficiency, and even more so in their political
dependability. These two realities make at least a tactical case for a
surge, if it is really feasible on the part of our already overworked
soldiers and marines. Despite the success of military commanders in
putting Iraqis to work with their commander emergency response program
funds, the administration never chose to emphasize job creation in its
economic reconstruction plans meaning that the unemployment rate has
remained stubbornly high. And for all our happiness about Iraq's
democracy, it is clear that extremely few Iraqi leaders enjoy any real
support outside of their own sectarian group. Trying to force them to
work across sectarian lines must be a focus of our policy efforts, if
there is to be any hope of ultimate stability in Iraq.
Social scientists and military experts do not know how to assess,
rigorously, the probabilities that such steps will succeed at this late
hour in Iraq. Overall, however, it seems fair to say that most have
become quite pessimistic. If the above types of ideas fail, therefore,
``Plan B'' options may well be needed within a year, ranging from a
federalism plan for Iraq that Rumsfeld and Senator Biden have been
discussing to plans that would go even further and help Iraqis relocate
to parts of their country where they could feel safer (as Bosnia
expert, Edward Joseph, and I have recently advocated in The American
Interest). Such an idea is widely unpopular--with Iraqis themselves,
with President Bush, with most Americans who value the notion of
interethnic tolerance. But with 100,000 Iraqis per month being
displaced from their homes, making for a total of some 2 million since
Saddam was overthrown, ethnic cleansing is already happening. Unless
current trends are reversed, the question may soon become not whether
we can stop this Bosnia-like violence--but whether we try to manage it
or let the death squads continue to dictate its scale and its
character.
Although it has been said before about previous new years, it seems
very likely that 2007 will be make or break time in Iraq.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Category 11/03 11/04 11/05 11/06
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Security
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S./other foreign troops in Iraq (thousands)............ 123/24 138/24 160/23 140/17
U.S. troops killed....................................... 82 137 96 68
Percent killed by IEDs................................... 24 13 48 54
U.S. troops wounded...................................... 337 1,397 466 508
Iraqi Army/police fatalities............................. 50 160 176 123
Iraqi civilian fatalities................................ 1,250 2,900 1,800 4,000
Multiple fatality bombings (for month in question)....... 6 11 41 65
Estimated strength of insurgency......................... 5,000 20,000 20,000 25,000
Estimated strength of Shia militias...................... 5,000 10,000 20,000 50,000
Daily average of interethnic attacks..................... 0 1 1 30
Estimated number of foreign fighters..................... 250 750 1,250 1,350
Number of daily attacks by insurgents/militias........... 32 77 90 185
Attacks on oil/gas assets................................ 9 30 0 11
Iraqis internally displaced 100,000 since 04/03 (total).. 100,000 175,000 200,000 650,000
Iraqi refugees since 04/03 (total)....................... 100,000 350,000 900,000 1,500,000
Iraqi physicians murdered or kidnapped/fled Iraq......... 100/1,000 250/2,000 1,000/5,000 2,250/12,000
Iraqi Security Forces technically proficient............. 0 10,000 35,000 115,000
Iraqi Security Forces politically dependable............. 0 0 5,000 10,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Economics
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Oil production (millions of barrels/day; prewar: 2.5).... 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.1
Percent of household fuel needs available................ 76 77 88 54
Electricity production (in megawatts, prewar: 4,000)..... 3,600 3,200 3,700 3,700
Ave. hours/day of power, Baghdad (prewar: 20)............ 12 12 9 7
Unemployment rate (percent).............................. 50 35 33 33
Per capita GDP (real dollars; prewar: $900).............. 550 1,000 1,100 1,150
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Politics, Public Opinion, Democracy, Law
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. of Trained Judges.................................... 0 250 350 750
Telephone subscribers (prewar: 800,000).................. 600,000 2,135,000 5,500,000 8,100,000
Independent media companies (prewar: 0).................. 100 150 225 400
Iraqi optimism (percent who think things going in right 65 54 49 45
direction)..............................................
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chairman Biden. Thank you.
Mr. Said.
STATEMENT OF YAHIA SAID, DIRECTOR, IRAQ REVENUE WATCH, LONDON
SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS, LONDON, ENGLAND
Mr. Said. Mr. Chairman, Senators, I'm honored to be here,
and I'm pleased by your interest in the situation in Iraq, and
efforts to find a solution that will be helpful to the Iraqi
and American people.
Chairman Biden. As Strom Thurmond used to say, ``Will you
pull the machine closer so everyone can hear you?'' Thank you
very much.
Mr. Said. Some of the statements I'm going to make are
going to echo what was said before, and, in a way, will
confirm, through anecdotal evidence, what has been suggested
through the numbers and statistics.
The conflict in Iraq is not only pervasive, as the numbers
suggest, but it's very complex. And it's very important not to
try to simplify it. The situation in Iraq has suffered, and
policymaking in Iraq has suffered, because the conflict was
reduced to some of its elements rather than looked at in its
complexity. This is not only a conflict between democracy and
its enemies, it's not only a conflict between insurgency and
counterinsurgency, it's not only a conflict between Sunni and
Shia. This is a multifaceted, overlapping series of conflicts
which is a function of the various groups and interests and
agendas. And what I will try to do in my statement is try to
address some of the elements of the conflict, to just
illustrate the complexity of it, and hopefully that will help
inform policymaking. I will also try to address the question:
Why are these conflicts taking such a violent form? And
finally, I will try to address issues of national dialog and
efforts at finding a peaceful resolution to these conflicts.
As the numbers suggested by Mr. O'Hanlon, the insurgency
continues--and by ``insurgency'' I mean attacks against
coalition forces--continues to be a significant part of the
conflict. The majority of attacks continue to target coalition
forces and coalition personnel, and the high numbers of
casualties are evidence to that. But the insurgency is also a
domestic political game. Many groups from the various
communities, from various political directions, engage in the
insurgency to acquire political legitimacy and to acquire,
through that, a right to govern. Indeed, when the Iraqi
Government proposed or suggested the option of an amnesty
lately, insurgents bristled and said, ``They shouldn't be
pardoned for fighting the occupation, they should be rewarded
by being given positions in power.'' The insurgency is also
about many other factors, including money. And it's becoming
harder and harder to distinguish whether a commercial interest
is a goal in itself or is a means to a goal.
The sectarian violence, as, again, the numbers have
suggested, is on the rise, and is tearing at the fabric of
society, but it's not producing the kind of consolidation, the
kind of alignment along sectarian and ethnic lines that some of
the architects of the violence have hoped for. Indeed, as Ms.
Marr has suggested, there is fragmentation. There is
fragmentation within communities, there is fragmentation within
political blocs and individual political parties. There is also
increasing and growing specter of warlordism as rogue military
commanders take control of fragments of militias and even state
security structures. And the evidence for the fragmentation is
everywhere. On my recent trip to Baghdad, a driver from a Sunni
neighborhood complained to me that the Sunni insurgents, the
Sunni fighters, kill more of their own kin than they do of Shia
militias. The fighting between the Sadrists and militias
affiliated with the Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in
Iraq, the SCIRI, and security forces controlled by them, have
swept throughout the south of the country, and, over the last
year, the Sadrists have gained control, at least temporarily,
of various cities in the south. Even in Kurdistan the tensions
are not far below the surface.
One of the largest movements--the largest political
movement in Iraq today are the Sadrists, and I think it's
worthwhile to focus a little bit on that component of the
situation in Iraq, because it's also illustrative of the
dynamics. While other political parties control state and
security structures, particularly the SCIRI, the Sadrists
control the streets. But this is a very controversial and
contradictory movement. The Sadrists nurture a nationalist
image. They don't engage in sectarian rhetoric. They have
clashed frequently with coalition forces. At the same time,
they have participated in the political process, they have 30
MPs, 6 ministers currently in boycott.
Many ex-Baathists--Shia ex-Baathists--joined the Sadrist
movement, yet the Sadrist movement has been the most vocal in
calling for revenge and for punishing regime officials. The
Sadrists style themselves after Hezbollah in Lebanon, and seek
to protect their communities and constituents and provide
services. At the same time, their militias are undisciplined
and engage in criminal violence and looting, themselves, and,
of course, man some of the feared death squads.
This is a movement of the poor. This is an
antiestablishment movement. Their grassroots support comes from
the very poor Arab Shia in the countryside and the slums of
Baghdad. And, as such, their natural enemies are not
necessarily the Sunnis, but are the establishment, regardless
of their sectarian or ethnic affiliation. As--and we see that
through their clashes with the Shia establishment, with the
merchant and religious Shia establishment represented by SCIRI.
So, you have one movement that is fighting three conflicts.
It's fighting an insurgency, it's fighting an antiestablishment
revolt, and it's fighting a sectarian civil war.
So, why does the conflict in Iraq take such violent forms?
It does, because there is a political vacuum, as Ms. Marr--
Professor Marr--has suggested. And this political vacuum is
signaling to the various groups and communities the necessity
to protect their interests and achieve their goals through
violent means, because there is no framework for a peaceful
resolution of conflicts, for a peaceful reconciliation of the
diverging interests.
This violence, of course, is also feeding into the collapse
of the state, and you have a vicious circle of political
vacuum, violence, and state collapse.
Now, the political process that took place over the last 3
years was supposed to address that. It was supposed to create
that vehicle for a peaceful resolution of conflict, for ways
for Iraqis to come together and reconcile their differences.
But, unfortunately, and despite a tremendous effort by Iraqis,
Americans, and others, this has not been the case. Indeed, the
political process is defunct, and, as Ms. Marr suggested, the
state also has not emerged. We don't have, in Iraq, a
legitimate public authority that could protect people and
provide them with services.
Why did this process fail? And this is not about pointing
fingers at the past, but it's very important to understand some
of the reasons for the failings. It's tempting to point the
finger at external factors. Indeed, the Iraqis love to point
the finger at external factors. And if you ask them, ``It's the
Americans' fault, it's the Israelis, it's the Iranians, it's
Saddam,'' and everybody possible. But there are, of course,
internal reasons. And one of them is the fact that many Iraqis,
a majority of Iraqis, are sitting on the fence, or, as my
colleague has just suggested, are pessimistic. Iraqis have
little faith in the process--in the political process and its
results, and in the elites that emerge from it. They don't have
confidence in this regime--in the current regime and its
sustainability.
What you have is a pervasive atmosphere--it's two
sentiments that--dominating the situation in Iraq--which is
fear and apathy. And you see that everywhere. And it's these
sentiments that provide the perfect cover for corruption, for
terrorism, for violence, and for sectarian hate. Even
government officials are inflicted by this sentiment, and this
explains how they use their positions to undermine, to
dismantle the machinery of government that has been entrusted
to them. And, indeed, you can hear echoes of that pessimism or
apathy in the Prime Minister's recent interview with the Wall
Street Journal.
Within this atmosphere, we're seeing, now, a hardening of
positions on all sides. There is this mood, if you like, of
going for a last push. And it's not only evident through the
terrorist and the sectarian violence, but also in the
government's own position. Clearly, the model of a full-
spectrum national unity government, which we still have in Iraq
now, has not worked. It has even furthered the dismantling of
the machinery of the state, because it was reduced to farming
out ministries to individual parties and groups. Now the
strongest parties in the government, particularly the SCIRI and
the Kurds, are trying to build a narrower government, and hope
that it would be more efficient and work more as a team. But
there are risks to this approach. These parties don't have
strong grassroots support, and will rely more both on coercion,
but also on continued U.S. support and bolstering. The
execution of Saddam Hussein, and the manner in which it was
carried out, and the rhetoric and the timing and everything, is
indication of this hardening. That event was clearly designed
to intimidate political opponents of the government, and
particularly the Sunni community.
The new security plan and the push for an all-out assault,
in combination with the surge option, is also an indication of
that. There is very little evidence to show, today, that the
Iraqi Government will be able to mobilize the resources
necessary to make this security plan more successful than those
who preceded it. And a temporary surge will also probably not
lead to sustainable outcomes. At the same time, if the plan--if
the security plan is carried out in a one-sided way, and the
Prime Minister has indicated that he views Sunni violence,
terrorist violence, as the primary problem, and that the Shia
militias are a secondary reaction to that--so, if this plan is
carried out in a one-sided way with disregard to human rights,
it can exacerbate the situation and make finding a political
peaceful solution even harder. And, at the end of the day, the
only solution to the situation in Iraq has to come through
dialog, has to come through engagement and ownership of a broad
cross-section of Iraqis, to overcome that feeling of apathy and
disconnection. The dialog has to be genuine--as in, the parties
have to produce real concessions--all the parties. It has to be
broad. It has to involve not only the sectarian protagonists,
but also those who still believe in the viability of the Iraqi
states and in the necessity, as Professor Marr has indicated,
of having a central state in that particular region.
Unfortunately, the government's action, the hardening of
the government's position over the last 6 months--the Iraqi
Government has closed down to opposition newspapers, TV
stations, has issued arrest warrants for leading opposition
figures--do not create a conducive environment for an open and
genuine dialog. So, there is need for international
intervention on that front, and I'll address that later.
Dialog, of course, doesn't mean that one needs to throw out
the results of the political process of the last 3 years. I
think the Constitution--the Iraqi Constitution, with all its
shortcomings, serves as a good starting point for dialog, but
the Constitution needs to be transformed, through genuine
dialog, from a dysfunctional to a rational federal structure.
Oil, and--negotiations on an oil deal, which have
apparently concluded recently, also provide a model for the--
for that rational federalism. The main principles that the
negotiators have agreed on is to maximize the benefit of Iraq's
oil wealth to all Iraqis, to use oil as a way to unite the
nation, and to build a framework based on transparency, which
is very important in a situation of lack--of poor trust, and on
efficiency and equity.
Major issues have been resolved, like having a central
account to accumulate all oil revenues, and manage the oil
revenues on--at the federal level. Apparently, even the issue--
the current issue of contracting, and who has the right to
contract, has been resolved, as well as the structure for a
national oil company.
But there remains issues open, and it's very important not
to let the details derail the negotiations. And it's also very
important to have a professional and open dialog on those
issues, as in involving the proper professionals in the
negotiations, and not reduce them to a political kitchen
cabinet. One needs financial people, one needs economists and
petroleum experts, involved in the debate.
And one of the critical issues is how the revenue-sharing
framework is going to work. Will it be through the writing of
checks, which is unsustainable in the long term? There is no
reason for Basrah to transfer money to the central government
so that it can write checks to the other regions. Unless the
revenue-sharing is carried out through the budget, through an
integral budgetary process, the arrangement will be
unsustainable. So, it's very important to make sure that the
integrity of budgetary process is preserved.
In conclusion, I think policies for Iraq should be informed
by the complexity of the conflict. A surge, or the security
plan envisioned now for Iraq, reduces the conflict to one
between a democracy and its enemies; between democracy and
terror. But if it is carried out with disregard to human
rights, if it is carried out with disregard to the rule of law
and in a one-sided way, it may exacerbate the situation and may
also increase sectarian tensions and undermine the very
democracy it purports to defend.
The withdrawal of U.S. forces also reduces the conflict to
an issue of a fight between an occupying army and a nationalist
resistance. But, at the same time, a withdrawal may spell the
end to the Green-Zone-based Iraqi State, and that could unleash
further spirals of violence.
Segregation, or the various proposals on the table that are
aimed at addressing Iraq through an ethnic prism, reduces the
conflict to one between Sunnis and Shia. But, in that
atmosphere of fragmentations, as Professor Marr has suggested,
that means that we will just replace one civil war with three
civil wars, one failed state with three failed states. And, as
I hope the next speaker will address Iraqi partition or
segregation will lead to unimaginable consequences at the
regional level.
So, the only solution for Iraq will have to be long term
and comprehensive, as Professor Marr has suggested, and will
have to be based on an open and inclusive dialog, but it's
something the Iraqis, on their own, cannot do, and they will
need an international intervention to identify the
protagonists, to bring them to the negotiations table, and to
help prod them to reach compromise. What Iraq needs today is an
internationally sponsored and mediated peace process.
And I will finish at that. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Said follows:]
Prepared Statement of Yahia Khairi Said, Director, Revenue Watch
Institute, London School of Economics, London, England
The conflict in Iraq today is as complex as it is pervasive. This
is a reflection of the various groups and interests at play as well as
the legacies of the past. The conflict can not be reduced to simple
dichotomies of democracy against its enemies, resistance against the
occupation or Shia vs. Sunni. Likewise there is no single universal
solution to the conflict. Neither the current proposal for a ``surge''
nor the proposal to withdraw coalition forces are likely to bring
peace. What is needed is a comprehensive and long-term approach based
on an open and inclusive dialog at national and international levels,
in which the fair distribution of Iraqi oil revenues is used as an
incentive for uniting Iraqis.
THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT
The Insurgency: The targeting of Multinational Forces continues to
account for a significant portion of the violence as evidenced by the
consistently high numbers of coalition casualties. The insurgency is
also an arena of domestic political conflict. Groups from different
ethnic and political backgrounds use the ``resistance'' to legitimate
their claim to power. Sunni insurgents bristled at the government's
offer of an amnesty last year, insisting that they should be rewarded,
not pardoned for fighting the occupation. Al-Qaeda uses videos of
attacks on U.S. troops to recruit and fundraise for its own global war.
Some insurgent attacks are simply a cover for economic crimes. As with
many such conflicts, it is often hard to discern whether the violence
is purely a means to commercial gain or an end in itself.
Spiralling sectarian violence is polarising communities and tearing
society apart. However, it is not producing the consolidation and
political mobilization along ethnic and sectarian lines as intended by
its architects. Quite the opposite, the pervasive violence and
uncertainty is leading to fragmentation within communities, political
blocks, and individual parties. Warlordism is emerging as rogue
commanders assume control of fragments of militias and individual units
of the state security forces.
A resident of a Sunni neighborhood in Baghdad recently complained
to me that Sunni fighters kill more of their own kin than they do Shia
militias. Tribal rivalries broke into open conflict in the Anbar
province this summer pitching Sunni tribes against each other and
against the foreign al-Qaeda fighters. The head of the prominent Tamim
tribe recently expressed a widely held sentiment among fellow Sunnis
when he lambasted the ``Iraqi un-Islamic Party'' which purports to
represent them in government. Likewise among the Shiites, there are
frequent and violent confrontations between the SCIRI-controlled
militias and police forces on one side, and militias associated with
the Sadrist movement, on the other. These confrontations allowed the
Sadrists at various times to briefly seize control of most major cities
in central and southern Iraq. The competition to control Basra's oil
smuggling business among various militias and political parties often
takes the form of street warfare. Less overtly, tensions bubble just
under the surface between the two main Kurdish parties and between them
on one side and Kurdish Islamists on the other. Outburst of separatism
by Kurdish leaders--like the recent spat over the national flag--should
be viewed in the context of competition for power in Kurdistan itself.
The Sadrist Movement is emblematic of the complexities and
contradictions of Iraq's political and security landscape. While SCIRI
and other political groups control government positions and resources,
the Sadrists control the street. They nurture a nationalist image
clashing occasionally with Multinational Forces and deriding the new
elite who came with the invasion. This did not stop them from actively
participating in the political process. The Sadrists have 30 members of
Parliament and 6 ministers. Many Shia ex-Baathists joined the Sadrists
after the collapse of the regime yet the movement is most vocal in
seeking revenge against regime officials. Among Shia groups the
Sadrists are the least likely to employ sectarian rhetoric yet their
warlords are implicated in the worst instances of sectarian violence.
The Sadrists try to emulate Hezbollah in Lebanon by seeking to protect
and provide social services to their constituents and by meting out
vigilante justice against criminals and those engaged in what they deem
to be ``un-Islamic'' conduct. But its militias are undisciplined and
often engage in looting and criminal activities themselves. The Sadr
leadership freely admits to having only indirect control over their
fighters. The Sadrists style themselves as the representatives of the
poor and downtrodden. Indeed their main strength is the support of
millions of poor Arab Shia in the rural south and the slums of Baghdad
who are in a rebellious mood aimed at the establishment regardless of
its sectarian color. As such SCIRI and other Shia groups representing
the merchant and religious elite with strong ties to Iran are the
Sadrists' natural enemy. In short, the Sadrists are simultaneously
fighting a nationalist insurgency, a revolt against the establishment
and a sectarian conflict.
STATE WEAKNESS AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS
The pervasiveness of the violence in Iraq today, the persistent
power vacuum and progressive hollowing out of the state are components
of a vicious circle. State weakness sends signals to the various groups
that they can, and, in fact, need to defend their interests and achieve
their goals through violent means. The political process over the past
3 years was supposed to fill the vacuum by establishing a framework
where Iraqis can reconcile competing interests through peaceful means.
The goal was to establish a legitimate public authority which would
protect Iraqis and provide them with essential services. Despite
enormous efforts, expenditures and sacrifice by Iraqis, Americans, and
others, this goal has yet to be achieved.
It is tempting under such circumstances to blame everything on
enemies and external influences such as al-Qaeda and Iraq's neighbors.
Iraqis habitually blame their woes on the Americans, Iran, Arab States,
Israel, Saddam, and so on. There is no question that external factors,
sometimes by intent and sometimes by mistake, have played a role in
shaping the current predicament. But the roots for such consistent
failure need to be explored and addressed inside society itself.
Despite overcoming great risks to vote in two elections and a
referendum, Iraqis have little faith in the political process and the
leadership it has produced. Indeed political participation for most
Iraqis has been limited to these three votes. There are few in Iraq
today who believe in the viability and sustainability of the new
regime. A substantial majority sits on the proverbial fence. This is
not only a result of the authoritarian legacy or the fact that change
came from the outside. It is also the result of disappointed hopes and
broken promises over the past 4 years.
Fear and apathy are the most pervasive sentiments in Iraq today.
They provide the perfect cover for corruption, crime, and terror and
sap the energy from the enormous task of reconstruction. These
sentiments extend to many officials and politicians who do not shy from
dismantling the machinery of government and the state they have been
entrusted with in pursuit of short-term narrow gains. One could even
hear echoes of this apathy in the recent interview by Prime Minister
Maliki with the Wall Street Journal.
Faced with this predicament, there is a hardening of positions on
all sides and a determination to go for ``one last push.'' This is not
only expressed through the debilitating terrorist and militia violence
but also in the posture of the Iraqi Government.
The model of a full spectrum ``National Unity'' government is
clearly not working and has indeed exacerbated the decline of the
state. The farming out of ministries to individual parties and groups
produced a weak and divided government unable to function as a team.
The strongest parties in government, particularly the SCIRI and the
Kurds, seem resolved to build a narrower coalition government which may
exclude the Sadrists and some Sunni parties. This has already taken
place on the ground with Sunni parties only nominally participating in
government and the Sadrists boycotting it.
Without the Sadrists, however, this coalition has little grassroots
support. It will have to rely more on cordon and will be more
susceptible to external influences. It will be even more dependent on
continuous U.S. support.
The handling of the Saddam execution is illustrative of the
hardening of the government's stance. The rush to execute the former
dictator, the rhetoric preceding it and the manner in which it was
carried out were clearly designed to intimidate the Sunnis.
The government has also hardened its rhetoric and actions against
political opponents, closing down two opposition TV stations and
issuing an arrest warrant for the most prominent opposition figure--the
head of the Association of Muslim Scholars.
SECURITY PLANS
The security plan announced a couple of days ago is the culmination
of this approach. While officially targeted at all militias and armed
groups, the Prime Minister has clearly indicated that he views Sunni
violence as the main source of tensions and Shia militias as a reaction
to Sunni violence.
It is not clear yet whether the government will limit the targets
of the security plan to Sunni groups or whether it will also take on
the Sadrists. Either way it is unlikely that it will be able to muster
the resources necessary to achieve better results than previous
efforts, including the two recent Baghdad security plans. Even a
temporary U.S. surge in support of the plan is no guarantee for
achieving sustainable outcomes. A military offensive--especially if it
fails to protect civilians on all sides--is liable to inflame the
sectarian conflict and make a peaceful settlement even less likely. The
U.S. forces can find themselves embroiled, as a party, in the sectarian
conflict.
There is no doubt that there is an urgent need to confront the
terrorists, criminals, and those spreading sectarian hatred and to
protect civilians from them. This can only be achieved on the basis of
legitimacy and respect for human rights and the rule of law. It is,
therefore, particularly disconcerting when the Iraqi Government insists
on taking over control of the security portfolio in order to fight the
enemies ``our way,'' dispensing with what they view as exaggerated and
misplaced U.S. concern for human rights.
The new security plan and the associated surge option emphasises
the aspect of struggle between a nascent democracy and its opponents.
Yet if it is carried out without regard to human rights and in a way
that exacerbates sectarian tensions, it is only likely to make matters
worse and destroy the very democracy it seeks to protect.
If the conflict in Iraq was primarily about occupation and
resistance then a speedy withdrawal of coalition forces would offer the
best solution. In today's context a withdrawal will cause a spike in
other forms of violence and precipitate the collapse of the last
remnants of the Iraqi state unleashing an open-ended conflict with
unpredictable consequences.
A solution based on ethnic segregation emphasises another aspect of
the conflict. But in the context of fragmentation and warlordism, it is
unlikely to bring any relief. On the contrary it will exacerbate ethnic
cleansing and undermine regional stability.
NATIONAL DIALOG
Ultimately the violence in Iraq can only end through a political
process which unites Iraqis rather than dividing them. For this to
happen it is necessary to engage all constituencies in the shaping of
the new Iraq and provide them with a sense of ownership in the outcome.
This requires open and inclusive dialog and readiness for compromise on
all sides. It will require broadening the political process to include
those Iraqis who still believe in nation-building and coexistence
rather than limiting it to the combatants and extremists on all sides.
Current national dialog and reconciliation efforts have fallen short of
these ideals.
Dialog will clearly require regional and international mediation.
International assistance is needed to help identify the protagonists,
bring them to the negotiations, and encourage them to compromise. In
short Iraq is in need of an internationally mediated peace process.
The International Compact with Iraq offers a platform for such
dialog as well as a framework for mobilizing international assistance
once a settlement is reached. Other initiatives by the United Nations
and the League of Arab States are essential for success in this
context.
The final settlement can not dispense with the achievements of the
last 3 years. Those, including the constitution, will have to serve as
the starting point of any discussion over Iraq's future. The
constitution will need to be reviewed and implemented in a way that
provides a basis for rational federalism. The winners of the political
process will have to be prepared to make real concessions and genuinely
share power and resources if compromise is to be achieved.
Over the past months, Iraqi officials have been negotiating a
framework for the management and sharing of Iraq's oil wealth which can
provide a model for the shape of federalism in the new Iraq.
Negotiators were in agreement that such framework should maximise the
benefit from the wealth to all Iraqis and promote national cohesion. It
should be based on the principles of efficiency, transparency, and
equity. Transparency is particularly important as it helps build trust
among the various parties and prevent abuse.
The negotiators succeeded in overcoming a number of obstacles
agreeing in particular on the federal management and sharing of all oil
revenues, a structure for a National Oil Company and a framework for
coordinating negotiations and contracting with International Operating
Companies. Some details will still need to be worked out, chief among
them is the exact mechanism for revenue-sharing. If the new framework
is to contribute to national cohesion, transparency and accountability
the budgetary process must be the main vehicle for revenue-sharing.
A draft framework along these lines has been developed over the
past months and will shortly be presented to Parliament. It is critical
for the success of this effort that deliberations on the subject are
carried out in an open, inclusive, and professional manner.
Chairman Biden. Thank you very much.
Doctor.
STATEMENT OF DR. PAUL PILLAR, VISITING PROFESSOR, SECURITY
STUDIES PROGRAM, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Pillar. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
thank you very much for the privilege of participating in this
most important set of hearings. And I commend the committee, as
Phebe Marr did in her opening comment, for its approach to
educating the American public on this topic.
You've asked me to address the relationship between the
conflict in Iraq and other trends and developments in the
Middle East. And, in that connection, I would focus on five
major dimensions on which the war has had impact elsewhere in
the region or on the perceptions and concerns of other Middle
Eastern actors. Those five are: Sectarian divisions, extremism
and terrorism, political change and democratization, ethnic
separatism, and the alignments and the relative influence of
other states in the region.
With the violence in Iraq having increasingly assumed the
character of a civil war between Sunnis and Shiites, as
described by my fellow panelist, it has intensified sectarian
sentiment, suspicions, and resentments all along the Sunni-Shia
divide, only a portion of which runs through Iraq. Just as
important, this divide coincides with longstanding and deeply
resented patterns of economic privilege and political power.
The evident conviction of many Iraqi Shiites, who, as we
know, constitute a majority in their country, that their time
for political dominance has come, cannot help but put
revisionist thoughts in the minds of their coreligionists
elsewhere in the region. The conflict in Iraq has made this
sectarian divide more salient, not only for ordinary Shia and
Sunni populations, but also for regimes. It's a concern for
Saudi leaders, for example, because of Saudi sympathy for their
Sunni brethren in Iraq, and because of any possibility of
restiveness among the Saudi Shia minority. Looking out from
Riyadh, Saudis today see themselves as encircled by a Shia arc
that now includes control of both of the other major Persian
Gulf countries--Iran and Iraq. King Abdullah of Jordan has
spoken in similar terms about such a Shia arc.
For the United States, one consequence--not the only one--
but one consequence of this regionwide intensification of
sectarian sentiment is that it is difficult for the United
States to do just about anything in Iraq without it being
perceived, fairly or unfairly, as favoring one community over
the other and thereby antagonizing either Sunnis or Shiites, or
perhaps both, elsewhere in the region.
A second dimension on which the war in Iraq is having
repercussions throughout the Middle East, and, in this case,
even beyond, concerns extremist sentiment and the threat of
jihadist terrorism. Iraq is now the biggest and most prominent
jihad, and may ultimately have effects at least as significant
as those of earlier ones, partly because it is seen as a
struggle against the United States, in the eyes of the
jihadists, the sole remaining superpower and the leader of the
West. I concur, and I think just about any other serious
student of international terrorism would concur, in the
judgments recently declassified from the national intelligence
estimate on terrorism which stated that--in the words of the
estimators--that, ``The war in Iraq has become a cause celebre
for jihadists. It is shaping a new generation of terrorist
leaders and operatives. It is one of the major factors fueling
the spread of the global jihadist movement, and is being
exploited by al-Qaeda to attract new recruits and donors.''
Some of the possible effects within the surrounding region
may already be seen in, for example, the suicide bombings in
Amman, in November 2005, which were carried out by Iraqis from
the al-Qaeda-in-Iraq group.
A third important regional dimension is the possibility of
favorable political change, especially democratization, within
Middle Eastern countries. One hopeful development in the Middle
East over the last few years has been an increase in open
discussion of such political change. And I believe the current
administration, with its rhetorical emphasis on
democratization, deserves at least a share of the credit for
that.
In looking not just for talk, but for meaningful reform,
however, it is harder to be encouraged. What passes for
political reform in the Middle East has generally been, in
countries such as Egypt, slow, fragmentary, very cautious,
subject to backsliding, and more a matter of form than of
substance.
It is difficult to point convincingly to effects, one way
or the other, that the war in Iraq has had on political reform
in other Middle Eastern states, but, in my judgment, the all-
too-glaring troubles in Iraq have tended, on balance, to
discourage political reform in other Middle Eastern countries,
for two reasons. First, the demonstration of what can go
terribly wrong in a violent and destructive way has been a
disincentive to experiment with political change. Middle
Eastern leaders, like political leaders anywhere, tend to stick
with what has worked with them so far when confronted with such
frightening and uncertain consequences of change. And, second,
the identification of the United States with both the cause of
democratization and the war in Iraq has, unfortunately, led the
former subject to be tarnished with some of the ill will and
controversy associated with the latter, however illogical that
connection may be.
The fourth major issue, and an important one for three of
the states that border Iraq, is ethic separatism. And here, of
course, we're talking about the status of the Kurds, the
prototypical stateless ethnic group. Kurdish separatism is a
concern for both Syria and Iran, for example, which have
significant Kurdish minorities. The strongest worries, however,
are in Turkey, where Kurds constitute about 20 percent of the
population and where the organization that has usually been
known as the Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK, waged an
insurgent and terrorist campaign that left an estimated 35,000
people dead. Ankara has been very sensitive about any
suggestion of independence for Iraqi Kurdistan because of
worries about rekindling separatist sentiment among Turkish
Kurds. Turkey also is unhappy about what it regards as
insufficient action by Iraq or the United States against PKK
fighters who have taken refuge in northern Iraq.
The final set of issues I would highlight concerns effects
on the geopolitics of the Middle East; that is, on the relative
power and the foreign policies of neighboring states. Among the
neighbors the largest winner has been Iran. The war has
crippled what had been the largest regional counterweight to
Iranian influence, not to mention doing away with a dictator
who started a war in the 1980s that resulted in the deaths of
hundreds of thousands of Iranians. Iranians today view the war
in Iraq with mixed motives. The current leadership in Tehran
probably is pleased to see the United States continue to be
bogged down and bleeding in Iraq for the time being, but it
also has no reason to want escalating and unending disorder on
its western border. Tehran has been reaching out and providing
assistance to a wide variety of Iraqi groups. Although some of
this assistance may help to make trouble for United States
forces, it is best understood as an effort by Tehran to cast
out as many lines of influence as it possibly can do, that
whenever the dust in Iraq finally settles, it will have a good
chance of having the friendship of, or at least access to,
whoever is in power in Iraq.
Syria is another neighbor that faces a significantly
changed geopolitical environment as a result of events in Iraq.
The bitter and longstanding rivalry between the Syrian and
Iraqi wings of the Baathist movement had been a major
determinant of Syrian foreign policy for many years. It was the
principal factor that led Damascus to break ranks with its Arab
brethren and ally with Iran during the Iran-Iraq war. The
demise of the Iraqi Baathist regime has changed all this, as
punctuated by the restoration of diplomatic relations just 2
months ago, in November, between Syria and Iraq. Sectarian
considerations also must enter into thinking in Damascus, where
the regime is dominated by the minority Alawite sect, but rules
a Sunni majority. Meanwhile, Syria's main foreign-policy aim
continues to be return of the Golan Heights, which Syrian
leaders realize could come about only through cooperation with
the United States.
I've highlighted what I regard as the main issues that
involve the regional impact of this war. They are not the only
issues, of course. A major concern of Jordan, for example, is
the influx onto its territory of an estimated 700,000 Iraq
refugees. Syria also faces a major Iraqi refugee problem, as do
Lebanon and Egypt, and, to lesser degrees, other neighboring
states.
Oil is another interest for several Middle Eastern states,
given the obvious effects that different possible levels of
Iraqi production and export could have on the oil market, and,
thus, on the finances of these countries.
A concluding point, Mr. Chairman, concerns the United
States directly. Given how much the war in Iraq has become a
preoccupation for the United States, it necessarily colors
virtually all of our other dealings with countries in the
region. It has been one of the chief reasons for the decline in
the standing of the United States among publics in the region,
as recorded by opinion polls by such organizations as the Pew
group taken over the last several years. It has been a reason
for concern and doubt among Middle Eastern governments
regarding the attention and commitment that Washington can give
to other endeavors. And Middle Eastern governments know that it
has, in effect, relegated to a lower priority almost every
other U.S. interest in the Middle East.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Pillar follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Paul Pillar, Visiting Professor, Security
Studies Program, Georgetown University, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for the
privilege of participating in this very important series of hearings
related to the conflict in Iraq. I have been asked to address the
relationship between that conflict and other trends and developments in
the Middle East.
Events in other countries in the region will depend primarily on
issues and conditions in those countries; in my judgment, the hoped-for
beneficial demonstration effects that success in Iraq would have had on
the politics of the broader Middle East have always been overly
optimistic. Nonetheless, the development of a multifaceted and
worsening armed conflict in Iraq does have significant implications for
the rest of the region and by implication for U.S. interests in the
region. Unfortunately, conflict and instability tend to have greater
repercussions in a neighborhood than do success and stability.
In the case of Iraq and the Middle East, regional consequences
involve concerns by neighbors about what may yet lie ahead as well as
adjustments that regional actors already have made. The consequences
involve regimes in the region as well as nonstate actors such as
terrorist groups. And they involve direct consequences of the violence
in Iraq as well as more indirect reverberations from the conflict
there.
I want to emphasize how much uncertainty is involved in trying to
analyze the regional impact of the current war in Iraq, much less of
various future scenarios or policy options. It is simply impossible to
predict the full range of important regional effects, partly because of
the uncertainty that clouds Iraq's own future but also because of the
complexity of factors affecting events elsewhere in the Middle East.
Any prognostications that speak with certainty about particular future
effects ought to be met with skepticism.
With that understanding, I would identify five major dimensions on
which--although specific future consequences may be uncertain--the war
in Iraq already has had discernible impact elsewhere in the Middle East
and is likely to have more, and which, therefore, are worthy of
attention as debates over policy proceed. Those five are: Sectarian
divisions, extremism and terrorism, political change and
democratization, ethnic separatism, and the alignments and relative
influence of states in the region.
SECTARIAN CONFLICT
Sectarian divides within the Muslim world deserve to be discussed
first, because the violence in Iraq has increasingly assumed the
character of a civil war between Sunni and Shia. As such, it has
intensified sectarian sentiment, suspicions, and resentments all along
the Sunni-Shia faultline, only a portion of which runs through Iraq. It
would be almost impossible to overstate how strongly this divide, which
the Iraq war has made more salient, stokes feelings and fears among
many people of the Middle East. Rooted in centuries-old disputes over
succession to the Prophet, the conflict manifests itself today in, for
example, the perspective of some Sunnis (particularly the more
doctrinaire Wahhabis of Saudi Arabia) that Shia are not even true
Muslims. Just as important, the sectarian divide coincides with
resented patterns of economic privilege and political power.
The special significance of Iraq is that, although Shiites are a
minority of Muslims worldwide, they are a majority in Iraq (as well as,
of course, next door in Iran). The evident conviction of many Iraqi
Shiites that their time for political dominance has come cannot help
but put revisionist thoughts in the minds of their coreligionists
elsewhere in the region. These include the Shia minority in Saudi
Arabia, who are concentrated in the oil-rich eastern province and see
themselves treated as second-class citizens. They include the Shiites
who constitute a majority in Bahrain but are still under the rule of a
Sunni government. And they include Shiites in Lebanon, who probably are
the fastest-growing community in that religiously divided country and
who believe that current power-sharing arrangements give them an
unfairly small portion of power--a sentiment exploited by Lebanese
Hezbollah.
The conflict in Iraq has made this sectarian divide more salient
not only for Shia populations but also for regimes. The sectarian
coloration of that conflict is an acute concern for Saudi leaders, for
example, because of their own sympathy for Sunni Arabs in Iraq, the
emotions of other Saudis over the plight of their Sunni brethren in
Iraq, and any possibility of restiveness among Saudi Shiites. Looking
out from Riyadh, Saudis now see themselves as encircled by a Shia arc
that includes control of both of the other large Persian Gulf States--
Iran and Iraq--Shia activism in Lebanon, and significant Shia
populations in the Arab Gulf States as well as to their south in Yemen.
King Abdullah of Jordan also has spoken publicly about such a Shia arc.
For the United States, this intensification of sectarian conflict
carries several hazards, only one of which is the specter of direct
intervention by other regional actors in the Iraqi civil war. There
also are issues of stability in the other countries that must manage
their own part of the Sunni-Shia divide. And not least, there is the
difficulty of the United States doing almost anything in Iraq without
it being perceived, fairly or unfairly, as favoring one community over
the other and thereby antagonizing either Sunnis or Shiites, or perhaps
both, elsewhere in the region.
EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM
A second dimension on which the war in Iraq is having repercussions
throughout the Middle East--and in this case even beyond--concerns
extremist sentiment and the threat of international terrorism,
particularly from Islamist terrorists often styled as ``jihadists.''
Other wars in other Muslim lands have served as jihads in recent years,
including in Bosnia, Chechnya, Kosovo, and especially Afghanistan. The
Afghan jihad against the Soviets served as an inspiration to radical
Islamists, a training ground for terrorists, and a networking
opportunity for jihadists of diverse nationalities. We have seen the
effects in much of the international terrorism of the past decade and a
half. Iraq is now the biggest and most prominent jihad. It may
ultimately have effects at least as significant as those of earlier
jihads, because it is taking place in a large and important country
that is part of the core of the Arab and Muslim worlds, and because it
is partly a struggle against the United States, the sole remaining
superpower and the leader of the West.
The effects of the war in Iraq on international terrorism were
aptly summarized in the National Intelligence Estimate on international
terrorism that was partially declassified last fall. In the words of
the estimators, the war in Iraq has become a ``cause celebre'' for
jihadists, is ``shaping a new generation of terrorist leaders and
operatives,'' is one of the major factors fueling the spread of the
global jihadist movement, and is being exploited by al-Qaeda ``to
attract new recruits and donors.'' I concur with those judgments, as I
believe would almost any other serious student of international
terrorism.
The full effects on terrorism of the war in Iraq, as of the earlier
anti-Soviet campaign in Afghanistan, will not be seen and felt for a
good number of years. But some of the possible effects within the
surrounding region may already be seen in, for example, the suicide
bombings in Amman, Jordan, in November 2005, which were perpetrated by
Iraqis who belonged to the ``al-Qaeda in Iraq'' organization. Another
possible effect is the recent use in Afghanistan of suicide bombings, a
tactic not previously part of the repertoire of insurgents there but
perhaps partly exported from, or inspired by, Iraq where the tactic has
been used extensively.
I believe that the most important variable in Iraq in the months or
years ahead as far as the effects on international terrorism are
concerned is the sheer continuation of the war, as well as the
continued U.S. participation in it. ``Jihad'' means, literally,
``struggle.'' What is important to the jihadist, more so than any
particular outcome, is participation in a struggle. As long as the
jihadists' struggle in Iraq is not completely extinguished, it will
continue to inspire the Islamist rank-and-file and to be exploited by
the likes of al-Qaeda.
POLITICAL CHANGE AND DEMOCRATIZATION
A third important regional dimension is the possibility of
political change within Middle Eastern countries, especially change in
the favorable direction of more democracy and more civil and political
liberties in what is still, by most measures, the most undemocratic and
illiberal region of the world. One hopeful development in the Middle
East over the last few years has been an increase in open discussion of
issues of political change. There has been, at least, more talk about
the subject; it has been more of a live topic in more Middle Eastern
countries than a few years earlier. I believe the current U.S.
administration, with its rhetorical emphasis on democratization,
deserves a share of the credit for this.
In looking not just for talk but for meaningful action, however, it
is harder to be encouraged. What passes for political reform in the
Middle East has generally been slow, fragmentary, very cautious,
subject to backsliding, and more a matter of form than of substance.
It is difficult to point convincingly to effects, in one direction
or another, that the war in Iraq has had on political reform in other
Middle Eastern states. Inspired statesmanship should have good reason
to move ahead with reform regardless of what is happening in Iraq. But
most Middle Eastern statesmanship is not inspired. And in my judgment,
the all-too-glaring troubles in Iraq have tended, on balance, to
discourage political reform in other Middle Eastern countries, for two
reasons.
First, the demonstration of what can go wrong--in a very violent
and destructive way--has been a disincentive to experiment with
political change. Middle Eastern leaders, like leaders anywhere, tend
to stick with what they've got and with what has worked for them so
far, when confronted with such frightening and uncertain consequences
of political change. If today's Iraq is the face of a new Middle East,
then most Middle Eastern leaders, not to mention most publics, do not
want to be part of it.
Second, the identification of the United States with both the cause
of democratization and the war in Iraq has led the former to be
tarnished with some of the ill will and controversy associated with the
latter. This connection is, of course, illogical. But it should not be
surprising, given that some in the Middle East had already tended to
view liberal democracy with suspicion as an alien import from the West.
The issue of political change and democratization is important for
many Middle Eastern countries, but I would mention two as being of
particular significance. One is Egypt, the most populous Arab country
and a keystone of U.S. policy in the region. The Mubarak government has
evidently seen the need at least to appear to be open to reform, as
manifested in the holding in 2005 of an ostensibly competitive
Presidential election, in place of the prior procedure of a one-
candidate referendum. But such procedural change has not reflected any
significant loosening of Mubarak's hold on power. A continuing
emergency law helps to maintain that hold, opposition Presidential
candidates have not been treated fairly, and the most popular and
effective opposition party remains outlawed.
The other key country is Saudi Arabia, in which neither the form
nor the reality is remotely democratic, and in which power is still in
the hands of a privileged royal family in alliance with a religious
establishment. King Abdullah appears to recognize the need for reform
if Saudi Arabia is not to fall victim to more sudden and destructive
kinds of change. He faces stubborn opposition, however, not least from
within the royal family. Anything in the regional environment that
makes political reform appear riskier will make his task harder.
ETHNIC SEPARATISM
The fourth major issue, and an important one for three of the
states that border Iraq, is ethnic separatism. This really means the
issue of the Kurds, who ever since the peace of Versailles have been
the prototypical stateless ethnic group. Kurdish separatism is a
concern for Syria, in which Kurds, who are concentrated in the
northeast part of the country, constitute a bit less than 10 percent of
the Syrian population. It also is a concern in multiethnic Iran, where
Kurds in the northwest represent about 7 percent of Iran's population.
Kurdish dissatisfaction led to deadly riots in Syria in 2004 and in
Iran in 2005. The strongest worries, however, are in Turkey, where
Kurds constitute about 20 percent of the population and where the
organization usually known as the Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK,
waged an insurgent and terrorist campaign that has left an estimated
35,000 people dead. Ankara has been very sensitive about any suggestion
of independence for Iraqi Kurdistan, because of worries about
rekindling separatist sentiment among the Kurds of southeastern Turkey.
The Government of Turkey also has a strong interest in the status of
PKK fighters who have taken refuge in northern Iraq, and it has been
unhappy about what it considers to be insufficient U.S. or Iraqi
efforts against those fighters.
The views of regional governments toward the Kurds, as events in
Iraq play out over the coming months, will depend at least as much on
the legal and political forms applied to Iraqi Kurdistan as on the
practical facts on the ground. After all, since 1991 the Iraqi Kurds
have enjoyed--and neighboring governments have lived with--what has
largely been de facto independence, despite Kurdish participation in
politics in Baghdad. The situation may be similar to that of Taiwan in
the Far East, in which de facto independence is tolerated but any move
to make it de jure would be destabilizing.
ALIGNMENTS AND POWER OF NEIGHBORING STATES
The final set of issues I would highlight concerns the effects the
situation in Iraq is having on the geopolitics of the Middle East--that
is, the effects on the relative power, and the foreign policies, of
neighboring states. The geopolitical impact stems from at least three
aspects of that situation: The change in the ideological map of the
region resulting from removal of the Iraqi Baathist regime; the
competition of neighboring states for influence within Iraq; and the
debilitating effects of the war itself, which has greatly weakened what
had been one of the stronger states in the area.
Among the neighbors, the largest winner has been Iran. The war has
not only toppled the dictator who initiated an earlier war that killed
hundreds of thousands of Iranians; it also has crippled what had been
the largest regional counterweight to Iranian influence. Meanwhile, the
all-consuming preoccupation that the Iraq war has become for the United
States, along with the growing unpopularity of the war among Americans,
probably has made Iranian leaders less fearful than they otherwise
might have been about forceful U.S. action, including military action,
against Iran. This confidence is tempered, however, by the fact that
the occupation of Iraq has completed a U.S. military encirclement of
Iran, a posture that nonetheless suits the internal political purposes
of Iranian hard-liners as they play off an image of confrontation with
Washington.
Iranians today view the war in Iraq with a mixture of motives. The
current leadership in Tehran probably is pleased to see the United
States continue to be bogged down and bleeding in Iraq for the time
being. But it also has no reason to want escalating and unending
disorder on its western border. Tehran seems determined to exercise as
much influence as it can inside Iraq as whatever process of political
reconstruction there unfolds. It has been reaching out, and providing
assistance to, a wide variety of Iraqi groups, not just its traditional
allies such as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq.
Although some of this assistance may help to make trouble for U.S.
forces, it is best understood as an effort by Tehran to throw out as
many lines of influence as it can so that whenever the dust in Iraq
finally settles, it will have a good chance of having the friendship
of, or at least access to, whoever is in power. Iranian leaders
probably realize that creation in Iraq of a duplicate of their own
system of clerical rule is not feasible, but they at least want to
avoid a regime in Baghdad that is hostile to Iran.
Iranian leaders almost certainly hoped, prior to March 2003, that
they would be able--as was the case in Afghanistan--to work
cooperatively with the United States on the political reconstruction of
Iraq. That, of course, did not happen. But the shared U.S. and Iranian
interest in avoiding escalating and unending disorder in Iraq probably
would make Tehran, despite all the ill will that has transpired over
other issues, receptive to engagement with Washington. The Iranians
would want such engagement, however, not to be limited to any one
issue--be it Iraq, or the nuclear program, or anything else--but
instead to address all matters in dispute.
Syria is another neighbor that faces a significantly changed
geopolitical environment as a result of events in Iraq. The bitter and
longstanding rivalry between the Syrian and Iraqi wings of the Baathist
movement had been a major determinant of Syrian foreign policy. It was
the principal factor that led Damascus to break ranks with its Arab
brethren and to ally with Iran, and later to participate in Operation
Desert Storm, which reversed Saddam Hussein's aggression in Kuwait.
With the demise of the Iraqi Baathist regime, the foreign policy
equation for Syria has changed. Syria restored relations with Iraq in
November 2006. Although the economic ties between Syria and Iran are
substantial, Syria's main reason for its otherwise counterintuitive
alliance with Tehran is over. The sectarian dimension also must
influence thinking in Damascus, because the regime is dominated by the
minority Alawite sect but rules a Sunni majority. The implication of
all these factors is that there is significant potential for coaxing
Syria away from the alignment with Iran and its client Hezbollah, and
toward more cooperation with the United States, with the hope for Syria
of realizing what is still its main foreign policy goal: The return of
the Golan Heights.
Other regional states, including the gulf Arabs, are conscious of
the strength that Iraq once had and that, if it were again to become
stable and united, could be the basis for Iraq once again throwing its
weight around. They also are conscious of the fact that the issues
involved in previous conflicts involving Iraq were not all the creation
of Saddam Hussein. The longstanding enmity between Persian and Arab
that underlay the Iran-Iraq war certainly was not. And Kuwaitis viewing
the turmoil to their north know that the notion of Kuwait as rightfully
the 19th province of Iraq also predated Saddam, and has been part of
the undercurrent of relations with Iraq ever since Kuwait became
independent.
I have highlighted several of the main issues that involve the
regional impact of the Iraq war. They are not the only issues. A major
concern, for example, of another of Iraq's immediate neighbors--
Jordan--is the influx of approximately 700,000 Iraqi refugees. Syria
and other neighbors also are facing a significant Iraqi refugee
problem. Oil is another issue of high interest to several Middle
Eastern states, given the effects that different levels of Iraqi
production and export could have on oil prices and consequently on the
finances and economies of those states.
A concluding point concerns the United States directly. Given how
much the war in Iraq has become a preoccupation for the United States,
it necessarily colors virtually all of our other dealings with the
Middle East and with countries in the region. It has been one of the
chief reasons for the slide in the standing of the United States among
publics in the region, as recorded by opinion polls taken over the last
several years. It has been a reason for concern and doubt among
governments regarding the attention and commitment that Washington can
give to other endeavors. And Middle Eastern governments know that it
has, in effect, relegated to a lower priority almost every other U.S.
interest in the region.
Chairman Biden. Thank you very much. Your collective
testimony has generated a number of questions, and let me
begin.
Dr. Marr and Mr. Said, I've actually--as many have--read
the Iraqi Constitution, and I have it in front of me, and it is
a--if I were to make a comparison, I'd compare it to our
Articles of Confederation rather than the American
Constitution. And it lays out in detail how regions can become
regions; and, if they become regions, what authority they have,
the 18 governates can. Tell me, if you will, Dr. Marr, in light
of your point, on page two or three, in which you say, ``Iraq
is not likely to be a unified state dominated by a strong
central government in Baghdad for at least some time'' and
``the high degree of decentralization called for in the
Constitution.'' How do we square that?
Dr. Marr. I've read the Constitution, too, but, I must say,
not in the last month, so you may have to spark----
Chairman Biden. Well, then----
Dr. Marr. No; I know the whole issue of regionalism--the
question of whether Iraq, or rather federalism, is going to be
defined by large regions is a very controversial one. Now, we
have a clearly formulated region in the KRG, the Kurdish
Regional Government, which, as you know, would like, in my
view, to expand and take in other Kurdish-majority areas,
including Kirkuk, which I don't believe will be done entirely
tranquilly. I think that's a flashpoint that could cause a lot
of difficulty. And I also believe that, within that region,
while the Kurds are cooperating--and I give them high marks on
a lot of things--looking beneath the surface, some of these
differences, some of this fragmentation exists there, as well.
However, the Kurds have a solid region. Now, what is at stake
here is whether there's enough homogeneity among these two
other sectarian groups--``The Shia'' and ``The Sunnis''--to
form a region similar to that in Kurdistan. And one particular
party, SCIRI, Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in
Iraq--I won't say that again--would like to form a nine-
province Shia region in the south, which, of course, they
expect to control.
If we look at that map up there, it looks as though there's
a Shia majority down there, but, in fact, there's much more
fragmentation. I don't believe that that could be accomplished
without quite a bit of controversy with others, for example,
the Sadrists, just to mention one. And, indeed, that piece of
legislation, as you know, the legislation to enable the
Parliament to form that region, was postponed for 18 months,
precisely because people see it as controversial.
When we come to the so-called Sunni region, that's even
more difficult, because the Sunnis, in my view--you can't speak
of them as ``The Sunnis'' because they're very diverse. As a
whole, Sunnis have played the major role in the formation of
the state, and have dominated the state--not exclusively, but
it's been something they feel they've done. Getting Sunnis to
identify as Sunnis rather than Iraqis, nationalists, or even
Arab nationalists, is extremely difficult.
Last, but not least, there are large mixed areas, which are
undergoing a lot of sectarian differentiation. They are a
patchwork quilt. If we look at greater Baghdad, if we had a map
here of where these areas are, Kirkuk, many other areas such as
Diala, they are a nightmare. They include Kurds, Turkmen, Shia,
Sunnis--actually creating borders, dividing them up, would be
very difficult. And, in the end, I think we would have a
system, if we follow through with this, which is, in some ways,
repugnant to many people, that the dominant identity has to be
what you were born with, in----
Chairman Biden. If I can----
Dr. Marr [continuing]. One way or another.
Chairman Biden [continuing]. Interrupt. The dominant
identity, as I read the Constitution, doesn't require it to be
based upon a region, based upon ethnicity. In my seven visits
to Iraq, I meet with people, and they say they want to have
their local policeman running their local areas. They've gotten
along very well. And they don't want a national police force
dominated by a bunch of thugs patrolling their streets.
Question. Do any of you picture, in your lifetime, the
likelihood that a national police force will be patrolling the
streets of Fallujah? It's a serious question. Does anybody see
that in their lifetime?
[No response.]
Chairman Biden. I don't think so. I don't see it, either.
So, it's about time, I think, we, maybe, stop pushing a rope
here.
One of the questions I have, as well, is: What is the role
of Sistani? What influence does he possess now? Anyone. Yes.
Mr. Said. Well, I'll address the issue of Sistani, but I
also would like to come back on the issue of the Constitution.
Sistani has great moral authority in Iraq, and it extends
beyond the Shia community. However, that authority has been
eroding over the past 3 years.
Chairman Biden. Why?
Mr. Said. In part, because Sistani himself has been
manipulated, if you like, by some of the Shia political
parties.
Senator Boxer. I'm sorry, say that louder.
Mr. Said. He has been--the image--the institution of Mr.
Sistani has been manipulated by some of--by the--some of the
Shia parties who have been trying to glean legitimacy from him.
The institution of the Shia Marjiya has been used for political
means to advance narrow party political objectives. And this
has reflected negatively on--has tarnished, has limited--has
reduced the omnipotence of Sistani. At the end of the day, it's
very important to remember that Sistani is an apolitical--is a
nonpolitical religious leader who does not like to meddle in
politics. And he has largely withdrawn from interference since
the last elections.
Chairman Biden. Let me follow up with a question, since my
time is up.
Mr. O'Hanlon, you indicated that--which comports what we've
been told--that there are roughly about 5,000 politically
reliable, as well as well-trained, Iraqi forces. I listened
this morning to Mr. Bartlett, speaking for the President--and
I'm assuming he's going to say what Mr. Bartlett said today--
that, in a surge that will be in conjunction with Iraqi forces,
who will be moved into neighborhoods, who will be the ones,
``going door to door,'' do you believe there are a sufficient
number of reliable Iraqi forces to work with whatever surge
plan the President moves forward, if the President's plan
envisions a significant Iraqi military initiative along with
this surge?
Dr. O'Hanlon. Right now, Senator, I'd say no. I think the
only hope for changing that is if there can be some kind of a
broad political dynamic that's created in the next couple of
months, that's been different from what we've seen in the
past--some resolution on sharing oil, on rehabilitating former
Baathists who don't have blood on their hands, letting them
regain their jobs, all the things that probably should have
been done 2 or 3 years ago. There's some hope of creating--and
it's, of course, a political question. It's less about training
and less about the mathematics of the schedule, and more about
this national need for consensus.
Chairman Biden. Do you all agree that oil has the potential
to be the glue that holds the country together, rather than
splits it apart?
Mr. Said. Definitely. And as the resolution on the oil
negotiation shows, one could come up with solutions that go
beyond the Constitution----
Chairman Biden. Well----
Mr. Said [continuing]. Beyond the----
Chairman Biden [continuing]. There's been no resolution on
the distribution of the revenue. There has been a resolution--
tentative, as I understand it--on who has authority to
determine whether or not investments will be made, in what
wells and where. But if you're sitting out there in the Sunni
province, where you've got a lot of nice sand and shale, and
not much else, you're going to want to know, ``How much is
coming my way?'' in terms of revenue-sharing, and, ``What
guarantees are there to be?'' In my understanding, that's the
point that has not been resolved. Is that correct?
Dr. Marr. I'm not entirely sure of that. But I think
negotiations are going on now, and, to my surprise, I've been
impressed by the fact that there have been some compromises on
this--by the Kurds, for example, who are the most eager to get
going on this. Maybe not enough compromises yet, but there have
actually been some. So, I think it could move ahead in that
direction, but it could also be a point of contention,
depending on how it's done.
Chairman Biden. That's encouraging. My time is up. I thank
you.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate the four statements. And I suspect that--I
appreciate them even more having read, in the Wall Street
Journal yesterday, a story called ``Nightmare Scenario,'' which
relates to the U.S. withdrawal from the region. Now, although a
lot of our debate, politically, has been over whether troops
should come in or whether they should come out, and the
timeframe for the coming out, and so forth, the Wall Street
Journal had this paragraph that said, ``The United States is
pushing a wide-ranging strategy to persuade Sunni allies that
are serious about countering the rise of Iran in exchange for
Arab help in Iraq and Palestinian territories. Key to the
effort is to continue to promise to keep United States forces
in Iraq for as long as necessary. But the United States is also
beefing up the U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf, plans to deepen
security cooperation with the gulf allies. The Pentagon has
proposed sending a second carrier battle group to the gulf
region. There are also advanced plans in the way to knit
together the air defense systems of the six smaller states,
including Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates, and to
build a United States-administered missile defense system.
Similarly, the Air Force is laying plans to lay up exercises
with Arab allies in the region. One proposal calls for the
United States to hold combined air exercise with Oman and the
UAE.''
Now, that's a very sizable agenda going on, quite apart
from the debate that we're having as to whether as many as
20,000 troops, in some form or other, get to Baghdad. I want to
raise a question of the panel, of any of you. You've
illustrated the interests of each of the regional governments,
and discussed in your testimony, how critical U.S. presence is
for them. Absent that, they have testified, either publicly or
covertly, that they will take action--the Jordanians, even--to
carve out, maybe, a space to take care of these 700,000
refugees that you have mentioned; or the Saudis, quite overtly,
that they may come to the assistance of Sunnis in Iraq under
certain conditions. Likewise, the Syrians, conflicted, in a
way, because of the nature of their government, but their Sunni
majority has a deep interest in Iraq outcomes. Furthermore, the
Turks, as you have mentioned, quite apart from Iran--
characterized as the big winner--each with important interests
in Iraq.
What if Secretary Rice, as she heads out to the area Friday
to begin a very important and timely tour, were to suggest all
of us need to come together--by ``all of us,'' I mean the
United States and Iraq, the Turks, the Iranians and the Syrians
and the Jordanians, and even the Egyptians and the Saudis--
around the same table to meet rather continuously? This is not
the old debate, ``Should we have negotiations with Syria?
Should we ever talk to Iran?'' Rather, the subject of
conversation question is, each of these countries has an
interest in Iraq, presently, and an interest in us--that is,
the United States presence in the region. What about this
carrier group? What about the six countries with conducting air
exercises over here? What do they think about the United States
having more troops in the general area? Where? What should they
be doing? Now, we may not want to share all of our plans,
although this is pretty explicit in the Wall Street Journal, in
terms of a permanent presence. But absence means chaos for a
good number of people. And you have to consider those who will
take advantage of the situation in ways that, strategically,
may be injurious to the United States and certainly a good
number of other people, including the specter raised in the
article of all-out warfare, which would likely constrict the
supply of oil to everybody in the world, the price goes sky
high, recessions occur--the subject, really not discussed
today, but an implication of this predicament.
Now, is it practical, if the Secretary were to say, ``I'd
like to have a meeting. We can have it wherever you want to
have it, but we'd like to see everybody around the table''--
what would be the response, at this point, of the neighbors?
Would they come together? Would they want to see each other?
Would they want to participate with us? Do you have any feel
about some type of strategy, of grand diplomacy in which we,
sort of, lay all the cards on the table and try to think
through what is happening in this troubled period, which you
all have said is going to take time to evolve--not 6 months or
a year or so forth, but an evolutionary struggle for a state to
evolve in Iraq, in which that kind of time can only be
guaranteed if all the rest of the players are not restive and
aggressive? Anyone have thoughts about this idea? Yes.
Mr. Said. I think you raise a very important point. And
there's a situation of putting the cart before the horse in the
debate about Iraq--surge, withdrawal, troop movement. I think
the decision on troops should come on the back of such
settlement that you have outlined--a comprehensive regional
agreement. Iraq's neighbors will have various attitudes toward
that, because some of them, as has been suggested, are
flourishing--and generally like the current state of affairs,
although they fear deterioration. Others have been crying for
attention. Saudi Arabia, in particular, had been demanding
attention to the situation of Iraq, from the United States, as
well as Turkey. So, there will be various responses.
One problem with having a comprehensive regional conference
to address all the issues in the region, that this is a--quite
a big load for one conference, but there is no doubt that, as
suggested, also, by the Baker-Hamilton Report, that there is
need for a regional approach. Iraq cannot be solved on its own,
Palestine cannot be solved on its own. But the decision on
troops and troop movements should come on the back of such--the
blueprint of such agreement, rather than come ahead of it.
Senator Lugar. Yes.
Dr. O'Hanlon. Senator, I'd like to add one word on this,
and it's sort of a hawkish case for regional engagement, if you
will, which is that, I--Paul Pillar mentioned, earlier, that
Iran's interest here may be trying to maximize its influence. I
think there's also a chance that Iran is trying to deal the
United States a major strategic defeat and try to drive us, not
only out of Iraq, but out of the region, and that Iraq--that
Iran has gotten more ambitious as this war has gone worse.
I would see one purpose of a regional conference as
disabusing Iran of the notion that it can drive us out of the
region, and sitting down and making it clear to Iran that they
should have an interest in some level of stability in Iraq,
because, even if Iraq totally fails, which it might, we are
going to stay committed, to the extent our regional partners
wish, to the Persian Gulf, and that Iran has no chance of
driving us out of the region. I think that message is worth
sending. I'd be very curious--I know people in this room have
been articulate about the need for different options in Iraq,
but I haven't heard anybody say we should get out of the
Persian Gulf. And I think Iran needs to be disabused of the
notion that they could drive us out.
Senator Lugar. And particularly because we have
negotiations with Iran about nuclear weapons. That goes on
somewhere very close to this. And perhaps a feeling, by Iran,
that, in fact, if we are in a withdrawal status would have, I
think, a deep effect upon that set of negotiations.
Dr. Pillar. Senator Lugar, if I could just add to what Mike
said. If you look at the perspectives of, say, the Saudis--and
the issue has been raised about Saudi concern, about the ties
with the United States, and so on--it really isn't American
troops fighting in Iraq that are most important to the Saudis,
as far as their own security is concerned; it has to do with
those other aspects of the U.S. presence, the overall U.S.
security guarantee, and so on.
And my other final comment would be, how the regional
actors would respond to that kind of initiative depends on
other things, as well, such as what the United States is doing
vis-a-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict. And that's the reason the
Iraq Study Group highlighted that issue, as well.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
Chairman Biden. Thank you.
Senator Kerry.
Senator Kerry. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
There's so much to try to tackle, and it's hard to do,
obviously, in a short period of time. We appreciate your
testimony this morning.
Let me try to cut to the, sort of--there's a short-term and
a long-term set of interests here. The long-term interests are
enormous. And you've just touched on them. I mean, obviously,
none of us on either side of the aisle--I don't think anybody
in Congress--wants to give short shrift to the large strategic
interests we have in the region. And anybody who's been
talking, like myself, about the need to push the process--and I
recommended an international peace conference in--3 years ago.
Nothing's happened. We've been sitting around not engaging in
this kind of political resolution, while we've continued down
the military side. But none of us have suggested that there
isn't a huge interest in the stability of the region, in the--
in our neighbors, in a whole set of strategic issues. But when
you measure those interests against what Iraq is doing to our
interests, you come out on a real low side of that ledger. Iran
is more powerful. Hezbollah is more powerful. Hamas is more
powerful. ``The Shia Revival,'' as Vali Nasr refers to it, is
more real. I mean, things that weren't staring us in the face
are now staring us in every quarter. We're worse off.
So, our current policy is, in fact, not protecting our
interests, not doing for the forces that we want to support in
those countries, what's in their interest. And, in the end,
we're setting ourselves backward.
Against that, you have to, sort of, ask yourself, OK, so
where do you go here, to put those interests back on the table
and resolve this? No. 1 issue in front of us is this question
of more troops. Now, that speaks, I think, to both short and
long term. Let me just come to it very quickly.
General Abizaid said--and now he's leaving, we understand
there's a transition, but I don't think you could quickly
dismiss his experience, his being in the field, General Casey
being in the field, and what they've observed and learned in
that period of time--and he said, point blank on November 15 of
last year, ``I've met with every divisional commander, General
Casey, the corps commander, General Dempsey. We all talked
together. And I said, `In your professional opinion, if we were
to bring in more American troops now, does it add considerably
to our ability to achieve success in Iraq?' And they all said
no.''
Now, Mr. Said, you just said, yourself, that adding more
troops may, in fact, make it more difficult to get a
resolution. So, my question to each of you, in sum, is: If
there isn't sufficient evidence of this kind of summitry and
diplomacy, if there isn't a sufficient political process in
place--and I want your judgment as to whether or not there is--
will more troops have any chance of, in fact, getting what we
want, or is it going to make matters worse? And, if it does,
where are we, after putting them in, in 6 months, if it hasn't
worked?
Mr. O'Hanlon.
Dr. O'Hanlon. Senator Kerry, very tough question. I like
your idea of a ledger. On the positive side of the troop-surge
proposal, I would say, we all know, tactically, there have
never been enough troops in Iraq to clear and hold. So, that's
the tactical argument for this case. It would have been a much
more compelling argument 3 and 4 years ago than it is today,
but I think it remains, at some level, in the plus column. On
the negative column, of course, we know that there is no
political resolution of these very sectarian divides----
Senator Kerry. Well, hold on a minute. I mean, 30,000
troops or 20,000 troops, is there anybody who imagines,
measured against the task, that that's enough to do the job?
Dr. O'Hanlon. You have to hope that you can get momentum in
Baghdad, or in parts of Baghdad, and then that will begin to
have a spillover effect. So, narrowly speaking, I would say no;
there's no hope you can do it nationwide with 20,000 troops.
Senator Kerry. Go ahead and finish up.
Dr. O'Hanlon. Well, I think--I think, you know, that's the
main tactical argument in favor. Most of the other arguments
say, either there's a danger to this, to our Army and Marines,
to the Iraqi sense of dependency on us, or it's not going to be
enough.
Getting to Senator Biden's question earlier, ``Are there
enough Iraqi security forces to team with us to be
dependable?'' Absolutely not, unless there's a much stronger
political consensus in Iraq.
So, I would not oppose the surge, but I would only support
it if it's in the context of a much broader----
Senator Kerry. Political settlement. And you don't see the
political settlement effort or capacity there now.
Dr. O'Hanlon. Not now.
Dr. Marr. I would ask----
Senator Kerry. Dr. Marr.
Dr. Marr [continuing]. Very carefully, what these troops
are going to do. I have some questions as they get involved in
this complex sectarian situation and other issues. Are they
going to attack simply Muqtada, or are they also going to
attack insurgents? What are the Iraqis going to do? What are
others going to do? What are these troops going to do, and what
is the strategy that is going to be employed?
One other issue, about sending them or not sending them in,
is the question of how we get Iraqis--I don't want to say to
just step up to the plate; that's a very simplistic idea--but,
indeed, Iraqis themselves are the only ones who can ultimately
sort out and move ahead on this sectarian strife issue. And
whether sending the troops in and doing the job for them is
going to provide an atmosphere which enables them to do it, or
whether it's going to delay the hard choice they face. This is
another issue----
Senator Kerry. Do you see the political process in place to
resolve the fundamental differences between an Abdul Aziz al-
Hakim and a Muqtada al-Sadr, between the very--the interests of
the militias, the warlordism that Mr. Said just referred to,
the Sunni reluctance to participate, the Sunni desire to
reemerge as the people who run the country, the interests of
certain individuals with respect to Iran, the Persian-Arab
divide? I mean, all of these things are, it seems to me, so
huge, so historically and culturally deep in this issue, that,
as it further disintegrates into this morass of individual
interests, you can't--our troops can't pull that back together,
can they, Mr. Said?
Mr. Said. No. Troops, alone, can never resolve this. I
mean--well, there's one caveat to that, of course. If you send
500,000 troops to Iraq, you may be able to steamroll the
situation without there being a political consensus, but there
is no--neither the resources nor the will to do that. So, given
the lack of the possibility to mobilize the necessary troops,
the troops need to come on the back of political consensus, on
the back of a political settlement that is internationally
mediated, that is supported by Iraq's neighbors, as well as the
various communities in Iraq.
Senator Kerry. I mean, I want to get your answer, too, Mr.
Pillar, but, as you do, because time runs so fast, could you
just touch on the question of to what degree the presence of
the American troops delays the willingness of people to resolve
those issues, and acts as a cover for people's other interests
to be able to play out to see who's on top and who's on the
bottom?
Dr. Pillar. I think there's a strong sense, both among
Iraqis and with the regional players, the subject of Senator
Lugar's question, that, as long as the United States is doing
the heavy lifting, however much of an interest they have in
eventually resolving the situation, they are not the ones in
the front having to do it. There is an issue of having to
concentrate the minds.
Senator Kerry. Do you want to comment, Mr. Pillar? You said
something about the Green Zone state that struck me. The Green
Zone state might fall. Isn't the fact that it is only a Green
Zone state, kind of fundamental to this question of legitimacy
and of resolving these larger political differences?
Dr. Pillar. I think some--I think that was your----
Senator Kerry. And would you, as you touch on that, tell
me: If the troops start going after the militia--and I'm
reading that they're talking about an evenhandedness in the
application of this--what is the Muqtada al-Sadr response to
that? And where do the Badr Brigade and the Jaish al-Mahdi come
out in that conflict?
Mr. Said. It's speculative, at this point, to judge what
the troops are going to do. The Iraqi Government security plan,
although, declares that all the militias will be attacked, but
also, in the same breath, states that they view Sunni violence
as the primary objective. So, on the back of this security
plan, the surge of U.S. troops can be seen as taking sides in
the ongoing sectarian conflict. The United States may declare
that it will go differently, but, at this point, the agreement,
since the meeting in Amman between the Prime Minister and the
President, seems to have been to go for one last push in
support of the elites that have emerged out of the current
political process and against their enemies. And this could
contribute--if mishandled, and especially if no protection is
offered to all communities, to all Iraqi communities, this
could embroil the United States in a new role in Iraq, as being
a party in the conflict.
Senator Kerry. My time is up, but----
Mr. Said. Thank you.
Senator Kerry [continuing]. But none of you answered the
question--maybe you will as you go along here--of: What happens
if this fails?
Mr. Said. It will make--it will make the negotiations even
harder. I mean, we have a window of opportunity today, and
maybe passing, for a negotiated settlement, including the
region. Further blood, more blood--and, if it's seen as one-
sided--will make negotiations even harder, down the road.
Chairman Biden. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Hagel.
Senator Hagel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you each for your presentations and your continued
efforts to educate and inform not just the Congress, but the
American people. And that, as we all appreciate, is of great
essence, on probably the most significant issue this Nation has
faced since Vietnam. Not just as you all have said, and each in
your own way, noted, that it is not just an Iraqi issue, it is
far broader, and the consequences are far more significant.
It's a regional issue, and some of us have been saying that for
some time.
As I have listened to your presentations and my colleagues'
questions, no matter the question, no matter the answer, no
matter the issue, the dynamic, it all comes back to one
fundamental thing, and that's the absolute requirement for
political settlement, not just in Iraq, but in the Middle East.
And each of you has been very articulate in framing those
issues in some specificity.
I noted, Mr. Said, in your testimony and comments, if I can
quote--I think you said something to the effect that no
framework for a peaceful resolution exists now in Iraq. You
then further, toward the end of your statement, said, ``What
Iraq needs now is an international sponsored peace process, a
framework.'' You engaged Senator Lugar on this issue, to some
extent. With that in mind, and each of you have noted Professor
Marr's point about: Only the Iraqis, essentially, can settle
their differences. Dr. Brookings--I mean, Dr. O'Hanlon----
[Laughter.]
Chairman Biden. You don't mind Dr. Brookings, do you?
Dr. O'Hanlon. Thank you. [Laughter.]
Senator Hagel. I think your mother was from that side of
the family. [Laughter.]
Dr. O'Hanlon noted that this was going to require a broad
political dynamic. So, if I have listened as attentively as I
think I have to each of you, you all come to the same
conclusion. So, here's the question. We will, tonight, learn,
from the President of the United States, what he is going to
propose to the Congress and the American people, and to our
allies--most specifically, to the Iraqi Government--on where we
go from here. I think it's pretty clear what that proposal is
going to consist of. And you mentioned Baker-Hamilton. I don't
think that there is any great--I'll listen to the President
tonight, carefully, obviously, to find out, but I don't think
there is any great attention in what the President is going to
say tonight that comes from, or a result of, the 79
recommendations that came out of the Baker-Hamilton
Commission--one, specifically, which has been noted here,
engagement with Iran and Syria, and the wider diplomatic
regional focus.
If you all had the opportunity--and I know you all talk to
the White House and decisionmakers--but to focus on two or
three most specific issues, in the President's presentation
tonight, as to what he will be proposing, what would you say
are the most important two or three? Or what would you like to
see are the most important two or three? Or, if you were the
President, what do you think is the essence of where we go from
here, and why? And I know we are limited in our time, but I
have 4 minutes; that gives each of you 1 minute. And we would
start with Dr. Marr.
Thank you.
Chairman Biden. You can go over, on your answers.
Dr. Marr. I would focus on regional cooperation. That is to
say, getting the regional community in, either by a big
conference, which I tend to think isn't going to work very
well, or by a contact group, something that allows us to deal
with them individually--would be very important, and getting
them on board on stablizing Iraq. And, second, on the kinds of
pressures, incentives, other things we're going to have to
undertake, as the group that's providing most of the force in
Iraq, to nudge Iraqis--that means the political parties in
power now--to cooperate, to get on with reconciliation, to deal
with the de-Baathification issue, and other things. Ultimately
that's going to determine what kind of response we get in Iraq.
Senator Hagel. Mr. O'Hanlon.
Dr. O'Hanlon. Senator, I would focus, as Phebe has just
said, on the need for political reconciliation. I think it's
the overwhelming prerequisite to any kind of success, or even
averting complete failure in Iraq, at this point. It's hard for
the President to really create the right mentality in Iraqi
minds, because, of course, he is so committed to this
operation. But it strikes me that the Iraqis need to feel like
2007 is a make-or-break year. Hopefully, they can read our
politics well enough to know that this country may support the
President tonight if he asks for more effort in various ways,
but I think it's probably his last chance to really get that
kind of support from the country, and he may not even get it
this time. And so, I hope that there's a sense of acute focus
among Iraqis on the need to resolve issues like sharing oil
equally, reining in militias, rehabilitating former Baathists
who don't have blood on their hands directly, and dealing with
issues like Kirkuk. If that doesn't work, the President can't
talk about it very easily tonight, but I think the backup plan
is to think about this more like Bosnia and move toward a
facilitated resolution of the civil war, where we move toward
autonomous regions and help people relocate so they're in
neighborhoods where they feel safer. I think that's the obvious
backup plan, and pretty much the only choice we're going to
have within 9 to 12 months, unless things turn around quickly.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Mr. Said.
Mr. Said. For a political settlement in Iraq, Iraqis need
to come together to decide on the shape of the state they want
to live in. That's the essence of a political process that is--
that doesn't exist now. We have the formal mechanisms--we have
elections, we have a constitution, we have a government--but
they are not working. And the evidence to that is the violence
and the apathy that I have spoken about. So, there needs to be
an external intervention, because Iraqi forces, Iraqi political
entities and groups, are clearly unable to reach that consensus
on their own. There is a need for international intervention in
that regard. And it's better that it's multilateral rather than
the United States doing it alone, as it has been trying over
the last 3 years. There is a need to bring in more players, who
can cajole the various actors, who can bring them to the table,
and who can provide the essential support needed to implement
whatever the Iraqis agree on--needed to support whatever the
Iraqis can agree on.
And only on the back of that, one can then decide which
forces stay, which forces leave. Maybe other actors will be
able to bring their own forces to the table after having been
engaged properly.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Dr. Pillar. It is unfortunate that--but true, as you said,
Senator--that what we hear tonight probably is not going to be
drawn much from the Baker-Hamilton Report, so I would just use
the last few seconds to say I endorse strongly both the
approach in the report that the regional engagement, including
engagement with the likes of Syria and Iran, has to be part of
a package, and, second, to support the whole concept of an
approach toward the troop presence in Iraq that let's Iraqis,
as well as the American people, look forward to a future in
which, as the report put it, by the first quarter of 2008,
essentially the combat role by United States troops will be
over.
Senator Hagel. Thank you, to each of you. Mr. Chairman,
thank you.
Chairman Biden. Thank you very much. We usually move--at
least I have been moving based on seniority, but Senator--my
good friend, Senator Dodd, is here, but he suggested that I
move to Senator Feingold.
Senator Dodd. Before you jump too quickly at that, Mr.
Chairman, as a strong supporter of the seniority system--I've,
over the years, acquired the ability to appreciate it--let me
briefly, briefly say--let me congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, on
taking the gavel here--to thank Dick Lugar for tremendous
leadership on this committee. And it's a continuation--a
continuum here. I'm not surprised at all that Joe Biden is
convening a hearing like this, with a distinguished group of
panelists, to talk about the critical foreign policy issue of
the day. It's exactly what Dick Lugar has been doing before.
It's great to see this kind of leadership move back and forth
here, with people who are highly competent, know what they're
talking about, and providing great leadership in the country on
this issue. So, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, very, very much.
Chairman Biden. Thank you.
Senator Feingold.
Senator Feingold. Well, as an increasingly strong supporter
of the seniority system----
[Laughter.]
Senator Feingold [continuing]. Let me thank Senator Dodd
for his tremendous courtesy in this regard.
Senator Kerry. Ask Senator Webb how he feels about this.
[Laughter.]
Senator Feingold. Thank you all for coming to testify in
front of this committee. And thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
for arranging this and the rest of the hearings we'll be having
over the next few weeks. I know you and your staff have worked
hard to lay out a range of good hearings and witnesses so this
committee can grapple with one of the most significant
challenges, really, in our Nation's history.
Unfortunately, these hearings are taking place in the
context of increasing violence in Iraq, a lack of political
agreement among Iraqi political factions, an overstrained
United States military, and an overwhelming and accurate sense
among the American people that the President's policies in Iraq
are wrong. This really is, of course, a tragic situation. And I
appreciate your candor and insights today on what I hope will
be the first of many open, honest, and candid hearings we'll
have.
My colleagues have already addressed a number of important
issues. I don't want to take a lot of time here today, but I do
want to talk about a critical aspect of the administration's
Iraq policy: What the role of the United States military in
Iraq is, given what you've been talking about, political
deadlock and increasing sectarian violence; what impact the
current United States military presence in Iraq is having on
the political, economic, and security conditions in Iraq; and,
most importantly, what impact our continuing presence in Iraq
is having on our efforts to defeat terrorist networks not just
in Iraq, not just in the region, but around the world. I think
sometimes we forget this isn't a regional issue, it is an
international issue. And I think one of the greatest failings
of our view of this is that we look at this either in--through
the prism of Iraq or even through the prism of the Middle East.
That is insufficient, in light of what happened to us on 9/11,
in light of the challenges to the security of the American
people.
So, let me start with Dr. Pillar. Let me focus on a
statement you made in your testimony. To paraphrase, you said
you concurred with the statements in the declassified national
intelligence estimate published by DNI on September 26, 2006,
that suggested that Iraq could become a ``cause celebre'' for
jihadists, and that it is ``shaping a new generation of
terrorist leaders and operatives,'' and is being exploited by
al-Qaeda to ``attract new recruits and donors.''
First, in speaking generally about your analysis, would the
withdrawal of American troops from Iraq at some point help
counter the ability of al-Qaeda and other jihadists around the
world to recruit new members?
Dr. Pillar. Yes, sir; I believe it would, which is not to
say that it would undo much of the damage that's already been
done. What's taking place in Iraq right now is that the current
prominent jihad mirrors what took place in Afghanistan in the
earlier jihad against the Soviets in the 1980s, where a number
of effects occurred. One, it became a huge inspiration and
propaganda point, a kind of rallying point. Two, it was a
training ground, in a very specific way. Lots of people learned
how to handle firearms and explosives to put to other use. And
third, it was the ultimate extremist networking opportunity, in
which you had people of different nationalities--Pakistanis,
Arabs, what have you--who came together. And we're still seeing
the effects of that today. I think most of the long-term
effects of the jihad in Iraq paralleling that most of those we
have yet to see. What's already occurred cannot be undone. But
the short answer to your question is yes; we can avoid
compounding the damage by reducing, or bringing to a close, our
presence there.
Senator Feingold. Thank you for that direct answer. So,
more specifically, then, is it safe to say that al-Qaeda will
continue to exploit the presence of a significant level of
United States military personnel in Iraq?
Dr. Pillar. There's no question in my mind that it will.
It's been one of the biggest propaganda points that al-Qaeda
has been offered.
Senator Feingold. In your prepared statement, you said
that, ``The most important variable in Iraq in the months or
years ahead is the sheer continuation of the war, as well as
the continued United States participation in it.'' So, for
example, if the United States began redeploying from Iraq, what
would be the long-term impact on al-Qaeda, globally, in your
view?
Dr. Pillar. Senator Feingold, I think you have to bear in
mind that ``jihad'' means, literally, ``struggle.'' What's most
important for the people we're talking about is not a
particular outcome, or what we, back in this country, might
consider, in our lexicon, victory or defeat and what have you.
It's participation in a struggle, and especially participation
in a struggle against a superpower. And with the Soviets no
longer around, that's us. So, just about any outcome that is
within the realm of imagination of anyone in this room, which
would involve at least some violence still in Iraq, is going to
serve that purpose of a struggle. So, that's the most important
thing, not a particular outcome or this side winning or that
side losing.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Doctor.
Dr. O'Hanlon, thanks for your testimony. First, let me
applaud the work that you and your colleagues at Brookings are
doing on Iraq. Your data and analysis are helpful and
insightful. Let me ask you some questions about some of the--
what lies beneath the data.
Your data obviously highlights troubling trends. It shows
that, regardless of the size of United States troop presence in
Iraq--and your data shows that it has gone from 123,000 in 2003
to 140,000 in 2006--Iraqi civilian fatalities, estimated
strength of the insurgency, strength of the Shia militias, and
daily average interethnic attacks and the estimated number of
foreign fighters have all risen over the past 3 years, without
fail. Given that we can't, from this data, draw a connection
between U.S. troop levels and the improvement of any of these
important indicators, can we draw a conclusion with your data
that sending in more U.S. troops will actually have an impact
on any of these key indicators?
Dr. O'Hanlon. No; not from the data, Senator. I think
there's a possibility of constructing a theory that the added
troops could help, especially in the context of a broader
political and economic initiative. But there's no data that
would prove that it would work. And, in fact, I think that, to
the contrary, I would be, while not against the surge proposal,
if done in a broader context, I'd be skeptical, at this point,
that it can make a big difference.
Senator Feingold. As you mentioned, the other big troubling
statistic is shown in the number of Iraqis who are displaced.
This is turning into an incredible humanitarian tragedy.
According to your data, in your view: Would an increase in
United States military personnel in Iraq address any of the
driving factors of their displacement--presumably things like
bombings, growing militias, interethnic attacks? As we
discussed, it appears as if the numbers don't support the
hypothesis that more troops will help settle things down.
Dr. O'Hanlon. Well, again, you can tell a story, you can
construct a theory of how more neighborhood-by-neighborhood
security might help reduce the ethnic displacement. But, again,
we have no evidence from the information, that we've
accumulated over 4 years' time, to prove that. Even in an
earlier period, when there was less violence and less for the
United States and its partners to deal with day to day in Iraq,
we were not able to get things on a positive trajectory. So, I
think, if anything, the data would make one skeptical. Can't
prove it, one way or another, but should make one skeptical
about the prospects.
Senator Feingold. Well, studying your data, what dynamics
or variables, in your view, have had the most significant
impact on reducing violence in Iraq? The top-line numbers
you've given us show, again, pretty consistent increase in the
violence across the board, but do you see any connections or
positive stories in that data that should contribute to
formulating policy proposals?
Dr. O'Hanlon. I see virtually no positive news on the hard
numbers of security or economics. The only good news really is
in the politics and the public opinion, although there's less
than there used to be. Two or three years ago, it was possible
to tell a better story, because 2 or 3 years ago, the Shia
really seemed to believe in the future of Iraq, and that's when
you had the Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani more vocal, trying to
rein in some of the militias. The overall Shia response to the
insurgency seemed to be one of patience, of believing time was
on their side anyway. They stayed optimistic in the polls. They
still seemed to believe in the idea of an integrated Iraq. The
Sunni Arabs were very skeptical all along, and very quickly
soured on our presence, as you know, but the Shia stayed
positive for a long time. Unfortunately, that's gone, to a
large extent, and I don't know how to recreate it.
So, I'm certainly much more pessimistic about the idea of
building an integrated Iraq, at this point, than I have been in
the previous 4 years.
Senator Feingold. Well, thanks, all of you.
And, again, thank you very much, Senator Dodd.
Chairman Biden. Thank you, Senator.
I would note the presence of Chairman Lantos's wife,
Annette Lantos, in the audience. Welcome. I'm glad you've come
over to the other side. Thank you.
Senator Coleman is next, but he is absent.
So, Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman, it's an honor to be on this
committee.
Chairman Biden. We welcome you. We're delighted to have you
with us.
Senator Corker. Thank you. And I'm glad to see that, after
Ranking Member Lugar had 35 hearings, you're doing the same.
This is a tremendous service to us in the Senate, to our
country, and I appreciate what you're doing very much, and echo
what Senator Dodd said, a minute ago.
I'm a new member. I'll ask one question and then move on to
other members. But I know that we all want to see a stable
Iraq, and we all want to see our men and women in uniform home
as soon as possible. And I keep hearing that possibly the
addition of troops would be better served after political
settlements could occur. And I guess the question is: Is there
any real thought that political settlements can occur with so
much chaos, with so much lack of security for citizens there in
Iraq today?
Dr. Marr. I'll start by taking a crack at that. I'm not
optimistic either, but I'm a realist. And so, my expectations,
from the start, were perhaps not of the highest.
I think the idea that we're operating in a timeframe where,
in the next year or two, according to our exigencies here, the
situation is going to play out in Iraq is wrong. Their
timeframe--as you can see if you talk to any of these leaders
coming over here--is a much longer one. And I, frankly, think
this chaos, perhaps not with the same level of killing--but
this kind of instability is going to go on for a very long
time, until the population and the political leadership that
either benefits or loses from it comes to the conclusion that
they're losing more than they're gaining. And the settlement is
not going to result from some grand conference, some grand
reconciliation. I'd like to suggest, again, it's going to be
much more mundane and prosaic. And we see it going on at a
local level. It will come from different groups making
different deals with different people across these divides
until something more cohesive emerges. That's going to take
quite some time. And whether our patience with this process is
going to last or not is an open question.
Dr. O'Hanlon. A somewhat different take, Senator, although
I greatly respect Dr. Marr's point and I think there's a lot to
it. I would also say, when 100,000 people a month are being
driven from their homes, the idea that the conflict can stay at
this level indefinitely, and essentially retain a character
like we're seeing today, is not what I would agree with or
prognosticate. I would say that we have a couple of years to
save anything like a multiethnic integrated Iraq. Frankly, I
don't think it's that important to save it. I think stability
is much more important than salvaging the kind of Iraq that's
been there in the past, from America's strategic-interest
perspective. And I think we're going to have to see progress on
that in the course of 2007, in part because of American
politics, but in part because another year's worth of this
level of ethnic cleansing and Iraq starts to look more and more
like three separated regions, where you essentially had a civil
war divide the country. I see Dr. Marr is disagreeing with me,
but that's what the numbers say to me.
And so, I think that we are going to have to view 2007 as
our last best chance to have anything like current strategy
succeed, and, if it doesn't, with or without a surge, I think
within a year we're going to have to start having a
conversation about whether Iraq has to be divided up into a--
what you could call a federal structure or a soft partition--
you know, different phrases can be used--but basically where
oil revenue is shared, but, otherwise, most of the governance,
most of the security is done in three separate provinces, there
is some kind of a loose federal structure, a small federal
army. And, otherwise, you help people relocate, if they need
to, to places where they will feel safer, and help them with
relocation assistance, in terms of housing and jobs.
Dr. Pillar. Well, it is valid to say that--to point out
that the security affects the politics, just as the politics
affects the security. I strongly agree with Phebe Marr's
observations about the timeframe involved and about how Iraqis
are going to keep doing what they're doing until they believe
they don't have a chance to get the upper hand. If you're
looking for an analogy in the Middle East, that I think is
frightening in a way, but perhaps most apt, it was the Lebanese
civil war, which raged on for something like 14 years, from the
mid-1970s to the late 1980s, until all the Lebanese parties--
and that, too, was one characterized by a very complex
sectarian mosaic--until they basically exhausted themselves,
literally and figuratively, and finally, with the help of the
Saudis and the Syrians, reached a peace agreement, even though
that left a number of people dissatisfied. We're seeing the
effects of it today. But that's the kind of timeframe I think
we're dealing with, with regard to resolving, if it's ever
going to be even halfway resolved, the political conflict in
Iraq.
Senator Corker. Well, are you recommending, then, that
things stay as is until they get so bad that people start
making those kinds of deals? Is that what you're recommending?
Dr. Pillar. It wasn't a recommendation, Senator Corker, it
was an analytic observation about the situation we face.
Chairman Biden. Thank you.
I would note that we did not have 135,000 forces in Lebanon
during that period. And I know you're making an accurate--I
think, accurate observation, but--at any rate.
Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. I want to thank Senator Dodd for
understanding my conflict here with the Environment Committee.
I really do appreciate it. And I want to thank----
Chairman Biden. You're a chairwoman of that committee----
Senator Boxer. Yes.
Chairman Biden [continuing]. And he has interests before
that committee, and, don't worry, he's not going to fool around
with you. [Laughter.]
Senator Boxer. I shall never forget the problems of
Connecticut. [Laughter.]
Acid rain and everything else.
Senators Biden and Lugar, thank you for continuing to work
so closely together. And this panel, I think, has been
fascinating. And I find that, you know, as I've listened, a
couple of things are leaping out at me that I think make sense
in a very difficult chaotic situation. And the things I think
make sense happen to be the things that my chairman has been
talking about, and I'm going to pursue what Mr. O'Hanlon has
talked about--which is to try and wake up, smell the roses, and
figure out what is actually happening on the ground. People are
moving toward their ethnic identities. That's not America. This
is what we don't want to see happen. But either we're going to
accept that or our kids are getting killed--and more and more
and more. And if you listen to Dr. Marr--and she's so learned--
she says, ``Only when the participants in the struggle for
power recognize they're losing more than they can gain will
this violence come to an end. This may be a very long time.
And, in the meantime, the best we can do is staunch the
violence, contain the struggle.'' Listen. How many more dead
will that be? And I'm not asking you that, because you're not a
military expert. But I will ask the Secretary of State that.
And I have to say, Dr. Marr, with all due respect, when you
talk about--you see, kind of, an ending, and you say--and you
could be right--``This will end when''--and I'm quoting you--
``different people make different deals across a period of
time.'' How is that better than the idea of accepting the fact
that that dealmaking ought to happen from all the parties
accepting the reality of this, and then doing what Mr. Said
says, which is come to a political agreement, and then figure
out how to enforce that agreement with international forces,
not just on the backs of the American people. I just--and I say
``the American people,'' because their kids are bearing the
brunt of this.
I think it's very interesting--I read, Mr. Said, your
amazing article, December 9, 2002. Is it--am I right that your
family fled Iraq because of Saddam Hussein? OK. And this is
what you wrote in 2002, ``There are many reasons why Iraqis who
have long sought to topple Saddam Hussein are opposed to the
impending war.'' This is before the war started. ``This, after
all, is not the first time the United States has pursued regime
change in Iraq. All previous attempts ended with disastrous
consequences for the Iraqi people.''
But I would add a sentence: And this time, although it
isn't ended, a lot of families here are coping with disastrous
consequences, not only the dead, but the wounded and the post-
traumatic stress and the brain injuries and so on.
Now, Mr. Said, every poll shows us that 60 percent of the
Iraqis today think it's OK to shoot an American. Could you
explain to us why that is the case? Could you--why do you think
that's so?
Mr. Said. I mean, it's understandable. The effect of United
States troops in Iraq today--not the whole consequences of the
invasion, which obviously are--have been catastrophic for
thousands of Iraqis and Americans--is ambiguous, it's a mixed
bag. On one hand, the foreign troops are an irritant, they are
creating a reaction in the form of an insurgency, which
continues to be the bulk of the violence taking place in Iraq
today. And the number--60 percent--confirms that, that for most
Iraqis they view the American presence as an occupation, and
they continue to consider fighting the occupation a legitimate
pursuit.
Senator Boxer. OK. Well, let me----
Mr. Said. However, if I may----
Senator Boxer. Yes. Go ahead.
Mr. Said [continuing]. The presence of United States troops
today is critical for the survival of the Iraqi State and
actually for the physical survival of many Iraqis. The United
States troops in Iraq today have a humanitarian mission, as
well as a----
Senator Boxer. I get it. Why do 70 percent of the Iraqi
people say we should get out, 60 percent say it's OK to shoot?
So, this may be the case, but clearly that message hasn't
gotten through.
Now, Dr. Marr, have you ever read the book, ``The
Reckoning,'' by Sandra Mackey?
Dr. Marr. Yes. I know her. Yes.
Senator Boxer. Both of you make me very proud, by the way,
just as an aside. But I read that book before I voted on
whether or not I wanted to give this President authority to go
to war. She predicted everything that has happened. And one of
the things she said--and I want--and you may not agree with
her--is that after World War I, Iraq was put together, was it
not, as a country?
Dr. Marr. No; I think there were some elements of being
together before that. There was Mesopotamia----
Senator Boxer. I understand.
Dr. Marr. You know, there's a sense of living within that
territory that is more than just throwing a country----
Senator Boxer. But is it not----
Dr. Marr [continuing]. Together.
Senator Boxer [continuing]. So that there was no ``Iraq,''
per se, until after World War I?
Dr. Marr. Yes. That's----
Senator Boxer. And is it not true----
Dr. Marr [continuing]. True of many countries----
Senator Boxer. Well, I'm----
Dr. Marr [continuing]. In the area.
Senator Boxer [continuing]. I'm not talking about other
countries.
Dr. Marr. Yes.
Senator Boxer. I'm talking about Iraq. And isn't it true--
isn't it true that when the British drew these lines, they put
many different ethnic groups inside Iraq who they knew had many
years, perhaps thousands of years, of enmity?
Dr. Marr. I don't even know what you're talking about. They
put----
Senator Boxer. I'm talking about----
Dr. Marr [continuing]. Ethnic groups inside of----
Senator Boxer. I'm saying----
Dr. Marr [continuing]. Iraq?
Senator Boxer. I'm saying: When they drew the lines,
according to Sandra Mackey, they were very clear that they drew
them knowing that it would be a contentious country because of
all the ethnic rivalries. Would you agree with her on that
point?
Dr. Marr. No.
Senator Boxer. You don't agree----
Dr. Marr. It's a----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. With her.
Dr. Marr. It's a long issue. I don't deny ethnic and
sectarian rivalries, but I do want to succinctly address your
issue. There are many other ties--tribal, family--which
frequently override ethnic and sectarian identity, and a
nonsectarian educated middle class, which was very strong in
periods in Iraq--forties, fifties, sixties, seventies.
Education doesn't obliterate, sectarianism, but really reduces
it. It's much more complex. And I didn't want to leave the
impression that I feel that United States troops have to stick
around for years and years while Iraqis solve their problem. I
would favor, if the Iraqis can't get their act together in a
reasonable time, a policy of containment, that is containing
the problems from spilling across the borders of Iraq.
So, don't, please, identify my position with one of
sticking around there----
Senator Boxer. Good, I'm glad you----
Dr. Marr [continuing]. Forever----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. Clarified. I'm really glad.
Dr. Marr [continuing]. While that happens.
But I want to come back to one point. I don't agree with
the reality--I don't think Sandra goes as far as this--that
Iraq is inevitably based on ethnic identity and sectarian
identity which has come to the fore very virulently only
recently. You may think you're going to get stability by
recognizing these divisions, and drawing lines, but who is
going to protect the seams?
Senator Boxer. Well, let me----
Dr. Marr. Which forces----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. Let me--let me address----
Dr. Marr [continuing]. You know----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. That----
Dr. Marr. So----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. Because I think my chairman has
spelled that out beautifully, because we're talking about still
one Iraq with semiautonomous regions, where you can bring in,
you know, the world community to help enforce a political
settlement. But that's OK. I don't need to--you know we
disagree on the point.
And I'll close, because I know my time is up. But it seems
to me that Sandra Mackey was right on every single point that
she made, that what would happen when a war came is that these
ethnic differences would come to the surface, where they were
tampened down before.
Because I think we're missing the point. We haven't really
laid out how we're going to get keeping this country as a whole
and not going with the idea expressed by Dr. O'Hanlon. We
haven't really resolved that question. If you think they're
going to go in and go after al-Sadr, al-Maliki's government
will fall, because he's dependent on Sadr. So then, is it all
going to be against the Sunnis? And then, as Mr. Hakim says,
``Are we in the middle, taking sides in a civil war?'' It's
complex.
I thank you all for your time. And I thank you----
Chairman Biden. Well, I thank you, Senator. I'm sure the
panel would be prepared to answer some questions. We will not
take up the rest of their academic and----
Senator Boxer. No, no, that's not what I meant.
Chairman Biden. But I'm--no, but, I mean, I hope the panel
would consider--and if you could submit through the chair any
additional questions you have. But I'd try to narrow them,
rather than have each of us committing 10 or 12 questions to
them. I know we could do that.
Senator Boxer. That's my only one. Thank you.
Chairman Biden. Yes. No; I would--the panel has no problem
responding to that, I'm sure.
Senator Coleman.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I was in Iraq about a month ago. And just a quick
observation. OK? Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To me, it seemed like there are two battles going on in
Iraq. One is a war in the Anbar province that our Marines are
fighting, and they know who the enemy is. The enemy is the
foreign fighters and the al-Qaeda insurgents. And the Marines
are doing their job, and they're making progress every day, in
the sense of eliminating terrorists. You can measure this
progress. The other battle is in Baghdad, and consists of
sectarian violence. I see our troops caught in the crosshairs
of this sectarian violence in Baghdad. If you see it, it's
almost unbelievable, the extent of it, the depravity of it. And
it seems to me that as our Marines make progress in clearing
areas of terrorists, they need Sunnis to participate in the
police departments in Anbar to hold the territory they've
cleared. The local Sunnis know who the foreign fighters are.
And Sunnis are needed in the army. So it seems to me that the
Iraqis have got to achieve reconciliation in order to end the
violence in the long term. We can't resolve anything in Iraq in
the long term, militarily, without reconciliation among Iraqi
factions. And during my trip to Iraq it didn't appear to me
that the Iraqi leadership were doing all they could to achieve
real reconciliation. I met with Dr. Rubaie, the National
Security Advisor for the Prime Minister, and said that he
didn't think that sectarian violence was a major issue in Iraq.
I was incredulous when I heard that. Yet we continue to face
the problem with Sunnis and the insurgency and I think we saw
some of that in the paper today. When I was in Iraq I didn't
get a sense that Iraqis are done killing each other through
sectarian violence.
And so, my first question is: Does anybody here have a
sense of whether reconciliation can occur in Iraq today? And,
if not, is there a timeline for reconciliation?
Mr. Said. Mr. Coleman, I tried, in my testimony, to
illustrate a complex conflict--and you alluded to that--that
there is an insurgency, for example, taking place in Anbar, and
the sort of the civil strife taking place in Baghdad. Of
course, it's less neat than that, actually. There are
insurgencies and civil wars happening throughout Iraq. There
are only a few pockets of stability in Iraq, including
Kurdistan. But, almost in every province there is a conflict,
whether it's a criminal--criminal gangs or whether it's a sort
of a social revolt against the establishment or whether it's
civil war. In Anbar this summer, there were clashes between
Sunni tribes. Ostensibly, in the media, it was about Sunni
tribes fighting al-Qaeda, but, in reality, these were old
tribal rivalries spilling into open conflict and being dressed
as Anbar tribes fighting al-Qaeda. Inside the Sunni political
representations, there are deep fissures between the Islamists,
on one side, and the Baathists--and unreformed Baathists, on
the other. So, there are no neat groups that one can resort to
or revert to in a partition formula whereby one can say: What
do the Sunnis say? There is a vast difference between the
positions of various Sunni groups. And the differences between
the Shia groups are expressed in real fighting and dead bodies
in the south, throughout Basrah. Every city in the south has
fallen out of government control at one point or the other over
the last 6 months.
So, the Iraqis are not done killing each other, but on the
various bases, under various motivations--there is--we don't
have the luxury to wait out for compromises to emerge from this
chaos. The situation--the pervasive fear and violence is
creating a humanitarian disaster in Iraq, as Mr. O'Hanlon has
described, that needs to be addressed. So, there is an urgency
for a political process, if you like, regardless of the
willingness of the parties to engage. The problem is, the
parties need to be brought to the table. And what needs to be--
to happen is, one needs to bring more parties that are willing
to engage. If the combatants, if the radicals or the extremists
are not willing to talk, then the table needs to be widened,
because there are many Iraqis, as well, who want to see peace
in their country, and want to rebuild their nation. And this is
a role for the international community. There is a need for an
international-sponsored peace process that will bring Iraqis to
the table, including those who are willing to find compromises
and willing to stay together.
Senator Coleman. But, Dr. Marr, I mean, if I could turn to
you on this, if the parties aren't at that point where they
have that fundamental commitment to say, ``We recognize what
the problem is, and we are committed to do those things to
resolve it''--that's my concern as--and I'll listen to the
President, but I'm not--I didn't see, in my time there, in my
conversations, that you've got a commitment on the part of the
Iraqis to do what has to be done that would then justify a
greater commitment of American lives and resources. That's my
problem. If----
Dr. Marr. I agree that that is a problem. And it's not
perhaps either/or. I'm just expressing what I think is a
realistic analysis of what's likely to happen. That doesn't
mean that I like it or there aren't some other things we can
do.
The key issue is: How do you get Iraqis, particularly those
that are going to be in the political process, to reconcile?
And you have pointed out a very good way to do that. You've got
to put pressure, you have to have incentives, you certainly
have to widen the political spectrum. Because one of the things
that's operative here is that political parties and groups who
have power now want to keep it, and their power is fragile. And
widening the spectrum and including others may not be exactly
what they want. We don't want to get caught in that. We, alone,
are not the only ones who need to do this. The regional
neighbors have their own clients, and they need to be able to
exercise pressure but there are numerous ways in which we could
push, nudge, and otherwise try to get this reconciliation.
Now, whether that's going to be successful is a big issue.
And certainly whether we keep troops there and keep on with
this effort, if Iraqis don't rise to the occasion, I have to
say, it is, in fact, one of your jobs----
Senator Coleman. And----
Dr. Marr [continuing]. To decide that.
Senator Coleman. But you have also highlighted the
consequences if we do that, that there are devastating
consequences, in terms of ethnic cleansing, in terms of--Dr.
Pillar, in terms of what's going to happen in the rest of the
region.
And I'm not sure what my time is, Mr. Chairman. If I can
just----
Chairman Biden. No; you have another little bit.
Senator Coleman. Dr. Pillar, the--we're not in this alone.
I mean, Iran has--Iran is pressuring us in--with Hezbollah in
Lebanon; they're pressuring us with Hamas in Gaza; they're
pressuring us with supporting al-Sadr in Iraq. Is there any
appetite on the part of folks in the region to play a
constructive role in trying to resolve this situation?
Dr. Pillar. Yes, Senator; I think there is. And you can
look at past experience. In the case of the Syrians, for
example, just to mention them in passing, they were part of
Operation Desert Storm, back in 1991. In the wake of 9/11 I
believe administration officials would tell you that Syrian
counterterrorist cooperation against the jihadists, about whom
they share with us a concern, has taken place. The State
Department has spoken about that publicly. And in the case of
Iran, we had the experience of very profitable cooperation in
Afghanistan in the wake of Operation Enduring Freedom. And
people like Ambassador Khalilzad and Ambassador Dobbins could
talk to you about that.
There's little doubt in my mind that, in Tehran, there was
at least a hope, if not an expectation, that something similar
would happen with the political reconstruction of Iraq.
Obviously, it did not work out that way. But the short answer
to your question is yes; as demonstrated in the past, even the
likes of the Iranians and the Syrians have shown their
willingness to cooperate.
Senator Coleman. Does any other--is that a unanimous
opinion?
Mr. Said. I think there is opening for engagement, almost
with all parties, without exception. And the question is:
What's the framework? It has to be a multilateral framework. It
has to be seen as a fair framework that will offer everyone
something. Everyone needs something out of the process. It
cannot be just at the expense--you know, it cannot happen at
the expense of some parties and to the benefit of others.
Dr. Pillar. And it has to be, as Senator Lugar put it
earlier in the proceedings, all the cards on the table. You
know, from the Iranians' point of view, they wouldn't want a
negotiation just about Iraq, just as they're not comfortable
with a negotiation just about the nuclear issue. They want to
talk about all issues in dispute with the United States.
Senator Coleman. But you do recognize that they are
fueling--they are fueling the instability, they're doing those
things that are worsening the problem rather than doing
anything to----
Dr. Pillar. As I suggest in my testimony, they are dealing
with a wide variety of groups in Iraq. It may be hard--and
you'd have to rely on your classified intelligence for the
latest story on this--to connect this bit of Iranian assistance
with that attack. Nonetheless, some of that assistance, no
doubt, has facilitated attacks against coalition forces. But,
as I suggested before, the main way to look at that is as a
full-court press by Iran to get as much influence in Iraq as
they possibly can, with all parties.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Biden. Thank you.
Did you want to say something, Mike?
Dr. O'Hanlon. I just wanted to make one other point. And I
hesitate to add a nuance to anything Paul Pillar has said on
this region; he knows it so well. But I am getting worried,
from what we can see from the available evidence, that Iran has
one other aim, which is to deal the United States a major
strategic defeat in the region, which it now thinks is
attainable in a way it did not 3 and 4 years ago, which may
somewhat change the calculus. And it doesn't make me oppose the
idea of negotiation, but it makes me very wary of expecting any
progress or even assuming that Iran wants a stable Iraq as an
outcome in this.
Senator Coleman. And I share those concerns, Dr. O'Hanlon.
Mr. Said. If I may just add, Iran is not a coherent actor,
by the way. Iran--there are various influences and interests in
Iran, and that also gives an opening for dialog.
Dr. Pillar. Yes; we have to see beyond the outrageous
rhetoric of Ahmadinejad. I agree completely.
Chairman Biden. Let me--by the way, the chairman and I have
discussed holding, hopefully, some thoughtful hearings on Iran
and actually what the state of play in Iran is, unrelated to
us, just what's going on in Iran at the moment.
But let me, before I yield to my friend from Connecticut,
indicate that there is going to be--you've been sitting a long
time, and there is going to be a vote at noon, in which time we
will break. Assuming the vote goes off at noon--after Senator
Dodd, we will break for that vote, which will be 15 minutes,
give you a little breather. And then I will confer with the
Senator, and I'll ask the staff to confer with you. My
intention was to continue to go through, to finish, but it's a
much bigger committee. We have a total of 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,
8, 9, 10, 11--almost 12 more members to go. I'd like you all to
consider, based on your schedules, whether or not you would
want to break briefly for a lunch break from 12 noon to 1
o'clock, to give you an opportunity to have some lunch.
Senator Sununu. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Biden. Yes.
Senator Sununu. If we break when the vote occurs, it does
appear we might have time for one more round on each side.
Being the next in line, I have a particular interest in that
type of arrangement----
[Laughter.]
Senator Sununu [continuing]. If it were possible.
Chairman Biden. Well, based on your comments yesterday, I'm
not going to let that happen. [Laughter.]
Chairman Biden. That's a joke. That's a joke. We will
accommodate you, Senator, notwithstanding your comments.
[Laughter.]
Senator Dodd.
Senator Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I'm going to ask one question, and then I see
colleagues here, and try and provide some time for others
before we break for the vote. Let me also join the chairman in
welcoming our new members to the committee.
Jim, I've sat in that chair you're in, a long time ago, but
it does move, and then it stalls, it seems, for a while.
[Laughter.]
But I was looking at Barack Obama and remembering last year
when he was sitting--and wondering if we'd even notice him at
the end of the table, and moving up very quickly. So, welcome,
all of you, to a very exciting committee with some tremendous
leadership we've had, as I mentioned, with Dick Lugar and with
Joe Biden now, and others. So, it's a good committee to be on,
and your participation is really welcome.
I'd like to just pick up on--picking up off Senator
Coleman's question. We're going to have the Secretary of State
here tomorrow, as you know, coming before us. And I have been
impressed with your comments and your ideas in this thing, and
particularly, Dr. Marr, this issue of reconciliation, how it's
going to come about. I suspect you're probably more--far more
right about that. Despite our desires for something else to
happen in a sort of a conversion on the road to Damascus here
to occur with major political leaders.
But two points here; I'd like you to just quickly comment,
if you can. One is: What can we be doing to help facilitate
this? A question we get all the time, that if you're--if you
believe this is a surge, it's not the right idea, that
increasing military forces doesn't make a lot of sense, that
clearly political resolution here is what everyone seems to
suggest is ultimately going to produce the kind of results we'd
like to see, the question then follows on: What should we be
doing? What should the United States, our allies, moderate Arab
leaders in the region, be doing, specifically?
I just came back from 6 days in the region, as well. I was
there with my colleague from Massachusetts. We were in Lebanon
and spent about 3\1/2\ hours with President Assad in Damascus,
which I've shared, with the Secretary and others, the
conversations and what was offered there. One of the things
that I share with you here is, when I asked, specifically,
``What sort--what do you want to see, in Iraq, occur?''--the
answer, I don't mind sharing with you here in this room, was,
``I'd like to see a pluralistic, stable Arab government. I'm
not interested in seeing a fundamentalist Shia-Iranian state on
my border.'' Now, he said that in English in a private meeting.
It wasn't announced in--in Arabic in a public document. So, I'm
conscious of the fact that these are statements being made, as
Tom Friedman likes to point out, in private, where you may get
less than what the actual policies are. But, nonetheless, I
found it interesting that he pursued, or at least willing to
say those things.
What should we be doing? How should the United States--how
should the Secretary of State be conducting our foreign policy
in the region? And what, specifically, do you think we ought to
be doing to encourage this kind of political resolution that
we're all talking about?
Dr. Marr. That is absolutely critical and difficult, and I
have only a few thoughts; I hope my colleagues have some
others.
First of all, the absence of security and the dreadful
humanitarian situation that Mike O'Hanlon is talking about
needs to be addressed. Insecure people are not willing to make
compromises. But with the political parties, you've got to have
a collection of incentives and disincentives to get them to
come to some terms on these very issues we've identified.
There's a considerable amount of agreement on this.
You've got to say no to some people who may not like it,
and you've got to have a little, perhaps, stick there, in terms
of how long and how much support and troops the United States
is going to be willing to provide.
And, second of all, I like the idea that I just heard--and
I agree with it--of widening the pool. I'm not so sure some of
the parties who now have power, and who feel very fragile, who
feel worried that the Baath might come back or Sunnis might
come back or whatever, are going to be willing to make the
compromises. There used to be a large middle class with a lot
of technocrats. There are not a lot now. Many of them have
fled. They need to come back.
Two things, I think, are very important. One is to get this
Cabinet to act as a Cabinet, not just a collection of fiefdoms
of individual people, and getting the educated middle-class
professionals back who have some of the spirit of, you know,
nonsectarian identity.
So, widening the political pool, getting other people in,
would be helpful. But I think, of course, the neighbors need to
be brought in. We've talked about that. There's no easy answer.
That's the only thing I want to say here. This is going to be
long, laborious, the kind of thing diplomats, politicians do
all the time. But I think our expectation, that somehow this is
going to happen rapidly, needs to be a little more realistic.
Senator Dodd. Anyone else want to comment?
Dr. Pillar. If I understand your very broad question,
Senator Dodd, about approaching the region, I would just
incorporate, by reference, the recommendations of the Iraq
Study Group, and two themes, in particular. One is what we were
discussing a moment ago, which is to talk with everyone. And
that doesn't necessarily mean one big multilateral conference.
I think Phebe made the very appropriate point earlier that
other kinds of engagement are called for. And, No. 2, be
prepared to talk about everything that is on the agenda of the
regional governments, and not just ours. And, again, the Arab-
Israeli conflict comes right to the fore.
Dr. O'Hanlon. Senator, I wanted to make a plug for what I
know many of you do, especially in the bipartisan coalitions or
groups that go to Iraq and talk to Iraqis, because I think
Iraqis need to know American political support is very fragile,
and it's not going to last much longer.
Senator Dodd. We've made that point.
Dr. O'Hanlon. And I'm sure you continue to, but I think
they need to keep hearing it, because I think it's very hard
for President Bush to send that message in a convincing way,
given how much his Presidency depends on this. From what I
understand of the way he's going to talk--tonight, from what
little I've heard from people in the administration, he is, of
course, not going to be able to create this sense. He's going
to try to put pressure on the Iraqis, but he's not going to be
able to say, and not going to want to say, that if they don't
get their act together, we're leaving. You know, that's just
not something that he is in a position to want to say.
But I think you all, collectively, and we, in the think-
tank world, to a lesser degree--we're less visible and less
important in their eyes--we have to send that message, that,
you know, for the reasons across the spectrum, from military
capability of our Army and Marine Corps, to the patience of our
people, to the upcoming Presidential race, and everything else,
our patience for sticking with anything like this strategy is
very limited, and it's probably measured in terms of 9 to 18
months, not years.
Mr. Said. I just wanted to second what Professor Marr has
said, in terms of broadening the political process--if you
like, facilitating national dialog, internationalizing the
Iraq--the Iraq issue, and bringing in more actors to the table.
About the broadening of the political process, this is not
about reversing the outcomes of the political process----
Senator Dodd. Yes.
Mr. Said [continuing]. Of the last 3 years, it's about
enhancing it. It's a process that has some elements that are
good, but it's clearly not working, and it needs to be
enhanced. There needs to be concessions. The winners of the
political process need to make concessions and bring in more
people to the table. And I'm not talking, here, about more
combatants and more extremists, but about bringing people with
a vested interest in a democratic Iraq.
There are also things that the United States will need to
do on the humanitarian level. There is a humanitarian situation
evolving in Iraq today, and the United States needs to keep
engaging on that issue, and maybe also bring in more
international support.
And, finally, again, it's--again, efforts that are already
underway in Iraq, on state-building, on maintaining the
machinery of government, that will be necessary, no matter what
the outcome of the current violence is.
Senator Dodd. Thanks. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Biden. I thank you very much.
Let me suggest that it's possible that maybe all the
Senators who were here will not be coming back, so it may be
more in your interest for us to keep going. But I will do--you
need a break. We'll go to Senator Sununu, and, after his
questioning, I'd ask permission, since Senator Webb has to
preside at 1 o'clock, if the vote hasn't been called by then,
whether or not my friend from Pennsylvania would be willing to
let Senator Webb go next. And then we can make a--then we'll
give you a break, regardless, and then decide whether to come
back in 5 minutes or give everybody a chance to eat lunch. My
guess is, we'll continue to go through, in light of the
rollcall I just got from the committee staff as to who is
likely to come back. So, it may be easier to do it that way.
Senator Dodd. Mr. Chairman, I presume, by the way, opening
statements are going to--you've made an accommodation for that
to be included.
Chairman Biden. Yes; anyone who has an opening statement,
it will be placed in the record.
Senator Dodd. Thank you.
Chairman Biden. Senator Sununu.
Senator Sununu. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
We often say how much we appreciate your time and
testimony, to all of our witnesses, but I think it's fair to
say, today in particular, this has been a great panel. They're
very constructive, very specific, very direct, and I think
that's extremely helpful to us, given the importance of these
issues.
There does seem to be a lot of consensus about the
importance of the climate: Economic issues, political issues,
social issues that need to be dealt with in order for
stability--long-term stability to be realized. There's been
specific discussion, as there was in the Iraq Study Group
report, of things like the oil law, provincial elections, the
training process, and the broader reconciliation process. Those
were all recommendations here. But I think, Mr. O'Hanlon, you,
in particular, emphasize that those would need to be addressed,
or at least referenced, with regard to any change in the
military footprint, military operations, and military
objectives. And I think this, as well, is something that was
contemplated in the Study Group Report, specifically with
regard to an increase in troops. On page 73, it says, ``We
could support a short-term redeployment or surge of American
combat forces to stabilize Baghdad or speed up the training-
and-equipping mission if the United States commander in Iraq
determines that such steps would be effective. We reject the
immediate withdrawal of troops because we believe so much is at
stake.'' So, clearly, this is something that's contemplated by
Baker-Hamilton, but in the context of achieving some of these
other specific objectives.
So, I'd like all the panelists to comment, but we'll begin
with Mr. O'Hanlon, whether or not you feel that some increase
in forces, if used to--hypothetically, for example, stabilize
Baghdad--would make, or could make, a difference in improving
the window for training forces or for the formal reconciliation
process, which began in December, but seems to have slowed a
little bit. I mean, we can talk about those two specific
examples or any others you want to discuss.
Dr. O'Hanlon. I'll give you a somewhat tortured answer,
Senator. I would support a surge, in the context of a much
broader approach, but I'm not sure I could be very confident
it's going to work. So, since I have the opportunity--and
you've given it to me--to speak today, I think that we all have
to be thinking about backup plans very hard, because, with or
without a surge, I think we're likely to see something like the
current strategy not succeed. But I would still think our
chances would improve in the short term, at the tactical level,
at least, with a surge. So, it's a tough situation.
Senator Sununu. If those troops are given a specific
objective, or an objective to support one of these other
political or economic issues, which would it be? Which do you
think their temporary role or security role could be most
effective in enhancing?
Dr. O'Hanlon. I think that they have to create some level
of stability in Iraq, in the neighborhoods, reduce the
violence. If you don't do that, nothing else can work.
Senator Sununu. But, in terms of reconciliation, training,
oil law, provincial elections, we--for example, in the
electoral process, last time a surge was implemented, or two of
the three times that we saw a surge in troops, it was focused
on the elections, with relative success, and most people agree
that those were relatively peaceful.
Dr. O'Hanlon. I think a limited focused approach like that
probably won't work. We're going to--we sort of need a miracle,
politically. We need for Prime Minister al-Maliki, who now has
an 85-percent unfavorability rating among Sunni Arabs, to be
seen as a different kind of leader than he's been seen as so
far. Or maybe we need a new Iraqi Prime Minister, like Allawi,
who at least had a little stronger--you know, linkages across
other ethnic groups. But I think we are beyond the point where
you could say one specific political improvement will be
enough. I think we're going to have to see a whole new ball
game in very short order.
Dr. Marr. Well, it seems to me that if there's any mission
for this additional surge, it's going to be to stop the ethnic
cleansing, sectarian cleansing, or whatever we want to call it,
in Baghdad. It certainly can't address all the problems of the
country. But it's the demographic shift, that Michael has
mentioned, that is so devastating and we want to stop and slow
this. That's what we mean when we say ``providing some security
in Baghdad.'' But I think we've all pointed out how that's
fraught with dangers, because it's so inextricably mixed with
different ethnic and sectarian groups and political parties and
others. I agree, here, that perhaps it's worth giving it a
shot, but our chances of actually turning the whole situation
around on the ground is very slim. We might be able, with our
forces, to hold some neighborhoods or do something militarily,
but, as everybody has pointed out here, the real issue is: What
are you going to do with the time you buy and the increase in
tranquility, presumably, that you get? How are you going to get
Iraqis to begin to address their political problems? That's the
real issue.
Senator Sununu. And that's the point I make. And where I'd
like a little bit of additional comment is: If that time is
created, where might it be best used? And do you even think it
might be used effectively?
Mr. Said.
Mr. Said. I think this is an issue of putting the horse
before the cart. I think the troops are a tool to achieving a
certain objective. We need to agree on the objectives before we
can discuss the tools. And the discussion seems to be having--
that there is this option of a surge on the table, and let's
find a role for it. And I think that's the wrong way of asking
the question, or for putting the question, I think.
Senator Sununu. Well, I--although it would--I think I've
actually asked the question in just the way you want. The
objectives are a reconciliation process--equity in distribution
of oil revenues, so that the Sunnis feel enfranchised
economically, provincial elections, so that the feel
enfranchised politically, so that they have some better voice
in governance. Those are the objectives that will lead to long-
term success. And my question is: Do you see an opportunity for
additional military troops to help achieve a window where those
objectives might be accomplished?
Mr. Said. I think if there is agreement--if there is a
political process that leads to agreement on these issues, if
we--if we have a blueprint for addressing these issues, on the
back of that they may be needed--more troops may be needed or
less troops may be needed. It all depends on the shape of the
agreement. That agreement may bring other troops from other
countries to help with the situation, and it doesn't have to
become a burden of the United States alone. So, there are all
kinds of outcomes from the political process that could lead to
increased or reduced troops.
There's one issue that the others suggested, and I have
emphasized, as well, which is the humanitarian role. There is
one role that the United States can play today, which is
protecting civilians. But that's--this has to be done in an
evenhanded way that is not seen as participating in the
conflict on one side or the other. But protecting civilians is
definitely an important role.
Senator Sununu. Thank you.
Mr. Pillar.
Dr. Pillar. It presumably is the capability of troops,
whether it's part of the surge or any others, to provide
security, not to run elections, not to pump oil, not to do
those other things. But I think the answer to your question,
Senator, if I understand it, is that you cannot focus on any
one thing. You noted the elections before. Well, we've been
through this multistage political reconstruction process in
which there was always something else to look forward to. You
know, the constituent assembly elections or the transfer of
sovereignty or the election of the regular legislature. We're
through all that. And so, there isn't any one thing. It is the
oil. It is the political reconciliation. It's the neighborhood-
by-neighborhood security. It's everything. So, I'm afraid I
would resist giving you a specific answer, because the valid
answer is: All of the above.
Senator Sununu. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Biden. Thank you.
Folks, what we're going to do is give you a little bit of a
break here. I instructed--I suggested that my colleagues go and
vote. We'll adjourn. If Senator Lugar makes it back before I
do, he will reconvene the committee for Senator Webb to be able
to ask his questions. This is an opportunity to get up and
stretch your legs. And I think what we'll try to do is go
straight through rather than have you have to come back this
afternoon.
So, we'll adjourn until the vote is over.
Thank you.
Recess, I should say.
[Recess.]
Chairman Biden. The hearing will come to order, please.
There's an awful lot of things that are going on today,
including a meeting with Mr. Hadley. I see that in order, next,
ordinarily, what would be the case--and I'd just raise this as
a question--my friend from Florida would be next, but Senator
Casey, a new member, is to be down at the White House at a
quarter of 12. I wonder whether or not the Senator would yield
to Senator Casey?
Senator Bill Nelson. Of course I do.
Chairman Biden. And then go back to--I believe the Senator
from Alaska, who's next on this side, but I'm not sure.
Senator Casey, why don't you proceed?
Senator Casey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman--and I appreciate
your indulgence--Senator Lugar. And thank you, Senator Nelson,
for this opportunity to jump the line a little bit. I will try
not to get used to it.
I have two questions, one that pertains to our troops, and
the other with regard to diplomacy.
I come from Pennsylvania, where Senator Specter and I
represent a State that has lost, right now, the third-highest
amount of troops--just last week went above 140. I'm thinking
of those troops today, and their families, as all of us are,
who gave, as Abraham Lincoln told us a long time ago, the last
full measure of devotion to their country.
One of the questions I have for Dr. O'Hanlon and others--
when it comes to data points with regard to where we are in
Iraq, one that I'm not sure you've been able to track, or
whether you or the other panelists have information about, is
the condition of our troops, in terms of the things we used to
read a lot more about than we do now--body armor, the
protective gear, weapons, all of the indicators that we can
point to that tell us whether or not we're doing everything we
can to support the troops who are in battle right now. Do you
have any information about that or any kind of status? Because,
as you know better than I, many months ago we read about all
the horrors, where families were buying equipment and body
armor and things like that. So, that's the first question I
had, with regard to that data point, so to speak.
Dr. O'Hanlon. Senator Casey, my impression is that most of
these numbers are much better now, but I'm going to focus on
one thing, which I wonder if we should have had a broader
national debate about, which is the type of vehicle we put our
troops in. As you know, there are some vehicles that are built
around the world that are designed to withstand the blast of
mines, or, as we call them in Iraq, improvised explosive
devices, which are now responsible for about half of all of our
fatalities, as our data show. And, of course, other types of
threats exist, and snipers are a worse concern than before in
Iraq, but it's really the IED problem that's No. 1. And I,
frankly, am wondering--it's getting pretty late in the game to
have this conversation, but I am wondering if we should have
had, and maybe still should have, a big debate about whether to
refit a lot of our vehicles with things that look more like
some of the specialized mine-clearance vehicles, that are more
expensive, have--often have V-shaped hulls, different kinds of
suspension, are higher up off the ground. Now, a bigger IED can
always penetrate that, so there's always a countermeasure the
enemy can envision.
But, frankly, that's the one thing I'm still wondering, if,
in broad terms, we really never focused on enough in this
country. It would be very hard to build 10,000 of them fast,
but if you took a World War II-type approach, and you said,
``This is a national emergency, we're going to have to ask
every car manufacturer in the United States to do this for 6
months,'' you could do it. And we simply haven't considered
that. I'm not sure history will judge us very well. And I say
this as being critical of myself, too. I'm a defense specialist
at Brookings, and I wonder if I shouldn't have been thinking
about this more 3 and 4 years ago. It may be kind of late in
the game now, but I--maybe not.
Senator Casey. But, in particular, you're talking about up-
armoring vehicles, or retrofitting or redesigning?
Dr. O'Hanlon. New vehicles. Vehicles that are designed to
have V-shaped hulls, higher suspensions to be able to operate
more effectively on three wheels, even if one's blown out.
Basically, building much of our patrolling fleet around the
same vehicle concept that some specialized mine-clearance
vehicles currently employ in the U.S. military, but that most
of our fleet of Hummers and Bradleys and so forth does not.
Senator Casey. And in the interest of time--and I know
Senator Webb has presiding duties, and I want to be cognizant
of that--the last question is very broad, and it's been asked,
probably, in different ways throughout the morning, but it's
one that I think a lot of Americans are wondering about. We
hear a lot of things that talk about a political solution and
steps to get us in that direction, apart from the military
strategy and tactics on the ground, much of which we'll be
talking about tonight when the President presents his plan. But
just in terms of diplomacy, if you could focus on that with
your collective experience, I think it's good to work with
lists, if we can, if that's at all possible. I know it's very
difficult in this context. But if you had the opportunity to
construct a diplomatic strategy for the next 6 months, say,
what would be the three or four or five things you would do, in
terms of very specific steps that this Government should take
diplomatically--within the region especially, or beyond the
region? Any one of you can weigh in on that, in terms of a
specific list of steps.
Mr. Said. Well, I think there is a need to engage with
Iraq's neighbors, but also with the broader international
community, the permanent five from the Security Council.
Professor Marr suggested a contact group concept. That may be a
good first step. I still believe that we need to work toward a
process--a peace process that will involve some form of a
conference. But, preparations for that, engaging with each of
Iraq's neighbors, trying to address their concerns and their
interests in Iraq, and trying to see how they can contribute to
influencing the situation inside Iraq by working with their
constituencies in Iraq, by working with the groups, by
providing assurances for certain groups in Iraq about their
interests, and encouraging them to achieve compromises.
So, there is scope for active diplomacy in Iraq. And some
of that has taken place in the international compact with Iraq,
which the administration and the United Nations have been
engaged in over the last 6 months. And I had an opportunity to
work on that. That involved intensive diplomacy with the Gulf
States and with the international community, 22 countries or
more, to bring them in Iraq. And there is great interest to get
engaged. There is great interest in the international community
to get engaged in Iraq in a meaningful way so that there is no
hierarchy at levels and sort of a--category A countries and
category B. But really get engaged--China, Russia, the gulf.
And there--and this should be pursued.
Dr. Marr. I had a couple of thoughts at a practical level,
on our Embassy. We need skillful, behind-the-scenes, but
muscular, diplomacy. I like much of what Ambassador Khalilzad
did. And we're getting another very good Ambassador. But two
things are needed for our Embassy there: More Arabic speakers,
of every kind--it's difficult enough, in the security
situation, to get out, but the more we can interact with Iraqis
at every level, the better off we'll be; and more sustained
deployments, not of troops, but of AID people, whoever. The
turnover in personnel, because it's a hardship post, is
abysmal, in terms of intelligence, building linkages, networks,
and so on. That's what everyone complains about. You just get
into the job, you learn who's who, you establish the contacts,
and you're out, and somebody else comes in. So, those are two
practical things that I think would help our Embassy in
Baghdad.
Chairman Biden. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Casey. I'm out of time.
Chairman Biden. Senator Murkowski.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We hear a lot about suggestions that we, here in the United
States, might do or propose, and the President is going to
present his new proposal this evening. We'll listen very
attentively to that. But I think we all recognize that we can
only do so much from the outside, from the United States
perspective, or even from the international-community
perspective. And I appreciate the focus that you all have made
in saying we need to broaden the dialog, bring in more. But we
recognize that the Iraqis have to step up and do their part.
They've got to be the participant.
And, Mr. O'Hanlon, I listened very attentively this morning
as you kind of went down through your various measures, and I
have to admit that they were really very discouraging as you
listen to some of the terminology that you used, and that
others of you used, as well. You know, you used the term
``pessimism'' over and over. We heard of the ``hardening of the
people,'' the word ``fear'' and the ``apathy,'' just the
general environment being ``poor,'' all very negative and
really very discouraging words. We all know that you can't
really engage, you can't get your--the men behind you to engage
in the fight that you must take on if you don't believe. And
the question that I would pose to you, Mr. O'Hanlon, and to any
of the others is: Is there any good-news indicators that we're
seeing from the Iraqis that give us hope to believe that if we
should move forward with, as the President may propose, this
surge, that the Iraqi people feel a degree of optimism, at this
point, that they can be that full participant that we need and
expect them to be? Are there any good signs that you can
report?
Dr. O'Hanlon. Senator, I think you could find some, and we
used to try very hard to try to give them equal billing,
because I used to think that, whether they were 50 percent of
the reality of Iraq or not, they needed to be highlighted. But
they seem to be dwindling in number. But I can still tick off a
few for you.
Some of them are on our last category, of politics and
public opinion. Certainly, Iraqis have a lot more in the way of
communications, whether it's newspapers, TV, telephones,
Internet access. And they use these things, and they relish
them. There's also, from what I understand--I haven't spent as
much time in Iraq as some people on this committee, but there
is more bustle in some of the streets, or at least there has
been. And we can read about a traffic jam, and that's the
negative way to look at it; the upside is that a lot of people
have cars, and there is a sense of people still wanting to be
out and about, despite the risks. So, there is a certain energy
in Iraq that I think may be dwindling, but it's still there.
There are some indicators about public utility performance.
It's confusing to try to track GAO and USAID and figure out
exactly where Iraqi utilities stand today. Electricity is not
very good. Oil production is not very good. Water and sewage
performance, hard to read. I can't quite get confidence in the
data I'm seeing. Things are probably about at Saddam Hussein
levels, though. In other words, we've basically treaded water
for 4 years on that front. But there are some new facilities
coming online. Child vaccinations seem to be up, from what I
can tell. The number of trained judges in the Iraqi political
system, of course, much higher than it used to be.
So, yes, if you want to find things, you can find a number
of indicators that----
Senator Murkowski. We can find----
Dr. O'Hanlon [continuing]. Are possible.
Senator Murkowski [continuing]. Those, but do the Iraqi
people believe that more good is being delivered?
Dr. O'Hanlon. Not now.
Senator Murkowski. Now, Mr. Said, you're kind of shaking
your head no. Can you comment on that?
Mr. Said. Unfortunately, in terms of life of Iraqis on the
street, it's getting progressively worse. And even if you can
find numbers--for example, the numbers on the electricity don't
look so bad, but the reality of it is worse than the numbers.
Water--the Ministry of Water Resources have done a wonderful
job. It's one of the most efficient ministries in Iraq. But,
without electricity, you can't deliver water. So, even where
things are getting better, the overall situation is making it
worse.
However, if you are looking for a silver lining in the
situation, one of the elements is the recent agreement on an
oil management framework. Because that agreement shows that
there has been movement since the time when the Iraqis
negotiated a constitution as a zero-sum game, whereby weakening
the federal government--the strength of the region is only
achieved through weakening the central government. I think the
deal on oil shows that the Iraqis have moved on, have realized,
if you like, that, actually, it doesn't have to be a zero-sum
game, that strong federalism is based on a strong center and
strong regions.
So, there are elements of awakening, if you like, at least
among some Iraqi--Iraq's leaders and politicians, but, in terms
of reality on the ground, it's devastating.
Senator Murkowski. On the oil issue, have you looked at the
Alaska Permanent Fund model as a model to be utilized there,
where you would have a sharing of the revenues among the
people? And, in your opinion, do you think that that would help
with some of the sectarian strife that we're facing now?
Mr. Said. I think there have been proposals for a direct
distribution of oil revenues to the Iraqi citizens. Some people
in the Iraqi Government strongly support that. However, there
has been great opposition to it from the international
financial institutions.
Senator Murkowski. Great opposition, you say?
Mr. Said. Opposition to the direct distribution of
revenues. They fear that it may be inefficient use of
resources, that Iraq needs to invest all its oil revenues, and
so on. I, personally, disagree with that. I think direct
distribution is a good tool to unify Iraqis. I think there is a
lot speaking in favor of direct distribution of revenues to the
citizens, at least a portion--a small portion. Unfortunately,
it is now--it's not happening, simply because of strong
opposition by the IMF, in particular.
Senator Murkowski. Mr. O'Hanlon.
Dr. O'Hanlon. Senator, I think it's a good idea, also. And
I would envision, potentially, divvying up Iraq's oil into
three or four buckets, one of which would be the Alaska model,
direct distribution, one of which would be direct payments to
the provinces, based on population, a third bucket would be for
federal projects or for national-level institutions. But I
think, in responding to the international financial
institutions, the natural thing to do is to keep reducing Iraqi
subsidies, which we all know are still too high. The Bush
administration has had some success in convincing them to
reduce those for various consumer goods. Try to keep reducing
those, and then use the Alaska model, direct distribution
system, as compensation. So, that's a way to avoid, you know,
siphoning off money from investment, and I think it would also
improve the consumer market for many of these goods, which is
being distorted by subsidies right now.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Biden. Thank you very much.
At the risk of generating a revolt here, the most junior
member of the committee is to preside at 1 o'clock. I'll leave
it up to his more senior colleagues to wonder whether you let
him go for 8 minutes, which means it's going to put you all
behind. I will have pushed you back a good 20 minutes.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, I don't mind. Be happy to defer.
At 1 o'clock, I turn into a pumpkin, as well, in handling a
meeting. So, if we can go--let the Senator from Virginia go
ahead, and just let me get in a couple of questions before 1
o'clock.
Chairman Biden. We will try to do that. We've got 15
minutes. If you do less than 8, you'll make more friends, Jim.
[Laughter.]
Senator Webb. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I realize
that I've now incurred a sequence of obligations all the way
down this bench here. And the unfortunate part of that is, as
the junior member, there's not many ways I can repay that----
[Laughter.]
Senator Webb [continuing]. Other than agreeing to preside
on the Senate floor for some of these people, which I won't do.
[Laughter.]
Senator Webb. But I want to thank the witnesses for their
testimony. I thought there were some really fascinating
information for me to be able to put into the thought process
here. I think, as most of you know, I was an early-warning
voice against going into Iraq in this way. I thought that
strategically it was going to harm the country. And I was very
interested to see that there seems to be pretty strong
agreement here that the--for the long-term benefit of Iraq and
the region, the solution here really should be moving from the
outside in, rather than from the inside out. And what I mean by
that is, we do need a regional diplomatic umbrella before we
can, in my view, guarantee the long-term security and stability
of Iraq.
And I know that, Dr. Marr, in your testimony, you mentioned
the notion that there's going to be a high degree of
decentralization for quite a period of time. And Dr. Pillar
mentioned, several places, the specter of direct intervention.
And, you know, Dr. Said, you mentioned the Lebanon model,
which--I was a journalist in Lebanon in 1983, when the Marines
were there. You--there were a number of parallels, other than
simply the idea that people are going to fight it out over a
period of years. Just the notion they had a very weak central
government that was unable to get on its feet. You had all
these different militia elements in constant turmoil. There was
a great deal of middle-class flight, and, you know, people with
high degrees of skills leaving the country. And we're seeing,
in many ways, some of those parallels.
And it occurs to me that, with respect to the players in
this region, that it would be much better to have a United
States-led sponsorship, in a way, that would bring these
players to the table in a constructive way, rather than having
them come in more as a consequence of disarray as things move
forward. I would like your thoughts on that.
Dr. Marr. Let me just say that among people I talk to that
know the region, this opinion is almost unanimous--there is
widespread believe that we need to engage the neighbors, and,
to an extent, the international community, in a variety of
ways. And I would just like to go back to the Iraq Study Group,
because it was interesting that we had a very wide variety of
opinions--on the right, left, middle--and there really was very
widespread agreement that this must be a component,
particularly if Iraq is not going to be successfully stabilized
soon. I keep coming back to at least minimizing the damage to
the neighbors and getting the neighbors to help to put either
pressure or provide incentives to their clients inside. We need
to do that.
Dr. O'Hanlon. Senator, I think it's probably a good idea,
although I'm skeptical of Iran's willingness to participate in
a constructive way. But I think, even under those
circumstances, it's still worth doing. As I've tried to argue,
it's because, in part, you can tell the Iranians, ``Listen,
there's not going to be any great outcome for you here, in
terms of driving us out of the region.'' If you're in a
conference where Saudis and Turks are sitting down with the
United States, we'll have our allies there, too, and it'll be
easier, I think, to convince the Iranians, something which they
need to recognize, which I'm not sure they have, so far,
which--they cannot drive us out of the region the way Britain
left in the early 1970s, for example. Regardless of the
outcome, and regardless of who's elected President in the
United States in 2 years, we are almost certainly going to stay
committed to our traditional allies. And I hope that awareness
could sober Iran a bit about what it's trying to do inside
Iraq. So, even if you take a very, sort of, dire interpretation
of Iran's motives, I think it's still worth talking.
Dr. Pillar. Senator, I agree with your observation
entirely. And just to comment on Mike's comment, Iran's motives
are shaped, in large part, by the United States posture toward
Iran. And insofar as regime change is the main element of--or
is perceived to be the main element of--that posture then the
other side doesn't have much incentive to cooperate. So, that's
a set of incentives that is very much in our power to
manipulate.
Mr. Said. I think, without taking the Lebanon analogy too
far, because, of course, there are also differences there, I
think what is also instructive from Lebanon is the Taif
accords, the peace deal that brought peace to Lebanon. It was
sponsored by Saudi Arabia, and it involved an element of
implementation by Saudi Arabia, as well. And I think there
are--there are instructive elements there that could be
extended to Iraq, whereby a regional process where----
Senator Webb. Yes.
Mr. Said [continuing]. Can not only bring the solution and
the settlement, but also the resources to implement it.
Senator Webb. I have 2\1/2\ minutes left. I have one other
question, and it--it's, sort of, inspired by the chairman's
question earlier about: Do you ever--do you think you would
ever see national police operating on the streets of Fallujah?
Do any of you believe there will ever be true stability in Iraq
if there are American combat troops on the streets of Iraq's
cities? Or while there are?
Mr. Said. No.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Biden. Thank you.
Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. In deference to my--the Senator from
Florida who has to leave at 1 o'clock also, I'm certainly
willing to let him ask a couple of questions before 1 o'clock.
Chairman Biden. I told you this is the most collegial
committee in the Senate here. Thank you very much. It's kind of
you.
Senator Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you.
Senator Isakson. As long as he doesn't run over.
[Laughter.]
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, rather than make a speech, I'm
just going to ask questions. How's that?
Senator Isakson. Good.
Senator Bill Nelson. When does the pain of sectarian strife
become sufficient that it finally causes the Sunnis and the
Shiites to start getting serious about reconciliation?
Mr. Said. The pain is already quite serious. The question
is--and if it was just Sunnis and Shiites fighting, there may--
we may have reached that threshold. But what's happening in
Iraq, as has been suggested by others as well, is
fragmentation. This is becoming, gradually, a war of everyone
against everyone. There are criminals on the streets. There are
myriad Shia militias fighting among each other as much as they
are fighting against the Sunnis. There are death squads of
undescribable origin and of undescribable violence. This has
become such a pervasive exercise in violence that there is no
pain threshold that can stop it. This--there are no coherent
sides directing the violence anymore. They are fragmented.
There are warlords acting at the behest of the highest bidders.
There are commercial interests and foreign interventions. Iraq
has passed the point, if you like, where it can pull itself by
its bootstraps. There is a need for an external intervention to
bring peace to Iraq.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right, now, that answer is
particularly appropriate to Baghdad, would you not say? Let's
go outside, to the west of Baghdad, to Al Anbar. I thought that
the Marine commanders made a compelling case to me there, that
additional troops would help them, as they are beginning to get
the Sunni leaders to help them with al-Qaeda, which is the
problem in western Iraq, in Al Anbar. Give me--differentiate
between Al Anbar and Baghdad.
Mr. Said. There are clearly differences, but they could go,
also, the other way around. One of the major sources of the--
the major source of violence in Anbar is the fight between the
Iraqis and Americans. So----
Senator Bill Nelson. Pull that mike----
Mr. Said [continuing]. One can easily----
Senator Bill Nelson [continuing]. To you closer.
Mr. Said. Huh?
Senator Bill Nelson. Pull the mike closer.
Mr. Said. I'm sorry. I'm saying, the main component of
violence in Anbar is the fight--is the violence between the
Iraqis and Americans. So, one can just as well say that a
solution in Anbar can come through withdrawing U.S. forces
rather than increasing them. But, regardless of that, even in
Anbar there is intra-Iraqi violence. It's not Shia versus
Sunni, it's Sunni versus Sunni. And, indeed, the tribal feuds
in Anbar province--old tribal feuds on--over commercial
interests and smuggling routes, have spilled out into this new
coalition of Anbar tribes purporting to fight al-Qaeda. In
reality, there is an--inside that determination, there are old
tribal rivalries that are being used. And, in a way, the United
States is being used by one tribe to bolster its bid against
the other. So, it's never a simple--a black-and-white
situation. But----
Senator Bill Nelson. Right. All right, you----
Mr. Said [continuing]. You are right that, in mixed areas,
that's--the situation is different.
Senator Bill Nelson. With the example you just gave in Al
Anbar, could the Saudis, with their tribal influence, help in
settling down the tribal strife, and, therefore, help with the
stabilization of that western part of Iraq?
Mr. Said. Tremendously. I think the one party if--everyone
speaks about bringing Iran to the table, and Syria--I think one
party that could contribute a lot more significantly than those
two to a political settlement in Iraq is Saudi Arabia. And it's
not being engaged properly.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right. Let's----
Dr. Marr. If I could----
Senator Bill Nelson. Yes, Dr. Marr.
Dr. Marr [continuing]. Just remind people how complex it
is, there are tribes and tribes. And I've talked to people in
Saudi Arabia who don't have any love for the Dulaymis, who are
in Anbar. But I do agree the Saudis have a very vested interest
in the stability of the Sunni region, so that this instability
doesn't spill across the border. And something beside building
a fence should be done.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, Mr. Chairman, I haven't given
you my report, but that's one of the reasons I went and spent
12 days in the region. And I spoke, specifically at the request
of General Hayden, to the Saudis--the King, all of the security
apparatus in Saudi Arabia, and so forth. So, I would ask: How
do you encourage Saudi Arabia properly to get involved?
Mr. Said. I'm sorry. One reason why the Saudis are not
being engaged sufficiently in Iraq is that--is the resistance
on behalf of Iraqi--some of the Iraqi leaders, winners of the
political process, to engage them. Because clearly a Saudi
engagement will bolster the position of some of the opposition
groups, vis-a-vis some of those who are in power; and,
therefore, Saudi engagements needs to be a part of a regional
approach, and it needs to be part of an internationally
mediated settlement for Iraq that goes beyond, if you like, the
pain threshold of the Iraqi Government. I mean, we cannot--this
will not happen if everything happens exactly as to the wishes
of the Iraqi Government. The Iraqi Government needs to be
pressured into accepting Saudi engagement, as well as some of
the other groups need to be pressured into accepting Iranian
engagement.
Senator Bill Nelson. All right. Final question, Senator
Isakson. As I said, I'm not making a speech, I'm asking
questions.
A final question. Bashar Assad says that he has an alliance
with Iran, vis-a-vis Iraq. You all have already testified on
his reasons not to do that. How do we--how do we crack that
door? How do we start to bring him to us instead of to Iran?
Dr. Pillar. I think two main things. One, bear in mind that
his principal objective is still to get what his father
couldn't get, which was return of the Golan, as, obviously,
part of a larger peace process with Israel. And the last time
the Syrian track was active, they came this close to an
agreement. And the second thing is, there are economic ties
that have developed over the years between Iran and Syria, and
there's going to have to be some kind of consideration for how
economic ties with the United States could take part of the
place of that, if they lost any of it.
So, economic issues and Arab-Israeli peace-process issues.
Mr. Said. If I might add, again, I mean, the--there has
been a very strong and constructive, in the region, Syrian-
Saudi alliance that has broken down over the last 10 years. And
that's something that could also be--especially in terms of
economic aid--if Saudi Arabia could replace Syria's dependence
on Iran, one could see a different behavior.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you.
Senator Menendez. Mr. Chairman, a procedural question, if I
may?
Chairman Biden. Sure.
Senator Menendez. I won't be, unfortunately, able to stay
after Senator Isakson. I have an interview I've got to do. What
is the procedure here on questions for the committee?
Chairman Biden. Yes; we'll submit----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. Some course of events----
Chairman Biden [continuing]. Them through the Chair to the
witnesses.
And I apologize to my colleague from New Jersey for the way
this has been disjointed a bit here.
Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
All of you have said, in one way or another, that
reconciliation is absolutely essential to long-range stability
of Iraq. I have read that part of the administration's case may
be--for a surge of troops in Baghdad--may be that you can't
have reconciliation until you first have stability within
Baghdad, relative peace. The question is: If the multifaceted
violence--more than just the sectarian violence, but what you,
Mr. Said, have referred to--if, in fact, a surge does produce a
more peaceful Iraq, without having played a favorite within the
many facets, and was evenhandedly done, can that contribute to
bringing about the reconciliation we're talking about? Or is
the fact that we're going to have soldiers there, present--as
the answer to Mr. Webb's question--make it impossible?
Mr. Said. I think any additional U.S. soldier brings with
him the--or with her--the complexity of the issue. Again, it's
one more occupation soldier, in the eyes of many Iraqis, as
well as a protector for some communities, in the case of the
sectarian violence. So, the--you're asking if the presence of
the troops will produce stability, and I think what we've heard
from me and from the others is that there is skepticism that
the proposed surge will produce the stability and the
protection that the people will get. But to answer your
question directly, yes; if they succeed, if the additional
troops do succeed in protecting more Iraqis and reducing the
threshold of fear, the level of fear that they experience
today, then, of course, that will be--that will contribute to
political settlement.
Dr. Marr. I would just----
Senator Isakson. Yes.
Dr. Marr. I would just like to add, here, that I see the
situation in the Iraqi Government, within the Green Zone, as
one centered on political parties and factions and groups, with
their militias, particularly an alliance between the two
Kurdish parties and SCIRI. Of course, Muqtada al-Sadr is
playing a role. These are political parties with leaders who
have been shaped by certain perceptions. They're new, they're
not entirely stable. And this is the dynamic you have to look
at. They're being asked to make compromises with ex-Baathists,
people--insurgents and people who have perhaps wreaked a great
deal of terror in Baghdad, and who have a history of wanting to
get back in. So, I--put it in a political context here,
because, in fact, it's not just a question of stabilizing
Baghdad. They might use us for that purpose, because, indeed,
that's what they'd like. Better we do it than that they do it.
Even if we stabilize Baghdad, if that should occur, we're going
to have to find ways to get these particular parties, groups,
leaders, operating within this dynamic, to make the compromises
necessary, and to expand the political group. That's the task
that's at hand, and we can think of a variety of ways in which
you can do that. Hopefully, it will work, but it really
requires a strategy, nudging, and instruments, positive and
negative, to get that to occur.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Dr. Marr.
Dr. O'Hanlon, I want to ask you a question, and you can add
on what you were going to say. Sixteen years ago, my son wrote
a master's graduate thesis at the University of Georgia--which
as a father I read--which just occurred to me in your
testimony, it was about the effects of the Dutch disease on the
Middle East. And the Dutch disease, as I remember it from that
master's thesis, is when you have a nation with a singular
source of wealth, which is a raw material--in this case, oil--
that never develops its infrastructure or its economy or its
people, then it--they are rife for problems. Then it went into
investigating each one of these.
The President's recommendation, we are told, is going to
have a $1 billion economic--for lack of a better word, a WPA
program for, I presume, mostly in Baghdad. Does that help,
given this Dutch disease, which Iraq obviously suffers from--
does that--assuming, again, the stability, which is step one--
does that help to bring--to contribute to reconciliation, if,
in fact, they begin being employed in the--there begins some
semblance of a diversified economy?
Dr. O'Hanlon. Senator, I'm a supporter of a job-creation
program, not necessarily because I expect it to contribute to a
stronger Iraqi economy, in the long term, but because I think
it's a good security strategy, in the short to middle term--
takes some of the unemployed angry young men off the street, or
at least gives us some hope that some fraction of them will be
less likely to oppose what we're doing and oppose the Iraqi
Government. So, on those more specific security grounds, I
would support it.
On your earlier question, if I might add on----
Senator Isakson. Please.
Dr. O'Hanlon [continuing]. I think it's fine to imagine,
you know, a surge beginning before a reconciliation, as long as
there's a sense of urgency about the latter. Because I think--
my own sense, this is just guesstimating, of course--but the
best you could hope for out of a surge is to get violence back
to where it was, maybe, in 2004, or, if you're really lucky,
the more difficult parts of 2003. A surge is not going to end
Iraq's problems, it's not going to stabilize Baghdad. That
would be too ambitious of a goal, and it's just not realistic.
So, the most we can hope is that it arrests the deterioration,
maybe stops some of the worst ethnic cleansing, and gets things
back to where they were a couple of years ago. That's obviously
not good enough. That's not a stable endpoint. So, the only way
that could be useful is if there very quickly follows on--
hopefully at the same time, but certainly very quickly
thereafter--a broader political and economic strategy, as well.
Senator Isakson. Yes.
Mr. Said. I think it's a very important question you raise
about Dutch disease. And, indeed, none of the economic policies
promoted by the United States in Iraq under the direct
administration, nor now under the Iraqi Government, are mindful
of that. Indeed, Iraq's dependence, singular dependence, on oil
has increased over the past 4 years. Last year's budget, 94
percent of government revenues came from oil. That's
unprecedented. There is no country in the world that has such
degree of dependence on oil. But, unfortunately, at this point,
it seems that Dutch disease--worrying about Dutch disease is a
luxury that the Iraqi Government cannot afford. And, as Mr.
O'Hanlon suggested, an immediate job-creation program, although
it is clear that it will not offer any long-term economic
benefits, will at least reduce the violence, which is the main
concern.
Senator Isakson. Dr. Pillar, I--first of all, thank you for
your service to the country. You're a retired veteran, served
in Vietnam--I was reading your resume--and, I think, wrote a
book that's title was, in part, ``Negotiating Peace and
Terrorism in U.S. Foreign Policy.'' And when you made your
statement, it was enlightening to me, when you said--talked
about ``jihad depended on struggle,'' and talked about ``the
terrorist networking, given the struggle in Iraq,'' assuming,
for a second--knowing what happened on 9/11, and knowing what
al-Qaeda's stated purposes are, and assuming stability came to
Iraq and we were gone, what would al-Qaeda do to--would it
create more struggles to keep feeding itself?
Dr. Pillar. It would create more struggles. It would lose a
big propaganda point and recruitment tool and networking
opportunity and training ground, which, again, are the things
that parallel what we saw in Afghanistan. It would not be
critical, one way or another, in the survival of al-Qaeda. And
most of what al-Qaeda will continue to try to do would not
depend even on a safe haven, as was once the case in
Afghanistan. One can talk about Iraq, but more important will
be things terrorists do in places like Hamburg and Kuala Lumpur
and flight-training schools in the United States, which is one
of the lessons of 9/11: You don't need a territory. They can do
their dirty business other ways.
Senator Isakson. And I guess my answer to that would be,
they thrive off the continued conflict in Iraq, they have no
interest in reconciliation, or peace, for that matter.
Dr. Pillar. Absolutely. They thrive off of continued
conflict in Iraq, yes.
Senator Isakson. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Said. If I may add, here, also, al-Qaeda is not
necessarily interested in gaining power in Iraq.
Senator Isakson. I know.
Mr. Said. Al-Qaeda is more interested in keeping it as it
is, and keeping the United States in Iraq, where there could be
major confrontation.
Dr. Pillar. Exactly. I agree, completely.
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Biden. Senator Cardin, you take what time you
need. [Laughter.]
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it
very much. And I can't tell you how much--how important I think
these hearings are, and the witnesses that we have here,
building upon the opinion that the United States needs to lead
with diplomacy and bringing in the international community if
we're going to be able to complete a mission in our interest in
Iraq.
I want to follow up specifically on one part that is likely
to be in the President's policy, and that is the public works
initiative, significant United States-initiated economic-
development public works in Iraq. And I want to know what your
views are as to the capacity of Iraq to be able to deal with
that type of initiative. All of you are saying that the United
States is viewed as an occupation force, the President's
message tonight is certainly going to get mixed reviews among
the parties in Iraq. It's--it makes more visible, United States
presence in Iraq. There are concerns about security issues
among any public works projects. And I just would like to
know--we've had problems in Congress making sure the money is
used appropriately that we appropriate. And we know that it has
not been the case. So, I guess I have a concern that, yes, we
want to be responsible in building Iraq, the economics and
providing opportunity for the people of Iraq, but--well, what
are your views as to how well that will be used in Iraq, or
what suggestions you might have as to what we should be doing
to make sure that money is properly used in Iraq, understanding
that the package that the President's likely to be submitting
to us is coupled with an escalation of United States presence
in Iraq that certainly will cause some additional problems for
us in that region?
Dr. O'Hanlon. Senator, that's a great question. I certainly
think you're right to raise all these concerns, but I still
strongly support the job-creation program, because, again,
unemployment has been such a nagging issue in Iraq, and it
creates more angry unemployed young men who join the Mahdi
Militia, for example, or who join the Sunni-based insurgency.
So, I think it makes sense. But to focus in on one of your
operational questions: How do we provide oversight? What are
the most important things for us to watch? In the spirit of
what I was saying before, and that my colleague, Mr. Said, was
saying also, I think it's, in a way, almost less important what
the Iraqis do on their jobs, and more important that we make
sure the right people get the money. In other words, you don't
want to have this become a slush fund that some jihadist gets
in charge of or some militia member gets in charge of, and then
turns it into a patronage system to reward militia members. You
have to make sure that you are being very careful about the
disbursement of the funds. I don't, frankly, care if they
whitewash the same fence 10 times in a row, as long as it's 10
people who are relatively good-natured and well-intentioned and
are not using that money to funnel to a lot of al-Qaeda or
insurgent or militia operatives.
So, figuring out the mechanism to pay people, I think, is
the single most important thing, and my guess is the right
answer is to build on the military commander's emergency
response program, because our troops in the field are the ones
who are out there in the large numbers who are going to have
the ability to do more vetting and more careful distribution.
They have to be involved, at some level. You can't just rely on
these Provincial Support Teams, Provincial Reconstruction
Teams, that have a couple of dozen people in each province,
because they're going to have to give the money in bucketloads
to Iraqis who, in some cases, may or may not be fully
dependable. That would be my only advice.
Dr. Marr. I'd just like to make three points on this. I
would hope that this money is going to be rapidly funneled to
Iraqis. The whole idea that Americans are going to be there
doing the public works is just, it seems to me, a nonstarter.
Iraqis traditionally are schizophrenic on foreign powers
and occupation, and we perhaps put a tad too much concern on
antiforeign, antioccupation sentiment. Of course that's going
to be there, but Iraqis do need the outside help. And yet, even
when they get it, they're going to rebel against it.
I think there is an issue here, not so much on the public
works and the emergency funds, because the money needs to be
spread for employment, I agree. But in terms of really
developing the economy, getting the electricity going, and so
forth, Iraq used to have a very good technocratic class,
engineers and others, but, as everybody has pointed out,
they're really losing it, not just at the top level, the
engineer, but the technocrats who actually do the work. I
recall a conversation in Basrah, last time I was there, about
some technician who was dealing with something as simple as
filters of some kind on oil installations; and just getting
people to understand that they had to change that filter--it
had to be absolutely clean every day--he said, was very really
a problem. So, this is something we do need to be concerned
about, whether the money is going to be used properly.
And we haven't talked too much about it, but corruption is
a huge problem. Mike probably knows the figures on how much of
the Iraqi oil revenue, the economy, and so on, is siphoned off
to individuals, and doesn't feed into the formal economy or the
government. So, some kind of balance has to be found, in terms
of oversight of the funds, that they're going not just to
insurgents, that goes without saying, but corrupt politicians
and others--there will always be a certain amount of
corruption--versus getting that money and the jobs into the
bloodstream. I think there's always a balance to be achieved
here. But that corruption issue is a real problem.
Senator Cardin. I agree with you. And there's certainly a
desire to get Iraqis employed. And I can appreciate your
pointing that out. But I think, at the end of the day, we want
the water supply to be available to the Iraqis. We wanted this
to be constructive and helping the economy of the country to
lead toward stability of the country. And without the experts
that they need, because they have left, without having the
trained workforce, there's going to be a lot of foreign
interest in helping in Iraq, and, unfortunately, some of that's
not going to be well received, it seems to me.
Mr. Said. I think there are two problems with the job-
creation program that is being proposed. First of all, the
Iraqi Government, last year--this past year--have failed to
spend a lot of the money that it has allocated through the
budget for investment. There is a serious shortage of capacity
to spend, in the Iraqi Government, to--especially for
investment projects. So, to add additional resources, if the
Iraqi Government hasn't been able to spend, is a bit
problematic.
So far, such initiatives have been guided by short-term
interests, particularly addressing the security situation, and
has not fed into a long-term or medium-term strategy. Now,
there is--the Iraqi Government has developed several
strategies--a national development strategy on, currently, the
compact--but there has been--there seems to be continued--
continuing disconnect between the interventions, the aid money
that is being given, and the Iraqi medium-term strategy. So,
it's very important for this particular package to flow through
an Iraqi-owned and -designed planning strategy that looks in
the--to the medium term and is not ad hoc and short term.
Senator Cardin. Well, let me thank, again, the witnesses,
and thank your patience, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Biden. Well, thank you for your patience.
Senator Lugar, do you have anything you want to----
Senator Lugar. Just one followup on Senator Cardin's
question. We've been discussing--and he illuminated this, as
you have--that it would be desirable for this to flow through
somebody in Iraq. But you've all testified the bureaucracy is
decimated, the professionals that were left have gone
somewhere, and there is a protection problem even for those
Iraqis who might be doing these works, quite apart from
Americans or somebody. Physically, how can the billion dollars
be spent? You've said that the Iraqis couldn't allocate maybe a
quarter of their own budget this year, quite apart from $1
billion that comes in from us. I'm just trying to trace,
physically, what happens, in terms of expectations and results.
Mr. Said. This is quite a challenge. I mean, you are
pointing out a serious challenge that the administration will
face in spending these resources. I think the trick is--here is
to help spend at least some of these resources to build Iraqi
capacity to spend, Iraqi capacity to manage and execute
projects, which has been decimated over the last 3 or 4 years.
Senator Lugar. Build the capacity to get those resources to
people.
Mr. Said. Another element of it is to use the emergency
response fund framework that the commanders use, the military
commanders on the ground, with small sums of money, to produce
the kind of relief. But this is not a framework within which
you spend billions of dollars; these are much more small-
scale--however, quite effective in generating short-term
employment.
Dr. Marr. Just one point. I'd like to bring up my favorite
subject, and that's exchanges--education, students, training
people, getting Iraqis out; it doesn't even have to be to the
United States--and working on the visa problem here, to get
them in. I'm hearing all kinds of complaints, still, about
Iraqis not being able to come over, study, and so on. But one
way to help build the capacity is to get Iraqis out, get them
in training, and that helps some of the security problems, as
well.
Senator Lugar. You mean develop a major scholarship program
for 10,000 Iraqis, something of this sort, with a significant
public-relations aspect, and maybe some leadership.
Dr. Marr. Not enough is being--not enough is being done
there, I think.
Chairman Biden. Senator Menendez----
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Biden [continuing]. Welcome back.
Senator Menendez. I'm glad to have been recognized. I
didn't think it was going to be that short, but I appreciate
it. And I appreciate the panelists for their testimony and
their staying power for all this time. And I wanted to get
back, and having sat here all morning I hope that the questions
that I want to pose to you are not repetitive. I stayed here
through the morning, so, maybe on some of the questions and
answers, you may have answered some of this. So, I hope it's
not repetitive, in case I didn't catch it.
As I both read your testimonies and listened to your
testimony here today, and your answers to questions I have a
real concern. I didn't vote for the war in the first place, so
I come from a certain point of view. But, of course, I want us
to succeed. And it seems to me that everything I heard you
collectively say is that this is about, at the end of the day,
a political solution, and that we cannot necessarily accomplish
a military solution.
I hear and read, for example, Dr. Marr, in your testimony,
toward the end, you say, ``Only when the participants in the
struggle for power recognize that they are losing more than
they can gain by continuing will it come to an end. And that
may be''--your sentence goes on, ``that may be a very long
time.'' When I listen to Mr. Said say that, in fact, ``a good
part of the violence is one about power and money'' and when I
hear Dr. Pillar say, which I agree with totally, that ``Iran is
the big winner, at the end of the day''--all of those comments,
and others, in my mind, speak volumes as to why an escalation
is not the solution to our problem. As a matter of fact, from
what I've seen of those who are military experts, including
several of our generals, say is that to have a real ability to
have some military effort--as I think Mr. Said mentioned--is
about half a million troops, over three times the number of
troops that exist in the United States now. And there is no
way, both military, I think, from the U.S. perspective, in
terms of the ability to do that, as well as the support, for
that possibly to happen.
So, having said all of that, the question is: How is it--
and you've all talked, at different points, about the political
process, the regional players but what would you be saying
tomorrow if the Secretary of State comes before the committee?
What would you be saying to her if you were advising her, and
to the President, about what the steps are that we need to take
to get that political process, both internally by Iraqis and as
General Pace said, ``to love their children more than they hate
their neighbors''? That can't be accomplished through military
might, to love their children more than they hate their
neighbors. The question is: How do we have a surge, an
escalation, in a political process that gives us the ultimate
success that we want? What would be the steps that you would be
suggesting in order to accomplish that?
Dr. Marr. Well, I'd kind of like to go back to the Iraq
Study report again, because I think they really did address
this, aside from the surge. And, incidently, I'm not so
pessimistic that I think there are going to be no agreements
between Iraqis for a very long time. We've pointed out to one
area where this long process seems to be beginning, and that's
the oil legislation. There have been some compromises, mainly
from the Kurds, who recognize that they want to get on with
this. I think you have to take a strong stand behind the scenes
and indicate that there's both a carrot and a stick, as the
Iraqi Study Group report said. We're willing to continue aid
and help--not necessarily money, but training, assistance,
support, and so on--if certain milestone steps are taken--
something on the de-Baathification, compromise on the oil law,
and----
Senator Menendez. But this is now--you're saying the United
States saying to----
Dr. Marr. United States talking turkey----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. Proactively.
Dr. Marr. Yes; to these----
Senator Menendez. And as part of that----
Dr. Marr. But also negative. If----
Senator Menendez. Uh-huh.
Dr. Marr [continuing]. These things are----
Senator Menendez. That's what I want to----
Dr. Marr [continuing]. Not accomplished--and our patience
isn't exhaustive, as Michael has said--then we're going to
withdraw this support, including military support.
Senator Menendez. Well, I'm glad you said that, because my
followup to the question, and I'd like to hear from others, is:
Isn't it true that benchmarks without timetables or at least
consequences, are only aspirations, as part of that process?
What would your suggestions be?
Mr. Said. I think benchmarks are useful, even without
consequences, because they set goals, they set parameters
according----
Senator Menendez. But we've had those benchmarks, and many
of them have not been met, and----
Mr. Said. Definitely.
Senator Menendez [continuing]. And now we have them as
another excuse for an escalation of troops.
Mr. Said. Definitely. I mean, there is definitely a need
to--for the U.S. Government to take a more assertive role, vis-
a-vis its own allies in Iraq. There is a need to take a more
serious look at----
Senator Menendez. How do we get other regional players to
be involved in a proactive way?
Mr. Said. Beyond that, I thought--I think it's very
important to say that this is not something the United States
alone can make. I think internationalizing Iraq is a very
critical element. To give you just one example, the League of
Arab States and the United Nations have been trying, over the
last 3 years, to build, if you like, the Iraqi delegation to a
peace conference, trying to canvas Iraqi political class and
political elites to identify people who could sit together and
negotiate a peace settlement. This is a role that the United
States cannot play. This is a role that could--that only
trusted international multilateral actors can do. And I think
the United States should encourage such efforts, be it through
the United Nations, through the international compact, or
through the Arab League, to broaden the negotiating table and
bring additional Iraqis to the table, and regional players, to
start working on a settlement and on a political framework.
Senator Menendez. Dr. Pillar, you may have responded to
this previously, but in the twin exercise that the Iranians and
the Syrians have right now, where, in one part they are
enjoying us being bogged down, shedding our blood and national
treasure, and on the other part, they have an interest in the
stability of Iraq, where is the tipping point? Where do we get
them to move in the direction that is more positive than the
negativity they are playing right now?
Dr. Pillar. Well, Senator, we did address, somewhat earlier
in the proceedings, some of the ways of manipulating the
incentives. On the Syrian side, it has to do with their
objectives regarding the peace process, getting the Golan back.
With regard to the Iranian side, Tehran is interested in a
whole host of things--not just the nuclear issue that gets all
the attention, but a whole host of things that involve the
United States, having to do with everything from frozen assets
to developing a normal relationship, and a vague thing that the
Iranians would refer to as ``respect,'' which is kind of hard
to operationalize, but it is important to them.
I think Phebe, I'd go back to the Iraq Study Group as a
reference point to this, because I think their treatment of the
external dimension is excellent. And I would summarize our
earlier discussions in this room and what the ISG says by
saying the diplomatic approach needs to be inclusive with
regard to with whom we are speaking, it needs to be flexible
with regard to the forums and formats--it's not just one big
conference, it's bilateral contacts, it's track-two-type stuff,
it's the indirect incentives that could affect the thinking in
places like Tehran, and it has to be sensitive to what's on the
agenda of those countries. I just mentioned some things of
interest to Iran, for example. We can't just limit it to, ``We
want to talk about stopping your troublemaking in Iraq.'' You
know, if that's our agenda, it's going to go nowhere. It has to
be broader.
Mr. Said. If I may add another element here, which is
violence inside Iran and Syria, Iraq has been--there has been
an element of contagion taking place through Iraq, and there
has been a spike in sectarian violence and ethnic violence in
Iran, both with the Arab minority and the Kurdish minority. And
there have been issues with the Kurdish minority in Syria. And
this could become more serious as Iraq implodes. So, there is a
threshold of pain, if you like, there, as well, that will
encourage them to engage more.
Dr. Pillar. With the Kurds, there were fatal riots in
Syria, I believe in 2004, and similar ones in Iran in 2005, so
they've actually had bloodshed inside their territories over
these issues.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Biden. Folks, the end is in sight. You've been a
wonderful panel.
Let me address, from a slightly different perspective,
several points you've raised.
I believe--it doesn't make me correct, it just made me a
pariah for a while--I believe I was the first one to suggest,
in an op-ed piece over a year ago--that there be an
international conference, and a contact group to follow up on
that conference. It was pointed out, as one of the criticisms,
which is legitimate, in one sense, that if you expand the
participation, not only externally, but internally, within
Iraq, which you're suggesting, you are, by definition,
undercutting the government. There is a ``freely elected
government in Iraq.'' There is a Constitution that the Iraqi
people have overwhelming voted for. ``I was there when the vote
took place,'' the argument goes. Therefore, for the United
States to do anything that goes beyond the governmental
entities that exist now within Iraq, and to do anything without
their permission relative to external forces, is to, in effect,
negate the commitment we made to their Constitution and to the
unity government. How do you respond to that?
Dr. Pillar.
Dr. Pillar. Well, I guess it all has to be portrayed as
help. And when you talk about the regional actors--for example,
Mr. Said made the point about the Arab League's efforts to try
to help the Iraqis do all the functions that a sovereign state
would do--and so, if help can be phrased in those terms, it
doesn't necessarily have to be represented as inconsistent with
Iraqi sovereignty.
Chairman Biden. But if, in fact, the existing Maliki
government says, ``We don't want X, Y, or Z participating in
this conference, internally--they are not elected, they're not
part of the government, they do not hold a ministry,'' et
cetera--then what do we say?
Mr. Said. I mean, a peace process--I'm sorry, a peace
process, by definition, detracts from sovereignty. There is----
Chairman Biden. Detracts from sovereignty?
Mr. Said. Detracts from sovereignty. There is no peace
process anywhere in the world that recognizes 100 percent of
the sovereignty of one of the parties involved. If there is a
need for a peace process, this means there is a problem; and,
therefore, we have to--it's a last--it's a last--it's a last
resort.
Governance, sovereignty, the right, is not a carte blanche,
it's not an open check. If the government is not delivering, in
terms of providing for peace, in terms of providing a peaceful
conflict resolution mechanism, then it loses the right to some
of its sovereignty.
Chairman Biden. Well, that is a new international concept.
I happen to agree with it, but that is a new concept, in terms
of what we'd constitute as the sacredness of sovereignty. I
happen to agree with you, but I just want to make sure we
understand. We mix terms a lot. We--not you--we interchange
terms a great deal. As you all pointed out, it's very complex
in Iraq. There's an insurgency and there's sectarian violence
and there's insurgency and violence within the insurgency and
so on. I would describe the situation in Iraq as almost a
disintegration rather than a civil war, quite frankly.
But, having said that, I think, in order to help us in this
process, think through this process--and one of the things the
chairman and I have, I think, been pretty much in lockstep on
is trying to figure out these practical big-ticket items.
For example, employment. I have made many trips to Iraq, in
relative terms. Two trips ago, I met with General Chiarelli,
the No. 2 guy, who is now leaving.
He said, ``Senator, if I--you ever hear me criticize the--
raise the word `bureaucrat' again, smack me.'' He said, ``There
is no bureaucracy to deal with here in Iraq. We desperately
need one.''
And he gave me the following example. He said, ``You know,
the date palm, the national fruit, national tree, it's a symbol
of Iraq''--he went back through the history of it.
He said--and I'm embarrassed that I don't remember the
varmint that can decimate it, but it's something the equivalent
of the boll weevil to cotton--``you have to spray these every 5
years.''
And, he said, ``If you don't, within that timeframe, you
run the risk of this disease consuming this national treasure,
and also a previous source of income.''
And he said, ``So, I went to the Embassy and said, `You
ought to get them--we ought to spray these things.' ''
And he said--and I'm paraphrasing--he said, ``They said,
`No, that's up to the Iraqis.' '' And he said, ``But I told
them there's no Department of Agriculture that works.''
And he said, ``Well, they said, `It's got to be them.' ''
And he said, ``So, I did what Saddam did. I used my helicopters
and went and sprayed them.''
Which leads me to the second point he raised to me. He
said, ``You know, we have what I call the most expensive water
fountain in all the Middle East, that we built in Baghdad.'' He
said, ``It's great to put some high water--potable water to
everybody in Baghdad.'' He said, ``We built it,'' except we
didn't run the pipes from ``the fountain'' to the homes. That
was up to the Iraqis. Yet there was no mechanism by which the
Iraqis knew how to, or were able to, organize, at least at that
point, actually putting the PVC pipe in the ground from his
term of art, his facetious term, ``the water fountain'' to the
homes.
So, I guess what I'm getting at is this. And this is a
question to you, Dr. Marr. From a historical perspective, how
big a contributor to the economy of Iraq was agriculture in the
1950s, let's say, or the 1940s or the 1960s? I mean, was it a
major component? You hear the phrase ``Iraq used to be the
breadbasket of the Middle East.'' Can you tell me, from a
historical perspective what--
whether or not Iraq was a major exporter of agricultural
products in the past?
Dr. Marr. I have covered that in my previous book, and
there's a very interesting history on that. And let me just
recoup it.
When the British were there, under the mandate, up until
the 1950s, they put a lot of emphasis on agriculture. But you
have to remember, as you know, there are two kinds. There's
irrigation system in the south, which is hugely expensive. You
have to desalinate, you have to put a lot of effort, on dams
and so forth, and you have to have a population that likes
agriculture and wants to work in it. And, in fact, that has
gradually fallen into decay. Growing grains, rice, and other
things grown in the south, Iraqis were able to feed themselves,
were even able to do some exporting, into the 1950s. The rain-
fed agriculture in the north is much easier. The Kurdish area
and some of the areas around Mosul, you don't need that
irrigation. But, frankly, because of political mismanagement
and all sorts of other things, agriculture has fallen into
incredible disarray in Iraq. This migration of the population
from the south to Baghdad and so on has depopulated the area,
and it really has fallen into decline. And not only does Iraq
not export, not just under our occupation or even under Saddam,
but everything went into industry, and you can just chart the
figures where oil and urban service industries, working for the
government, for education, took over and left agriculture
behind.
One word of caution. I'm not sure Iraq can be a
breadbasket. I think there's been too much emphasis on how much
agriculture could do. It could certainly be revived. It would
help to feed the population. But modern agriculture is not
grains and so on; it's vegetables and other things you grow for
commercial agriculture. They could do a great deal more with
that. But a breadbasket for the Middle East, I think, is too
ambitious.
But agriculture, as a percentage of population employed or
any other figure, has declined radically.
Chairman Biden. Well, one of the reasons I raised the
question is, my last trip, over the Fourth of July, it was
suggested to me there was a direct correlation--and, Michael--
or Dr. O'Hanlon, maybe you could speak to this--there was a
direct correlation between the formation of the unity
government and the exponential rise in those participating in
militias, the exact opposite that was predicted. What was
predicted was, there would be a unity government; what that
would do is focus on a unified Iraq; they would have a united
Iraqi Army that was multiethnic; that the police force would be
able to begin to be purged of the death squads and so on. And
the irony was, at least in just pure data, that the number of
people being prepared to get a paycheck and get a weapon to
``fight with a militia'' went up almost exponentially. And so,
two of the generals with whom I sat said, ``You want me to deal
with the militia. Don't give me jurisdiction to disarm them.
Get the Department of Agriculture working, and give them
employment. You want me to deal with reduction of the militia.
Give me the opportunity to provide for employment.'' Because
these are people between the ages of 18 and 30, they've got
nothing to do. The unemployment rates you gave us were very
high. Are they correct? Is there a correlation--are people
joining the militias, in part, because there's nothing else to
do, a la riots in the 1960s in the United States of America, in
center cities where large numbers of teams sat on corners and
had nothing to do, and, therefore, engaged? You were mayor of
Indianapolis, going through that very difficult period of time.
Talk to me about that a minute. I mean, what's the correlation
between the intensity of support for being part of a militia
and the sectarian violence and being unemployed?
Dr. O'Hanlon. I don't think I can create a direct link that
I can prove with the data. But I can agree with your point, in
a broader sense. But it's impression. And the impression is
that when you give a country lack of hope for multiple years--
you know, you have angry young men joining the working-age
population, with nothing else to do--we just have to ask:
What's going to be their psychology? So, it's the
commonsensical answer you gave that I would fall back on,
myself. I can't prove it from the data. And in the small
samples that we have of pilot projects being attempted, I don't
think we have a way to prove that job-creation programs reduce
the support for the insurgency or the militias. But, as you
say, Senator, it's the combination of high unemployment, the
experiment in democracy not really producing reconciliation, 3
years of accumulated violence. All this has added up to a
climate of hopelessness, and we have to attack it in multiple
ways, even if we're not sure of what's going to work.
Chairman Biden. OK. Last point I'll make, and then--unless
the chairman has additional questions, close this out.
I was impressed with, not the dissimilarity, but the
similarity of your testimony today on a number of very
important points. One is that there's no straight line here to
look at, in terms of the disintegration of the situation in
Iraq. It's not totally a consequence, or even primarily a
consequence, of religion, although religion is playing a larger
role. There's an interlocking and complicated connection
between tribal loyalties, religious loyalties, political
parties, the disintegration of the middle class, or at least
the exodus. One thing that I don't want to misrepresent, so I'm
going to ask you specifically--my impression is that there was
total agreement on the need for a political settlement being
the ultimate criteria for stability in Iraq. The real question
that's evolved is one that we've been discussing for a while,
and the Baker Commission discussed, and I have discussed in the
proposal I've made, and others--I'm not unique in this regard--
and that is whether continuing and/or increasing our presence
physically with military in Iraq promotes movement toward
reconciliation, whatever ``reconciliation'' means, or the
looming middle term--not threat, but reality that, over the
next 12 to 18 months, if there's not a correlation between
political reconciliation--if that does not occur, you will see
a correlation with the reduction of American forces, to the
point that we essentially have removed all our combat forces
from that country. And that seems to be the tension. I may not
be explaining this succinctly. But, given the broad choice that
it seems to me the President of the United States has--and it's
a pretty basic choice, it seems to me--does he increase, surge,
escalate, or even just maintain without any threat, if you
will, of significant reduction within a particular timeframe?
Is that more likely to get action along the lines we need it,
which is reconciliation of some sort? Or is it better as the
Baker Commission suggested, by implication anyway, to tell the
Maliki government, and others now, ``Hey, Jack, it's not gonna
last very much longer''?
I was asked, when the President made his secret trip to
Iraq--I was on one of those programs, and they showed a picture
of the President whispering in Maliki's ear. And they said,
``What do you think of that?'' I said, ``It depends on what
he's whispering.'' I wasn't being facetious. If he's
whispering, ``I'm with you to the end, don't worry, we're
staying,'' then we're in real trouble, was my response. If he's
whispering, ``Hey, Jack, listen up here. You've got a limited
amount of time. You've got to make some courageous and
difficult choices. You've got to put yourself on the line. If
you do, we'll help. If you don't, you can't count on it.'' In
very colloquial terms, that's about what the choices are, in
terms of our policy. You can demur, you cannot answer, but if
you're willing, which side of that ledger do you--are more
inclined to come down on? I know nothing is straight-line here,
nothing is black and white. What should be the thrust of our
policy over the next year as it relates to the issue of
encouraging consensus, or a move toward consensus or
reconciliation? By suggesting we're going to be leaving or by
suggesting that we're going to provide the physical stability,
the security, first, before we ask you to make these very
difficult decisions?
Dr. O'Hanlon. Senator, it's a great way of framing the
dilemma. I think the way I would put it is, I would not be
comfortable with President Bush being the only person speaking
for the United States on this issue, because we know anything
he says is going to be interpreted not as a surge, but as a new
level of effort. His whole legacy is linked, as we all know, to
Iraq coming out at least OK. So, I personally, not just
become--not just because I'm a Democrat--I'm happy to see the
Congress in Democratic hands--and, even where Republicans are
having the opportunity, they are asking tough questions and
sending the message--the current policy is not going to be
sustainable. It's not sustainable militarily. The Army and
Marine Corps are already doing too much, even at 140,000. To go
to 160 is really going to something that has to be viewed as a
temporary measure, even if President Bush asked for 50,000 more
troops in the budget this year.
In terms of our politics, we all know, a number of you
running for President, and just running for campaigns in 2008,
are sending a message, ``This can't continue.'' And the Iraqis
have to know that, with 100,000 people being displaced from
their homes every month, it can't continue in their country
either.
So, only if both messages are sent simultaneously can it
work. A surge, by itself, with the implication that it could
continue indefinitely, I think, would be a terrible message to
send. But if it's juxtaposed with this sense of urgency, and
``2007 is the last real chance,'' then I think there may be a
case for it.
Dr. Marr. That is a wonderful question, and I think it is
the nub of the matter. I've asked myself the same thing,
thinking of it from the Iraqi side, What motivates----
Chairman Biden. Right.
Dr. Marr [continuing]. Iraqis? And I wish I had a really
definitive opinion on it, but I think I lean somewhat more to
the Iraq Study Group sense of it, although I'm not hard over.
A couple of points. I think threat is necessary, but not
sufficient, to get the Iraqis to move. And I think we have to
ask ourselves, also, what motivates people. It's not only
threat. If you're always threatening, without some incentive,
you're not going to get anywhere. But there is a sense of not
only so much hopelessness, but passivity, or, ``What can we do
about it?'' in the Iraqi tradition that I'm not sure, even if
we used a threat, it's going to be successful.
Chairman Biden. Yes.
Mr. Said. I think that a threat to withdraw will have two
impacts of opposite direction. On one hand, it may incentivize
people to talk and to seek a settlement. On the other hand, it
may emphasize--encourage them to go for a last push. Indeed,
what seems to be the dynamic, so far, has been that the threat
and the--because people in Iraq realize that the Americans are
not staying--has been to go for a last push.
Likewise, the surge option, particularly if taken out of
context, out of political context, is more likely to produce
negative results than positive.
A third--and it's just a general comment--I don't think
there is an option of a gradual U.S. withdrawal. I think what
you will realize--and this has happened on--in regional bases,
in provincial bases--that attempts to withdraw, especially
British attempts to withdraw, gradually have not materialized.
And, indeed, once you start to withdraw, you'll have to be
ready to withdraw almost immediately. And so, that is also
important to keep in mind.
Dr. Pillar. I will not demur at all in answering your very
clear question, Senator. I would definitely lean in the
direction of letting the Iraqis know we're not going to be
there forever, consistent with the Iraq Study Group report.
I disagree a little bit with the comment Mr. Said just
made. You know, people talk about an immediate withdrawal
versus gradual. I think, just as a matter of military logistics
and force protection and all that, even if you wanted to get
out fast, fast could translate into a matter of months and
wouldn't really be that much different from the timeframe that
the ISG was talking about.
But my basis for answering you that way is, basically, we
have tried other things, even ones that look like surges in the
Baghdad area. They haven't worked. This other thing might not
work, either, but at least it hasn't been tried. And it's also
the option that we know will reduce U.S. costs and casualties.
Chairman Biden. Well, I appreciate it very much. We're
going to hear from the Secretary tomorrow. She's graciously
agreed to be here. And I hope, when she does, we will have
explained that in a sense, ``surge'' is a bit of a misnomer.
Most Americans, I think, when you talk about a ``surge,'' are
thinking of 20 or 25 or 30 or 15,000 folks getting on a boat,
being shipped to the gulf, coming up through Basrah, and
occupying Baghdad. The truth of the matter is, this is going to
be a process, if it occurs. And we're talking about telling the
Marines they've got to go from 6 months to a year in place.
We're going to tell the Army guys and women there, they're
going to go from 12 months to 14 months, we're going to take a
brigade out of Kuwait or out of Qatar and move them in, and so
on. So, this is a process--which I think complicates the matter
even more, in a sense. But that's for another day.
So, I--again, the purpose of this is to educate us--and
you've helped do that today. And hopefully, the American people
and the press have gained as much from listening to all of you
as we have. I truly appreciate your patience. You've been
sitting here since 9:30. It's now a quarter of 2. It's the
drawback from expanding the committee to 21 people. I guess
that's the number we have. But there are so many people in the
Senate so critically interested in this that I overcame my
instinct of making it smaller. I was chairman or ranking member
of Judiciary for 17 years, and my entire effort was to reduce
the size of the committee to make it more manageable. But I'm
delighted with the new members. You can tell the degree of the
concern and participation. And I think you've all noted--you've
testified before--I doubt whether you've ever testified before
where you were any more convinced that as many people were
listening to everything word you had to say. And so, I hope
that's some psychic remuneration for you, for all the work
you've done on our behalf. We promise we'll try to cut the
questions down. We'll kind of see if we have multiple
questions. I don't want you in a position where you're spending
the next whatever having to answer the written questions.
Again, the chairman and I both thank you for your
tremendous input here and your patience.
And the committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:52 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
Additional Statements Submitted for the Record
Prepared Statement of Hon. Jim Webb, U.S. Senator From Virginia
The series of hearings that we begin today provide a critical
opportunity to forge a new strategic direction for Iraq and the entire
region--one that is long overdue and one I hope all Americans will
eventually be able to rally behind. I would like to express my
appreciation to our panel's witnesses for their appearance today. I
look forward to hearing their assessments, especially as they relate to
the regional implications of the situation in Iraq today.
We went to war in Iraq recklessly; we must move forward
responsibly. The war's costs to our Nation have been staggering. These
costs encompass what we hold to be most precious--the blood of our
citizens. They also extend to the many thousands more Iraqi people
killed and wounded as their country slides into the chaos of sectarian
violence and civil war. We have incurred extraordinary financial
costs--expenses totaling more than $380 billion and now estimated at $8
billion a month.
The war also has diverted our Nation's focus fighting international
terrorism and deflected our attention to the many additional threats to
our national security abroad and national greatness at home--costs
difficult to measure, perhaps, but very real all the same.
The Iraqi Government and the Iraqi people must understand that the
United States does not intend to maintain its current presence in their
country for the long term. They must make the difficult but essential
decisions to end today's sectarian violence and to provide for their
own security. The American people are not alone in seeking that day;
indeed, the overwhelming majority of Iraqi citizens also does not want
our forces present in their country for any longer than is absolutely
necessary.
The key question of the moment is how long the United States should
be expected to keep our forces in Iraq as its government seeks to
assume these burdens? How and when do we begin to drawdown our combat
presence and conclude our mission in a way that does not leave even
greater chaos behind? What is the administration's strategic vision
and, as it relates to our presence in Iraq, its eventual end point?
The answers to these questions are not to be found in Iraq alone.
Achieving our goals in this war requires a coherent strategy
encompassing the entire region. The National Strategy for Victory in
Iraq, published by the National Security Council in November 2005,
principally emphasized how the United States would help the Iraqi
people defeat terrorists and build an inclusive democratic state. This
strategy identified an initiative to increase international support for
Iraq. It did not, however, affirm the need for an overarching
diplomatic solution that is now, more than ever, an imperative if we
are to end the war.
I have said for many months that the United States does not require
a military solution to end the war in Iraq. We must seek a diplomatic
solution immediately--one that engages all nations in the region with
historic and cultural ties to Iraq. Because they are part of today's
problem, Syria and Iran also must be party to tomorrow's solution. This
overarching diplomatic solution, one supportive of a coherent strategy,
will lead to four outcomes. First, it will enable us to withdraw our
combat troops from Iraq over time. Second, it will lead to
progressively greater regional stability. Third, it will allow us to
fight international terrorism more effectively. Lastly, it will enable
us to address our broad strategic interests around the world with
renewed vigor.
During an earlier era in our Nation's history, we were faced with
an unpopular war that had gone on too long. The then-recently retired
General Dwight David Eisenhower spoke out against the conduct of the
Korean war in the summer of 1952. ``Where do we go from here,'' he
asked; ``when comes the end?''
Today, the members of this committee--indeed all Americans--await
answers to these same questions: Where do we go from here? When comes
the end?
______
Prepared Statement of Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, U.S. Senator
From Maryland
As a new member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I wish
to thank Chairman Biden and Ranking Member Senator Lugar for taking the
initiative to hold today's hearing regarding the war in Iraq. This
hearing is timely and responds to the interest of the public to learn
more up-to-date information about the President's plans and options.
I know the citizens of Maryland are very keen to understand where
we are in Iraq and the implications for our sons and daughters fighting
in Baghdad and other parts of that country. Maryland is home to the
U.S. Naval Academy and other key military installations. For many
reasons, the Iraq war and the return of our troops are of critical
concern to the citizens of my State. Sixty-two Marylanders have lost
their lives in Iraq and many more have suffered life-changing injuries.
In fact, this is one of the reasons I sought a seat on the Foreign
Relations Committee. Marylanders want to be informed about what is
happening in Iraq and other U.S. engagements around the world and I
wanted to be in a position to respond to this interest. To be sure, the
Iraq Study Group Report was an excellent means to begin this process.
The findings and recommendations from the report constitute the most
in-depth study to date of the management of the Iraq war. Specifically,
I agree with the report's recommendation to begin a phased troop
withdrawal of combat brigades.
Today we begin a series of hearings on Iraq designed to give
Members of Congress and the American public a situational overview of
the war and viable options to change our current course to promote
greater security and to bring our military forces home. At the outset,
I am very concerned about media reports regarding the Bush
administration's intent to increase the number of U.S. troops.
In 2002, as a Member of the House of Representatives, I voted
against the war in Iraq and have been critical of the President's
conduct of the war and reconstruction efforts. I have encouraged the
President to change course in Iraq and begin a phased troop withdrawal.
Now, every indication suggests the President plans to do the opposite
and increase American forces.
The escalation in combat forces causes me great concern for several
reasons. First, it is unclear whether we can count on the Iraqi
military/security forces to contribute and participate in the new
security arrangement at a level that will allow U.S. forces to pull
back from Baghdad and to begin troop withdrawal. This was the major
problem in 2006 with ``Operation Together Forward'' Iraq failed to
provide the agreed-upon troop numbers.
Second, there is strong opinion that the increase in U.S. forces by
itself will do little to quelling the violence in Iraq and protect its
civilians. The Iraqis should not be allowed to hide behind robust
American troop levels. Rather, the Iraqis should assume responsibility
to hold areas with American tactical, logistical, and technical
support. It is imperative now for the Iraqi Government to assert
control over its armed forces and security apparatus and finally
institute appropriate command and control structures to credibly fix
many of their identified shortcomings.
Third, with increased security must come greater protection for
civilians and enhanced economic/infrastructure reconstruction efforts.
While I recognize reconstruction is a long-term process, the quicker
the United States and our coalition partners begin this effort, the
sooner we can stifle the insurgents' ability to recruit more Iraqi
citizens into the deadly cycle of violence. Security and reconstruction
go hand in hand and we owe it to the people of Iraq and our troops to
implement a multifaceted approach to rebuild Iraq.
Fourth, it appears the President's new Iraq plan may well raise as
many problems as it attempts to resolve. Troop escalation is a risky
gambit that could increase sectarian violence and contribute further to
Iraq's slide to a larger civil war. I hope this is not the case and I
encourage the President to work with this Congress to create a lasting
solution to the situation in Iraq.
Finally, in that regard, it is critical that an aggressive
initiative be undertaken on the political and diplomatic front among
the countries in the region. The goal of such an initiative must be to
bring about a cease-fire in the civil war and an Iraqi Government that
has the support of all the ethnic communities in Iraq. Military efforts
alone cannot bring peace and stability to Iraq. The United States must
undertake a broader international effort for a political solution to
the civil war in Iraq.
During the coming weeks, the role of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee to inform will be just as important as the role of the
committee itself. This committee must exercise the appropriate
oversight and investigation that the American people are demanding, and
that our troops deserve.
THE ADMINISTRATION'S PLAN FOR IRAQ
----------
THURSDAY, JANUARY 11, 2007 [A.M.]
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:02 a.m., in
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R.
Biden, Jr. (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Dodd, Kerry, Feingold, Boxer, Bill
Nelson, Obama, Menendez, Cardin, Casey, Webb, Lugar, Hagel,
Coleman, Corker, Sununu, Voinovich, Murkowski, DeMint, Isakson,
and Vitter.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
Senator Biden. The hearing will come to order.
Welcome to the Foreign Relations Committee, Madam
Secretary. It's an honor to have you here.
Nearly 4 years ago, Congress and the American people gave
the President of the United States the authority to destroy
Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, and, if necessary, to
depose a dictator. We know now that the weapons of mass
destruction were not there, and that the dictator is no longer
there, as well. The Iraqis have held elections, and they've
formed a government. But the country and our troops, in my
view, are now embroiled in the midst of a vicious civil war.
As of last night, according to the Pentagon, 3,009
Americans have lost their lives, over 22,000 have been wounded,
and we have spent and committed hundreds of billions of
dollars. And there seems to be no end in sight.
For many months now, the American people have understood
that our present policy is a failure, and they wanted to know,
and continue to want to know, where we go from here.
Last night, like millions of my fellow Americans, I
listened intently to the President of the United States lay out
his new strategy for Iraq. We all hoped and prayed the
President would present us with a plan that would make things
better. Instead, I fear that what the President has proposed is
more likely to make things worse.
We hoped and prayed we would hear of a plan that would have
two features: Begin to bring American forces home and a
reasonable prospect of leaving behind a stable Iraq. Instead,
we heard a plan to escalate the war, not only in Iraq, but
possibly into Iran and Syria, as well. I believe the
President's strategy is not a solution, Secretary Rice. I
believe it's a tragic mistake.
In Iraq, the core of the President's plan is to send
another 20,000 Americans to Baghdad, a city of more than 6
million people, where they will go, with their fellow Iraqi
soldiers, door to door in the middle of a civil war.
If memory serves me, we've tried that kind of escalation
twice before in Baghdad. And it's failed twice in Baghdad. And
I fear it will fail a third time. And the result will be the
loss of more American lives and our military stretched to the
breaking point, with little prospect of success, and a further
loss of influence in the region.
Secretary Rice, this November the American people voted for
a dramatic change in Iraq. The President said, forthrightly, he
heard them. But it seems clear to me from listening to him last
night, he did not listen. And, for the life of me, I don't
understand how he could reject the overwhelming opposition to
his plan from a broad bipartisan cross-section of the country's
leaders--military, civilian, and civic. As I understand it, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff opposed this plan. Our commander in the
region, General Abizaid, opposed the plan. Our commanders in
Iraq, starting with General Casey, opposed this plan. The
Baker-Hamilton Commission opposed this plan. And so did our
greatest soldier statesman, Colin Powell.
They all gave advice to the President that could be boiled
down to two things. First, our military cannot stop the Shia,
the Kurds, and the Sunnis from killing each other. The Iraqi
people have to make very, very, very difficult political
compromises in order for the killing to stop. And all of the
people who gave advice to the President that I've mentioned
suggested that the best way to force the leaders and the people
to make these hard compromises was to start, this year, to
drawdown our forces, not escalate them. The second consensus
point from the advice the President got was that the way to
secure this political solution to secure Iraq--was to secure
support for whatever political solution the Iraqis arrived at
from Turkey, Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and all the neighbors.
And there's a second reason for seeking that kind of support
and consultation. It was that, if, in fact, the civil war
cannot be stopped, at least with a regional consensus, the hope
would be, it would be contained within Iraq.
So, Secretary Rice, to be very blunt, I can't, in good
conscience, support the President's approach. But because
there's so much at stake, I'm also not prepared to give up on
finding a bipartisan way forward that meets the twin goals most
Americans share and, I believe--I don't speak for anyone in
this committee, but I believe most of my colleagues in the
Senate share, and that is: How do we bring American forces home
in an orderly way over the next year and leave behind a stable
Iraq? In all my years in the Senate, Secretary Rice, I don't
think we've faced a more pivotal moment than the one we face
today. Failure in Iraq will not be confined to Iraq. It will do
terrible damage to our ability to protect our interests all
over the world, and, I fear, for a long time to come. That's
why we have to work together for a solution.
I'm aware that the surge is not 22,000 people--or 20,000
people getting into the boat, landing at one moment. The reason
why I think there's still time for us to work out a bipartisan
solution is that this is a process. We need a solution that
will gain the support of our fellow citizens.
I say to my colleagues, maybe because I got here in the
midst of the Vietnam war, toward the end, I think we all
learned a lesson, whether we went or didn't go, whether we were
for it or against it, is no foreign policy can be sustained in
this country without the informed consent of the American
people. They've got to sign on. They've got to sign on. I just
hope it's not too late.
Mr. Chairman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in
welcoming Secretary Rice to the Foreign Relations Committee
once again. I appreciate her willingness to discuss policy on
Iraq with the committee in advance of a very important trip to
the Middle East which I understand commences tomorrow. All of
us listened intently to President Bush's speech last night.
Yesterday I said that, initially, the President and his team
should explain what objectives we're trying to achieve if
forces are expanded, where and how will they be used, why is it
the strategy will succeed, how Iraqi forces will be involved,
how long additional troops may be needed, what contingencies
are in place if the situation does not improve, and how this
strategy fits into our discussion throughout the region. The
President made an important start on this process with his
speech. The elements of his plan require careful study by
Members of Congress. I appreciate the efforts the President has
made, thus far, to reach out to Congress and to the American
people.
I was encouraged by the President's emphasis on a regional
element in his Iraq strategy. Whenever we begin to see Iraq as
a set piece--an isolated problem that can be solved outside the
context of our broader interests--we should reexamine our frame
of reference. Our efforts to stabilize Iraq and sustain a
pluralist government there have an important humanitarian
purpose. But remaking Iraq, in and of itself, does not
constitute a strategic objective. Stability in Iraq is
important because it has a direct bearing on vital U.S.
strategic objectives. To determine our future course in Iraq,
we must be very clear about what those objectives are. In my
judgment there are four primary ones.
First, we have an interest in preventing Iraq, or any piece
of its territory, from being used as a safe haven or training
ground for terrorists. As part of this, we have an interest in
preventing any potential terrorist in Iraq from acquiring
weapons of mass destruction.
Second, we have an interest in preventing a civil war or
conditions of permanent disorder in Iraq that upset wider
regional stability. The consequences of turmoil that draws in
outside powers or spills over into neighboring states could be
grave. Such turmoil could generate a regional war, topple
friendly governments, expand destabilizing refugee flows, close
the Persian Gulf to shipping traffic, or destroy key oil
production and transportation facilities. Any of these outcomes
could restrict or diminish the flow of oil from the region,
with disastrous results for the world economy.
Third, we have an interest in preventing the loss of U.S.
credibility and standing in the region and throughout the
world. Some loss of confidence in the United States has already
occurred, but our subsequent actions in Iraq may determine how
we are viewed for generations.
Fourth, we have an interest in preventing Iranian
domination of the region. The fall of Saddam Hussein's Sunni
government opened up opportunities for Iran to seek much more
influence in Iraq. An Iran that is bolstered by an alliance
with a Shiite government in Iraq or a separate Shiite state in
southern Iraq would pose serious challenges for Saudi Arabia,
Jordan, Egypt, and other Arab governments. Iran is pressing a
broad agenda in the Middle East with uncertain consequences for
weapons proliferation, terrorism, the security of Israel, and
other U.S. interests. Any course we adopt in Iraq would
consider how it would impact the regional influence of Iran.
Now, these are not our only interests in Iraq, but they're
fundamental reasons for our military presence during the last
several years.
I would observe that all four of these objectives are
deeply affected not just by whether the insurgency and
sectarian violence can be abated in Iraq cities and
neighborhoods, but by the action of Iraq's neighbors.
For this reason, I have advocated broader diplomacy in the
region that is directed at both improving stability in Iraq and
expanding our options in the region. Inevitably, when one
suggests such a diplomatic course, this is interpreted as
advocating negotiations with Syria and Iran--nations that have
overtly and covertly worked against our interests and violated
international norms. But the purpose of the talks is not to
change our posture toward these countries. A necessary regional
dialog should not be sacrificed because of fear of what might
happen if we include unfriendly regimes. Moreover, we already
have numerous contacts with the Iranians and Syrians through
intermediaries and other means. The regional dialog I am
suggesting does not have to occur in a formal conference
setting, but it needs to occur, and it needs to be sustained.
Both our friends and our enemies in the region must know
that we will defend out interests and our allies. They must
know that we are willing to exercise the substantial leverage
we possess in the region in the form of military presence,
financial assistance, diplomatic context, and other resources.
Although it is unlikely that a political settlement in Iraq can
be imposed from the outside, it is equally unlikely that one
will succeed in the absence of external pressures and
incentives. We should be active in bringing those forces to
bear on Iraqi factions. We should work to prevent
miscalculations related to the turmoil in Iraq.
Now, finally, much attention has been focused on the
President's call for increasing troop levels in Iraq. This is
an important consideration, but it is not the only element of
his plan that requires examination. The larger issue is how we
will manage our strategic interests in the Middle East, in
light of our situation in Iraq. Can we use the stability that
we offer the region, and our role as a counterweight to Iran,
to gain more help in Iraq and in the region?
I look forward to continuing our examination of Iraq in the
committee's hearings, and especially your testimony this
morning.
Thank you.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
Madam Secretary, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. CONDOLEEZZA RICE, SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Secretary Rice. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman. Thank you, Senator Lugar. Thank you, members of the
committee.
I look forward to our discussion. And in order to
facilitate that, Mr. Chairman, I have a longer statement that I
would like to have entered into the record, and I will----
Senator Biden. Without objection, your entire statement
will be placed in the record.
Secretary Rice. Thank you.
As I come before you today, America is facing a crucial
moment--indeed, as the chairman has put it, a pivotal moment--
concerning our policies in Iraq and concerning our broader
policies in the Middle East. I think that we all know that the
stakes in Iraq are enormous and that the consequences of
failure would also be enormous, not just for America and for
Iraq, but for the entire region of the Middle East, and,
indeed, for the world. And so, we agree that the stakes in Iraq
are enormous. And as the President said last night, Americans
broadly agree, and we in the administration count ourselves
among them, that the situation in Iraq is unacceptable. On
these two points, we are unified: The enormousness of the
stakes, and the unacceptability of the current situation.
The President has, therefore, forged a new strategy that
speaks both to our stakes in Iraq and the need to change the
way that we are doing things. The Iraqis have devised a
strategy that they believe will work for their most urgent
problem; that is, to return security to Baghdad. We are going
to support that strategy through the augmentation of American
military forces. I think Secretary Gates will say more about
that in his committee. But I want also to emphasize that we see
this not just as a military effort, but also as one that must
have very strong political and economic elements.
In order to better deliver on the governance and economic
side, the United States is further decentralizing and
diversifying our civilian presence. And I will talk a little
bit more about that, and in greater detail. We are further
integrating our civil and military operations. And, as Senator
Lugar has noted, it's extremely important to see Iraq in a
regional context, and I would like to talk a little bit about
the regional strategy that we want to pursue that supports
reformers and responsible leaders in Iraq and across the
broader Middle East.
Let me be very clear. We all understand that the
responsibility for what kind of Iraq this will be rests with
the Iraqis. They are the only ones who can decide whether or
not Iraq is, in fact, going to be an Iraq for all Iraqis, one
that is unified, or whether they are going to allow sectarian
passions to unravel that chance for a unified Iraq. We know,
historically, that Iraq rests on the region's religious and
ethnic fault lines. And, in many ways, due to events in Baghdad
over the last year, Baghdad has become the center of that
struggle.
The Samarra mosque bombing provoked sectarianism, and it
set it aflame at a pace that threatens to overwhelm the fragile
and yet promising process of reconciliation, a process that has
produced successful elections and a new constitution, and
substantial agreement, as we sit here today, on a law to share
Iraq's oil wealth fairly, as well as a commitment to a more
reasonable approach to de-Baathification and to hold provincial
elections. Iraqis must take on the essential challenge,
therefore, that threatens this process of national
reconciliation, and that is the protection of their population
from criminals and violent extremists who kill in the name of
sectarian grievance.
The President, last night, made clear that the augmentation
of our forces is to support the Iraqis in that goal of
returning control and civility to their capital. He also noted
that there are also very important strategic, economic, and
political elements that must be followed up if ``clear, hold,
and build'' is to actually work this way. And so, I want to
assure you that we, in the State Department, recognize the
importance of surging our civilian elements and our civilian
efforts, as well as the surge that would be there on the
military side. This is a comprehensive policy.
Iraq has a federal government. We need to get our civilian
employees out of our Embassy, out of the Green Zone, into the
field, across Iraq. We have had, over the last year and a half,
the establishment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams that are
operating outside of Baghdad. The importance of those teams
should be understood in the following way: It is extremely
important to have an effective and functioning government in
Baghdad, and we have worked with them on ministries, on budget
processes, on the technical assistance that they need, to have
a functioning government. But it is equally important to have
local and provincial governments that can deliver for their
people. And, indeed, this gives us multiple points for success,
not just the Government in Baghdad, but the people with whom we
are working in the provinces.
I might just note that we believe that this is having an
effect in places like Mosul and Tal Afar, but it's also having
a very good effect even in some of the most difficult places.
And one of the other elements of the President's policy last
night was to announce that 4,000 American forces would be
augmented in Anbar, the epicenter of al-Qaeda activity. That
is, in part, because we believe that the efforts that we've
been making with local leaders, particularly the sheikhs in
Anbar, are beginning to pay fruit. For instance, they have
recruited, from their own ranks, 1,100 young men to send to
Jordan for training, and these ``Sons of Anbar,'' as they call
them, will come back to enter the fight against al-Qaeda.
And so, I want to emphasize, we're focused on the need to
return control to Baghdad, but we're also very focused on the
need to build capacity in the local and provincial governments,
and to be able to deliver economic and reconstruction
assistance there.
Finally, let me just say one word about our regional
diplomatic strategy. Obviously, Iraq is central now to
America's role in the Middle East--central to our credibility,
central to the prospects for stability, and central to the role
that our allies and friends and Iraq's neighbors will play in
the Middle East. But we have to base our regional strategy on
the substantially changed realities of the Middle East.
This is a different Middle East. This Middle East is a
Middle East in which there really is a new alignment of forces.
On one side are reformers and responsible leaders who seek to
advance their interests peacefully, politically, and
diplomatically. On the other side are extremists, of every sect
and ethnicity, who use violence to spread chaos, to undermine
democratic governments, and to impose agendas of hatred and
intolerance. On one side of that divide, the gulf countries,
including Saudi Arabia and the other countries of the gulf--
Egypt, Jordan, the young democracies of Lebanon, of the
Palestinian territory, led by Mahmoud Abbas, and in Iraq. But
on the other side of that divide are Iran, Syria, Hezbollah,
and Hamas. And I think we have to understand that that is a
fundamental divide. Iran and Syria have made their choice, and
their choice is to destabilize, not to stabilize.
And so, with all respect to those who talk about engagement
with Syria and Iran, I think we need to recognize that if Iran
and Syria wish to play a stabilizing role for their own
interests, then they will do so. If, on the other hand, they
intend to offer a stabilizing role because they believe that,
in our current situation in Iraq, we are willing to pay a
price, that's not diplomacy, that's extortion. And I would just
ask you what that price might be.
I have a hard time believing that Iran will, on one side,
talk to us about stabilizing Iraq and say, ``Oh, by the way, we
won't talk about what you're doing in the Security Council to
stop our nuclear program.'' That's not part of the price. Or
that Syria will talk about stabilizing Iraq while they continue
to destabilize it, and say, ``Oh, we aren't actually interested
in talking about the fact that we have not reconciled to the
loss of our position in Lebanon or to the existence of a
tribunal to try those who are responsible for the assassination
of Rafik Hariri.'' These two will most certainly come into
contact with each other, the destabilizing activities in Iraq
and the desires of these states to have us pay a price that we
cannot pay.
We do have a regional approach. It is to work with those
governments that share our view of where the Middle East should
be going. It is also to work with those governments in a way
that can bring support to the new Iraqi democracy. It is to
support the very normal democracy that Iraq itself may engage
in with all of its neighbors. And it is to have an
international compact, which is a bargain between the
international community and Iraq, for support in response to
Iraqi reforms, economic and, indeed, some that are political.
In that Iraqi compact, both Syria and Iran have been present,
and will continue to be.
Let me just conclude by saying that we all understand, in
the administration, that there are no magic formulas for Iraq,
as the Baker-Hamilton Commission said. And I'd like you to
understand that we really did consider the options before us.
The President called on advisors from outside. He called on the
advice of the Baker-Hamilton Study Group. And, of course, he
discussed the policies with his advisors, like me, who have
been there from the beginning, and, therefore, bear
responsibility for both the successes and failures of this
policy; and new advisors, like Secretary of Defense Gates, who
came with a fresh eye. After all of that, he came to the
conclusion--and I fully agree--that the most urgent task before
us now is to help the Iraqi Government. And I want to emphasize
``help'' the Iraqi Government--to establish confidence among
the Iraqi population that it will, and can, protect all of its
citizens, whether they are Sunni, Shia, Kurds, or others, and
that they will, in an evenhanded fashion, punish those violent
people who are killing innocent Iraqis, whatever their sect,
ethnicity, or political affiliation.
We believe that the Iraqi Government, which has not always
performed, has every reason to understand the consequences,
now, of nonperformance. They, after all, came to us and said
that this problem had to be solved. They came to us and said
that, yes, they would make the necessary decisions to prevent
political interference in the military operations that need to
be taken to deal with the Baghdad problem. They came to us and
said that, ``This government will not be able to survive if it
cannot reestablish civil order.'' And they gave to the
President, and not just Prime Minister Maliki, but many
leaders, an assurance that this time they're going to make the
difficult choices in order to get it done.
The situation in Iraq is unacceptable, but Iraq is also, at
this point in time, of very high stakes to this Nation. This is
a time for a national desire and a national imperative not to
fail in Iraq. We've faced crucible tests as a country before,
and we've come through them when we have come through them
together. I want to pledge to you, as the President last--did
last night, that we want to work with all Americans, here,
particularly, in the Congress, the representatives of the
American people, as we move forward on a strategy that will
allow us to succeed in Iraq. This is the strategy that the
President believes is the best strategy that we can pursue. And
I ask your careful consideration of it, your ideas for how to
improve it. And, of course, understanding that not everyone
will agree, I do believe that we're united in our desire to see
America succeed.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Rice follows:]
Prepared Statement of Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, Department
of State, Washington, DC
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, as I come before you today,
America faces a crucial moment. We all know that the stakes in Iraq are
enormous. And we all share the belief that the situation in Iraq is
unacceptable. On this we are united.
The new way forward that President Bush outlined last night
requires us to do things differently. Most importantly, the Iraqis have
devised their own strategy, and our efforts will support theirs. To do
so, we will further decentralize and diversify our civilian presence in
Iraq to better assist the Iraqi people. We will further integrate our
civilian and military operations. And we will fashion a regional
strategy that supports reformers and responsible leaders in Iraq and
across the Broader Middle East.
Among Americans and Iraqis, there is no confusion over one basic
fact: It is Iraqis who are responsible for what kind of country Iraq
will be. It is they who must decide whether Iraq will be characterized
by national unity or sectarian conflict. The President has conveyed to
the Iraqi leadership that we will support their good decisions, but
that America's patience is limited.
Iraqis are now engaged in a task without precedent in their
history. Iraq rests on the main religious and ethnic faultlines in the
Middle East, and for centuries, Iraqis have settled their differences
through oppression and violence. Now they are attempting to do so
peacefully and politically. This is not easy, and as one could expect,
many Iraqis have deep grievances, which some violent men interpret as a
license to kill innocent people.
Baghdad has become the center of this conflict. We know that al-
Qaeda deliberately sought to provoke sectarian violence in Iraq by
targeting Shia civilians. With last February's bombing of the Golden
Mosque in Samarra, the success of their plan accelerated. Sectarian
passions, incited to violence, now threaten to overwhelm Iraq's
fragile, yet promising, process of reconciliation--a process that has
produced successful elections and a new constitution, substantial
agreement on a law to share Iraq's oil fairly, and commitment to a more
reasonable approach to ``de-baathification.''
To succeed with national reconciliation, the Iraqi Government must
improve security for its people, particularly in Baghdad. Iraqis
themselves must take up this essential challenge. They must protect
their population from criminals and violent extremists who kill
innocent Iraqis in the name of sectarian grievance. The Iraqi
Government must reestablish civil order in Baghdad to regain the trust
of its people and control of its capital. President Bush has decided to
augment our forces to help the Iraqis achieve this mission. Secretary
Gates will have more to say on this.
Success in Iraq, however, relies on more than military efforts
alone; it also requires robust political and economic progress. Our
military operations must be fully integrated with our civilian and
diplomatic efforts, across the entire U.S. Government, to advance the
strategy that I laid out before you last year: ``Clear, hold, and
build.'' All of us in the State Department fully understand our role in
this mission, and we are prepared to play it. We are ready to
strengthen, indeed to ``surge,'' our civilian efforts.
Our political and economic strategy mirrors our military plan:
Iraqis are in the lead; we are supporting them. Improvement in the
security situation, especially in Baghdad, will open a window of
opportunity for the Iraqi Government to accelerate the process of
national reconciliation. We can and will measure whether this work is
being done. We recognize that the trend of political progress in Iraq
is just as important as the end result. On the hydrocarbon law, for
example, Iraqis are transcending sectarian differences and achieving a
national purpose. This is a positive trend, and the process is moving
in the right direction.
Iraqis must also take steps that accelerate economic development
and growth. The Government of Iraq has taken many important steps
already on key economic issues, including policies to open Iraq's
economy more fully and responsibly to foreign investment. The Iraqi
Government must now move urgently, especially in the most troubled
areas, to deliver essential services to its people--programs that
improve lives in meaningful ways, that restore confidence in national
and local governance, and provide a stake in the country's future for
all Iraqis who wish to see an expansion of hope rather than a
continuation of violence. The Iraqi Government is committing $10
billion of its own resources to help create jobs, to break the logjams
to growth in their economy, and to further national reconciliation.
To better disperse these new resources throughout the country,
Iraqis are building new governmental structures. One innovation they
have proposed is the creation of a new National Reconstruction
Development Council, which would enable the Prime Minister to deliver
resources faster and more effectively for major infrastructure
projects. This Council will also help take the place of our own Relief
and Reconstruction Fund. Another Iraqi innovation is the development of
Project Management Units, to help Iraqis use their own resources more
effectively to implement programs.
For these efforts to succeed, our support will be crucial. Since
2004, we have used money from the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund
and other programs to build infrastructure and help the central
government move toward self-reliance. As we enter 2007, despite many
problems, we have substantially and successfully completed this phase.
As Iraqis take charge, we will narrow our focus in how we help their
central government. Using FY 2006 Supplemental funding, we have worked
with the Iraqis to improve their capacity to govern. Now, our advisory
efforts will concentrate on the most vital ministries. We will advise
and invest our resources where we judge that our efforts will be most
effective.
To oversee our economic support for the Iraqi people, and to ensure
that it is closely integrated with our security strategy, I have
appointed Tim Carney to the new position of coordinator for Iraq
Transitional Assistance. He will be based in Baghdad and will work with
Iraqi counterparts to facilitate a maximum degree of coordination in
our economic and development efforts.
As Iraqis intensify efforts to improve lives, the main focus of our
support will continue to shift toward helping the Iraqi Government
expand its reach, its relevance, and its resources beyond the Green
Zone. We will help local leaders improve their capacity to govern and
deliver public services. Our economic efforts will be more targeted on
specific local needs with proven records of success, like microcredit
programs. And we will engage with leading private sector enterprises
and other local businesses, including the more promising state-owned
firms, to break the obstacles to growth.
Our decentralization of effort in Iraq will require a more
decentralized presence. We must continue to get civilians and diplomats
out of our Embassy, out of the capital and into the field, all across
the country. The mechanism to do this is the Provincial Reconstruction
Team, or PRT. We currently have 10 PRTs deployed across Iraq: 7
American and 3 coalition. Building on this existing presence, we plan
to expand from 10 to at least 18 teams. For example, we will have six
PRTs in Baghdad, not just one. We will go from one team in Anbar
province to three--in Fallujah, Ramadi, and Al Qaim. These PRTs will
closely share responsibilities and reflect an unprecedented unity of
civilian and military effort.
Expanding our PRT presence will also enable us to diversify our
assistance across all of Iraq. Iraq has a federal government. Much of
the street-level authority, and much of the opportunity for positive
change in Iraq, lies outside the Green Zone--in local and provincial
governments with party leaders and tribal chiefs. By actively
supporting these provincial groups and structures, we diversify our
chances of success in Iraq. Our PRTs have had success working at the
local level in towns like Mosul, Tikrit, and Tal Afar. Now we will
invest in other parts of Iraq, like Anbar province, where local leaders
are showing their desire and building their capacity to confront
violent extremists and build new sources of hope for their people.
All total, we seek to deploy hundreds of additional civilians
across Iraq to help Iraqis build their nation. And we will ask Congress
to provide funding to support and secure our expanded civilian
presence. We want to give our civilians, deployed in PRTs, the
flexibility to devote extra resources where they can do the most good
at the local level. Our expanded PRT presence will be a powerful tool
to empower Iraq's reformers and responsible leaders in their struggle
against violent extremism. We, therefore, plan to request, as part of
our FY 2007 Supplemental, significant new operating funds for our PRTs
as well as hundreds of million of dollars to fund their programs. When
we add in relevant USAID projects, we hope to approximately double our
resource commitment to help local Iraqi communities through PRTs.
These commitments will not be indefinite. As I said earlier, one of
our main objectives in this phase is to help the Iraqis use their own
money to rebuild their country. The Iraqis have budgeted billions of
dollars for this mission in 2007, and as their efforts become more
effective, we have kept our FY 2008 requests limited. We want Iraqis to
rely more and more on their own resources, their own people, and their
own efforts. Therefore, by 2008 and 2009, the burden of local
assistance should be assumed more effectively by the Iraqi Government.
In the meantime, though, our efforts will be vital.
The final piece of our effort is the development of a regional
diplomatic strategy, which was a key recommendation of the Iraq Study
Group. Iraq is central to the future of the Middle East. The security
of this region is an enduring vital interest for the United States.
America's presence in this part of the world contributes significantly
to its stability and success. So, as we recommit ourselves in Iraq, we
are also enhancing our efforts to support reformers and responsible
leaders in the region--and to deter and counter aggression to our
friends and allies.
Our regional diplomacy is based on the substantially changed
realities of the Middle East. Historic change is now unfolding in the
region, and it is unleashing a great deal of tension, anxiety, and
violence. But it is also revealing a new strategic alignment in the
Middle East. This is the same alignment we see in Iraq. On one side are
the many reformers and responsible leaders, who seek to advance their
interests peacefully, politically, and diplomatically. On the other
side are extremists, of every sect and ethnicity, who use violence to
spread chaos, to undermine democratic governments, and to impose
agendas of hate and intolerance.
This is why the proper partners in our regional diplomacy are those
who share our goals. In this group, I would count, of course, our
democratic allies: Turkey and Israel. I would also count the
governments of the Gulf States plus Egypt and Jordan, or the ``GCC+2.''
We have established unprecedented consultation with this group of
countries. In fact, I will be returning to the region, and to this
process, later this week. I would also count among our key partners the
democratic reformers and leaders in places like Lebanon, the
Palestinian territories, and, of course, Iraq. Our most important goal
now is to use our diplomacy to empower democratic and other responsible
leaders across the region. We must help them show their fellow citizens
that it is they, not violent extremists, who can best protect their
lives, promote their interests, and advance a future of hope.
On Iraq, in particular, our regional diplomacy has several
components. One concerns Iraq's neighbor to the north: Turkey.
President Bush and I have engaged retired GEN Joe Ralston to work with
Iraq and Turkey on concerns about terrorism from the Kurdish Worker's
Party. Those efforts have helped to ease tensions, but we will do more
to protect our ally, Turkey, from terrorist attacks.
Over the last 6 months, we have also supported significant progress
in crafting an international compact between the Iraqi Government and
the international community. Working with more than 40 countries, Iraq
has developed a set of written commitments to action on political,
security, and economic targets. The creation of the compact has been
guided by a diplomatic process that has already met at the level of
Foreign Ministers. This group involves all of Iraq's neighbors--
including Iran--and other states that have invested significantly in
Iraq's future. Iraq has led the compact process. The United Nations has
served as cochair. And the World Bank has assisted. This diplomatic
process also provides a structure that can easily accommodate flexible,
informal meetings of smaller groups of countries about other topics of
common concern.
While many of us are working to strengthen peace in the region, two
governments have unfortunately chosen to align themselves with the
forces of violent extremism--both in Iraq and across the Middle East.
One is Syria. Despite many appeals, including from Syria's fellow Arab
States, the leaders in Damascus continue to destabilize Iraq and their
neighbors and support terrorism. The problem here is not a lack of talk
with Syria but a lack of action by Syria.
Iran is the other. If the government in Tehran wants to help
stabilize the region, as it now claims, it should end its support for
violent extremists who destroy the aspirations of innocent Lebanese,
Palestinians, and Iraqis. And it should end its pursuit of a nuclear
weapons capability. I repeat my offer today: If Iran suspends its
enrichment of uranium--which is, after all, an international demand,
not just an American one--then the United States is prepared to reverse
27 years of policy, and I will meet with my Iranian counterpart--
anytime, anywhere--to discuss every facet of our countries'
relationship. Until then, we will continue to work with the Iraqis and
use all of our power to limit and counter the activities of Iranian
agents who are attacking our people and innocent civilians in Iraq.
Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I know there are no
guarantees or magic formulas on the question of Iraq. I know that most
Americans are skeptical and concerned about the prospects of success. I
know and share the concern for those who remain in harm's way that all
Americans feel, as well as the heartbreak they feel for the families
who have lost loved ones.
I also know that, over the past several weeks, President Bush and
our entire national security team have carefully considered a full
range of new ideas. The President has heard from those of his advisors,
like me, who have been around from the very beginning, and who bear
responsibility for our policy thus far--its successes and its setbacks.
He has also heard from new advisors who bring a fresh perspective. In
addition, the President has weighed the thoughtful advice given to him
by Members of Congress, by our friends and allies abroad, and by
outside experts like the gracious public servants who made up the Iraq
Study Group.
The conclusion the President reached, with which I fully agree, is
that the most urgent task now is to help the Iraqi Government establish
confidence that it can, and will, protect all of its citizens,
regardless of their sectarian identity, from violent extremists who
threaten Iraq's young democracy--and that it will reinforce security
with political reconciliation and economic support. Implementing this
strategy will take time to succeed, and I fully expect that mistakes
will be made along the way. I also know that violent extremists will
retain their capacity and their appetite to murder innocent people. But
reestablishing civil order--the willingness and the capacity of the
Iraqi Government to meet its responsibilities to its people--is
essential.
The situation in Iraq is unacceptable, and the stakes are
extraordinary--for the United States, for the region, and for the
entire international community. It was, after all, the trouble and
turmoil of the Middle East that produced the violent extremist ideology
of al-Qaeda, which led 19 young men to crash airplanes into our cities
5 years ago on September 11. It is clear that, now and for many years
to come, the crucible of the Middle East will remain the center of
gravity for American and international interests.
There have been other critical times for America, when we have
united as one nation to meet great challenges. Now must be such a time,
for it is a national desire and a national imperative not to fail in
Iraq. This, we believe, is the best strategy to ensure success. And I
ask that you give it a chance to work.
Senator Biden. Madam Secretary, thank you very much. And I
assure you, no one on this committee has any doubt about your
intense concern and the intensity with which you have
deliberated on this and your frank acknowledgment of the
mistakes that have been made. And I don't have any doubt about
us wondering whether or not you care a great deal about this.
I have been told by the staff that the Secretary--she has a
big day today. She has to be here, as well as in the House, and
she understandably will have to leave here by 1 o'clock, at the
latest. According to the staff calculation--and I'm going to
hold everybody to this, including myself--that if we give
everyone 7 minutes, everyone will have an opportunity to ask
her, not all the questions you have, but the most important
questions you think need be asked. We will be holding these
hearings for another 2\1/2\ weeks. There'll be plenty of
opportunities. And, again, the Secretary will be back over the
ensuing months. And so, I hope that that meets with everyone's
approval. Matter of fact, seven may be stretching it, but
that's where we're going to start, if we can.
Let me begin, Secretary Rice. Last night, the President
said, and I quote, ``Succeeding in Iraq requires defending its
territorial integrity and stabilizing the region in the face of
extremists' challenges, and that begins with addressing Iran
and Syria.'' He went on to say, ``We will interrupt the flow of
support for Iran and Syria, and we will seek out and destroy
networks providing advanced weaponry and training to our
enemies in Iraq.'' Does that mean the President has plans to
cross the Syrian and/or Iranian borders to pursue those persons
or individuals or governments providing that help?
Secretary Rice. Mr. Chairman, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs was just asked this question, and I think he perhaps
said it best. He talked about what we're really trying to do
here, which is to protect our forces, and that we are doing
that by seeking out these networks that we know are operating
in Iraq. We are doing it through intelligence. We are then
able, as we did on the 21st of December, to go after these
groups, where we find them. In that case, we then ask the Iraqi
Government to declare them persona non grata and expel them
from the country, because they were holding diplomatic
passports. But what is really being contemplated here, in terms
of these networks, is that we believe we can do what we need to
do inside Iraq. Obviously, the President isn't going to rule
anything out to protect our troops, but the plan is to take
down these networks in Iraq.
The broader point is that we do have, and we have always
had, as a country, very strong interests and allies in the gulf
region, and we do need to work with our allies to make certain
that they have the defense capacity that they need against
growing Iranian military buildup, that they feel that we are
going to be a presence in the Persian Gulf region, as we have
been, and that we establish confidence with the states with
which we have long alliances, that we will help to defend their
interests. And that's what the President had in mind.
Senator Biden. Secretary Rice, do you believe the President
has the constitutional authority to pursue, across the border
into Iraq or Syria, the networks in those countries?
Secretary Rice. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think I would not
like to speculate on the President's constitutional authority
or to say anything that certainly would abridge his
constitutional authority, which is broad, as Commander in
Chief. I do think that everyone will understand that the
American people and, I assume, the Congress, expects the
President to do what is necessary to protect our forces.
Senator Biden. Madam Secretary, I just want to make it
clear, speaking for myself, that if the President concluded he
had to invade Iran or Syria in pursuit of these networks, I
believe the present authorization--which granted the President
the right to use force in Iraq--does not cover that, and he
does need congressional authority to do that. I just want to
set that marker.
Let me move on. How long do you estimate American forces
will be going door to door with their Iraqi counterparts in
Baghdad before they can--I believe the phrase is ``secure''--or
``clear, hold, and build''? What is the estimate of how long
will it take to clear? And how long are we prepared to hold
with American forces in Baghdad that are being surged?
Secretary Rice. Well, I can't give you an exact timetable
on how long operations might take. Let me just note that the
Iraqis are in the lead on these Baghdad operations. And I think
that one reason that it's extremely important that they are
bringing some of their best forces from around Iraq to
participate in this--or to lead this effort is that a good deal
of the establishing of confidence in these neighborhoods has to
be done by Iraqis. We will be in support of them, but I think
that it's extremely important to have an image in mind that it
is Iraqis who are expected to take census. After all, they're
the ones with the linguistics skills to do so. It is Iraqis
that are expected to be in these neighborhoods. The problem
with previous Baghdad security plans is that there weren't
enough forces to hold. I think that it is important that it
will be a combination of Iraqi forces: Army and police--
national police and local police. But we want to be certain,
this time, that the holding phase lasts long enough for the
Iraqis to be able to deal with the perpetrators of the
violence. And so, I don't want to try to put a timeframe on it,
but Secretary Gates said, earlier today, that he expects this
to, of course, be a temporary measure while Iraqi forces are
brought up to----
Senator Biden. Well, Secretary Rice, I think you're right.
It's important to have a visual image of what this means: 6.2
million people, a civil war or a sectarian war taking place.
And here's what the President said last night, referring to our
surge troops, ``The vast majority of them, five brigades, will
be deployed to Baghdad. These troops will work alongside Iraqi
units, and will be embedded in their formations.'' No American
should misunderstand what that means. It means young marines
are going to be standing next to an Iraqi soldier as they break
down a door. So, I'd want to know and you've answered it--my
question related to how long we think these marines and these
five brigades are going to be kicking in doors, standing on
street corners, patrolling neighborhoods, going to second-story
walkups, et cetera. And that was the reason for my question.
But, you're right, it's important we have the correct image of
what this is. And that's what it is.
Secretary Rice. It is important that we have the correct
image that Iraqis want to have this be their responsibility.
Senator Biden. Are you confident--you, personally, Madam
Secretary--this will be my concluding comment--question--are
you confident that Maliki has the capacity to send you a
sufficient number of troops that will stay in the lead, that
will allow American Marines to feel that their physical
security is not being jeopardized merely by being ``with this
brigade of Iraqis''? Are you confident they will send a
sufficient number, and their best?
Secretary Rice. Most importantly, General Casey and our
Ambassador believe strongly that the Maliki government intends
to live up to its obligations.
Senator Biden. But I'm asking you, Secretary Rice.
Secretary Rice. I have met Prime Minister Maliki. I was
with him in Amman. I saw his resolve. I think he knows that his
government is, in a sense, on borrowed time, not just in terms
of the American people, but in terms of the Iraqi people.
Senator Biden. Are you confident?
Secretary Rice. I'm confident.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Secretary--or, excuse
me--Major Secretary----
[Laughter.]
Senator Biden. Senator Lugar--Chairman Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rice, in the New York Times today, columnist
David Brooks wrote a column called ``The Fog Over Iraq.'' I
simply wanted your comment, because you have indicated you have
visited with Prime Minister Maliki. David Brooks references the
meeting of our President with Prime Minister Maliki on November
30 in which, reportedly, Maliki presented a plan in which our
troops, the American troops, would go to the periphery of
Baghdad, and would fight off insurgents, Sunni insurgents or
whoever, trying to penetrate Baghdad. Meanwhile, the Iraqi Army
and police, including Shiites and Kurds, principally, would
take over the responsibility of attempting to clear the city.
Essentially, Brooks says President Bush rejected that plan,
or our Government did, and the President has decided that we
would do the opposite. American troops would be embedded in the
nine police districts in Baghdad, and would, in fact, be more
heavily involved, with a new mandate to secure those areas,
whether door to door or in some other fashion. One thought is,
no, not door to door, that the Shiites go door to door, and
that we are back in the background, advising and supporting,
and so forth. But the article goes on to give the impression
that Maliki and the Kurds and the Shiites had at least an idea
of creating their own kind of stability.
Now, from our standpoint, we may have decided that such a
move rejected the Sunnis as a partner in the process; and,
thus, led to greater destabilization of the country as a whole
on--but let me just ask for your comment as to whether this is
a sequence of events that transpired into the plan that the
President gave last night. And what are the strengths and
dangers of that?
Secretary Rice. Yes, Senator Lugar, the core of the Maliki
plan has really been preserved here. This really is based on
his plan. It is absolutely the case that the Iraqis have wanted
to have responsibility for their own problem, to have their
troops under their command, and to move out. When Prime
Minister Maliki presented the plan, he wanted our people to
look at it with his military people to see how quickly this
could be accelerated so that he could go and take care of the
sectarian problem in Baghdad.
The fact is that it could not be accelerated quickly enough
with only Iraqi forces in order to meet the timeline that he
really felt he had, in terms of dealing with the Baghdad
problem. And so, out of this planning process came, from our
generals, the view that we needed to augment their forces, as
embeds, as, by the way, the Baker-Hamilton Commission
recommends, as people who can help them with, in a sense, on-
the-job training, who can help them to, kind of, solidify their
ability to go after this. But the Iraqis continue to press that
they really need to be the ones interfacing with their
population in a major way, they need to be the ones to deliver
the stability that is needed.
I think you will see that in a relatively brief period of
time as their forces develop, they will take on more and more.
And as the President said last night, the thought is, they
would have all of their forces by November. But there was a gap
in time between the time that they need to get Baghdad under
control and having the capability to do it, even bringing, as
they are, their best and most reliable army forces from around
the country.
So, that's the difference. But I don't believe it was ever
really the Prime Minister's intention that it would be Shia and
Kurds only. I think he understands that one of the problems
that they have is that the Sunni population feels that the
Iraqi Government is not evenhanded in dealing with death
squads.
Senator Lugar. What can you tell us about favorable
reception of some of the sheikhs in Anbar province of our new
policies? Would you describe that situation?
Secretary Rice. Yes. Well, the last time that there was a
kind of formal report about Anbar, I remember some of the
reporting as being the tremendous difficulties in Anbar. And it
is a difficult place, because it is the epicenter of al-Qaeda.
Now what you will hear from our commanders in the area--and
also I have heard directly from my Provincial Reconstruction
Team leader, a very seasoned diplomat--is that the sheikhs have
essentially gotten tired of al-Qaeda, and want them out. They
do not believe that we can do that alone. They have begun to
recruit their own young men to be trained to be a force against
the foreign invaders. They have, for instance, sent 1,100 young
men to Jordan to train for something that they call the ``Sons
of Anbar'' to come back. They will recruit more and send them.
This is also a part of a success, we believe, of a policy with
regional neighbors who have been involved in the Sunni outreach
piece. It is into that--Anbar--that we believe it's important
to surge both civilian and military assets. And so, when the
President talks about 4,000 additional forces sent to Anbar,
this is not because of a sectarian problem, this is because we
think we may be able to support this local effort against al-
Qaeda, and, second, to surge resources into Anbar.
To be very frank, the chairman asked me if I was confident
about the Iraqi Government. I'm confident that they want to do
this. I'm also one who knows that there have been times when
they haven't performed, in the past. And one of the things that
they've got to perform better on is getting economic resources
into some of the Sunni areas, particularly into Anbar. And so,
we are also going to increase the number of Provincial
Reconstruction Teams in Anbar to help with that process.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
Senator Biden. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Dodd.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, U.S. SENATOR FROM
CONNECTICUT
Senator Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Madam Secretary. And let me thank you, as
well. We've had some conversations over the last couple of
weeks, prior to the trip Senator Kerry and I took to the
region, and then on the return, as well, and I thank you for
that. And I thank you for being here this morning.
And again, I thank the chairman for holding these set--
these series of hearings that we're going to have on the
subject matter. They'd offer, I hope, an opportunity for us not
only to listen to you, as we did the President last evening,
but also an opportunity for you to hear from us, as well. I
think it's important that there be a conversation here as we
try to sort out this policy and begin to make sense of it. It's
not about Democrats and Republicans, it's about getting this
right. And I couldn't agree more with Senator Biden, I don't
know of another foreign policy crisis that's been as compelling
as this one. Over the past 32 years, as a Member of the House
and as a Member of this body and a member of this committee for
a quarter of a century, I've never been to the region where
I've felt it was more in crisis than it is today, and at
greater risk.
So, I'd like to share just some opening thoughts and
comments, if I can with you, and then--and get to a quick
question.
On the eve of the Second World War, the 20th century's most
daunting and difficult struggle, Winston Churchill explained,
in the following words, a compelling thought, I think. He said,
``There's no worse mistake in public leadership than to hold
out false hopes to be swept away. People face peril or
misfortune with fortitude and buoyancy, but they bitterly
resent being deceived or finding that those responsible for
their affairs are, themselves, dwelling in a fool's paradise.''
Madam Secretary, I'm sorry to say, today--and I think many
hold this view--that a fool's paradise describes nothing as
aptly as our Iraq policy today. I think most Americans know it,
painfully. The Iraqi people, of course, know this, in
compelling numbers.
If the President did grasp, I think, the sad extent of that
failure, I sincerely doubt he would have ordered yet more
troops into Iraq. The President's plan simply strikes me as a
continuation of Operation Together Forward, which has been
described already, which--far from improving Iraq's security
climate, produced the unintended consequences of heightened
sectarian violence.
I fail to see--and I think many others share this view--how
the outcome will be different this time. And that is a true
disservice, I think, to the American troops, who have shown
nothing but professionalism and courage and should not be asked
to risk their lives for an unsound strategy and an unsound and
an unsure purpose.
The Baker-Hamilton Report should have disabused us, in my
view, of the notion that, caught in the midst of sectarian,
ethnic, and religious political hatreds, we can simply bludgeon
our way to victory. As many of us have been saying for some
time now, only political and diplomatic possibilities hold out
any real hope of reversing the spiral into chaos.
The time for blunt force, I think, is long past, and many
hold that view. Instead, we ought to withdraw, I think, our
combat troops from these large urban areas of sectarian
conflict, where they simply are cannon fodder. There are 23
militias operating in Baghdad, alone. It's hard to identify
exactly who is the enemy here. We have Shias and Sunnis, you
have Baathists, you have insurgents, some al-Qaeda elements
here. Asking our military people to sort out who the enemy is
in all of this is extremely difficult, to put it mildly.
Instead, we ought to be focusing our attention on training
reliable Iraqi security forces, providing some security in the
border areas. And, as several of our junior officers that I
talked with in Baghdad suggested, providing the kind of
security around some of these critical infrastructure areas,
and provide the kind of water, sewage, and electrical grids
that are so critical to people having some sense of opportunity
or hope for the future.
If the only solution in Iraq is a political one, then
diplomacy happens to be the weapon that we have left, and must
use. The President's solution to--for all of this--or to all
was, of course, to ignore the most important recommendations
the Iraq Study Group--namely, robust diplomacy--and, instead,
settle on an escalation of our current combat strategy. This is
a tactic in search of a strategy, in my view, and will not
bring us a more stable Iraq.
The American people have spent $14 billion training and
equipping 300,000 Iraqi police and security forces. Yet, as I
said a moment ago, 23 separate sectarian militias operate with
impunity throughout Baghdad, alone. Sectarian killings continue
largely unabated, averaging scores of deaths every day, and
thousands a month. This is not random violence, it is a
targeted civil war complete with ethnic cleansing. Those of us
who have been to Iraq recently have seen it with our own eyes,
heard it with our own ears. Beyond that, the President's own
intelligence experts have told us that the Islamic world is
growing more radical and that the terrorist threat is greater
today than it was on 9/11, not despite, but because of, the
continuing war in Iraq. They conclude it's become both a
physical and ideological training ground for the next
generation of extremists. The wider region has been further
plunged into violence, as we know. Hezbollah has crippled the
Lebanese Government; civil war in the Palestinian territories
now seems more likely than ever; Syria and Iran are more
powerful and emboldened than they have been in recent memory;
we're further away from stabilizing Afghanistan as drug-
traffickers and tribal warfare now threaten to destroy its
nascent democracy, and the Taliban is growing stronger by the
hour.
And perhaps most troubling of all is our standing in the
world. According to the Pew Center for Global Opinion, most
people in Great Britain, France, Spain, Russia, Indonesia,
Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, Pakistan, Nigeria, India, and China
think that the war in Iraq is a greater danger to world peace
than either Iran or North Korea, stunning as those numbers are.
The President says that we're in a war of ideas. But how can we
possibly win that kind of a war between democracy and extremism
when so much of the world considers us to be the threat? It's
deeply troubling to me, as I hope it is to you, as well. How
weakened is our standing in the world and our support from
foreign peoples? How many tools have we thrown away? And how
safe are we now?
Senator Lugar raised an important question in his opening
comments that I'd like you to address, if you can, and that
is--none of us are suggesting, at this table, that we engage
Iran or Syria as if they were an ally or a friend or talking
about conferences where we give them a status they don't
deserve. But it's awfully difficult to understand, Madam
Secretary, why we would not try to engage very directly with
people who can play a critical role in providing some
stability. We heard, in Syria, the President say that he's
interested in a secular Arab State operating on his border,
does not want a Shia-dominated fundamentalist state on his
border. That was just a comment to us in the room with Embassy
personnel present. It seems to me it's worthy of examining and
exploring those areas where we can have a common ground here,
rather than just neglecting or ignoring that kind of an offer,
if we're going to bring stability to the region.
I wish you would, once again, address the issue raised by
Senator Lugar in the context in which he raised it, not
diplomacy as a favor or a gift or some acknowledgment that we
agree with these people, but, rather, the necessity for the
United States to lead in a region where we have not been able
to do so.
Secretary Rice. Thank you, Senator.
Let me address the question, first, of Iran and Syria. And
they are different. And I think we need to separate the two.
First of all, on Syria, we did engage, for quite a long
time. Colin Powell engaged. Rich Armitage engaged. Bill Burns
engaged. And, in fact, we got nowhere. And, indeed, I would
argue that the situation, from our point of view, is worse
today, in terms of the terms on which we would be engaging,
than it was at that time.
The terms on which we would be engaging now, and on which
we're being asked to engage, is that we go to the Syrians and
we say, ``Help us to stabilize Iraq,'' or, ``Let's join in our
common interest to stabilize Iraq.'' That's what we would say
to them. The problem, of course, is that if they have an
interest in stabilizing Iraq, I assume that they will do it on
the basis of their national interest, and that they will do it
because it is in their national interest. To do anything more
with them is to suggest that there's a tradeoff that's
possible, ``You help us stabilize in Iraq, and perhaps we will
overlook some of your activities in Lebanon. You help us
stabilize in Iraq, perhaps we can do something to shave some of
the teeth from the tribunal.''
I think it's extremely important to note that we have
talked to the Syrians. We've generally gotten nowhere. And now
we would be going in a way that I fear looks like a supplicant.
Senator Dodd. Could I just ask you, Madam Secretary----
Secretary Rice. Yes.
Senator Dodd [continuing]. Is that speculation on your
part, or has----
Secretary Rice. No.
Senator Dodd [continuing]. That been the reaction you've
heard? It seems to me----
Secretary Rice. I would also just note that an awful lot of
people have engaged the Syrians recently, to no good effect.
The Italians, the Germans, the British all engaged them to no
good effect.
Senator Dodd. Well, but----
Secretary Rice. Senator Dodd, if I really thought that the
Syrians didn't know how to help stabilize Iraq, and we needed
to tell them, then perhaps that would be worth doing. They know
how to stabilize Iraq. They just need to stop allowing
terrorists to cross their borders.
Senator Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rice. Shall I go to Iran? Because I do think
they're different.
Senator Biden. Yes.
Secretary Rice. When it comes to Iran, first of all,
there's a 27-year history of not engaging Iran, so this would
be a major shift in policy. Of course, we did talk to them
about Afghanistan, when that made sense. But what we're looking
at, again, is an Iran that is engaging activities to try to
kill our troops. They know how to stop that. They know how to
stop it tomorrow. They know how to stop destabilizing the young
Iranian--Iraqi Government. And I assume that if they believe
it's in their interest, they would do so.
But I just don't believe, for a moment, that the
conversation with the Iranians is going to go in the following
way, ``Help us stabilize Iraq,'' and they don't want to talk
about a price on their nuclear program.
We are, I think, dealing with Iran in the proper fashion,
which is to insist, with the rest of the international
community, that any negotiations with Iran are going to be on
the basis of suspension of their nuclear program. We are
reaching out to the Iranian people. We just had a group of
Iranian medical doctors here, in an exchange. We will have some
American sports teams go there. There are banks. We are making
it difficult for Iran to continue its policies of terrorism and
WMD pursuit, because we are sanctioning and designating their
banks that are engaged in those activities, and it is having an
effect on whether people are willing to invest in Iran, whether
they are willing to take the reputational risk of handling
Iranian assets. That's why banks are leaving Iran. That's why
they're having trouble finding a way to support their
investment in their oil and gas industry.
We do have a pretty comprehensive way of dealing with Iran.
I have made the offer. If they are prepared to suspend their
enrichment capability, I'm there with their people at any time
that they'd like and any place that they'd like. But I think
that's the proper context.
And, finally, we do have the opportunity, within the
international compact, to have Iran and Syria play a positive
role in Iraq, if they wish to do it. They are--they've been at
those meetings of the international compact, and they should
play a positive role. And so, I don't think there's an absence
of diplomacy, an absence of a policy toward Iran and Syria;
it's just that direct negotiations on this matter put us in the
role of supplicant, and I think that's a problem.
Senator Dodd. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Senator Biden. Thank you.
Senator Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Biden. Senator Hagel.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK HAGEL, U.S. SENATOR
FROM NEBRASKA
Senator Hagel. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Welcome, Dr. Rice.
We always appreciate you coming before this committee. And
before I get to my questions, I want to----
[Pause.]
Senator Hagel. I was concerned. I--that doesn't count on my
time. He's not from Nebraska, Mr. Chairman. I----
[Laughter.]
Senator Biden. Would you reset--would you reset the clock?
Senator Hagel. He took the train over from Delaware, that
fellow did. [Laughter.]
Like I was saying, Dr. Rice--it was a little heavy, anyway;
we needed a break----
[Laughter.]
Senator Hagel. We are very appreciative of your trip to the
Middle East tomorrow, because not only does it fit into what we
are discussing today--and I have believed for some time that it
is the centerpiece of the difficulties in the Middle East, as
was noted here by our cochairman--this issue is going to be
with us for some time, as it has been. And you have noted that.
The President has noted that. I would hope that--and I have
reviewed your travel schedule--that we will find, as a result
of those meetings, that we will have locked in place some very
significant followup. And I have been one, as you know--and
I've discussed this with you--that I think the President and
you should think very seriously about some kind of a day-to-day
high-level envoy. You do not have the time and the energy and
the resources and the manpower--I don't need to tell you--to
continue to work this, nor does the President. But if, in fact,
we're going to make progress and move this to some higher
plane, where we are developing some confidence and trust that
we have lost, in my opinion--and I think others share that,
especially recent conversations and poll numbers--this issue
must be addressed, and that means followup. So, thank you for
your leadership.
I want to comment briefly on the President's speech last
night, as he presented to America and the world his new
strategy for Iraq, and then I want to ask you a couple of
questions.
I'm going to note one of the points that the President made
last night at the conclusion of his speech, when he said, ``We
mourn the loss of every fallen American, and we owe it to them
to build a future worthy of their sacrifice.'' And I don't
think there is a question that we all in this country agree
with that. But I would even begin with this evaluation, that we
owe the military and their families a policy--a policy worthy
of their sacrifices. And I don't believe, Dr. Rice, we have
that policy today. I think what the President said last night--
and I listened carefully, and read through it again this
morning--is all about a broadened American involvement--
escalation--in Iraq and the Middle East. I do not agree with
that escalation. And I would further note, that when you say,
as you have here this morning, that we need to address and help
the Iraqis, and pay attention to the fact that Iraqis are being
killed. Madam Secretary, Iraqis are killing Iraqis. We are in a
civil war. This is sectarian violence out of control, Iraqi on
Iraqi. Worse, it is intersectarian violence, Shia killing Shia.
To ask our young men and women to sacrifice their lives to be
put in the middle of a civil war is wrong. It's, first of all,
in my opinion, morally wrong; it's tactically, strategically,
militarily wrong.
We will not win a war of attrition in the Middle East. And
I further note that you talk about skepticism and pessimism of
the American people, and some in Congress. That is not some
kind of a subjective analysis, that is because, Madam
Secretary, we've been there almost 4 years. And there's a
reason for that skepticism and pessimism. And that is based on
the facts on the ground, the reality of the dynamics.
And so, I have been one, as you know, who believed that the
appropriate focus is not to escalate, but to try to find a
broader incorporation of a framework. And it will have to be
certainly regional, as many of us have been saying for a long
time. That should not be new to anyone. But it has to be more
than regional, it is going to have to be internationally
sponsored. And that's going to include Iran and Syria.
When you were engaging Chairman Biden on this issue, on the
specific question, ``Will our troops go into Iran or Syria in
pursuit, based on what the President said last night?'' you
cannot sit here today--not because you're dishonest or you
don't understand--but no one in our Government can sit here
today and tell Americans that we won't engage the Iranians and
the Syrians across the border. Some of us remember 1970, Madam
Secretary, and that was Cambodia. And when our Government lied
to the American people and said, ``We didn't cross the border
going into Cambodia''--in fact, we did. I happen to know
something about that, as do some on this committee.
So, Madam Secretary, when you set in motion the kind of
policy that the President is talking about here, it's very,
very dangerous. Matter of fact, I have to say, Madam Secretary,
that I think this speech, given last night by this President,
represents the most dangerous foreign-policy blunder in this
country since Vietnam, if it's carried out. I will resist it.
Now, let me ask a question about the Maliki government. Is
all of the Maliki government in support of America's
significant escalation of troops and all the other things the
President talked about? And where are our allies? Are they
escalating, as well? It's my understanding that most of our
allies have been withdrawing their troops. My understanding is
that Great Britain intends to have most of their troops, if not
all, out by the end of this year. Are the British escalating
their troops? Are the Poles, the Italians, the South Koreans,
the Australians? Are we finding ourselves isolated--going to
find ourselves isolated? If you would answer those two
questions, thank you.
Secretary Rice. Yes; certainly, Senator.
The first thing, I don't think we anticipate an
augmentation of other coalition forces. But the number of Iraqi
forces that should be growing over the next several months, so
that, in fact, by November, these are the places that Iraq
itself can take care of--we do expect Iraqi forces to fill the
void.
Now, second, let me just go to the question of escalation.
Senator Hagel. Let me ask you to----
Secretary Rice. Yes.
Senator Hagel [continuing]. Answer the second question--
actually, my first question----
Secretary Rice. Yes.
Senator Hagel [continuing]. A little more specifically. The
coalition government of Prime Minister Maliki----
Secretary Rice. Yes.
Senator Hagel [continuing]. The Sunnis----
Secretary Rice. Right.
Senator Hagel [continuing]. Sadr----
Secretary Rice. Yes.
Senator Hagel [continuing]. His 30 members, which leads us
right into, as we put our Marines and Army in Baghdad, another
22,000, or whether that's going to be 15,000, we're going to
then put them in a position to be killing, I assume, militia--
because the militia's the problem there. And, so, that's the
position we're going to put our troops in, and they'll be
killing our troops. Now, are the Sunni-Shia coalition members,
and the Kurds, of Maliki's government, are they all supporting
our new position?
Secretary Rice. Of course Muqtada al-Sadr does not support
coalition forces at all.
Senator Hagel. He has 30 representatives on that----
Secretary Rice. Yes.
Senator Hagel [continuing]. Government. So my--again, is
this a--is this a unified support of--go ahead.
Secretary Rice. Sorry. His 30 people are not even enough.
If you count the two Kurdish parties, the IIP and the other
Shia parties, they are, in fact, a majority. And, indeed, the
President has talked to the leaders of those blocs, prior to
this, to say that they need to support Prime Minister Maliki's
plan. And the augmentation of our forces, of course, is in
support of that plan.
So, I think you will find support among the people who are
supporting Prime Minister Maliki in his desire to end the
sectarian violence, and that is more than Prime Minister Maliki
himself.
Senator Hagel. Well, that's not my question.
Secretary Rice. Well, you asked me to also----
Senator Hagel. My question was the escalation of American
troops in Iraq.
Secretary Rice. But I think you asked who was supporting
it, and I said the Kurdish parties, Prime Minister Maliki and
his Shia allies, and the IIP support a plan to do this, and
they know that the augmentation of American forces is part of
that plan.
Now, as to the question of escalation, I don't see it, and
the President doesn't see it, as an escalation.
Senator Hagel. Putting 22,000 new troops--more troops in is
not an escalation?
Secretary Rice. Well, I think, Senator, escalation is not
just a matter of how many numbers you put in. Escalation is
also a question of, ``Are you changing the strategic goal of
what you're trying to do?''
Senator Hagel. Would you call it a decrease and billions
of----
Secretary Rice. I would----
Senator Hagel [continuing]. Dollars more than you----
Secretary Rice. I would----
Senator Hagel [continuing]. Need for it?
Secretary Rice. I would call it, Senator, an augmentation
that allows the Iraqis to deal with this very serious problem
that they have in Baghdad. This is not a change in what we are
trying to achieve. The Iraqi Government needs to establish
population security. What this augmentation does is to help
them carry out their plan to get population security.
I just want to note, though, of course, that many of the
American casualties actually are taken in places like Anbar,
they're also taken, really, because convoys are moving back and
forth in the city. They are deliberately done by people who are
trying to get us out of the country. They're not because we are
caught in the middle of crossfire between Sunnis and Shia. I
think it is important, again, to use the chairman's word, to
have an image of what's really going on in Baghdad. It is
absolutely the case that Iraqi----
Senator Hagel. Madam Secretary, your intelligence and mine
is a lot different. And I know my time is up here. But to sit
there and say that, Madam Secretary; that's just not true.
Secretary Rice. Well, Senator, if you will----
Senator Hagel. That is not true.
Secretary Rice. Senator, if you'll allow me to finish,
there is a point I'd like to make about the Iraqis killing
Iraqis and what that really is.
Senator Hagel. Well, what that really is, it's pretty
obvious what it really is.
Secretary Rice. There are death squads, Senator, that are
going into neighborhoods, and they are killing Iraqis. And,
indeed, the death squads are Iraqis. So, in that sense, it's
Iraqis killing Iraqis.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Secretary Rice. But I think it is wrong to give an image
that somehow all Sunnis and Shia have broken into violence
against one another. What the Maliki government is trying to do
is to reestablish civil order so that the violent groups,
including militias, including death squads, are dealt with by
Iraqi forces, with the aid of American forces. That's different
than saying that all of Iraq has fallen into civil war. And I
just think it's the wrong image. Not all of Baghdad has fallen
into civil war. There are deliberate efforts by organized
groups to go after Sunnis, if they are Shia, and Shia, if they
are Sunnis. What the President said to Prime Minister Maliki
is, ``You have got to be evenhanded in how you go after these
killers, whether they are Sunni or whether they are Shia.'' And
that is the obligation that he undertook, and it is the
assurance that he gave.
Senator Hagel. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Senator Biden. Gentlemen, these are really important
exchanges, but if we're going to get to the junior members
being able to ask their questions, I'm going to have to start
to cut them off. And I'm reluctant to do it, because this is
something the American people should hear and understand. And
so, I'm sorry, but I'm going to try to--try to get us back into
the--into this 7 minutes. OK?
Senator Kerry.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, U.S. SENATOR FROM
MASSACHUSETTS
Senator Kerry. You had to put the hammer down now, huh?
[Laughter.]
Senator Biden. Yes; I'm going to put the hammer down now.
Yes; right.
Senator Kerry. Madam Secretary, welcome. And we appreciate
your being here. I'm going to try and summarize a couple of
comments--of thoughts, quickly, and then, obviously, try to get
some questions. The time is so tight.
With all due respect, I think you were splitting hairs a
little bit in your answer to Senator Hagel. It is true that
Iraq, as a whole, is not engaged in--broadly, as you're saying,
but the trendline is increasingly moving in that direction. And
in places like Basrah, the British are struggling. There's
increasing violence in communities where there wasn't. And the
level of violence, according to most people's standards, the
testimony we had yesterday in this committee, is larger than
classified civil wars in many other places, historically. And
the violence of Sunni on Shia is clearly sectarian, and it is
civil war between them. Low grade, still; but, nevertheless,
civil war.
The Middle East that Senator Dodd and I saw when we were
there a few weeks ago, certainly the Middle East I saw, is very
different from the one that I think you've described here
today. Last night's speech by the President was very important.
It was important for what it said and set out as a policy, but
it was also important, I think, for what it didn't say and
didn't do.
Many of us--as you know, in our own personal conversation,
we've been looking for a bipartisan way to approach this. I
think the President lost an enormous opportunity last night for
that bipartisanship. None of us want failure. There is a road
to success, in the judgment of some people, conceivably. Much
more out of reach than it ever was at any point in time,
because of the failure to make the right choices and to find
that consensus to date.
But last night the President chose, fundamentally, to
ignore the foundation built by the Iraq Study Group, the
foundation built, bipartisan basis here, and knowingly and
willfully has divided the country yet again, and the Congress,
over this issue. We didn't find that bipartisanship. And what
was particularly lacking, in my judgment--and I don't
understand it--was the political-diplomatic approach and
solution here. Every general, you yourself, the President, has
said, there's no military solution. But last night the
President didn't offer the diplomatic and political solution.
And why there isn't a resolution on the oil revenue, why there
isn't a resolution on the federalism, why there isn't a path to
that through the summitry and the diplomacy necessary, is
really beyond a lot of people's understanding, at this point.
The Middle East that we saw is a Middle East--and if you
measure a policy by what it's accomplishing--I mean, I hate to
say it, but this policy is unbelievably off the mark. A
failure. Hamas is stronger than at any time previously.
Hezbollah is stronger than at any time previously. Iran is
stronger than at any time previously. Iraq is more of a mess
than at any time previously. That is the measure of a failure.
And so, the question is--and here, we have, in the New York
Times today, a story, saying that--promising troops where they
aren't really needed, a story about how the government itself
is saying, ``We don't want them,'' and how they would like to
run the war the way they want to, which I thought was the
purpose of this exercise, but we're not going to let them.
Now, I want to get to some questions, and it's hard to do
it in this timeframe. But the President said, last night, that
America's commitment is not open-ended, and, if they don't
follow through, they will lose the support of the American
people and the Iraqi people. I don't want to debate with you
whether or not you--they've already lost the support of the
American people. I think it's pretty evident to most people
that that's where we are. But what does it mean to say it's not
open-ended? What is the accountability measure here? Are you
saying, if it's not open-ended, that you're prepared to
terminate it? Do you agree that it's not open-ended, first of
all?
Secretary Rice. Of course it is not open-ended.
Senator Kerry. All right. If it's not open-ended, does that
mean you're prepared, if they fail, to pull out, to terminate?
What is the--what is the accountability mechanism?
Secretary Rice. Senator, I think it's best to leave the
President's words as the President's words.
I do think that the accountability rests in two places.
First of all, I think the Iraqis now know that if they don't
succeed in returning security to their population, then their
population is not going to support them.
Senator Kerry. And what are we going to do? That's the big
issue to the United States Congress.
Secretary Rice. It's a democratic process. And, second, we
will have an opportunity, as this policy unfolds--it's not
going to happen overnight, to see whether or not, in fact, the
Iraqis are living up to the assurances that they gave us.
Senator Kerry. And what if they don't?
Secretary Rice. Senator, I don't think you go to plan B.
You work with plan A.
Senator Kerry. But that's not a plan B. That's a very
critical issue here.
Secretary Rice. You work with plan A, and you give it the
possibility of success, the best possibility of success. And I
want to emphasize, it's not just about Baghdad. There are other
elements to this policy. And I really think it's important not
to underestimate the importance of relying, of course, on the
Maliki government, in terms of Baghdad, but also relying on the
local councils and the local leaders of Baghdad, through the
expansion of PRTs there, relying on the local leaders in places
like Anbar to do the kinds of things that they've started to
do.
Senator Kerry. But, Madam Secretary, with all due respect--
I mean, all of that is good. I think those PRT teams are
terrific, and I think the effort of those folks out there is
courageous, unbelievable. But they can't do this if Abdul Aziz
al-Hakim and SCIRI have a grand design for a nine-province
state that is Shia in the south, to the exclusion of adequate
support to the Sunni in Baghdad and a central government. You
know that. They can't do it if Muqtada al-Sadr has ambitions
with respect to the country, and the Sunni aren't brought to
the table with a sufficient stake that they feel they're
sharing. That's the fundamental struggle here.
Secretary Rice. I agree, Senator.
Senator Kerry. The President didn't address it.
Secretary Rice. No; the President did address it. He talked
about the need for the national oil law.
Senator Kerry. The need for it, but not how it's going to
happen and why do we have to wait 3 years to have that?
Secretary Rice. It's actually a very difficult thing,
Senator, in a place where they've never solved their problems
by politics, to ask them to take one of the most fundamental
issues facing the country, which is, how are they going to
divide the one strong resource they have--which is oil--and
what's remarkable is that the oil law that they are now close
to finalizing is not a sectarian oil law. In fact, even though
the Kurds might have been expected as some have said they
would--to insist that they will simply control all the
resources themselves, that's not what the oil law does.
Senator Kerry. I understand what the framework for it is.
But the question is: Why is there not the political resolution
on the table that assures Americans that the fundamental
struggle between Sunni and Shia--and the struggle within Shia--
I mean, the President talked last night about this war as if
it's sort of a single war--the Green Zone government struggling
for democracy versus everybody else. Really, there are four or
five--there are several wars.
Senator Biden. Senator, your----
Senator Kerry. There's a war of----
Senator Biden [continuing]. Time is----
Senator Kerry [continuing]. Sunni on Shia. There's a war of
Sunni and Shia on American occupiers. There's a war of Syria,
Iran, engaging with----
Secretary Rice. Senator, I think everybody understands
that, but you asked me about the political reconciliation.
Senator Kerry. Well----
Senator Biden. Senator, I'm sorry, your time is up. We're
just not going to be able----
Secretary Rice. All right.
Senator Biden. If----
Senator Kerry. Well, could you just speak to the----
Secretary Rice. Shall I answer?
Senator Kerry [continuing]. Political piece, please?
Secretary Rice. Yes. The political piece, it is composed of
the following elements: The national oil law, which is a
remarkable law, in that it does not take a sectarian cast; a
new de-Baathification policy, which already has allowed a
number of officers to return to the armed forces, and pensions
to be paid, and there will be further effort on that; a
commitment to provincial elections, which the Sunnis feel will
be important for righting the disproportionally low share of
their representation in provincial councils, because they
boycotted the elections, early on. These are the elements of a
national reconciliation plan. And I don't think, Senator, it
can be imposed from the outside. I do think the Iraqis
themselves, with our help and with the help of others--and, by
the way, with an international compact, where the international
community has, indeed, said, ``Those are the obligations that
you must undertake for support''--that that is how they will
get to that national reconciliation plan. But they're not going
to get there if they're unable to provide population security
in Baghdad, because that is stoking the atmosphere of
sectarianism.
Senator Biden. I realize that generates a lot of questions,
but I'm going to yield now to Senator Coleman.
STATEMENT OF HON. NORM COLEMAN, U.S. SENATOR FROM MINNESOTA
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rice, first I would say that I do appreciate the
President's candor last night in admitting mistakes. I think it
was important. I share his perspective on the two fronts we
face in Iraq. We're fighting a war against al-Qaeda and foreign
fighters in Al Anbar province. We're winning that war. I was
there just 3 weeks ago. But the problem is that we can't be
successful there in the long term, unless we have Sunnis in the
police force and Sunnis in the army. And that gets back to the
sectarian violence that we're seeing in Baghdad.
The chairman asked the question about capacity. To me, the
issue is not the capacity of the Iraqis to do what has to be
done to deal with this sectarian violence, but their resolve. I
met with Dr. Rubaie, who is the Prime Minister's national
security advisor, and I can tell you, 3 weeks ago he didn't
think the answer to the violence in Baghdad was more American
troops there. The sense I got from Dr. Rubaie was, ``We
[Iraqis] can take care of this--it is our problem.'' You've
indicated that, ``This time, they're going to make the
difficult choices.'' And I'm not seeing that type of resolve in
the Iraqis. It is difficult to ask them to enact an oil law.
It's a lot more difficult to ask our sons and daughters and
fathers and brothers and sisters to be on the front line in
Baghdad, in the crosshairs of sectarian violence when we have
this question about the resolve of the Iraqis to do what they
need to do to end sectarian hatred.
And so, my question to you is: Wouldn't it be wiser to hold
the Iraqis to certain benchmarks, to tell them, ``You have X
number of months to pass an oil law that distributes oil
throughout the region, to put money into places like Anbar
province, that are Sunni-dominated and have been cut off in the
past, and to show a real commitment to a reconciliation''? I
just don't know if the Iraqis are done killing each other. I
don't know if the bloodletting is past the mark where all the
groups are tired of it and willing to pursue reconciliation.
Why wouldn't it be wiser for us today, ``We'll give you 6
months to do this, and if you achieve it, there are a range of
things that the U.S. can do in response''? Why put more
American lives on the line now, in the hope that this time the
Iraqis will make the difficult choices?
Secretary Rice. Senator, you've come to the real crux of
the matter. Is it a matter of capacity or is it a matter of
resolve? If you think it's just a matter of resolve, then I
think that's precisely the strategy that you would pursue. You
would say to them, ``Show us, first, that you're resolved, and
then we'll help you.'' But if you think it's both a matter of
resolve and capability, which our people do, despite the
somewhat bravado of Mr. Rubaie and some others--I think the
Iraqi Defense Minister didn't think that he has the forces to
do what he needs to do. And so, if you think it's a matter of
both resolve and capability, then you want to provide the
capability up front so they don't fail. And that's really what
the President is saying. Then you have to have the resolve. I
am absolutely of the mind, and absolutely committed, that they
have to have the resolve. And, frankly, they haven't always
shown it. But they are moving on a number of fronts that show
that resolve--the oil law, some of the moves on de-
Baathification.
But I think, again, it's important to have a view of what
Baghdad really looks like. First of all, they are going to be
on the front lines, because they understand that sectarian
violence has to be ended by them, not by us. We can support
them; we can't take it on. But all of us remember times in our
history when it was not good to be in a neighborhood when the
police came in. I came from a part of our country where that
was the case. Seeing the police come into Birmingham, AL, when
I was a kid, was not a comforting sight. That's essentially the
case in some of the neighborhoods of Baghdad. And so, what that
government has to do is to reestablish in that population the
confidence that they are going to establish civil order, that
they're not going to let death squads take out neighborhoods,
kill the men, send the women into exile. That's what we're
trying to help them to do. But they've got to be on the front
lines of this, because ultimately only they can solve the
sectarian problem.
Senator Coleman. I think we agree on the outcome. We agree
on what the Iraqi Government has to do. We face the saying,
``Fooled once, shame on you; fooled twice, shame on me.'' What
I have yet to see--even as recently as 3 weeks ago--is that
level of commitment and resolve, so that the Shias are willing
to say, ``We're going to take care of the Muqtada al-Sadrs.
We're going to do those things that have to be done to quell
the sectarian violence.'' And to put the lives of more
Americans in the center of that sectarian violence in Baghdad,
without first having the Iraqis deliver on substantial
benchmarks on reconciliation, something we can point to, other
than just trusting--I'm not prepared, at this time, to support
that. The cost is too great. But it would appear to me that if
we could get some measure of assurance that the commitment is
there on the part of the Iraqis to deliver, that would be
acceptable. What we have now from the Iraqis are promises that
they have failed to fulfill previously, and I think the cost is
too high to make further troop commitments based on the
calculation we are faced with.
Secretary Rice. Thank you.
Senator, may I just say, I understand. We're clear-eyed,
too, about the fact that the Iraqi Government has to perform,
and we're clear-eyed about the fact that they've not, in the
past. But I think it's awfully important to recognize that the
violence--the sectarian violence, which was really accelerated
by Samarra--is threatening to outrun their chance to do exactly
the things that you want them to do, because the atmosphere of
sectarianism is breaking down the very fabric of a society
that, frankly, has a lot of ties between their peoples. Their
tribes are mixed Sunni and Shia. There are intermarried Sunni
and Shia. There are a lot of fibers of the society that are
actually not sectarian. But if what is going on in Baghdad
continues apace, without the government capable of getting
control of it and reestablishing civil order, then you are
going to have the kind of breakdown in the fabric of society to
support the very processes of national reconciliation that
you're talking about. That's why this is urgent, and that's why
we don't have time to sequence it, to let them prove themselves
first and then we will add forces to help them do what they
need to do. As I said, if it's a matter of just resolve, then
the sequencing works. But it's also capability. And that's the
assessment of our military people and of our political people.
We have the ability, of course, to see how they're doing,
in terms of living up to their obligations, because not all
American forces are going to go in up front. Not all will be
ready to go in on day one. And you can be sure that we're going
to be watching very carefully, and we're going to be pressing
them very hard, that their obligations are obligations that, if
they don't meet, this plan cannot succeed. We're also going to
be diversifying our efforts, making sure that we're not just
dependent on the Maliki government for some successes in the
country, but rather on local leaders, of the kind that we're
working with in Anbar. But I just think it's extremely
important to recognize that the threat right now is that that
fabric of a society that is nonsectarian is being stretched to
the limit by what's going on in Baghdad. And they don't have a
lot of time to get on top of it, and we don't have time to
sequence our help to help them get on top of it.
Senator Coleman. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
Senator Feingold.
STATEMENT OF HON. RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, U.S. SENATOR FROM
WISCONSIN
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Madam Secretary, for appearing before the
committee today. Unfortunately, Madam Secretary, this hearing
is taking place in the context of what has become a true
nightmare for the United States, and quite possibly the
greatest foreign policy mistake in the history of our Nation.
We just heard Senator Hagel, I think, use similar language, and
I thank him sincerely for his candor before this committee.
We currently have 140,000 of our bravest men and women in
uniform in Iraq, stuck in what has become a civil war. Over
3,000 Americans have died. And yet, we continue to see
increases in interethnic attacks and bombings, in the strength
of Shia militias and the strength of the insurgency and
displaced persons and so on. Almost 4 years after this war
began, Iraqis are no closer to a political agreement or to
resolving the underlying political, ethnic, religious, and
economic problems that are ripping the country apart. But the
President wants to send more United States troops to Iraq. His
strategy runs counter to the needs of our strained military,
counter to the testimony of our military's most senior
officers, counter to the need to address the troubling
developments in places like Afghanistan and Somalia, and
counter to the fact that, after 4 years of failed strategies
for victory, the American people have sent a resounding
message, and that message is, it is time to redeploy our brave
troops out of Iraq now.
The American people soundly rejected the President's Iraq
policy in November. They sent a clear message that maintaining
our troops in Iraq is not in the interest of our national
security. They understand that our Iraq-centric policies are
hurting our ability to defeat the enemy that attacked us on 9/
11.
We can't afford to continue this course. I have
consistently called for the redeployment of our military from
Iraq. I was the first Senator, in August 2005, to call for a
timetable to withdraw the troops over a period of time of 15
months, at that time. But that advice has not been heeded. And
now Congress must use its main power, the power of the purse,
to put an end to our involvement in this disastrous war. And
I'm not talking here only about the surge or escalation. It is
time to use the power of the purse to bring our troops out of
Iraq. Over the next several weeks, I--and I hope, many of my
colleagues--will work together to take a hard look at exactly
how we should do that. But it is time to use that power.
Our troops in Iraq have performed heroically, but we cannot
continue to send our Nation's best into a war that was
started--and is still maintained--on false pretenses. An
indefinite presence of United States military personnel in Iraq
will not fix that country's political problems. And sending
more troops to Iraq will not provide the stability that can
only come from a political agreement.
From the beginning, this war has been a mistake, and the
policies that have carried it out have been a failure. We need
a new national security strategy that starts with a
redeployment from Iraq so we can repair and strengthen our
military and focus on the global threats to our national
security.
With that, Madam Secretary, my first question is this. Is
the United States more secure now as a result of our military
incursion into Iraq than we were before we entered Iraq?
Secretary Rice. Senator, I think that we are more secure.
We are more secure, but we're not secure.
Senator Feingold. Are we more secure, vis-a-vis al-Qaeda?
Secretary Rice. We have done a lot to break up al-Qaeda,
the forces that came against us on September 11.
Senator Feingold. But are we more secure, vis-a-vis al-
Qaeda, than we were before we went into Iraq?
Secretary Rice. Senator, I do think that we are more
secure, vis-a-vis al-Qaeda, for a lot of reasons, not just our
policies in the Middle East; the policies we've undertaken
through homeland security improvements.
Senator Feingold. I asked you whether, as a result of our
Iraqi intervention, are we more secure, vis-a-vis al-Qaeda?
Secretary Rice. Senator, the notion about Iraq has always
been that to deal with the short-term problem of al-Qaeda, as
it exists now, is not going to create long-term security. You
can only do that by changing the nature of the Middle East that
produced al-Qaeda. I don't want us to confuse what we are doing
in Iraq with the short-term problem.
Senator Feingold. All right. Well, let me ask about----
Secretary Rice. The longer term security.
Senator Feingold [continuing]. Other things.
Secretary Rice. The longer term issue is how the Middle
East itself evolves.
Senator Feingold. Right.
Secretary Rice. And that's why Iraq is so important, and
that's why it's important that we succeed in Iraq.
Senator Feingold. I understand the argument. I completely
reject it, but I understand it.
What about Afghanistan? Are we better off in Afghanistan
than we were before the invasion of Iraq?
Secretary Rice. I think there's no doubt that we are better
off in Afghanistan. Afghanistan has made a lot of progress
since 2001--when we invaded.
Senator Feingold. That's not what I asked. I asked if we're
better off since the intervention in Iraq.
Secretary Rice. Senator, not everything is related to what
we have done in Iraq.
Senator Feingold. It's a simple----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. We've done----
Senator Feingold [continuing]. Question. Did it----
Secretary Rice. What we've done----
Senator Feingold [continuing]. Help or did it hurt our
situation in Afghanistan?
Secretary Rice. I think that we have been managing what is
going on in Afghanistan as we've been managing what's been
going on in Iraq. I don't actually see the connection that you
are trying to draw.
Senator Feingold. They're not----
Secretary Rice. I don't understand.
Senator Feingold. Well, are we better off, vis-a-vis Iran
and North Korea, than we were prior to the intervention in
Iraq? Is our security situation, vis-a-vis Iran and North
Korea, better than it was before the intervention in Iraq?
Secretary Rice. Well, I don't really think, Senator, that
the North Korean nuclear test has anything to do with Iraq.
Senator Feingold. Well, I think the diversion of attention
from the most important problems in the world has everything to
do with this terrible mistake.
What--let's try something that I think is more direct--what
about our military, the strain on our military? Is our military
better off than it was before Iraq intervention?
Secretary Rice. Senator, we're at war. And when we're at
war, there's going to be strain on the military. I think that's
what General Pace would tell you. But, again, I just can't
agree with you that there's been a diversion of our attention
from all other policy problems. If you look at the progress
that we've actually made on North Korea, with North Korea under
a chapter 7 resolution and with six-party talks about to begin
again, if you look at the progress that we're making on
stopping an Iranian nuclear weapon, that, by the way, has been
entrain for quite some time, if you look at the progress that
we've made--and I have to say, you know, this Middle East that
somehow was so stable before we invaded Iraq is a Middle East
that I didn't recognize in 2000 or 2001 either. That was a
Middle East where Saddam Hussein was still in power, still with
the potential to invade his neighbors, as he had done before,
where Syria was deep into Lebanon, where the Palestinian
territories were governed by a man who was stealing the
Palestinians blind, but couldn't take a peace deal--I don't
see----
Senator Feingold. My time----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. That Middle East as having
been----
Senator Feingold [continuing]. My----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Very stable. So----
Senator Feingold. My time is up, but I see this problem of
our security as an international problem. And I believe the
diversion of attention in Iraq has been absolutely catastrophic
with regard to our national security.
Secretary Rice. Well, Senator, I appreciate your views on
that, but I'm the one who, every day, goes to the office and
works not just on Iraq, but on North Korea, on Iran, on the
problems in Somalia, in Sudan. And I think if you look around,
you'll see that the United States has a very active policy
everywhere in the world.
Senator Feingold. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
Senator Corker. And, again, welcome to the committee.
STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER, U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I appreciate the
tremendous testimony that you've allowed us to have over the
last 3 days.
And, Madam Secretary, thank you for being here.
I've heard a lot--it seems that people agree--that in Iraq
we need a political solution, that that is what needs to occur.
And it seems to me that what the administration has tried to
put forth is a way for a political process to occur and a
political solution to happen, and that is by causing Iraqis to
actually feel secure, to feel like they can, in fact, go about
a political process in a way that allows people to debate and
come to a solution.
One of the things I've realized with the testimony over the
last 3 days is, there is another school of thought, and that
is, that by some--and I don't mean by anybody on this panel,
specifically--but that, by some who wish to withdraw, they
believe that the only way there's going to be a political
process, a healthy political process, is for there to be an
all-out civil war first, that what we've had is a measured
civil war, and that, by withdrawing, there actually would be an
all-out civil war, and that things have got to get much worse
before they get any better.
I'd like for you to address those two schools of thought,
if you would.
Secretary Rice. Well, thank you, Senator.
First of all, I think you've put it very well, because the
risk of American withdrawal, or, as it's sometimes called,
redeployment--and I think we have to recognize, redeployment's
really withdrawal--then we are dealing with a circumstance in
which the Iraqis are so-called ``left to their own devices'' to
deal with a problem that threatens to overwhelm their political
process. And that is the sectarian violence in Baghdad.
Again, as I was saying to Senator Coleman, it really does
depend on whether you think this is a matter of Iraqi resolve
or a matter of capability, or a matter of both. And the
President and his team thinks it's a matter of both. And so, no
amount of resolve, if they don't have the capability, is going
to help them to deal with the sectarian violence in Baghdad.
That's why we want to augment their capability, so that they
can show that resolve.
When analysts look at what you would be talking about if
you just said to them, ``All right, you just go at one another,
and we'll go to the borders and defend the borders, and we'll
fight al-Qaeda, and we'll do a few other things, but it's
really up to you to resolve this,'' I think it has the wrong
idea of what's really going on in Baghdad. It's not as if,
street-to-street, every Sunni and every Shia is determined to
kill each other. That's really not the case. You do have,
stoked by al-Qaeda, after the Samarra bombing, people--
extremist Sunni and Shia death squads, Sunni and Shia--who are,
in the name of sectarianism, going in to neighborhoods, killing
the men--that's where those bodies are coming from--expelling
the women--that's why there are internally displaced people--
but it is an organized effort to perpetrate violence by Shia
death squads and Sunni death squads. That means that if the
Iraqi Government is actually able to deal with the organized
effort, then they will be able to stem the tide of sectarian
violence. But if they're not able to do that, and to
reestablish civil order, then the fabric of the society, which
has not always been just sectarian--there is a lot of
intermarriage, a lot of--a lot of community between the
groups--that fabric's going to break apart.
And so, that's why the President has outlined what he has.
He did look, Senator, at other options. He did look at the
question of whether or not the Iraqis could be told, ``Go do
this on your own.'' And the assessment of the people on the
ground, both our political people and our military people, is
that they didn't yet have the forces to do it. I think General
Casey said, at one point, it would be the summer before they
were really able to take control of operations in Iraq. Well,
by the summer, if something hasn't improved in Baghdad, then
they're going to be in very difficult straits.
So, as you think about this policy, and whether you decide
to accept it or reject it, I think you have to think about the
consequences of not going down this route. And the consequences
of that is that you leave the Iraqi Government without the
capability to deal with their sectarian problem.
Senator Corker. Mr. Chairman, out of respect for my more
senior junior members on this committee, I'm going to pass
any----
Senator Biden. I'm sure it's appreciated. Thank you very
much, Senator.
Chairman Boxer.
STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER, U.S. SENATOR FROM CALIFORNIA
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, for me today marks the bipartisan end of a
rubberstamp Senate, and I am proud to be here in behalf of the
people of California.
Madam Secretary, on November 7, the American people voted
for a change in Congress, citing Iraq as the No. 1 issue
affecting their vote. And a week later, General Abizaid told
the Senate Armed Services Committee that he checked with every
single divisional commander on the ground in Iraq, and, to a
person, no one believed that more American troops would improve
the situation, because the Iraqis already rely on us too much.
And then, on December 7, the Iraq Study Group, noting that 61
percent of the Iraqis, who you say support us so much, approve
of attacks on United States troops--they approve of shooting
and killing United States troops--the Iraqi Study Group, in
light of that, recommended that United States combat troops
should be redeployed out of Iraq by early 2008. They also
called for an immediate meeting--international meeting in the
region to find a political solution to Iraq. And one line that
stands out in that Iraq Study Report is, ``Absent a political
solution, all the troops in the world will not provide
security.''
And on January 8, the Military Times--and I'd ask unanimous
consent to place this into the record, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Chairman, may I place this in the record? The Military Times?
Senator Biden. Without objection, it'll be placed in the
record.
Senator Boxer. The Military Times published a poll, which
found that only 35 percent of military members approved of the
way President Bush is handling this war, and only 38 percent
thought there should be more troops.
So, from where I sit, Madam Secretary, you are not
listening to the American people, you are not listening to the
military, you are not listening to the bipartisan voices from
the Senate, you are not listening to the Iraq Study Group. Only
you know who you are listening to. And you wonder why there is
a dark cloud of skepticism and pessimism over this Nation.
I think people are right to be skeptical, after listening
to some of the things that have been said by your
administration. For example, October 19, 2005, you came before
this committee to discuss, in your words, ``how we assure
victory in Iraq.'' And you said the following in answer to
Senator Feingold, ``I have no doubt that, as the Iraqi security
forces get better--and they are getting better and are holding
territory, and they are doing the things with minimal help--we
are going to be able to bring down the level of our forces. I
have no doubt''--I want to reiterate--``I have no doubt that
that's going to happen in a reasonable timeframe.'' You had no
doubt. Not a doubt. And last night the President's announcement
of an escalation is a total rebuke of your confident
pronouncement.
Now, the issue is: Who pays the price? Who pays the price?
I'm not going to pay a personal price. My kids are too old, and
my grandchild is too young. You're not going to pay a
particular price, as I understand it, with immediate family.
So, who pays the price? The American military and their
families. And I just want to bring us back to that fact.
NPR has done a series of interviews with families who have
lost kids. And the announcer said to one family in the Midwest,
``What's changed in your lives since your son's death?'' The
answer comes back, ``Everything. You can't begin to imagine how
even the little things change--how you go through the day, how
you celebrate Christmas''--Mr. Chairman, could I please--``You
can't begin to imagine how you celebrate any holiday or
birthday. There's an absence. It's not like the person has
never been there. They've--always were there, and now they're
not, and you're looking at an empty hole. He has a purple
heart. The flag that was on his coffin. And one of the two urns
that we got back--he came back in three parts, two urns and one
coffin. He's buried in three places, if you count our house.
He's buried in New Jersey. He's buried in Cleveland.'' That's
who's going to pay the price.
And then you have the most moving thing I've ever heard on
a radio station, which is a visit to a burn unit and a talk
with the nurse. Devon suffered burns over 93 percent of his
body, three amputations--both legs, one arm--his back was
broken, internal organs exposed. As the hospital staff entered
the room, they would see photographs on the wall, pictures of a
healthy private standing proud in his dark green Army dress
uniform. ``It's very important,'' says the major, ``that nurses
see the patient as a person, because the majority of our
patients have facial burns and they're unrecognizable, and
they're extremely disfigured.''
So, who pays the price? Not me. Not you. These are the
people who pay the price.
So, I want to ask you, since this administration has been
so clear about how this has been a coalition, and a coalition--
you've already said that we don't have anybody else escalating
their presence at this time. Is that correct?
Secretary Rice. That is correct.
Senator Boxer. That is correct. Have you seen the recent
news that the British are going to be bringing home thousands
of troops in the near future?
Secretary Rice. I have seen the stories about what the
British are going to do. I'll wait for a confirmation from the
British Government about what they're going to do.
Senator Boxer. OK. I would ask unanimous consent to place
into the record the article from today that announces that
that's what they're going to do, is bring home thousands of
troops.
And I want to point out to the American people, we are all
alone. We are all alone. There's no other country standing with
us in this escalation. And if you look at this coalition, the
closest to us--we've got about 130-140,000 troops. I don't know
the exact number. The Brits had 7,200. They're going to be
announcing they're bringing home, as I understand it, more than
3,000 of those. The next-biggest coalition member is South
Korea with 2,300; Poland, with 900; and, after that, Australia,
with 800. No one is joining us in this surge.
Do you have an estimate of the number of casualties we
expect from this surge?
Secretary Rice. No, Senator. I don't think there's any way
to give you such an estimate.
Senator Boxer. Has the President--because he said, ``expect
more sacrifice''--he must know.
Secretary Rice. Senator, I don't think that any of us have
a number that--of expected casualties. I think that people
understand that there is going to be violence for some time in
Iraq, and that there will be more casualties.
And let me just say, you know, I fully understand the
sacrifice that the American people are making, and especially
the sacrifice that our soldiers are making, men and women in
uniform. I visit them. I know what they're going through. I
talk to their families. I see it.
I could never--and I can never--do anything to replace any
of those lost men and women in uniform, or the diplomats, some
of whom have been lost----
Senator Boxer. Madam Secretary, please, I know you feel
terrible about it. That's not the point. I was making the case
as to who pays the price for your decisions. And the fact that
this administration would move forward with this escalation
with no clue as to the further price that we're going to pay
militarily--we certainly know the numbers, billions of dollars,
that we can't spend here in this country--I find really
appalling that there's not even enough time taken to figure out
what the casualties would be.
Secretary Rice. Well, Senator----
Senator Boxer. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rice. Senator, I think it would be highly
unlikely for the military to tell the President, ``We expect X
number of casualties because of this augmentation of the
forces.'' And, again, let me just say, the President sees this
as an effort to help the Iraqis with an urgent task so that the
sectarian violence in Baghdad does not outrun the political
process and make it impossible to have the kind of national
reconciliation that we all want to see there.
But I just want to say one thing, Senator, about the
placard that you held up. I have to admit, my eyesight's not
what it used to be, so I couldn't actually see the date
underneath, but I think it may have been 2005.
Senator Boxer. October--it was the end of 2005, October--
mid-October----
Secretary Rice. I think----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. 2005. And you had----
Secretary Rice [continuing]. The President----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. Absolutely no doubt----
Secretary Rice. Yes. And I think the President spoke----
Senator Boxer [continuing]. About how great it was going.
Secretary Rice. I don't think I ever said it was going
great, Senator.
Senator Boxer. You thought that our troops would be coming
home.
Secretary Rice. Senator, let's not overstate the case.
Senator Boxer. Well, let's just put----
Secretary Rice. I don't think I said it was going great.
Senator Boxer [continuing]. Let's just put it up again.
Secretary Rice. The point that I wanted to make, Senator,
is that that is October 2005. The President has talked
repeatedly now about the changed circumstances that we faced
after the Samarra bombing of February 2006, because that
bombing did, in fact, change the character of the conflict in
Iraq. Before that, we were fighting al-Qaeda. Before that, we
were fighting some insurgents, some Saddamists. But it was the
purpose of Zarqawi to try and stoke sectarian violence. He
wrote this letter to Zawahiri, told him he was going to do
that. Zawahiri himself was even concerned that this might be a
bad policy. But it turns out to have been a very smart one,
because, in fact, through the bombing of the Golden Mosque, he
accelerated this sectarian violence to the point that it now
has presented us with a new set of circumstances.
Senator Biden. Senator Sununu.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN E. SUNUNU, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW
HAMPSHIRE
Senator Sununu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, in the President's remarks last night,
there were some things that I was pleased to hear, such as his
emphasis that the burden has shifted now to the Iraqi
Government, both for these political issues that we've heard
talked about today, but also for security, even setting a
timetable for Iraqis taking full responsibility for security in
the outlying provinces by November. There were some areas where
I have a little bit more concern, such as whether or not the
use of the troops he discussed will really be appropriate in
dealing with sectarian violence in Baghdad, and some areas
where I was a little bit more disappointed, such as the failure
to talk about or establish a more formal process for engaging
all of Iraq's neighbors, including those that are already very
supportive and have been helpful, such as Turkey or Saudi
Arabia or Jordan, in a more formal process to provide whatever
support is necessary for Iraq.
But I want to begin with the area of political reform and
change for the Iraqi Government, because--even here, I think
you've sensed a level of frustration, because, while we
understand that a change in the oil law, local elections, a
reconciliation process, are essential to long-term success, and
no matter how we succeed militarily, those gains won't be
sustained unless these political reforms are undertaken, we
still haven't been provided with a lot of clarity there, and
timeframe. And while I think an arbitrary date for removing all
troops from Iraq doesn't make sense militarily or
diplomatically, setting a very clear timetable for these
reforms does make some sense, because it sends the right
message to everyone involved.
And I would further suggest, to you and the entire
administration, if we don't see more specifics, and even, where
appropriate, a timeframe that's established in concert with the
Iraqi Government, then Congress is probably going to step into
the void and start setting a timeframe for the Iraqi
commitments that have been made. I certainly wouldn't prefer
that. I would prefer the former to the latter.
So, I offer that as a very strong suggestion, that we work
to provide much more clarity and specifics, in terms of timing.
And I have two questions about those issues.
First, a very specific question with regard to the oil law.
You referred to the oil law as a ``remarkable law.'' Well, it's
the most remarkable law that no one has ever really seen. Over
the last week, I've had conversations with White House--senior
White House staff about this issue. We had a top-secret
briefing where this was raised in a very specific way. We heard
from scholars yesterday. And what we can gain is that there has
been some agreement on investment issues, and even ownership,
but not on distribution. And, from where I sit, it's
distribution that really matters. Money is power. Money is
power in Washington. Money is power anywhere around the world.
And unless we have a methodology for distribution, we're not
going to be successful.
So, can you give more specifics about these different
government objectives, not just oil law, political elections,
reconciliation process, de-Baathification law? And what about
the oil law, specifically? When are we going to see the area of
distribution resolved?
Secretary Rice. Well, on the first, Senator, I take your
point about needing to understand the timeframe in which the
Iraqis are trying to do the benchmarks that are put before you.
It's a political process for them, just like we have political
processes in the United States. And I think there have been
times when we've missed deadlines on trying to get this
legislative piece done or that legislative piece done. But they
do have a timeframe for moving things forward into their
Parliament and getting the laws passed and so forth. They've
tried to make sure that the laws that they're putting forward
have enough political support so they don't have a problem in
the Parliament. So, they're going about it, I think, in the
right way. But certainly I think we can be more explicit about
how they see the timeframes ahead, and in the days to come,
I'll try to do that.
As to the oil law, actually the sticking point has been
less about distribution. They understand that there needs to be
some distribution on the basis of a formula that has to do with
where the resource came from, the need to distribute it in a
way that is equitable, and, indeed, to deal with the fact that
some parts of the country are particularly underdeveloped. And
so, distribution has actually been less of a problem than the
question of who gets to sign contracts. That's, frankly, been
the one that they've been hung up on.
And so, I think you'll find that it's a law that, in terms
of distribution, in terms of some basic notion of a trust for
the Iraqi people, is actually quite forward-leaning.
Senator Sununu. Well, I understand the point you make, that
investment may have been the sticking point, but I think it's
also important that we fully recognize that, while that may
have been the sticking point in negotiation, that is not the
issue that has the potential to fuel the sectarian violence.
And it's when the Sunnis do not feel that there's an equitable
distribution scheme, when they're not enfranchised
economically, that they're more likely to turn to sectarian
organizations or sectarian groups, because they think that
violence is the only way to ensure that kind of resolution.
So, I understand investment may have been the negotiating
sticking point, but I think equitable distribution is more
important to long-term enfranchisement economically, and,
therefore, to dealing with some of the sectarian problems.
The second question I want to ask is about the PRTs. There
were some comments made, very positive, about the work of PRTs,
or their reconstruction teams, or their potential. But it's my
understanding that many of them are confined to relatively
small compounds, that there are security issues. So, two
issues. One, where will the funding and support come from? Two,
how are we going to address the security issues that confine
them, when we're deploying troops elsewhere? And, third, what
about recruitment? It is my understanding that recruitment has
been a problem, that Baker-Hamilton Commission outlined,
unfortunately, the tragic fact that we have so few Arab
speakers in our--both our State and intelligence personnel in
Iraq. How are we going to address these two issues? Better
recruitment, Arab speakers and security on the reconstruction
teams.
Secretary Rice. Yes. Senator, just so I'm not misunderstood
on the oil law, it does address the question of distribution.
And I think it addresses it in a way that we find hopeful.
Senator Sununu. We had senior intelligence officials, 1 day
ago--2 days ago--that were able to tell us nothing about the
proposed distribution methodology. On Friday Senior National
Security Council staff was able to tell me and others in the
room nothing about distribution methodology.
Secretary Rice. Senator----
Senator Sununu. So, either the right information isn't
being put into the hands of the President's National Security
Advisor and his senior intelligence official for the Middle
East or there's a refusal to share information.
Secretary Rice. Well, Senator, let me just say that I will
tell you what we know of the draft law. I will send you a note
about that.
[The information submitted by the State Department
follows:]
The Secretary of State,
Department of State,
Washington, DC, February 14, 2007.
Hon. John E. Sununu,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Sununu: I am writing to follow up on the question you
raised during my testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on January 11 regarding the need for Iraq to establish a
mechanism to share its oil wealth among all its provinces.
l agree with you on the importance of this issue. We have clearly
communicated to the Iraqi government our view that it is critical for
Iraq to pass a hydrocarbon law that reinforces national institutions
and creates a fair and transparent mechanism to distribute revenues
between the central government and the provinces in a way that is
broadly acceptable to all Iraqis.
In August 2006, discussions between the central government and the
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) began. Despite marked differences
of approach in the beginning of this process, the parties have made
significant progress and have agreed that Iraq will draft a hydrocarbon
law that sets out the guiding principles and framework for the oil and
gas sector.
In the course of their discussions, the KRG and the central
government have also agreed that the central government should collect
and distribute revenue to the provinces according to each province's
population once a census is completed. The Iraqis have now started
drafting a specific revenue sharing law that will more specifically
codify the collection methods and distribution levels.
We will continue to keep your staff updated as the Iraqis finalize
these important pieces of legislation. Please do not hesitate to
contact me if you have further questions.
Sincerely,
Condoleezza Rice.
Secretary Rice. In terms of the PRTs, now, 98 percent of
our positions are filled. And, as a matter of fact, we've
already filled 68 percent of the positions that would come into
rotation in the summer of 2007. There was a time when we had
some difficulty in recruiting. We had to make some changes in
the way we recruited. I wanted to be sure that we had senior
people leading these PRT teams, not people who were too junior.
And, in fact, I think you will find that we are doing very
well, in terms of getting the right people to the PRTs. And so,
it was--there was a time. We changed some of the incentives. We
changed the way we recruit for them. And we're doing very well
in filling the PRTs.
The absence of Arabic speakers, I'm afraid, is the result
of the national underinvestment in Arabic language skills over
a very long period of time, and we're doing what we can to
improve that. You know, at one time--I think we didn't have
problems, frankly, finding Russian speakers, because the United
States invested in people like me to teach them Russian. We
really haven't done that, as a nation, which is why we have a
critical-languages initiative, which is why we're recruiting
people with mid-level experience who might have those language
skills. And we're going to have to do better at getting Arabic
speakers not just into the PRTs and into Baghdad, but into the
rest of the Middle East, as well.
Finally, one of the things that we're doing is, we're
increasing the training of the people who go into Arabic, so
that they have longer in the training, so that they are more
capable in the language before they go out. So, we're trying to
address that problem.
Finally, as to security for the PRTs, yes, security is
something that I'm very concerned about and take very
seriously. We are now being provided security through the
brigade teams with which we are, in effect, embedded, and we
think that works best. Our people do move around. We just
recently had, for the President, a briefing by four of our PRT
teams. And, yes, they have, sometimes, some difficulty. But
they get out, and they go meet local leaders. One was telling
me--I'll not name the province, for security reasons--but that
he's out at least three, four times a week with the local
leaders. And so, people are getting out. They are experiencing
some of the same dangers that affect our military forces, and I
think it's important to recognize that our civilians are on the
front lines, too. But since we went to this structure of the
PRTs, they are getting out.
Senator Biden. Madam Secretary, let me suggest that--we
want to get you out by 1 o'clock, so--I appreciate your
exposition, but, to the extent that we all can't be shorter,
we're going to be trespassing on your time.
Senator from Florida.
STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON, U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Bill Nelson. Madam Secretary, I have supported you
and the administration on the war, but I cannot continue to
support the administration's position. I have not been told the
truth. I have not been told the truth, over and over again, by
administration witnesses. And the American people have not been
told the truth. And I don't come to this conclusion very
lightly.
Does General Abizaid support an increase in troops?
Secretary Rice. He does.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, that's at variance, of course,
as you've heard.
Secretary Rice. I think, Senator, first of all, if you look
at his testimony, and you look at the next lines in his
testimony, he talks about the conditions under which troops
might be useful. And, in fact, everybody had hoped that this
would be done with Iraqi forces. It wasn't that we didn't need
more forces; it was hoped that we would do it with Iraqi
forces. And what the Baghdad security plan of the summer showed
was that that wasn't possible.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well----
Secretary Rice. General Abizaid and General Casey have been
involved in the development of this plan. And it--in fact,
General Casey presented this option to the President.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, I'm looking forward to talking
to General Abizaid. He is one of the few that have come before
a number of the committees, that I have the privilege of
sitting on, who I feel like has been a straight-shooter. And
it's my hope that Chairman Carl Levin will call him here, and I
will ask him directly. But, of course, I was one of the ones
that asked him that question, very specifically, when he was
last here in front of the Congress, and he is someone that I
think has credibility. But, sad to say, he's one of the few who
I've felt like that I was getting a straight story from.
Let me pick up on something Mr. Coleman said. Three weeks
ago, we were in Iraq and our mouths about dropped open when the
National Security Advisory, Dr. Rubaie, said--and I think this
is almost his direct quote--``This is not a sectarian war.''
And he went on to talk about how the conflict is extremist al-
Qaeda and how the Baathists who want to come back into power.
And, of course, that's part of the situation. But the two of
us, certainly this Senator, got the impression that they are
not coming to grips with what they must face. And that is that
you've got Sunnis on Shiites, and Shiites on Shiites, and
Sunnis on Sunnis. And until you get that problem being solved,
our efforts are just simply not going to work.
Now, I'll tell you one place where I agree with the
President, when he said last night that he was going to send
additional troops into Anbar province. I was convinced by the
Marine commanders there, as I think Mr. Coleman was, as well,
that there, where you have just a Sunni population and that the
enemy is al-Qaeda, that working with those Sunni tribal leaders
with additional American troops could bring some progress. But
that is not so, in Baghdad. And I'm sad that we've come to this
point.
Let me just conclude by asking you something I would like
for you to amplify upon, although I think it's been said by a
number of people here. Obviously we need an intense diplomatic
effort in the region. One of the points of my trip was, at the
request of General Hayden, to go and talk with the Saudi king,
urging the Saudis to use their tribal contacts in Iraq to try
to get people to come together. Could you outline for the
committee what intense diplomatic effort will be taken, and
will it be taken simultaneously with the President's plan for
additional troops?
Secretary Rice. Senator, it is being taken. I will go out,
tomorrow night. The group that we are engaging, in addition to
all the many bilateral engagements that we have with the
Saudis, with the Kuwaitis, with others who can help, the
Jordanians, who can help, is through a group called the ``GCC-
plus-two.'' That is really the appropriate group. We work also
with Turkey very closely on Iraq. We have a problem on the
northern border with the PKK that General Ralston is trying to
resolve. But I think you would find that, first of all, there
already has been diplomatic effort. We will, of course, try to
intensify that effort to support what the Maliki government is
now trying to do to get its sectarian problem under control.
Frankly, the countries of the region are also watching to
see whether this will be an evenhanded government in dealing
with both Sunnis and Shia. And so, the Maliki government faces,
I think, some skepticism, not just from Americans and from
Iraqis, but also from the region. And we've made that point to
them, that they really must deal with the sectarian problem in
an evenhanded fashion, or they're not going to get support from
the region.
That said, to the degree that we hear from the Saudis and
others that their biggest strategic concern is Iran, then they
have a very strong incentive to help stabilize Iraq, so that
Iraq is, indeed, a barrier to Iranian influence in the region,
not a bridge.
Senator Bill Nelson. What do you----
Senator Biden. I hate to do this, but if the next question
is going to result in a long answer, we're--you're going to be
running out of time, Senator. So----
Secretary Rice. Thirty seconds.
Senator Biden [continuing]. If you want----
Senator Bill Nelson. Well----
Senator Biden. If it's a quick question, please----
Senator Bill Nelson. It's very quick.
We need more than engagement. We need to get these
countries to act. So, how do you get them to act?
Secretary Rice. There's an international compact that
they've all negotiated. We need to finalize it.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
Senator Voinovich.
STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, U.S. SENATOR FROM OHIO
Senator Voinovich. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, I'm sorry that I wasn't here for your
testimony or for the other questions that have been asked of
you, so please forgive me if I am redundant. But I met this
morning with representatives from 10 nations who are concerned
about our Visa Waiver Program. I believe that the current
program--and I'm glad the President understands this--needs to
be changed, because these nations whose representatives I met
with are our allies and helping us in Afghanistan and in Iraq.
I think you know that the most important weapon, in terms of
winning the war on terror, is our public diplomacy, which needs
to be improved substantially.
I hope, Mr. Chairman, that we can proceed with the Visa
Waiver legislation early in this session of Congress, so we can
help some of our allies, who are really upset with us that
their citizens cannot enter into the United States because of
this unrealistic and restrictive program we currently have.
You should know that I am skeptical that a surge of troops
will bring an end to the escalation of violence and the
insurgency in Iraq. Many of the generals that have served there
have said they do not believe additional troops will be
helpful--in Baghdad, particularly. And, Madam Secretary, my
faith in Prime Minister Maliki's ability to make the hard
choices necessary to bring about political solutions has to be
restored. There needs to be a political solution between the
Sunnis and the Shiites. I have asked this question now for 2
years: How can there be a unity government--one that is not
dominated by the Shiites that will ultimately get rid of the
Sunnis that are in Iraq--when Muqtada al-Sadr is there? From
everything I understand, he very well tells Prime Minister
Maliki what to do. We have seen evidence that Sadr simply makes
a telephone call and Maliki pulls the plug on whatever he was
previously doing in order to meet Sadr's wishes.
I think that we underestimate the hatred between Sunnis and
Shiites. We're saying that somehow they are all going to get
together and everything is going to be happy. The Sunnis and
the Baathists oppressed the Shiites for many, many years. Now
the Shiites are in the majority. Is there going to be a unity
government, or another theocracy, like there is in Iran? I
think that is what Sadr wants.
So, how can you explain to us that the political divisions
in Iraq are going to be resolved? Probably this article was
discussed already this morning, ``The Fog'' by David Brooks in
the New York Times. Brooks says that the plan we are proposing
does not reflect what Maliki says he wants done. But I would
insist that Maliki stand up and make it clear to the whole
world that he does want this done, that he supports the plan,
and that the United States is not superimposing its wishes onto
him. If he does not make that clear, then everyone is going to
think, ``Here we go again, the United States is in there on its
own.''
Another important question that has been raised here is:
How much help are we getting from our Sunni friends in the
Middle East? What have they done to help us? In addition,
countries that had been our friends are withdrawing support.
Why are our friends leaving? Have they lost confidence that
this dream we had of a democracy in Iraq, which many of us
bought into, will no longer happen, and that Iraq is going to
break down into a civil war? Another major concern I believe we
all have is that we don't want any more of our young men and
women killed in a civil war between two groups that ultimately
are never going to come together.
I send letters out to the families of soldiers, and I tell
them how brave their sons were, and that the work that they are
doing there in Iraq and the casualties we have sustained are as
important as that of the Second World War. But I have to
rewrite the letter today. We're talking now about stability as
our goal. And we're talking about young men and women's lives
at risk for that. This is a very, very important decision, and
I think you are going to have to do a much better job, and so
is the President, explaining this to us. You have seen the
testimony here among my colleagues. I would like to add that I
have supported the President's effort in Iraq, and I bought
into the dream of democracy taking root there, and now I don't
think it is going to happen.
Secretary Rice. Well, thank you, Senator.
I think that we don't have an option to fail in Iraq.
Consequences are too great. And I do think that it is not--I
just don't think that it is true that Iraqi Sunnis and Shia
hate each other to the point that they can't live together. I
don't believe that. I do think that there are long pent-up
tensions and emotions and grievances in that society that come
from years of tyranny, and that it's going to take some time
for them to get over it. And I do think they've had a very bad
set of circumstances by----
Senator Voinovich. Yes, but, Madam Secretary, what
evidentiary fact do we have that Maliki is going to make the
tough political decisions that he has to make, and lose his
support from Sadr and the others?
Secretary Rice. Senator, we have from him these assurances.
He's going to have to act on them. We're going to know very
soon whether or not there's political interference when his
forces--and they're his forces--want to go into a neighborhood.
We're going to know very soon whether or not he is carrying
through with his view--with what he told us, which is that,
``If you are Sunni or Shia, and you're outside the law, and
you're killing innocent Iraqis, then you have to pay a price
for that. You have to be punished.'' We're going to know. And
American forces, as they flow in over time, will only go to
support a policy in which Iraqis are carrying out those
obligations.
But I just want to emphasize again--I've heard everybody
say, ``We cannot fail. We cannot fail. We cannot fail.'' If
they are unable to get a hold of the sectarian violence, to
show that they can control Baghdad, to establish confidence
that they're going to be evenhanded, then it's going to be very
difficult for them to----
Senator Voinovich. How can it happen with Sadr?
Secretary Rice. The Iraqis are going to have to deal with
Sadr. And, to the degree that Sadr is outside of the political
process and his death squads are engaged in violence, then
they're going to have to deal with those death squads. And the
Prime Minister has said, ``Nobody and nothing is off limits.''
We will know, Senator, whether or not they're following
through. But we'd really better give them a chance to get a
hold of this sectarian violence in their capital, where it's
not Iraqis running down the streets killing other Iraqis, Sunni
and Shia; it is organized death squads going into neighborhoods
and killing Sunnis and Shia. That is what is going on there,
and they need to reestablish civil order, and we need to be
able to help them do that. That's the purpose of the
augmentation of our forces.
Senator Biden. Madam Secretary, I'm sure you understand--
you've been around--how profound this--these inquiries are.
Secretary Rice. Yes.
Senator Biden. Senator Obama.
STATEMENT OF HON. BARACK OBAMA, U.S. SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS
Senator Obama. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, I'll pursue a line of questioning that we
talked about yesterday in a one-on-one meeting. I expressed
these same views to the President. You know, I think when you
hear the voices of Senator Hagel, Senator Voinovich, others on
this panel, I think you get a sense of how weighty and painful
this process has become.
This administration took a gamble. It staked American
prestige and our national security on the premise that it could
go in, overthrow Saddam Hussein, and rebuild a functioning
democracy. And, so far, each time that we've made an assessment
of how that gamble has paid off, it appears that it has failed.
And, essentially, the administration repeatedly has said,
``We're doubling down. We're going to keep on going. You know,
maybe we lost that bet, but we're going to put a little more
money in, and--because now we've got a lot in the pot, and we
can't afford to lose what we've put in the pot.'' And the
fundamental question that the American people and, I think,
every Senator on this panel, Republican and Democrat, are
having to face now is: At what point do we say, ``Enough''? And
so, this, then, raises the line of questioning that I presented
to you yesterday.
It seems as if a solution to the problem is always 6 months
away. I'll give you an example. Ambassador Khalilzad. He was up
here before this committee in July of last year. He said, ``I
believe, Senator, that this government has about 6 months or so
to bring this sectarian violence under control. And, if it
doesn't, then I think we would have a serious situation.'' I
pressed him on the issue. I said, ``If this government has not
significantly reduced sectarian violence in about 6 months,
then we've got real problems. I mean, if I'm hearing this
correctly, the Iraqi people--at that point, the confidence in
the central government will have eroded to the point where it's
not clear what we do. And I guess the question becomes: What do
we do then? Because you may be back here in 6 months, and I'm
going to feel bad when I read back this transcript and say,
``Six months is up, and the sectarian violence continues.'' He
said, ``Well, what I'd like to say, Senator, is that we have to
work with the Iraqi Government in the course of the next 6
months to bring the sectarian violence under control.'' So on,
so forth.
Six months have passed. The sectarian violence has
worsened. It is now the President's position and the
administration position that, despite these failures, we now
have to put more young American troops at risk.
And so, I--to me, this is the key question. You continually
say that we've got assurances from the Maliki government that
it is going to be different this time. What I want to know is:
No. 1, what are the specific benchmarks and assurances have
been received? Where are these written? How can we examine
them? No. 2, why would we not want to explicitly condition, in
whatever supplemental appropriations legislation that these
benchmarks be met, so that the American people and legislators
who are voting on them have some understanding of what it is
that we expect and it's not a backroom, secret conversation
between the President and Maliki? No. 3, what are the
consequences if these benchmarks are not met? What leverage do
we have that would provide us some assurance that 6 months from
now you will not be sitting before us again, saying, ``Well, it
didn't work. Sadr's militia has not been disarmed. We have not
seen sufficient cooperation with respect to distribution of oil
resources. We are still seeing political interference. We have
lost an additional 100 or 200 or 300 or 400 American lives. We
have spent an additional $100 billion. But we still can't
afford to lose; and so, we're going to have to proceed in the
same fashion, and maybe we'll have to send more troops in.''
What leverage do we have 6 months from now?
Secretary Rice. Well, Senator, the leverage is that we're
not going to stay married to a plan that's not working in
Baghdad if the Iraqis are not living up to their part of the
obligation, because it won't work. Unless they're prepared to
make the tough political decisions--and, frankly, we know why
the sectarian violence didn't come down that all had hoped
would. It didn't come down, because there weren't enough
forces, when these areas were cleared, to actually hold them,
because there were not enough reliable Iraqi forces. And we
know that there was too much political interference in what was
going on. That's been changed in this plan, both by the
augmentation of the forces with our own forces and by bringing
forces in from other parts of Iraq. So, we're not going to stay
married to a plan that isn't working because the Iraqis aren't
living up to their end of the bargain.
Senator Obama. Madam Secretary, because I think the
chairman, appropriately, is trying to keep our time restricted,
I want to just follow up on this and be very clear. Are you
telling me that if, in 6 months or whatever timeframe you are
suggesting, the Maliki government has not met these
benchmarks--which, by the way, are not sufficiently explicit to
the public and Members of Congress, for a lot of us to make
decisions, but let's assume that these benchmarks are clarified
over the next several weeks as this is being debated--that, at
that point, you are going to suggest to the Maliki government
that we are going to start phasing down our troop levels in
Iraq?
Secretary Rice. Senator, I want to be not explicit about
what we might do, because I don't want to speculate. But I will
tell you this. The benchmark that I'm looking at--the oil law
is important, the political process is extraordinarily
important, but the most important thing that the Iraqi
Government has to do right now is to reestablish the confidence
of its population that it's going to be evenhanded in defending
it. That's what we need to see over the next 2 or 3 months. And
I think that over the next several months, they're going to
have to show that----
Senator Obama. Or else what?
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Or this plan----
Senator Obama. Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Or this plan is not----
Senator Obama. Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Rice [continuing]. Or this plan is not going to
work.
Senator Obama. The question is not whether the plan is
going to work or not. The question is: What are the
consequences to the Iraqi Government? Are there any
circumstances, that the President or you are willing to share
with the public and/or the Congress, in which we would say to
the Iraqis, ``We are no longer maintaining combat troops--
American combat troops in Iraq''? Are there any circumstances
that you can articulate in which we would say to the Maliki
government that, ``Enough is enough, and we are no longer
committing our troops''?
Secretary Rice. I'm not going to speculate, but I do tell
you that the President made very clear that of course there are
circumstances. That's what it means when he says, ``Our
patience is not limited.''
Senator Biden. Thank you very much----
Secretary Rice. But I do think we need to recognize that
the consequences for the Iraqis are also quite dire, and they
are in a process in which their people are going to hold them
accountable, as well.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Madam Secretary. The
Maliki government will probably be gone by then, but--Senator
Murkowski.
STATEMENT OF HON. LISA MURKOWSKI, U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA
Senator Murkowski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Secretary Rice, for your time this morning
and for all that you do. I wish you well in your trip, at the
end of this week.
You've clearly heard the skepticism that has been expressed
this morning, from so many of my colleagues, and for good
reason. Skepticism about a lot of things. The assurances that
we may or may not get from Mr. Maliki, an individual that we
all concede has not been able to deliver, or to follow through
with assurances that have been given in the past. There's a
great leap of faith that I think is being made here that he is
going to be able to do that which he promises, in terms of
delivering the number of Iraqi troops, mobilizing, and really
taking on those issues that, to this point in time, he has been
hesitant to do so. Skepticism with the fact that we are going
in alone.
And I will echo the concerns that Senator Boxer raised. On
the broadcast that I was watching last night of the President,
there was a little ticker underneath him as he spoke. And one
of those tickers was the announcement that Britain was
withdrawing 3,000 of their troops from Iraq. And it was--the
visual on that was pretty compelling, because it took me back
to last year, the year before, the year before that, when we
were sitting in this Foreign Relations room asking what the
number of coalition forces were, where they were coming from,
and the administration was citing, and proudly so, to the
number of countries that were engaged with us on this. But your
comment to us this morning is that you don't anticipate an
augmentation of the coalition forces.
You also said--and I think this is where--one area of the
frustration of the American people, that Iraq came to us with
this plan. Maliki came to us, to the United States, with this
plan. And I think there are many in this country who are
saying, ``Well, why did they just come to us? Why is it just
the United States that is shouldering this? Why is Great
Britain pulling back? Why are we the only ones that are moving
forward with this new plan?''
So, I have great concern as to where we are now, in terms
of the world scene, and the fact that it really is the United
States in the Iraq situation, very much alone, a situation that
I had hoped we would not be in.
I want to focus my question this morning on the mission
itself. When the idea of a surge in forces was first presented,
I was one of those that said, ``I have skepticism about it, but
if there is a clear definition for the mission, I think it's
something that we should look at, look at very carefully.'' I
would agree with Senator Hagel that, given the American lives
that have been lost in Iraq, we want to make sure that we have
a policy that is worthy of their sacrifices. And those are his
words, and I think they're very well spoken. But I'm not
convinced, as I look to the plan that the President presented
yesterday, that what we are seeing is that much different than
what we have been doing in the past. You look to the Victory in
Iraq plan that came out in November 2005, and I flipped through
that to compare that with the highlights of the Iraq Strategy
Review from January 2007. And basically, the components that
we're talking about for the security perspective remain the
same: To clear, to hold, and to build. And we, in Alaska, have
paid very close attention to what happens when we try to
increase our forces in Baghdad. We saw that with the extension
of the 172d Stryker Brigade in August for an additional 4
months. The strategy at that point in time was to plus-up the
forces in Baghdad so that we could deal with the security
issue. What we saw then didn't give me much assurance that
plussing-up, or a temporary surge, is going to deliver us
anything more than we have now.
So, my question to you, Madam Secretary, is: How is it any
different if we recognize that part of the problem, as the
President has described, was the restrictions that we had in
place before? Is this ramping up of this 17,500 in Baghdad--
what assurances can you give us that this is going to yield us
a better result, a different result than what we have seen in
the past?
Secretary Rice. Well, of course, Senator, there aren't any
guarantees, but I can tell you why the President, his advisors,
his military advisors, believe that this is going to work. The
plan requires a very different structure for Baghdad, a
military commander for Baghdad, an Iraqi military commander for
Baghdad, two deputy commanders for Baghdad, the division of the
city into nine military governances that have forces deployed
to those sections, Iraqi Army, Iraqi national police, Iraqi
local police, and an American battalion to help them. And so,
the structure is completely different.
But I wouldn't just run over the point that you made. The
rules of engagement really were the problem. Inadequate force
and rules of engagement were the problem. Those have been fixed
in this new plan.
Now, the Maliki government--I understand the skepticism
that people have that they will follow through. But, you know,
they are only 9 months in office. That's not really very long.
And they are dealing with an extremely difficult set of
circumstances in which sectarianism broke out in February 2006
in a very big way, and it's threatening to overrun the process
that they're engaged in. And so, I think the fact that they
didn't act properly in the past does not mean that they won't
act properly in the future. And I think it is something that we
have to give them a chance to do.
Senator Murkowski. And I think the concern that you've
heard today is: How long do we give them that chance? And those
benchmarks are extremely important.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
Secretary Rice. We're going to know very early, Senator,
because they have to act very quickly. Their forces will start
to come in February 1.
Senator Murkowski. Thank you.
Senator Biden. Senator Menendez.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, thank you for your service to the country.
I didn't vote for the war in Iraq, in the first place. I
believe it is one of the best decisions I ever made. And I
simply don't believe that the President's escalation of the war
will work. It seems to me that it's time for a political surge,
not a military escalation. And I also believe it's long past
time that we transition both our efforts in Iraq and our
mission in Iraq, particularly with our troops, and then
ultimately the transition of our troops out of Iraq in order to
have the Iraqis to understand what you've talked about here.
But they haven't given us any benchmarks that one can measure
by. We have to have them understand that they have to make the
hard choices, compromises, negotiations necessary for a
government of national unity.
When I heard General Pace, last year, say to us that, ``We
have to get the Iraqis to love their children more than they
hate their neighbors,'' that's a powerful truism. But that does
not get achieved by military might.
And so, it seems to me, to paraphrase Shakespeare, an
escalation by any other name is an escalation. I know out of
the White House, it came as ``surge,'' but ``surge'' would mean
temporary, and that's clearly not the case here. And a failed
strategy, however repackaged, is still a failed strategy. We
tried this plan before, and it didn't work, when we sent 12,000
troops to Baghdad last summer.
And we heard a panel of witnesses yesterday, and there have
been other military experts, who have said that, at this point,
reliable Iraqi troops aren't there simply to show up. So, you
suggested the President has listened to a wide range of
people--the Iraqi Study Group, the Members of Congress,
different military options, the American people--but if he
listened, I don't think he's heard. I don't think he's heard
that wide range of views.
So, I want to ask you, though, even in the midst of my own
views, trying to understand what is really new about this
effort: Did the President obtain a commitment from Prime
Minister Maliki specifically to use Iraqi troops against
Muqtada al-Sadr's troops?
Secretary Rice. He obtained an assurance from Prime Minster
Maliki that he will go after whoever is killing innocent
Iraqis. And I think they fully understand that the Jaish al-
Mahdi are part of the problem.
Senator Menendez. Did he speak specifically about--and
obtain specific commitments about--going against al-Sadr?
Secretary Rice. He said that whoever they have to go after,
and the military thinks they have to go after, they'll go after
them.
Senator Menendez. The reason I asked this specific
question, is because it's al-Sadr who's keeping his government
afloat right now.
Secretary Rice. Well, actually, al-Sadr and his people
pulled out of the government, and the government hasn't
collapsed. They pulled out, as you remember, because of the
Amman meeting with President Bush. And I think that
demonstrates that, in fact, they can continue to function even
if the Sadr forces are not a part of the government.
Senator Menendez. When the President spoke to these other
different groups--there's a broad misgiving among Shiite
leaders in the government about the Shiites having a deep-
seated fear that the power they want to have at the polls is
going to be whittled away by Americans in pursuit of Sunnis--
did he get their commitment to support Prime Minister Maliki?
Secretary Rice. I'm sorry. ``Their,'' being the other Shia?
Senator Menendez. The other Shia leaders, the other party
leaders.
Secretary Rice. Yes. For instance, the SCIRI supports Prime
Minister Maliki in this effort.
Senator Menendez. In the effort to support him in his
position as Prime Minister?
Secretary Rice. They support him as Prime Minister. They
brought him into power.
Senator Menendez. Well, I find it really hard--unless we
have a specific--I know the general view, that, ``We will go
against anyone,'' but is not, in fact, part of the negotiations
that the President had with Prime Minister Maliki to give him
more operational control? And, in that operational control,
couldn't he circumvent going against al-Sadr?
Secretary Rice. If he circumvents going against the people
who are doing the killing, then he's going to fail, and this
plan is going to fail. And he understands that.
Senator Menendez. And let's talk about that, then. Let's
assume that, for argument's sake--let's not think about the
best; the best would be great--let's assume he fails. One of
the problems is these benchmarks without timelines or
consequences. Even the Iraq Study Group said that, as part of
their recommendation--they specifically said, ``If the Iraqi
Government does not make substantial progress toward the
achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security,
and governance, the United States should reduce its political,
military, economic support for the Iraqi Government.'' But when
I heard your response to Senator Coleman, you said the Iraqis
didn't have--you said--you go with plan A, and if plan A
doesn't work, then you deal with it subsequently. I think
that's been part of our problem here. We have a plan, but even
plan A does not have contingencies. It doesn't have benchmarks.
How can you ask the American people, and the Members of
Congress who represent the American people, to continue to give
you a blank check without benchmarks that are definable,
without benchmarks that have timelines of some consequence,
without consequences to the failure to meet those deadlines?
Because we've seen these benchmarks be repackaged from the
past. They were benchmarks before. They were not met. There are
no consequences. And we continue to create a dependency--by the
Iraqis on our forces.
Secretary Rice. But, Senator, first of all, I think you do
one strategy at a time. But you can tell--and you can adjust a
strategy as you go along. This is not going to unfold all at
once. We're going to know whether or not, in fact, the Iraqis
are living up to their obligations. And we're going to know,
early on. And there are opportunities for adjustment then.
The benchmarks are actually very clear, and the Iraqis
themselves have set forward some timetables for those
benchmarks, because they've got to get legislation through.
They have an international compact that they're trying to
respond to.
But I just want to speak to the word--to the point of
consequences. There are consequences, in that they will lose
the support of the American people, and they'll lose the
support of the Iraqi people.
Senator Menendez. But they're there already, Madam
Secretary, in terms of the support of the American people. The
question is: What will our Government do, specifically, if
benchmarks are not met? What will we do? And that's where there
is no answer. And, therefore, very difficult to be supportive
of any such----
Secretary Rice. Senator----
Senator Menendez [continuing]. Policy.
Secretary Rice. I just think that it's bad policy, frankly,
to speculate on what you'll do if a plan fails that you're
trying to make work.
Senator Menendez. Well, you----
Secretary Rice. I just don't think it's the way to go about
it.
Senator Menendez. The President did it in Leave No Child
Behind.
Secretary Rice. But----
Senator Menendez. There are real consequences if you, in
fact, don't meet certain standards. You lose a lot of money.
You get----
Secretary Rice. Yes.
Senator Menendez [continuing]. Categorized as a failed
school district. It seems to be a standard that can work here
domestically. We're unwilling to give the government--standards
that ultimately they would have to meet in order for us to be
able to achieve success or, therefore, determine what are the
consequences to failure.
Secretary Rice. Senator, as complicated as education policy
is, I think Iraq--the circumstances of the Iraqis are very
complicated. We're not giving--first of all, we don't expect
that anyone here is giving us a blank check. I understand the
skepticism. And I know that if this doesn't show some success,
there isn't going to be support for this policy. I understand
that.
Senator Biden. Thank you----
Secretary Rice. And we said this to the Iraqis, in no
uncertain terms. They have to start to deliver. They have to
start to deliver now. And if they don't, then I think they know
that we're not going to be able to continue to support them at
the levels that we do.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
Senator Isakson.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHNNY ISAKSON, U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA
Senator Isakson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In respect for Senators Cardin and Casey, Webb and Vitter,
I'll be very quick.
In reference to the previous exchange, I would simply say
this. It's been my observation in war and in diplomacy, there
are times you can answer questions and times you can't. I have
great respect for that, and I understand the answers the
Secretary has given, and I respect her being here today.
With regard to that, I hope this hearing is the most
watched television event in downtown Baghdad right now, which
I'm sure it is. And if it is, and Maliki is watching
television, I think he realizes that this--in Kenny Rogers old
song, ``You've gotta know when to hold 'em and know when to
fold 'em,'' it's time for them to deliver on the hand that
they've dealt, and there's no folding that will take place. You
can't go on, ad infinitum.
And I would say, in response to the exchange--I heard, from
the President last night, in the right words, ``This one is for
all the marbles,'' vis-a-vis the Iraqi commitment, and it being
totally across the board, and there be no cover for Muqtada al-
Sadr any more than a Sunni or anybody else that might be
around. That's just a--you don't have to answer that. That's
just my observation.
My second thing, to live up to my promise to my colleagues,
is to say this. Ranking Member Lugar made a very insightful
statement with regard to diplomacy. I--it has not gone
unnoticed to me that John Negroponte has joined your staff as
the No. 2 person, I believe, at State. It also has not gone
unnoticed that, when you answered the questions regarding Syria
and regarding Iran, they were definitive into what you
expected, they were not prospective in what might happen. And I
think there's a burden on Iran and Syria to show that there are
reasons to come to the table that are in the best interest of
the region. The United States is not a nonnegotiable nation. We
may, as history has proven, been the best negotiating nation
that there ever was, but there's a time to negotiate, and it's
after you know what the cards of the other side are going to
be, or at least the first card. And I think, the way you stated
it was appropriate. And I encourage us to pursue negotiations,
but not by giving away, at the outset, what we may have to have
in the end.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Senator. Your
generosity is much appreciated.
Senator Cardin.
STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, U.S. SENATOR FROM
MARYLAND
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Madam
Secretary, thank you.
I certainly want our foreign policy to succeed, including
in Iraq. Several weeks ago, when the President said that he
would reevaluate our programs in Iraq and come out with a new
policy at the beginning of the year, I was encouraged by that,
because I thought: At last, Congress and the President and the
American people would be together on a policy in Iraq. I must
tell you, I'm extremely disappointed. The Iraq Study Group, the
military experts, have all said that it's time to start drawing
down our troops. And yet, the plan will increase the number of
troops. I don't understand that.
They talk about engaging the international community. And
I've listened to your testimony, and I've listened to the
President last night, and it seems like we are making a limited
effort, not an all-out effort, and we certainly are not holding
the Iraqis accountable to stand up to defend their own country.
So, I have one question I want to ask about the troop
numbers; how the 20,000-plus troops numbers were determined. I
must tell you that if we were looking at how many troops are
necessary to quell a civil war that is occurring in Iraq, I
think one would pick a much larger number. If we're looking at
carrying out our current mission, military experts believe that
we should be drawing down, so that we at least give the Iraqis
a message that they have to take care of their own country, and
we start making it clear this not a United States occupation.
So, I am somewhat suspect that this number was determined,
because it's what you have available, that it's not--you don't
have many more that you could bring in at this time without
creating a significant problem to our military. So, please tell
me how this particular number was arrived at.
Secretary Rice. Senator, Chairman Pace answered this
question, earlier today, and the requirement was established in
the field when the mission was established. And the mission
was, first of all, to support the successes that are beginning
to emerge in Anbar--that's where the 4,000 came from; and,
second, to provide assistance to the Iraqis as they bring in
their best forces to be able to deal with the death squads and
the organized violence that is going on against Iraqi
populations.
Yes; if you were trying to quell a civil war, you would
need much larger forces. But if what you're trying to do is to
provide population security in relatively defined areas by
augmenting Iraqi forces, then that's a much smaller number. And
the Joint Chiefs of Staff then resource the plan that is given
to them by the military. That's how the number was determined.
Senator Cardin. All I can tell you is that the information
that we've received from people that have been in command
indicate that they're--that's--it doesn't add up that way.
But, I tell you, I think it's going to be very transparent
to the international community that these numbers are more
symbolic, as far as the numbers of it--it's not symbolic to
those who are going over, not symbolic to those who are putting
their lives on the line--but it won't make a significant
difference as far as the amount of violence in the country
itself, but will be very much an indication that the United
States is increasing its commitment in Iraq.
One more question, very quickly. The President talked last
night about talking to our allies around the world. Can you
just list countries that are in support of what we're doing and
whether any countries are going to come to our help, as far as
providing additional military personnel in Iraq?
Secretary Rice. I think that we don't expect additional
military personnel. In fact, our surge of personnel is to
support the Iraqis in this very specific mission and to leave
behind an Iraqi force that can do this on its own. And so, in
fact, I think it's a temporary matter from our point of view,
to bridge for the absence of Iraqi forces that are capable of
doing this.
We do have allies on the ground with us. We're not alone,
Senator Cardin. We do have, still, Australian forces there,
Japanese forces, Korean forces, lots of forces from----
Senator Cardin. And they all concur with this new plan? I
mean----
Secretary Rice. We have had--Prime Minister Howard was out
this morning saying that this is the right thing to do. We know
that Prime Minister Blair agrees. I talked yesterday with
leaders--with Foreign Ministers from the region. They
understand the need to deal with this.
Senator Cardin. We all understand the need to deal with it,
but----
Secretary Rice. No; they understand what it is we're doing.
Their concern is the concern that I'm hearing here: Will the
Maliki government do this in an evenhanded fashion that goes
both after Shia and Sunni death squads? And that is their
concern, not the number of American forces that may be needed.
Senator Cardin. I'm glad to see this committee is not
alone.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll yield back.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
Senator Vitter.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID VITTER, U.S. SENATOR FROM LOUISIANA
Senator Vitter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Madam
Secretary. Good luck on your upcoming trip.
My main reaction to this initiative and the President's
speech is really to think of a number of significant questions,
so I want to just go directly to those.
I have not heard General Pace's testimony, so forgive me. I
think the President precisely, last night, said ``over 20,000
troops.'' What is that exact number, or what is the upper limit
on that?
Secretary Rice. I think it's around 21,500, at most. But
I'd like General Pace to speak to that, because they have a way
that they intend to flow the troops in that probably affects
that number.
Senator Vitter. OK. I know they have a very specific plan
for those troops, but, broadbrush and to a layman, that is--
what?--roughly 15 percent of what we have there now. So, it is
a marginal increase, as compared to a 50-percent increase. And
so, that does lead to a concern of mine that we may commit the
same mistake I think we clearly have in the past, which is too
little, maybe too late. In light of the past, why shouldn't we
take that number and say we're going to increase it 50 percent,
we're going to increase it 100 percent?
Secretary Rice. I think if that had been the assessment of
the commanders as to what needed to be done, that would have
been the recommendation. But this is a very specific purpose.
Let's leave aside Anbar, which is really to deal with the
positive developments there, in terms of what the sheikhs are
doing. But in Baghdad, it is not to make Americans the center
of police security or of providing population security for
Iraqis in Baghdad, it is to augment Iraqi forces in the lead in
doing that, because we recognize that sending Americans in to
separate people and neighborhoods, or to go door to door and
try to do a census, makes no sense. And so, while there were
obviously very detailed calculations done on what that needed
to be in the nine districts that are being developed, a
battalion per district, and how then to embed people with the
Iraqi forces so that they are trained up quickly.
Senator Vitter. Well, I'm----
Secretary Rice. I think that's where the number comes from.
Senator Vitter. I certainly understand all of that. But my
point about past history is, I assume it was the commanders'
recommendation about numbers in the past that seemed to be--in
many cases, have been too low. So: Does the number take account
of any drawdown of British or other troops?
Secretary Rice. Because it is a very specific mission in
Baghdad to support the Iraqis at this time, it's unaffected by
any drawdown that might take place--for instance, in the south
of the country.
Senator Vitter. But surely, while the British mission in
the south of the country is not what we're talking about,
particularly in Baghdad, I assume we consider it significant,
so that just forgetting about it has some loss or impact.
Secretary Rice. Well, first of all, the British will
continue to be there for some time. But Basrah is being turned
over to Iraqi control. And that, by the way, is happening
throughout the country--the continuing problems are Anbar,
Diala, and Baghdad. In most of the country, responsibility is
being turned over to Iraqis; and, as that happens, then people
can withdraw their forces.
Senator Vitter. OK. And a final question about troops. As I
heard the President, he talked about mostly Baghdad, also some
in Anbar, no increased deployment having to do with the
borders. And it seems to me, personnel and material coming over
the borders is maybe not the dominant problem, but a real
problem. And is part of the new plan going to address that in
any significant way?
Secretary Rice. Well, what the President has done, on
recommendation of his commanders, is to increase our naval and
air presence through the carrier presence, and also to give an
expanded mission, in terms of breaking up these networks. But
we think it's principally an intelligence function, Senator.
Those borders are so long and so porous that I don't think you
want to try to depend on boots on the ground to actually deal
with the borders.
Senator Vitter. OK. I want to turn to Sadr--obviously a big
topic of discussion, for obvious reasons. As I understand the
status of the government, he hasn't quite completely left the
government. They're boycotting it. It's something in between;
correct?
Secretary Rice. Well, he pulled his people out of the
government, but they've never really said they wanted to leave
the government. The fact of the matter is, the government is
functioning without them.
Senator Vitter. But no one different has, for instance,
assumed leadership of those ministries, correct?
Secretary Rice. In fact, there are temporary ministers in a
couple of those ministries.
Senator Vitter. OK. What different scenarios do you see
playing out if, in fact, Prime Minister Maliki is serious and
acts on his commitment? Sadr isn't going to like that, clearly
doesn't agree, is going to react somehow. So, how would you
game out or play out that situation? Because I assume we have
to be prepared for that.
Secretary Rice. Well, the first thing is that these death
squads, wherever they're coming from--and some of them are
being driven by Jaish al Mahdi--have to be dealt with. And Sadr
apparently has said that if his people are doing this killing,
then they ought to be dealt with. We will see whether he holds
to that commitment.
But, ultimately yes, he has, I suppose, the power to
threaten the government. But the government can't be
intimidated by that. And with enough forces that are reliable
and capable, I think they believe they can meet any
contingency.
But, again, it goes back to the question of whether or not
you believe that this is just a problem of will, or is it a
problem of both will and capability? The President, on
reflection on his commanders' recommendation, believes that
it's both will and capability, will and capability to be able
to deal with whatever contingency they face, including
contingencies they may face in Sadr City or from the Sadr
forces.
Senator Vitter. So, in terms of that playing out, I assume
you're fairly confident that the government can continue to
survive without him and with an even more complete and full
opposition by his forces than exist now.
Secretary Rice. Well, there's also the possibility that he
will decide that he wants to continue to be a part of the
political process.
Senator Vitter. Right.
Secretary Rice. That's a possibility.
Senator Vitter. Right. I'm not discarding that. I'm just
asking your analysis of the other possibility.
Secretary Rice. Well, I think it's become such a critical
situation for them that they recognize they've got to take on
anybody who stands in their way of bringing population
security.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Casey.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., U.S. SENATOR FROM
PENNSYLVANIA
Senator Casey. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And thank you for
convening this very important hearing.
Madam Secretary, we appreciate your presence here and your
testimony and your public service.
I represent the State of Pennsylvania, along with Senator
Specter. We've now lost, as of last week, more than 140 in
Iraq. And in a State like ours, apart from the deaths in big
cities like Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, most of the deaths,
most of the loss of life, are soldiers and marines from very
small towns. And, as you can imagine--and I know you appreciate
this--when there is a death like that in a small town, it is
like an earthquake, it's cataclysmic to the community and
obviously to the family. And I think that one of my basic
obligations as a U.S. Senator, when it comes to Iraq, one of
the obligations I have, when it comes to the question of what
we're going to do, going forward in Iraq, is to support
policies that, in fact, will be cognizant of those numbers, the
loss of life, and to do everything I can to make sure that we
reduce, as much as we can, as humanly possible, the likelihood
that another one of our sons or daughters are sacrificed for a
policy that is flawed.
Based upon your testimony today and based upon what I heard
the President say, National Security Advisor--all of the public
record that Americans have been reviewing the last couple of
days, I have to say I'm not convinced that the escalation of
troops that the President formally announced last night has
support in a strategy that will work. And I don't think I can
meet my obligation and support that kind of an increase in
troop levels.
But, I have to say, despite what I might think, I think
it's very important--and some of this will be redundant, I
realize, but I think it's very important that you tell us, once
again, in your own words, but also on behalf of the President
and the administration, What is the nexus--and I have not heard
this articulated well, so far--what is the nexus between the
good news that the Iraqi have developed this plan themselves,
that has its genesis or origin in their work and their
leadership--but what's the nexus between that Iraqi strategy
and the need for approximately 20,000 new troops?
Secretary Rice. Yes. When the Iraqis came to Jordan and
they said they really have to get a hold of this Baghdad
problem, and recognizing that the Baghdad security plan that
had been carried out in the summer did not succeed, they wanted
to do it themselves. To be very frank, they wanted to do it
themselves. They believe that sectarian violence is their
problem, not ours. And I applaud that. I think that's the right
responsibility.
It is true that people like Rubaie, who sometimes are very
enthusiastic, say, ``We can do this on our own.'' But, in fact,
when the experts, including their own defense people, looked at
the capabilities that they had and when those capabilities
would actually mature, which would be in the summer sometime,
there is a gap between the capabilities that will mature by the
summer, when we begin to really transfer operational control to
them over most of their forces, and what needs to be done in
Baghdad now. And so, the President asked his commanders to work
with the Iraqis to see what it would take to be able to
undertake a population protection--get-control-of-the-capital
plan now rather than waiting until the summer, when the Iraqis
could do that themselves. And the plan that came back was for
an augmentation of American forces so that a battalion could be
with each of these nine Iraqi groups that are going to be in
each of these nine military districts. That's where it came
from.
And so, the link, Senator, is--again, if you believe--and I
understand that people don't believe that the Iraqis have the
will, that there's great skepticism as to whether they have the
will--if you believe that it's a matter of will, then we should
do exactly what people are saying, we should draw back and say,
``Go at it. Go at it, and you'd better succeed in getting rid
of this sectarian violence, or you're not going to be able to
continue to govern.'' But you believe that it's both will and
capability, then telling them to do something that you don't
think they're capable of doing is not good policy. And so, the
President's policy is premised on the urgency of getting
Baghdad under control and what Iraqi capabilities there are and
what augmentation we need to do. So, that's how you would think
about the relationship between the two.
Senator Casey. Well, I appreciate your answer, but I do
hope that you and other members of the administration
continually, in the next couple of days especially, make the
case very specifically why you and the President and others
think this is necessary, because I don't think the American
people are hearing that. They're hearing a lot of the same
rhetoric we've heard for a lot of years, in my judgment. The
best efforts to make sure that every sound bite is phrased in a
way that sounds like, ``If we don't do this, it's going to
adversely impact the war on terror,'' which I think the case
hasn't been made, with regard to this particular policy.
So, I'll move on. One more question. With regard to
diplomacy, we hear it all the time--and this is your business--
we hear it all the time. We hear about the necessity of a
political strategy and a diplomatic strategy. Can you very
quickly--and I'd ask you to submit--amplify this for the record
for this hearing, if you could provide that. But, just very
quickly, can you summarize for us specific steps you have
taken, personally, as Secretary of State, when it comes to
dealing with the real crisis that we now have in Iraq, at least
in the last 2 years, just a list, if you can.
Secretary Rice. On the diplomatic front?
Senator Casey. Absolutely.
Secretary Rice. Yes. Well, I have been constantly--whether
it's through bilateral discussions or in the multilateral form
that we've created, the GCC-plus-two--pressing these states to
help the Iraqis send missions to Iraq. And we've succeeded in
getting some of them there; getting the Arab League to go there
in support because one of the problems is, they see, ``Well,
perhaps Iran is too influential, but these Iraqis, the Shia
there are Arabs.'' So bringing them into the Arab fold is
extremely important.
I have worked very hard to get European Union to go in, in
a major way. And, in fact, their commissioner, Benita Ferrero-
Waldner, has gone several times, at our urging. But the most
important thing that we've done is, we've negotiated, over the
last year, almost year now, an international compact for Iraq
which has very specific things that the Iraqis are to do,
including things like an oil law, anticorruption measures, and
so forth, and a series of steps that the international
community would take in response. This is something that we
used very effectively with Afghanistan, and we think we can use
it effectively with Iraq, as well. The debt relief. We've
negotiated, for the Iraqis, 80 percent debt relief from most of
the Paris Club debtors, and 100 percent from ourselves and
several others. We're trying to get the Gulf States to do the
same. So, it's been a very active agenda.
I do think that they've been much more active with Iraq in
the last 6 or 7 months, really engaging--really, the last
year--really engaging and trying to get Sunnis involved in the
process. I suspect that some of the Sunni states have been
supportive of what is going on in Anbar, and have had a role in
helping that come about.
So, that's how we see the diplomacy. And it's not a
question of whether--to my mind, who you talk to; it's a
question of what they're prepared to do. And the states that
have the same vision of the Middle East, and want an Iraq that
is unified, stable, without undue Iranian influence, which is
one of the uniting factors for all of these states, I think, is
the place to be.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much, Senator.
Senator Webb, your patience is commendable, and your
experience is extensive.
STATEMENT OF HON. JIM WEBB, U.S. SENATOR FROM VIRGINIA
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also realize I am
the last obstacle between you and lunch, and----
Senator Biden. No, no, no, no.
Senator Webb [continuing]. Secretary Rice and the door.
[Laughter.]
So, I'll be as brief as I can.
Secretary Rice, I want to thank you for being here. And I
want you to know my door is always open if you ever want to
come by and discuss any issue or call me or whatever. I'm
looking forward very much to working with you.
I'd like to associate myself with many of the views here,
that you've heard, about what I believe is a necessity for us
to widen the diplomatic approach, in terms of reaching a
solution. I want to make a--just a quick comment that won't
require an answer from you, and then I do have a question about
something that concerns me a great deal.
With respect to the situation in Iran, and with Iran and
the region, there are many, including myself, who warned that
invading and occupying Iraq would, in fact, empower Iran. And
that has become a reality. We also--there was a great deal of
notice and comment recently about the fact that Iran has more
power in Iraq than it has had in a very long--perhaps going
back a couple of hundred years, and that is a reality. And our
options are in--to ignore, to do things informally, as you've
been discussing, or to more actively engage.
And when I'm looking at this, one of the things that sticks
in my mind is a situation that we had with China in 1971. This
was a rogue nation. It had nuclear weapons. It had an American
war on its border. The parallels are not exact, but we went
forward, without giving up any of our own ideals or our
national objectives, and we did a very aggressive engagement
process that, over a period of time, has arguably brought China
into the international community.
And I just hope you will pass on to their President, (a) my
best regards, and (b) that if he were to move in that
direction, he certainly would have the strong support of me,
and perhaps other people.
The question that I have for you goes back to the
Presidential finding on the resolution that authorized force in
2002. And there is a sentence in here which basically says
that, ``This resolution does not constitute any change in the
position of the executive branch with regard to its authority
to use force to deter, prevent, or respond to aggression or
other threats to United States interests outside of Iraq.''
This phrase went to situations outside of Iraq. And this is a
question that can be answered either, you know, very briefly or
through written testimony, but my question is: Is this the--is
it the position of this administration that it possesses the
authority to take unilateral action against Iran, in the
absence of a direct threat, without congressional approval?
Secretary Rice. Senator, I'm really loathe to get into
questions of the President's authorities without a rather more
clear understanding of what we are actually talking about. So,
let me answer you, in fact, in writing. I think that would be
the best thing to do.
Senator Webb. I would appreciate that.
Secretary Rice. But let me just say how we view the
situation currently. We continue to believe that our struggle
with Iran is a long one. It's a strategic one. It has elements
of the fight in the war on terror. It has elements of trying to
stabilize a Middle East in which Iran is a tremendously
destabilizing force. It has, of course, an Iraq dimension. And
it also has an important nuclear dimension. And I think we
believe we have the right policy for dealing with those
matters, through diplomacy.
Now, what the President was very much referring to is, of
course, every American President--and that goes back a very,
very long way--has made very clear that we will defend our
interests and those of our allies in the Persian Gulf region.
And so, there is nothing new in that statement that the
President has made.
The one important new fact here is that, for force-
protection purposes, we have to worry about what Iran is doing.
We all know their activities for these enhanced IEDs and so
forth. And we are going to go after the networks that do that.
I believe that--when you talk to the military advisors,
they believe that is something that can be done in Iraq, that
it is something that is done by good intelligence and by
quickness of action. And, in fact, we've had a couple of those
occasions recently, where we've gone after these networks.
Senator Webb. Right. Well, I think that--I think we both
probably know what the elephant in the bedroom is here. And
I've got a long history of experience in dealing with defense
issues. And there is one pretty profound change since I was in
the Pentagon, in the Reagan administration, and that is the
notion that the executive branch has the power to conduct a
preemptive war, as opposed to a preemptive attack. And the
situations that you're talking about really go to a preemptive
attack against a specific threat, where people on the other
side are being threatened. And the concern that I and a number
of people have is that this would be interpreted as something
broader. So, I'd appreciate it if you could give us something
in writing on that.
Secretary Rice. I will, certainly.
[The information submitted by the State Department
follows:]
U.S. Department of State,
Washington, DC, January 31, 2007.
Hon. Jim Webb,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Webb: In the President's January 10 speech to the
American people on the Administration's New Way Forward in Iraq, he
made clear that Iran was providing material support for attacks on
American forces. He emphasized the importance of disrupting these
attacks and interrupting the flow of support from Iran and Syria. The
President also noted our intention to seek out and destroy the networks
that are providing the advanced weaponry and training that threaten our
forces in Iraq. During the January 11 Senate Foreign Relations
Committee hearing on Iraq, you and Senator Biden asked a number of
questions concerning the scope of the President's authority to carry
out these critical missions.
The Administration believes that there is clear authority for U.S.
operations within the territory of Iraq to prevent further Iranian- or
Syrian-supported attacks against U.S. forces operating as part of the
Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) or against civilian targets. Such
attacks directly threaten both the security and stability of Iraq and
the safety of our personnel; they also continue to threaten the
region's security and stability. U.S. military operations in Iraq are
conducted under the President's constitutional authority and the
Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002
(P.L. 107-243), which authorized the use of armed force to defend the
national security of the United States against the continuing threat
posed by Iraq and to enforce all relevant United Nations Security
Council resolutions regarding Iraq. The United Nations Security Council
has authorized all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance
of Iraq's security and stability, which encompasses MNF-I conducting
military operations against any forces that carry out attacks against
MNF-I or Iraqi civilian and military targets.
You also ask what authority might be relevant in connection with a
hypothetical military operation in Iran. As this Administration has
said, we are not planning to invade Iran. For over two years, we have
actively pursued a diplomatic strategy to address Iran's nuclear
program, and we remain committed to resolving our concerns with Iran
diplomatically. Of course, the Constitution charges the President to
protect the United States and the American people. As Commander in
Chief, he must be able to defend the United States, for example, if
U.S. forces come under attack. Whether and how to do so in any specific
situation would depend on the facts and circumstances at that time.
Administration officials communicate regularly with the leadership and
other Members of Congress with regard to the deployment of U.S. forces
and the measures that may be necessary to protect the security
interests of the United States and will continue to do so.
We hope this information will be helpful to you and thank you for
your interest in this important issue.
Sincerely,
Jeffrey T. Bergner,
Assistant Secretary,
Legislative Affairs.
Senator Webb. Thank you very much.
Secretary Rice. If I may, just one other point on Senator
Webb's earlier point. Senator, we've gone a long way, actually,
to offer the opportunity for the Iranians to talk to us. We did
it in the context of the nuclear program, because we believe
that's a real near-term threat and if we don't get a handle on
the nuclear program, we've got a real problem. I want to repeat
again--now, if they will stop enriching so that they're not
improving their nuclear capability while they're talking,
they'll find somebody who's willing to talk to them under any
circumstances. But I think short of that, we send a wrong
message about our resolve. And, frankly, it has a cost with
nations in the region that are looking very closely at how we
are conducting ourselves, vis-a-vis the Iranians.
Senator Webb. Right. Well, I think that it's important, as
the Baker Commission was saying, and a lot of people have been
saying, and I've been saying, that when you have a situation
with a nation that constitutes this kind of threat, it's very
important to confront, as well as to engage. And I personally
think it would be a bold act for George W. Bush to get on an
airplane and go to Tehran in the same manner that President
Nixon did, take a gamble and not give up one thing that we
believe in in terms of its moving toward weapons of mass
destruction, our belief that Israel needs to be recognized and
its interests need to be protected, but to maybe start changing
the formula here.
Thank you.
Secretary Rice. Thank you.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much.
Senator Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Biden. I thank my colleagues for their patience;
and, particularly, I thank the Secretary of State.
Madam Secretary, I'd conclude by just making a few very
brief comments.
One is, one of the things that you've learned here today
from hearing our colleagues is that there is an overwhelming
concern that the reason why we insisted that we not accept the
Maliki plan, as he laid it out, is that what he would do is go
in and take out the Sunnis and we'd exacerbate the civil war.
That may or may not be true, but that's been one of the
potential explanations as to why we insisted we go into Baghdad
when he said they don't need us in Baghdad. I'm not saying
that's right or wrong. Just be aware that that's something
that's going to have to be dealt with, in terms of, I suspect,
people's judgments about how they feel about the
administration's position.
Second, I also want to make it clear, as chairman of the
committee, that I feel very strongly that the authorization of
the use of force, and the provision that the Senator read from
it, explicitly denies you the authority to go into Iran. Let me
say that again. Explicitly denies you the authority to go into
Iran. We will fight that out if the President moves, but I just
want the record to show--and I would like to have a legal
response from the State Department, if they think they have
authority to pursue networks or anything else across the border
into Iran and Iraq. That will generate a constitutional
confrontation here in the Senate, I predict to you. At least I
will attempt to make it a confrontation.
Third point I would make, Madam Secretary, is that I've sat
through a lot of hearings, and you have, too, and, God love
you, you've had to do it in a very different position than I
have, and I commend you for your patience, but I want to say,
again--and I hope you'll convey it to the President, because
I'm sure he has not had time to watch our hearing--I think what
occurred here today was fairly profound, in the sense that you
heard 21 members, with one or two notable exceptions,
expressing outright hostility, disagreement, and/or
overwhelming concern with the President's proposal. And I think
that he will proceed at significant political risk if there is
not a much more intensive and detailed attempt to bring the
U.S. Senate and the Congress into his proposals.
As you point out, this surge is a process. This is not
going to happen in a day or a week or a month. And we will have
time and opportunity to revisit this next month, and in the
next 2 months. Because the President is going to, as I
understand it, Madam Secretary--and my colleague from Virginia
knows more about this than any of us on the committee, having
served in the Pentagon--as I understand it, the decision will
come across the desk of the President of the United States, or
at least through the Secretary of Defense, next week, in 3
weeks or 5 weeks, as to whether he extends 1,500, 2,000, 900,
600, 1,400 marines, sailors, and soldiers. And so, this is a
decision that will necessarily have to be revisited privately
by the President once a week, once a month, from this point on.
And I see my----
Senator Webb. Mr. Chairman, if I may, we saw a notice from
the Marine Corps this morning about a number of units already
having been extended.
Senator Biden. Right. But my point is, a month from now, in
order to keep the troop level up to accommodating this 21,500
additional forces, that decision will have to be made again.
Senator Webb. Right. Yes, sir. This was a part of that----
Senator Biden. Extending. So----
Senator Webb [continuing]. His proposal--or the policy that
he mentioned last night.
Senator Biden. So, the point I'm making is that I don't
want anybody to think--and I hope the administration does not
think--that the President's made a decision, we're going to go
forward with 21,500 people, it's a done deal, that it is
finished. He will have an opportunity to revisit it. We will
revisit it. And you heard from my colleagues, they are, I don't
think it's unfair to say, ranging from skepticism to intense
skepticism to outright opposition to the President's proposal.
And I'll end where I began, Madam Secretary. And I realize
this is not all on your plate. If we can't figure out how to
bring along the American people on this deal, we are--we are in
real trouble. We would be making a tragic mistake that I think
will mortgage the ability of this President and that of the
next President to do what they are going to have to do. And
that is, there will be a requirement to deploy force to other
parts of the world. We will undermine that in a way that I
think will be incredibly damaging to our national interest. So,
that's just one man's opinion.
I appreciate, Madam Secretary, your perseverance, your
willingness to be here, and the fact that we have cut your
lunch hour by 20 minutes. And that's not a minor point. You're
going to have to go and sit down in front of the House, as
well. But I thank you for your courtesy.
Senator Voinovich. Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman.
Senator Biden. Yes.
Senator Voinovich. I hope that we make it clear to the men
and women that are serving our country today in Iraq that this
difference of opinion in regard to the President's sending in
more troops----
Senator Biden. It has nothing to do with them.
Senator Voinovich [continuing]. Is that we're supportive of
what they're doing, and we're going to provide them the
resources so they can do their job, and are protected, to the
very best of our ability. Because I wouldn't want anything said
in here today to interpret that we're just----
Senator Biden. I think that's a valid point to raise again,
and we should raise it again and again. In my seven trips to
Iraq--and collectively on this committee there's probably been
50 trips to Iraq--I don't know a single person, having voted
for or voted against the deployment, having agreed or disagreed
with the President, who hasn't been absolutely amazed by the
dedication, the service, and the overwhelming commitment of
those forces on the ground. And if you want to see how that
works, travel to Iraq with a guy that is a noncommissioned
officer, and watch how he relates with these folks on the
streets of Baghdad and Fallujah and Basrah. It is real. They
have our overwhelming support. They have our admiration. And it
should not be read that our disagreement, to the extent we
disagree with the President, is any reflection on their
abilities.
I would close by saying that I also want to thank the
Capitol Police for having done, very skillfully and without
much fanfare, a very good job in keeping order here today. I
want to acknowledge that and thank them.
I want to thank all of you who came to listen, for the
orderly way in which you did. I know there are incredibly
strong feelings about this issue, and as American citizens,
you've conducted yourself in a way that I think makes our
democracy one that's the envy of the world.
Again, I thank you, Madam Secretary.
The committee is--oh, I'm supposed to--also, we're supposed
to begin this afternoon's hearing at 2 o'clock, but I've been
informed by the U.S. Senate that we are going to have two votes
at 2 o'clock, that they are--to use Senate jargon, they've been
agreed to by unanimous consent, which means they will take
place. So, rather than convene at 2 o'clock, we will convene at
2:30. And the list of witnesses we have today are very
prominent people who have different views on--and specific
plans on--how to proceed in Iraq. They include the Honorable
Peter Galbraith, Dr. Frederick Kagan of the American Enterprise
Institute, and Dr. Ted Galen Carpenter of the CATO Institute.
So, I thank you, Madam Secretary.
We stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:23 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
Additional Material and Questions and Answers Submitted for the Record
Poll Published in the Military Times Submitted by Senator Boxer
(1) Are you on active duty?
Yes--100%
No--0%
(Note: Only active-duty responses were counted in remaining
results.)
(2) Service Branch?
Army--46%
Navy--21%
Air Force--23%
Marine Corps--9%
Coast Guard--1%
No response--0%
(3) How many times have you deployed to Iraq?
Once--32%
Twice--12%
Three times--3%
More than three times--3%
Never/no response--50%
(4) How many times have you deployed to Afghanistan?
Once--12%
Twice--1%
Three times--0%
More than three times--0%
Never/no response--85%
(5) In total, I have deployed in support of the war in Afghanistan and/
or Iraq for:
Less than 2 months--3%
3-6 months--17%
7-12 months--25%
13-18 months--11%
19 or more months--9%
Haven't deployed/no response--34%
(6) Should the U.S. have gone to war in Iraq?
Yes--41%
No--37%
No opinion/no answer--9%
Decline to answer/no answer--11%
(7) Regardless of whether you think the U.S. should have gone to war,
how likely is the U.S. to succeed?
Very likely to succeed--13%
Somewhat likely to succeed--37%
Not very likely to succeed--31%
Not at all likely to succeed--10%
No opinion/no answer--8%
(8) How soon do you think the Iraqi military will be ready to replace
large numbers of American troops?
Less than a year--2%
1-2 years--20%
3-5 years--36%
5-10 years--22%
More than 10 years--12%
No opinion/no answer--7%
(9) How long do you think the U.S. will need to stay in Iraq to reach
its goals?
Less than a year--2%
1-2 years--8%
3-5 years--26%
5-10 years--31%
More than years--23%
No opinion/no answer--8%
(10) Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling
the situation with Iraq?
Approve--35%
Disapprove--42%
No opinion--10%
Decline to answer--12%
(11) Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling
his job as president?
Approve--52%
Disapprove--31%
No opinion--6%
Decline to answer--10%
(12) Do you consider the war in Iraq to be part of the war on terrorism
that began Sept. 11, 2001, or do you consider it to be an entirely
separate military action?
Part of the war on terrorism--47%
Separate military action--47%
No opinion--5%
(13) We currently have 145,000 troops in Iraq and Kuwait. How many
troops do you think we should have there?
Zero--13%
0-50,000--7%
50,000-144,000--6%
145,000--13%
146,000-200,000--22%
200,000+ --16%
No opinion/Don't know--23%
(14) We currently have 18,000 troops in Afghanistan. How many troops do
you think we should have there?
Zero--8%
0-10,000--7%
10,000-17,000--4%
18,000--15%
19,000-50,000--27%
50,000+ --12%
No opinion/Don't know--26%
______
Article From the Daily Telegraph Submitted by Senator Boxer
[From The Daily Telegraph, Jan. 11, 2007]
3,000 British Troops To Be Pulled Out of Iraq by May
(By Thomas Harding in Basra and Toby Harnden in Washington]
Thousands of British troops will return home from Iraq by the end
of May, The Daily Telegraph can reveal today.
Tony Blair will announce within the next fortnight that almost
3,000 troops are to be cut from the current total of 7,200, allowing
the military to recover from 4 years of battle that have left it
severely overstretched.
In what will be the first substantial cut of British troops serving
in southern Iraq, their number will drop to 4,500 on May 31. The
announcement will be made by the Prime Minister before he steps down
from office as an intended signal of the achievements the British have
made in Iraq--albeit at the cost of 128 dead.
The plans for the British withdrawal were revealed as President
George W. Bush announced that he was sending an additional 21,500
troops into Iraq.
The primary objective of the five brigades and two U.S. Marine
battalions is to curtail sectarian violence in Baghdad and target Sunni
insurgent strongholds in western Anbar province.
His high-stakes, prime-time television address to Americans last
night signalled a stark divergence of policy on Iraq with that of his
British allies.
In an uncharacteristic admission of errors, Mr. Bush made
acknowledged ``mistakes'' in previous ``failed'' plans to pacify
Baghdad.
The troop ``surge''--bitterly opposed by Democrats and many
Republicans--would bring forward the end of the war, he said. ``If we
increase our support at this crucial moment, and help the Iraqis break
the cycle of violence, we can hasten the day our troops begin coming
home.''
He gave warning to Nouri al-Maliki, the Iraqi Premier, that
America's patience was running out: ``If the Iraqi Government does not
follow through on its promises, it will lose the support of the
American people and it will lose the support of the Iraqi people.''
Mr. Bush's strategy was to be accompanied by a massive influx of
American cash for reconstruction and a commitment from the Iraq
Government to send three brigades into Baghdad.
A senior British officer serving in Iraq said yesterday: ``The U.S.
situation appears to be getting worse because they are sending more
troops while the British are getting out of Basra. But the situation is
different, with the Americans facing a gargantuan problem of sectarian
violence.''
The precise timetable for the U.K. withdrawal has been disclosed to
The Daily Telegraph. Unless there are ``major hiccups'' in the next few
months, 1 Mechanised Brigade will enter Iraq with a much reduced force
when it replaces 19 Light Brigade in June for its 6-month tour.
Military planners are drawing up force levels for when Basra comes
under ``provincial Iraqi control'' at the end of spring, when all
security will be handed over to the Iraqi police and army.
The British Army will then position its troops at a major base that
is being expanded at Basra Air Station, 5 miles west of the city, where
they will be on standby. A small force of 200 men will be left in
central Basra.
By the end of February the volatile Maysan province, patrolled by
the 600-strong battle group of the Queen's Royal Lancers, will be
handed over to the local authorities.
______
Responses of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to Questions Submitted
by Senator Joseph R. Biden
Question. Does the executive branch believe the objectives set
forth in section 3(a) of Pubic Law 107-243 have been achieved and why?
If the answer to this question is yes, please elaborate on
the authority under U.S. law for the continued use of force by
U.S. forces in Iraq.
If the answer to this question is no--
What is the ``continuing threat posed by Iraq''?
Which United Nations Security Council resolutions
regarding Iraq are United States Armed Forces enforcing?
Answer. Section 3(a) of the Authorization for Use of Military Force
Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (P.L. 107-243) authorizes the use of
armed force to defend the national security of the United States
against the continuing threat posed by Iraq and to enforce all relevant
United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq.
To date, the United States, working closely with its coalition
partners, has achieved certain successes in working toward the
objectives in section 3(a) of the AUMF. For example, coalition military
operations resulted in the fall of the former Iraqi regime under Saddam
Hussein. In addition, coalition military operations allowed weapons
inspections that had been blocked for years by the Iraqi Government to
take place. The military has been critical in contributing to the
ongoing democratic transformation of Iraq, including by supporting two
national elections and a referendum that approved Iraq's new
constitution and furthering the development of Iraq's new security
forces. The use of military force also has disrupted the activities of
terrorists plotting acts of violence against Iraqi, American, and other
interests.
While certain progress has been made, U.S. military operations
continue to be necessary and appropriate to defend the national
security of the United States and to eliminate the continuing threat
presented by the current circumstances in Iraq. In his January 10
speech on the administration's New Way Forward in Iraq, the President
underscored that, for the safety of the American people, the United
States must succeed in Iraq. He made it clear that failure in Iraq
would lead to radical Islamic extremists growing in strength and
resolve and gaining recruits. He noted that, as a result, they would be
in a better position to topple moderate governments, create chaos in
the region, and use oil revenues to fund their ambitions. He also noted
that failure would provide our enemies a safe haven from which to plan
and launch attacks on the American people.
As we have consistently made clear in the administration's regular
report to the Congress consistent with the War Powers Resolution, the
United States also continues to use military force to enforce relevant
United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding Iraq. As the AUMF
recognizes, the President clearly indicated prior to taking military
action that the United States was committed to work with the United
Nations Security Council to meet the common challenge posed by Iraq.
This commitment has not wavered, and the United States continues to
play a leading role in Multinational Force in Iraq, which the Security
Council authorized in Resolution 1546, inter alia, to take all
necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of Iraq's security
and stability. Moreover, the Security Council has twice unanimously
extended this authorization for the Multinational Force, most recently
in Resolution 1723. This authorization encompasses MNF-I conducting
military operations against any forces that carry out attacks against
MNF-I or Iraqi civilian and military targets. As the Department has
noted in previous reports to Congress, these contributions in
implementation of the Security Council resolutions also assist the
Iraqi people in the development of their political and security
institutions in accordance with the transitional frameworks established
in a series of Security Council resolutions, both of which are critical
to the longer term security of the Iraqis.
In light of the foregoing, the administration believes that there
continues to be clear authority for U.S. military operations within the
territory of Iraq based upon the Authorization for Use of Military
Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 and the President's
constitutional authority.
Question. In his January 10 speech, President Bush said,
``Succeeding in Iraq also requires defending its territorial integrity
and stabilizing the region in the face of extremist challenges. This
begins with addressing Iran and Syria. These two regimes are allowing
terrorists and insurgents to use their territory to move in and out of
Iraq. Iran is providing material support for attacks on American
troops. We will disrupt the attacks on our forces. We'll interrupt the
flow of support from Iran and Syria. And we will seek out and destroy
the networks providing advanced weaponry and training to our enemies in
Iraq.''
Does the administration have plans to cross the Syrian and/
or Iranian border to pursue those persons or individuals or
governments providing that help?
In your opinion, does the administration have the
constitutional authority to pursue networks across Iraq's
borders into Iran or Syria?
Answer. In the President's January 10 speech to the American people
on the administration's New Way Forward in Iraq, he made clear that
Iran was providing material support for attacks on American forces. He
emphasized the importance of disrupting these attacks and interrupting
the flow of support from Iran and Syria. The President also noted our
intention to seek out and destroy the networks that are providing the
advanced weaponry and training that threaten our forces in Iraq.
The administration believes that there is clear authority for U.S.
operations within the tenitory of Iraq to prevent Syrian- or further
Iranian-supported attacks against U.S. forces operating as part of the
Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) or against civilian targets. Such
attacks directly threaten both the security and stability of Iraq and
the safety of our personnel; they also continue to threaten the
region's security and stability. U.S. military operations in Iraq are
conducted under the President's constitutional authority and the
Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002
(P.L. 107-243), which authorized the use of armed force to defend the
national security of the United States against the continuing threat
posed by Iraq and to enforce all relevant United Nations Security
Council resolutions regarding Iraq. The United Nations Security Council
has authorized all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance
of Iraq's security and stability, which encompasses MNF-I conducting
military operations against any forces that carry out attacks against
MNF-I or Iraqi civilian and military targets.
This question also asks what authority might be relevant in
connection with a hypothetical military operation into Iran or Syria.
We are not planning to invade Iran or Syria. As this administration has
said, we have actively pursued a diplomatic strategy to address Iran's
nuclear program, and we remain committed to resolving our concerns with
Iran diplomatically. We are also committed to using diplomacy to
address Syria's facilitation of foreign fighters into Iraq, its
harboring of former Iraqi regime elements; and its interference in
Lebanon. Of course, the Constitution charges the President to protect
the United States and the American people. As Commander in Chief, he
must be able to defend the United States if the U.S. forces come under
attack. Whether and how to do so in any specific situation would depend
on the facts and circumstances at that time. Administration officials
communicate regularly with the leadership and other Members of Congress
with regard to the deployment of U.S. forces and the measures that may
be necessary to protect the security interests of the United States and
will continue to do so.
Question. In March 2006, Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad announced that
he had been authorized to hold face-to-face talks with the Iranians in
Baghdad. More recently the Bush administration has said that it will
engage with Iran only if it suspends its uranium enrichment.
Does the March 2006 offer still stand? If not, when was it
rescinded and under what circumstances? What led to the change
in the March 2006 policy?
How would you characterize Iran's and Syria's involvement in
the U.N.-sponsored ``international compact''?
Given the administration's stance on engagement with Iran
and Syria, is it supportive of Iran's and Syria's continuing
involvement with the ``international compact''?
Answer. Secretary Rice previously authorized Ambassador Zalmay
Khalilzad to speak directly to the Iranians in an ``ambassador-to-
ambassador'' channel on issues relating specifically to Iraq. For
various operational reasons at the time, we have not used this channel.
Our current offer on the table with the Iranians as announced by
Secretary Rice last May is to review with Iran in the Five-Plus-One
context the whole range of bilateral and multilateral issues, with the
only condition being Iran to suspend its nuclear enrichment efforts
just condemned by the U.N. Security Council. On occasion we also use
our Swiss channel to communicate specific, topical information to the
Iranian Government.
As members of the United Nations, Iran and Syria have both been
briefed on the International Compact with Iraq during a meeting at the
United Nations in September 2006, and we would expect that the United
Nations would invite them to attend future meetings. Neither Iran nor
Syria has participated in any Preparatory Group meetings.
We encourage all of Iraq's neighbors to be responsible stakeholders
in supporting and assisting the Iraqi Government. To that end, we
continue to pressure Iran and Syria to suspend their destabilizing
activities. Like Iraq's other neighbors, Iran and Syria must respect
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq and act in a manner
that supports a stable and democratic future for the Iraqi people.
Launching the International Compact with Iraq has been a joint
undertaking of the Government of Iraq and the United Nations. The
United Nations has hosted two events in New York to engage the
international community with the compact; one on September 18, 2006,
and the other on November 13, 2006. The United Nations invited all U.N.
member countries and the international organizations and financial
institutions that are concerned about Iraq and the compact to these
events. Thirty-eight countries and organizations attended the first
event, and 78 attended the second. Iran and Syria were represented at
both events.
Beyond attending these two events, neither Iran nor Syria has
played an active role in developing the compact.
Question. Do Iran and Syria assess it in their long-term interest
for there to be continuing instability and violence in Iraq?
Answer. Clearly, it should be in the long-term interest of Iran and
Syria--and of the rest of the international community--to have an Iraq
that can govern itself, defend itself, and sustain itself. We can only
infer what Iran and Syria assess is their long-term interest in Iraq by
their behavior to date, which has not been constructive. Iran has
demonstrated by its support for violence and militias that it does not
support a free and democratic Iraq. Iran's continued support for
networks that are using explosive devices to attack coalition and Iraqi
personnel is a demonstration that they must regard instability and
violence as in Iran's interest.
Syria, on the one hand, has a record of supporting Sunni insurgents
and has made insufficient progress in clamping down on foreign
jihadists crossing its borders into Iraq--a major source of continuing
violence and instability. On the other hand, the Syrians have recently
signed a memorandum of understanding with the Iraqis to deal with
terrorism, border, and security problems. Syria must make good on its
commitments to Iraq. We hope that both Iran and Syria will end their
destabilizing behavior and become a positive influence on Iraq.
Question. How would Iran and Syria react to the credible threat of
a United States redeployment from Iraq? Would this prompt them to
further destabilize Iraq? Would this pressure them to seek means to
stabilize the situation for fear of a spillover of violence?
Answer. In the absence of United States and coalition forces in
Iraq, we have no reason to believe that Iran or Syria would suspend
their destabilizing actions. Quite to the contrary, it appears likely
that Iran and Syria would fill the vacuum left by a U.S. withdrawal
from Iraq and increase their unhelpful, destabilizing interference in
Iraq's internal affairs.
Senior Iranian and Syrian Government officials have made clear in
recent statements that they actively seek U.S. withdrawal from not only
Iraq, but also the entire region. We believe that redeploying forces
from Iraq prematurely would thus send the wrong message not only to
Tehran, but also to key gulf allies who feel increasingly concerned by
the Iranian regime's aggressive regional policy.
Question. What steps is the United States Government making to
weaken the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in northern Iraq? What is the
likelihood of a Turkish military intervention against the PKK in
northern Iraq?
Answer. The PKK is a Foreign Terrorist Organization as defined by
U.S. law. We have worked closely with our allies to convince them to
take a tough stance against the organization and dry up its sources of
support.
To intensify our work with both the Turkish and Iraqi Governments,
on August 28 the Secretary appointed a Special Envoy for Countering the
PKK, (Ret.) GEN Joseph Ralston, to focus on this problem. General
Ralston is working closely with his Turkish counterpart, General Baser,
and Iraqi interlocutor, Minister al-Waeli. Since his appointment as
Envoy, General Ralston has traveled repeatedly to the region and
attempted to engage productively with both the Turks and the Iraqis.
General Ralston has engaged the Turkish and Iraqi Governments as
well as officials of the Kurdistan Regional Government. His
conversations have focused on building confidence between Turkey and
Iraq and obtaining cooperation to fight against the terrorist Kurdistan
Workers Party, which is using northern Iraq as a base of support for
attacks against Turkey. Since General Ralston launched his efforts, our
Embassy in Baghdad has worked closely with the Iraqis and Turks. As a
result of these efforts, the Government of Iraq has shut down several
PKK front offices in Iraq and begun closing down Makhmour refugee camp.
We also continue to work with our European allies to curb terrorist
financing of PKK activities.
Turkey remains a close ally of the United States and works with us
on many issues. Turkey is supportive of the President's goal of a
united, stable, and prosperous Iraq. We do not expect Turkey to take
any action that would undermine this goal. In fact, Turkey is working
with us and the Government of Iraq, permiting the transit of military
sustainment cargo, promote trade, and encouraging national
reconciliation.
Question. Three estimates have been produced on the number of Iraqi
civilians killed in violence in 2006. The United Nations Assistance
Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) estimated 34,452; a compilation of data from
Iraqi Health, Interior, and Defense Ministries puts the number at
12,357; another estimate by the Iraqi Health Ministry put the number at
22,950.
Which of these is the most accurate figure in your
estimation and why?
What is the State Department's estimate for the number of
Iraqi civilians killed in 2006?
Does the administration have a quantitative definition for
what would constitute a civil war in Iraq?
Does the administration consider Iraq to be in the state of
civil war?
How many Iraqis have been displaced from their homes since
the February 2006 bombing at the al-Askariya Mosque in Samarra?
How many have been displaced in Baghdad?
Answer. While we are aware of the different estimates of several
organizations and are quite mindful that thousands have died needlessly
at the hands of extremists, the United States maintains no
independently developed assessment of Iraqi fatalities.
The current sectarian violence in Iraq is now the main threat to a
stable, peaceful future. There are several varying academic definitions
for what constitutes a civil war. However, such definitions and labels
are not nearly as important as what we and the Iraqis are doing
together to stop the violence. As President Bush and Prime Minister
Maliki have agreed in their strategy, Iraqi and American forces will
pursue all those perpetrating violence in Iraq, regardless of sect or
party affiliation.
Following the February 2006 Samarra bombings, estimates of new
internally displaced Iraqis range from 360,000 (International
Organization for Migration-IOM) to 500,000 (United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees-UNHCR). This adds to a long-term caseload of
internally displaced persons that both UNHCR and IOM estimate at 1.2
million. In Baghdad alone, IOM has estimated nearly 20,000 Iraqis are
displaced.
Question. In your testimony, you said that Iraq's security
capabilities will mature during the summer of 2007. How do you define
mature? What do you expect the capacity of the Iraqi security forces
will be by the summer of 2007 in terms of their ability to take over
security responsibility from coalition forces?
Answer. The President noted in his January 10 address to the Nation
that the Iraqi Government plans to take responsibility for security in
all of Iraq's provinces by November of this year.
As to timing, a Joint MNF-I and Iraqi committee every month
assesses which provinces and cities are eligible for this transition of
security responsibility to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC). To date,
three provinces have transitioned to PIC: Muthanna in July, Dhi Qar in
September, and Najaf in December.
Capabilities of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are one of four
factors considered, and there is not one-to-one correspondence between
ISF capability and GOI assumption of security. The other three factors
are a threat assessment, the capability of Iraqi governance (especially
at the provincial level), and the ability of MNF-I forces to support.
With regard to control of Iraq's military, currently 5 of 10 Iraq
divisions are now under the operational control of Iraqi Ground Forces
Command, and more divisions are expected to transition to Iraqi command
as forces develop. We expect all 10 Iraqi Army divisions to be under
the control of the Iraqi Ground Forces Command by May 2007.
Transfer to PIC and transfer of army divisional command to Iraq
does not happen unless Iraqi forces and command relationships have
matured sufficiently to be in a leading--as opposed to a supporting--
role.
Question. According to the Government Accountability Office, the
number of violent attacks per month in Iraq has increased from a few
hundred in May 2003 to almost 6,000 in October 2003 [sic]. During this
same period the number of trained Iraqi Security Forces has steadily
increased to 323,000, according the State Department's reporting.
Given the sharp increase in the reported capacity of the
Iraqi Security Forces, how do you explain the continued
deterioration in the security conditions in Iraq?
Answer. The deterioration in the security conditions in Iraq are
the direct result of the acceleration of sectarian violence, especially
in Baghdad. Provoking sectarian violence has been a long-held goal of
al-Qaeda in Iraq. With last February's bombing of the Golden Mosque in
Samarra, the success of their plan accelerated. Sectarian passions,
incited to violence, now threaten to overwhelm Iraq's fragile, yet
promising, process of reconciliation; a process that has produced
successful elections and a new constitution, substantial agreement on a
law to share Iraq's oil fairly, and commitment to an approach to ``de-
Baathification'' that supports broad national reconciliation goals.
For specific information about the capacity of the Iraqi Security
Forces, I would refer you to the Department of Defense.
Question. In your testimony you stated that the administration is
``further integrating [its] civil and military operations.'' Could you
explain what this means?
Answer. There must be the fullest possible civilian-military unity
of effort if we are to succeed in Iraq. Reconstruction and economic
development cannot occur in the absence of security. Once security is
achieved, there must be an immediate, targeted civilian effort to
capitalize on that gain to benefit the Iraqi people.
To that end, we will immediately begin deploying greater civilian
resources alongside our military in Baghdad and Anbar province. The
centerpiece of this effort will be the expansion of our Provincial
Reconstruction Teams. We will double the number of PRTs from 10 to 20,
through a three-phase rollout program, but the extent of our deployment
of civilian resources will depend on FY07 budget supplemental funding.
We plan to collocate nine new PRTs with Brigade Combat Teams in Baghdad
and Anbar. We also plan to add a new PRT in North Babil and augment
existing PRTs with specialized civilian technical personnel, based on
local needs. PRTs will leverage both civilian and military resources
against a common strategic plan to sustain stability, promote economic
growth, support Iraqi leaders who reject violence and foster Iraqi
self-sufficiency.
Question. You testified, ``Out of this planning process came, from
our generals, the view that we needed to augment [the Iraqi] forces, as
embeds, as, by the way, the Baker-Hamilton Commission recommends, as
people who can help them with, in a sense, on-the-job training, who can
help them to, kind of, solidify their ability to go after this.''
Will United States forces be under Iraqi command or
operational control?
How will the command arrangements work for embedded American
soldiers?
Answer. All coalition forces and embedded transition teams with
Iraqi Security Forces remain under the operational command and control
of Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) commanders. For further details
regarding the military command and control structure, the State
Department defers to the Department of Defense.
Question. You said in your testimony that ``the rules of engagement
really were the problem'' in Operation Together Forward during the
summer and fall of 2006. Could you elaborate? What were the problems
with the previous rules of engagement and how have they been corrected?
Answer. In 2006, the Iraqi Government placed political limitations
on coalition and Iraqi security operations that undermined the
evenhanded pursuit of those engaged in violence. Some, but not all
extremists, were approved as acceptable targets of security operations.
The President's ``New Way Forward'' is a joint United States-Iraq
strategy for bringing stability to Iraq, with a particular focus on
Baghdad and Anbar province. Prime Minister Maliki has now pledged that
no neighborhood will be beyond the reach of the Iraqi state, that the
central government will pursue all perpetrators of violence regardless
of sect or party, and that there will not be political interference in
security decisions. President Bush and Secretary Rice have both made
very clear that the Iraqi Government must fulfill this pledge for the
``New Way Forward'' to be successful.
Question. In increasing the number of forces in Baghdad, how will
the administration ensure perceptions of evenhandedness in cracking
down on Sunni insurgent and terrorist groups and Shiite militias? How
will American forces avoid becoming embroiled in Baghdad's sectarian
violence?
Answer. It is critically important that Iraqis and Iraq's neighbors
perceive that both Iraqi and American security forces are acting in an
evenhanded manner against all those who perpetrate violence regardless
of sect or party affiliation. Both President Bush and Prime Minister
Maliki are committed to pursuing ``The New Way Forward'' in such an
even-handed manner. Prime Minister Maliki has made it clear, publicly,
to the Iraqi people that security operations in Baghdad will make no
distinction between Shia, Sunni, or other types of illegal militia or
illegal activity. He further stated that the Baghdad security plan will
not permit a safe haven for any outlaws regardless of their sectarian
or political affiliation, nor will there be political influence in
security decisions. President Bush has made similar commitments to the
American people.
American and Iraqi security forces will operate jointly to ensure
that they are pursuing a unified, evenhanded approach to securing
neighborhoods and targeting those engaged in violence. At the highest
levels, American and Iraqi commanders will work together to plan
operations. On the ground, there will be American advisors embedded in
all Iraqi units. The establishment of joint security stations in each
of the nine Baghdad districts to be manned with Iraqi police, Iraqi
Army, and coalition forces should also minimize the likelihood any unit
will act in a sectarian manner.
Question. You testified that during Operations Together Forward I
and II ``there were not enough reliable Iraqi forces.''
How has this problem been remedied?
How many politically reliable Iraqi Army and police do you
assess there to be?
How many Iraqi security forces do you expect will be in
Baghdad as part of the new plan? Which units will participate?
What is the readiness levels and sectarian composition of the
units?
Answer. The President laid out a revised military approach when he
addressed the Nation on January 10 and announced a new strategy, ``The
New Way Forward,'' in Iraq. As part of this joint United States-Iraqi
plan, Prime Minister Maliki has committed to deploy three additional
Iraqi Army Brigades to Baghdad. The Prime Minister has restructured the
command arrangements in Baghdad, with one overall military commander,
two subordinates, and an Iraqi Army Brigade assigned to each of the
nine districts in the city. Joint security stations manned with Iraqi
police, Iraqi Army, and coalition forces should minimize the likelihood
any unit will act in a sectarian manner.
Details of Iraqi unit participation, sectarian composition, and
overall planned force strength in Baghdad have not been released by the
Government of Iraq. I would refer you to the Department of Defense for
readiness levels of Iraqi units, which are assessed by Multi-National
Forces-Iraq (MNF-I).
Question. In June, Prime Minister Maliki offered a 24-point
National Reconciliation Program.
To date, how successful has this program been?
What have been the areas of notable progress and what are
the continuing challenges?
In the light of Prime Minister Maliki's new strategy, does
this 24-point remain operative?
Answer. Since PM Maliki launched his National Reconciliation plan
on June 25, the Iraqi Government, through the Ministry of National
Reconciliation, sponsored three out of four in a series of
reconciliation conferences across Iraq--for tribal leaders, civil
society organizations, and political parties. The fourth conference for
religious leaders is tentatively scheduled for this month. In addition,
the Prime Minister has participated in a conference hosted by the
Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) held in Mecca, in which
religious leaders--both Sunni and Shia--have condemned sectarian
violence in Iraq and called for an end to bloodshed.
The conferences have helped to encourage progress on some of the
toughest, unresolved political issues. For example, at the political
parties' conference in December, PM Maliki helped to further de-
Baathifciation reform by reaching out to former Baathists and inviting
them to rejoin the military.
The Government of Iraq is currently drafting a law to submit to the
Council of Representatives that would reform the de-Baathificiation
process by giving thousands of former Baathists the option of returning
to their former government jobs or drawing a pension for their past
government employment. The Constitutional Review Committee, which met
for the first time on November 15, is considering amendments to the
constitution, a process critical to keeping Iraq's Sunni Arabs engaged
in the reconciliation process. The Iraqis are also close to completing
a National Hydrocarbon Law, which we expect they will submit to the
Council of Ministers shortly. A fair and equitable Hydrocarbon Law that
gives all Iraqis a share of their country's abundant wealth will help
support national reconciliation.
In his new security plan, the Prime Minister stated publicly that
he will pursue all those engaged in violence, regardless of their sect
or party affiliation. This evenhanded approach to combating violence is
consistent with the Prime Minister's stated national reconciliation
goals. If the Iraqi Government successfully fulfills its pledge to
pursue all those who perpetrate violence, it will create the conditions
necessary to make additional political progress on critical
reconciliation issues. It will also improve the Iraqi Government's
credibility among its neighbors in the gulf whose support it will need
to create a stable, prosperous future.
Question. In your [Secretary Rice's] testimony you said that ``the
core of the Maliki plan has really been preserved'' in the plan of the
administration. What are the differences in the two plans? What changes
were made to the Maliki plan? What specific commitments has Prime
Minister Maliki made to assure the success of the new Baghdad Security
Plan? What specific commitments has he given to you [S], President
Bush, or other senior members of the administration that he will crack
down on the Jaysh al-Mandi? What public statements has he made
indicating his willingness to crack down on the Jaysh al-Mandi by name?
Answer. The current Baghdad Security Plan is the result of a
collaborative effort. In reviewing PM Maliki's plan, MNF-I assessed
that the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) were not yet capable of doing all
the tasks, and as a result the current plan has a larger supporting
role for MNF-I than first envisioned.
The Prime Minister assured President Bush that there would be even-
handedness in pursuing all involved in violence. Maliki has said that
his government will make no exception for any group or individual
regardless of sect or party affiliation. We expect him to apply this
principle universally, including to the Jaysh al-Mandi (JAM).
The Prime Minister assured the President that there would be no
political interference with military command decisions.
He also pledged to provide three additional brigades to implement
the new Baghdad Security Plan.
Prime Minister Maliki stated publicly on January 26 that: ``The
Baghdad security plan is now ready, and we will depend on our armed
forces to implement it with multinational forces behind them . . . ISF
will carry out the plan to restore security for Baghdad, will punish
outlaws or those who work according to political or sectarian bias . .
. The ISF will be above politics. Political parties and political
organizations are barred from political activities among the armed
forces . . . Iraq will not allow militias, regardless of sect, to
replace the function of the state or interfere with security.''
Question. In your testimony you spoke of ``surging'' the civilian
efforts of the Department of State. How many American diplomats does
the State Department have in Iraq? By what amount will these numbers
increase? Where will they serve? How many will be placed in Provincial
Reconstruction Teams? How much experience does the average PRT team
leader have?
Answer. Based on the latest staffing figures, there are 334 State
Department employees on the ground at Embassy Baghdad, and an
additional 46 State Department employees in Regional Embassy Offices
and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Other federal agencies,
such as DOD and the Department of Justice also have employees working
at the Embassy and other sites, who serve under Chief of Mission
authority.
We do not anticipate any major staff increases in Embassy Baghdad
at this time, but we are establishing new PRTs in Anbar, Baghdad, and
North Babil. We also plan to augment several existing PRTs in Anbar,
Baghdad, Diyala, Salah ad-Din, Ninawa, Kirkuk, Babil, Dhi Qar, and
Basrah.
We are currently reviewing the requirements, both here in
Washington and with Embassy Baghdad. In total, we expect to add more
than 300 civilian employees in these PRT locations. Some will be State
Department Employees, including 10 Senior Foreign Service Officers and
specialized direct hires, who will establish the new Provincial
Reconstruction Teams. Other team members will come from USAID, DOD,
Federal Agencies, and contractors.
PRT leaders are highly competent Senior Foreign Service Officers
with extensive overseas experience and proven records of leadership.
They can call on the special expertise of their team members, who
include experienced city managers, engineers, and others.
Question. In his January 10 speech, President Bush stated his
intention to seek $1.2 billion in additional economic and
reconstruction funds. According to a January 2007 Government
Accountability Office report, ``as of August 2006, the government of
Iraq had spent . . . 8 percent of its annual capital goods budget and
14 percent of its annual capital projects budget. Iraq's fiscal year
begins on January 1 of each year.'' The report found that in the
Ministry of Oil of a $3.533 billion capital budget only $4 million had
been expended. Given these funding shortfalls on the Iraqi side, what
is the rationale for additional United States reconstruction assistance
for Iraq?
Answer. In his January 10 speech, the President stressed the
importance of our improving the ability of the Iraqi Government to meet
the basic needs of its people, although he did not mention a specific
assistance figure for any future budget requests.
The Iraqi Government must do its part to invest in its own economic
development and to follow through on our joint strategy. The Government
of Iraq is committed to spending $10 billion this year to help create
jobs and further national reconciliation. However, Iraq faces major
challenges in designing and executing its capital budget. Simply put,
Iraq has available assets, the product of last year's underspent budget
and profits from higher than anticipated oil prices, but they do not
have the mechanisms to spend them--especially with the speed necessary
for post-kinetic stabilization in Baghdad and Anbar. Iraq must develop
the means to put its money to use, both for short-term ``build''
efforts and longer term capital investment.
There are several obstacles to better budget execution, including
technical problems, such as the lack of the ability to obligate money
for multiyear projects, and a lack of training and equipment to process
the transactions. The Iraqis are taking steps to address this problem,
such as draft 2007 budget provisions that permit the Ministry of
Finance to reallocate funding from any ministry that is unable to spend
it promptly. If the USG does not continue to provide assistance to the
Iraqi Government, the Iraqis will not be able to develop the mechanisms
they need to spend effectively their own budget. While we cannot spend
their money for them, we must help them get on the path to self-
sufficiency.
To help the Iraqi Government improve budget execution and take on
more responsibility for Iraq's own economic future, Secretary Rice has
appointed Ambassador Tim Carney as her new Coordinator for Economic
Transition. Ambassador Carney is now in Baghdad helping the Government
of Iraq meet its financial responsibilities, specifically on budget
execution, job creation, and capital investment projects.
Continued United States assistance is vital to help Iraq address
these problems and allow it to meet the myriad needs of its people.
Beginning in FY 2006, we have shifted the emphasis of our assistance
away from large reconstruction projects toward programs designed to
increase Iraqi capacity to govern at the national and local level.
Continued U.S. assistance is vital to establish firmly the roots of
democratic and representative governance, to support moderate political
forces, to continue economic reforms, and to establish competent and
representative government. It is a critical component of the
President's ``New Way Forward'' strategy to bring stability to Baghdad
and the rest of Iraq.
Question. How deep is the Iraqi support for both the
administration's new plan and Prime Minister Maliki's security plan?
Which factions have been publicly supportive and which have
opposed?
How much support do the plans enjoy beyond the office of the
Prime Minister?
How much support is there for the plans from the GCC+2?
Answer. PM Maliki, in his role as Iraq's commander in chief, agreed
to the troop increase as part of the Iraqi security plan and on the
basis of advice from his military and defense advisors, including
Minister of Defense Abd al-Qadir al-Mufraji. Other members of the Iraqi
body politic were consulted about the decision, and some leaders, such
as Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, supported the plan, while others
were more cautious.
The Prime Minister presented the new Iraqi security plan to the
Iraqi Council of Representatives (CoR), which approved it on January 26
following a vigorous debate. The plan's strongest support came from
Shia and Kurdish blocs. Some Sunnis in the CoR criticized the plan's
details, claiming it specifically targets Sunnis and Sunni
neighborhoods. Prime Minister Maliki, who attended the CoR session to
present his argument for the plan, responded to such criticisms by
explaining that the new security plan targets ``all who stand in the
way of the law,'' despite sect, religion, or nationality. The plan's
ultimate passage, though, demonstrates support within the Iraqi
Government and the Council of Representatives.
During their last meeting, the GCC+2 participants agreed that it
was in the interest of all countries for there to be a stable,
prosperous, and unified Iraq, based on respect for Iraq's territorial
integrity, unity, and sovereignty. They expressed their readiness to
support Iraq's efforts in this regard. While supportive of the security
plan laid out by President Bush on January 10, the GCC+2 have expressed
skepticism about the intentions of the Iraqi Government, and want the
Iraqi Government to demonstrate through its actions on the ground that
it is a truly national, rather than a sectarian, government.
Question. You testified that there is a ``new alignment'' of forces
in the Middle East pitting ``reformers and responsible leaders''
against extremists, of every sect and ethnicity, who use violence to
spread chaos, to undermine democratic governments, and to impose
agendas of hatred and intolerance.
On which side of the divide to place Muqtada al-Sadr? Jaysh
al-Mandi? The Badr Organization?
How would you characterize Prime Minister Maliki's
relationship with Muqtada al-Sadr?
What is the relationship between the Iraqi Ministry of
Interior and the Badr Organization and the Jaysh al-Mandi?
Answer. Any individuals or groups regardless of party or sectarian
affiliation, who reject violence and pursue their agendas through
peaceful democratic means can be part of the new alignment. Supporters
of Muqtada al-Sadr have joined the political process and are part of
United Iraqi Coalition (UIC) of which the Prime Minister and his party,
Dawa Islamiya, are also a part. The Sadrists have about 30 seats in the
Iraqi Parliament and have 6 ministers as part of the Iraqi Government.
Muqtada al-Sadr's supporters have chosen to be part of the political
process and it is up to him to remain a part of the political process.
Sadr appeared to reaffirm his commitment to the political process when
he ordered his members of the Council of Representatives (CoR) to
return after boycotting the sessions in late November.
We assess that Prime Minister Maliki and Muqtada al-Sadr have good
relations. PM Maliki believes the right course is to engage Sadr
politically and to try to engage him constructively in the political
process and to dissuade him from supporting violence. PM Maliki
believes he needs the support of a unified UIC in the Council of
Representatives (CoR), and works closely with all the major factions in
the UIC, including the Sadrists, in order to keep their support. Sadr
himself has not aspired to political office. Instead, he has asked his
followers to support other leaders for office, such as PM Maliki.
The Iraqi Government needs to have a monopoly on the legal use of
armed force. This means that the Jaysh al-Mandi or any militia cannot
continue to take orders from anyone other than the Iraqi Government.
Rogue elements must be reined in. This needs to be done by the Iraqis,
and quickly.
In 2003, the Badr Organization announced it had officially
disbanded its militias. However, reports suggest that elements within
the Badr Organization are still active, and we have raised our concerns
with the senior leaders of the Organization and with SCIRI.
The Iraqi Ministry of Interior has hired former members of the Badr
Organization and members or former members of JAM as part of the police
force. Some elements from both Badr and JAM have infiltrated the
security ministries, in particular the Ministry of Interior. We are
working closely with the Iraqi Government, particularly the Minister of
Interior, to reform the Ministry of Interior and police, and to find
ways to improve the screening process of those who seek to join the
police and security forces in Iraq.
______
Responses by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to Questions Submitted
by Senator Richard Lugar
Question. With only the kind of recruiting effort that comes from
phone calls from you, yourself, has State been able to meet its
staffing goals in Iraq.
Other agencies have also had significant challenges in meeting
staffing targets--both budgetary (no international emergency line items
in their budgets) as well as legal (the President cannot order
civilians to war, they must volunteer, adding to the time it takes to
deploy).
Is the President seeking changes to these authorities? What is your
vision for fulfilling the civilian mandate?
Will you or other Cabinet Secretaries begin directed assignments?
Answer. Fully staffing our most critical posts, including Baghdad
and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq, is one of our
highest priorities. We have made changes to our Foreign Service bidding
and assignments process and offered a generous incentive package to
encourage bidders to volunteer for service in Iraq. Even without
personal phone calls, State Department employees have willingly
responded to the call for service and have volunteered to serve at even
the most difficult and dangerous posts abroad.
In the current assignments cycle, we have already filled 89 percent
(156 positions out of 176) of Foreign Service positions in Iraq for
summer 2007. For Embassy Baghdad, we have committed candidates for 117
out of 128 jobs. For the Iraq PRTs, we have 39 committed candidates for
48 jobs. Personnel in Baghdad are also being provided the opportunity
to serve at PRTs and will be able to extend their assignments if they
wish to do so. The Bureau of Human Resources, the Bureau of Near
Eastern Affairs, and senior leaders in the Department are reaching out
to potential candidates to fill the remaining positions. We are also
looking at qualified Civil Service employees or Eligible Family Members
to fill some positions in Iraq on limited noncareer appointments. I am
confident that these positions will be filled.
At this time, the Department is not seeking any additional
authorities related to assignments. The administration has sought
various legislative changes to improve the incentives for overseas
service. A number of these incentives were included in the FY 2006
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-234). During this
Congress, the Department will continue to pursue Foreign Service
Modernization to make services abroad more attractive and to reduce the
18.6-percent pay gap for overseas service. Other proposals may also be
forthcoming, as we reevaluate the existing incentives for hardship
service and determine if other legislative changes are needed to
support and compensate our employees who serve in the most difficult
posts overseas.
The Department's FY 2007 supplemental request for operations
includes funds to enable State to reimburse other civilian agencies for
personnel they make available for service in Iraq. We believe that this
will overcome a significant obstacle to recruiting qualified personnel
from other agencies.
To date, we have not had to utilize directed assignments to meet
our staffing needs in Iraq. We are prepared to direct the assignment of
Foreign Service members should that become necessary. Our goal,
however, is continuing to fill the positions in Iraq and in all of our
missions around the world with qualified, willing employees who can
carry out our crucial U.S. foreign policy objectives overseas.
Questions about other Cabinet Secretaries' decisions to direct
assignments of their employees may be best addressed by those agencies
directly.
Question. What are the political trends outside Baghdad? Have the
PRTs been effective in empowering moderate parties? Is that a part of
the mandate?
Answer. Political trends outside of Baghdad vary from province to
province. Parts of Iraq, such as the Kurdistan region, are enjoying
relative security and prosperity. Ninawa, Tamim (Kirkuk), and Salah al-
Din have occasional acts of terrorism, but political life continues
despite this. In Anbar and Diyala, acts of violence are disrupting
political life. In south-central Iraq, sectarian violence is
negligible, but there have been sporadic episodes of Shia-on-Shia
violence between Badr Organization and Jaysh al-Mandi elements, or
involving fringe groups, such as the Soldiers of Heaven just outside of
Najaf. In Basrah, militias and political disputes play a negative role
on the political development of that province.
The President has decided to expand the size and reach of the PRTs
due to their success in building Iraqi capacity and self-sufficiency to
date. Since 2005, PRTs have invested effectively in moderate Iraqi
leaders on the local level by:
Reaching out to local and provincial leaders (including
grassroots groups) who want to make a difference in making
Iraq's democracy work;
Conducting extensive training in governance and municipal
planning for provincial, district, and subdistrict offices;
Working with Provincial Reconstruction Development
Committees to improve the provincial governments' ability to
identify and prioritize systematically the reconstruction and
development needs of their provinces and to improve the
delivery of essential services;
Facilitating better working relationships between provincial
leaders and their counterparts in the central government,
improving their ability to secure funds from the centre to pay
for provincial projects.
A core objective of the President's new strategy is to empower
moderates--those Iraqis who renounce violence and pursue their
interests peacefully, politically, and under the rule of law. The
expanded PRT program will be central to that effort. PRTs will support
local, moderate Iraqi leaders through targeted assistance, such as
microloans and grants to foster new businesses, create jobs, and
develop provincial capacity to govern in an effective, sustainable
manner. The expanded PRT program will be central to that effort. PRTs
will support local, moderate Iraqi leaders through targeted assistance,
such as microloans and grants to foster new businesses, create jobs,
and develop provincial capacity to govern in an effective, sustainable
manner.
Question. Can you describe recent efforts we have heard about in Al
Anbar province to reach out to disenfranchised Sunni Shaikhs? Are these
having any measurable effects politically or against al-Qaeda--Iraq?
How can we keep from being used as one of our witnesses yesterday
suggested may be happening?
Answer. In early 2006, several tribes, including those who have
links to insurgent groups, began efforts to root out foreign militants
in their region. Some of these tribal leaders have met with Prime
Minister Nuri al-Maliki in a show of support for his government and in
an effort to become involved in the political process. Many of these
tribal shaikhs have concluded that they can no longer watch the
destruction of their areas. They see no positive future with al-Qaeda.
Although parts of Anbar remain dangerous, in particular in the
areas immediately surrounding Ramadi, we have started to notice some
improvement, such as additional shops opening and an increase in the
number of the police force in Anbar province in general. USG-sponsored
reconstruction programs have already begun in parts of Anbar. Anbar
province enjoys perhaps the highest level of electricity anywhere in
Iraq. We hope that more tribal leaders will be motivated to join the
process after witnessing the tangible improvements brought about by
reconstruction programs.
Question. In your strategic review, has anyone modeled the negative
economic impacts a precipitous withdrawal and collapsed state would
mean to the region and the world?
Answer. We are unaware of any formal models, econometric or other,
of the negative economic impacts that a precipitous U.S./coalition
withdrawal from Iraq and the (probable) ensuing collapse of the Iraqi
state would mean to the region and the world. The impacts modeled would
depend on the model's assumptions. However, if a U.S./coalition
withdrawal was followed by the collapse of the Iraqi state, then that
would almost certainly cause a serious decline in Iraqi oil output for
some period of time.
International oil markets would be most affected by a collapse
scenario. The loss of Iraq's oil from world markets could have a
serious impact on the world oil market, both from the immediate
shortage and from the higher ``risk premium'' that the market would
demand. However, this could be mitigated by the current excess capacity
in world oil production (e.g., Saudi Arabia's excess production
capacity of about 2 million barrels per day is greater than Iraq's
production for world markets of 1.5 million barrels per day). In
addition, in any serious disruption of oil supplies, one option is that
the members of the International Energy Agency could consider a
drawdown of oil stocks.
Collapse of the Iraqi Government would also almost certainly result
in a major outflow of refugees. The economic consequences for
neighboring countries (Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and
Turkey) would be severe, as they struggled to provide food, shelter,
and security. In addition, Iraq's neighbors export and transship
significant amounts of goods of all types to Iraq and would be affected
by an Iraqi collapse.
Question. One of our witnesses yesterday brought up the Iraq
compact. Can you share specifics on that with us for the record?
Answer. The International Compact with Iraq (ICI) is a framework
for the international community to support the Government of Iraq in
exchange for Iraq making a series of commitments to essential economic
initiatives and reforms--including and extending beyond Iraq's
commitments under its IMF Stand-By Arrangements (SBA). The ICI also
defines the political and security context required for the economic
reforms to succeed. Iraq developed the ICI with the support of the
United Nations, World Bank, IMF, and its major international donor
partners. International contributions for the ICI will come in a
variety of forms, including technical support, debt forgiveness, loans,
private investment, and grants. The ultimate goal of the ICI is to set
Iraq on a path to financial and economic self-sufficiency.
The ICI demonstrates the increasing capabilities and determination
of the Iraqi Government to determine its future. The goals,
commitments, and benchmarks in the ICI were primarily developed by the
Iraqis themselves, and the ICI document has been approved by Iraq's
Council of Ministers. Iraq is already moving forward to implement
aspects of the ICI, for example, its progress to develop a new
hydrocarbons law.
The next step is for Iraq and the United Nations to convene a
meeting to close the text of the ICI documents. At that time, the ICI
document and annexes will be publicly released in final form for review
by the international community in anticipation of a high-level
international conference for formal adoption of the ICI in the near
future.
More information about the work to develop the ICI can be found at
www.IraqCompact.org (a Web site maintained by the United Nations).
Question. Please provide for the committee the latest draft of the
hydrocarbons law and relevant details of negotiations.
Answer. The Government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional
Government have made significant progress in narrowing their
disagreements. We expect them to submit a completed draft law to the
Council of Ministers (their Cabinet) shortly and to the Council of
Representatives (their Parliament) sometime in March. However,
differences remain over where to draw the lines of authority for
approving exploration and production contracts. The Iraqi negotiators
are hard at work resolving these differences.
Due to the ongoing nature of the negotiations, the U.S. Government
does not have an up-to-date draft of the law. Based on our
conversations with Iraqi officials, we understand the current version
contains the following elements:
(1) A framework for developing Iraq's oil and gas sector,
based upon free market principles and encouragement of private
sector investment;
(2) A set of governing principles and broad organization of
the sector;
(3) Key principles for revenue sharing, including, that after
funding of its national responsibilities, the central
government will collect and distribute revenue to local
authorities according to a formula that will include population
as a basis.
The law also stipulates that separate, complementary laws will
follow the main hydrocarbon law and will contain the following
elements:
(1) Specific implementation details on revenue sharing;
(2) Definition of the roles of the Iraqi National Oil Company
and the Ministry of Oil;
(3) There could also be subsequent legislation on petroleum
taxation.
Question. Each nation in the region has its own interests in mind
when it comes to a particular outcome in Iraq. Other than Iran and
Syria, what indications do we have from regional leaders that they are
willing to put Iraq's interests first? Are they taking any constructive
steps worth mentioning?
Answer. Iraq does not exist in isolation from the region.
Overcoming governance and security challenges will require the help and
support of its neighbors. On governance issues, the international
community can have a large impact through its participation in the
International Compact with Iraq (ICI). Under the ICI, Iraq has
committed to a series of primarily economic reforms that will allow it
to become self-sufficient over the next 5 years. In exchange, its
international partners will support Iraq through new assistance to
Iraq, debt forgiveness, and investments. The compact provides a
framework for Iraq's economic transformation and integration into the
regional and global economy. We expect the compact to be completed and
signed in the coming months.
On security, Iraq's neighbors can be helpful by supporting the
Iraqi Government and stopping the flow of terrorists elements across
their borders. While we are working with our partners in the region to
strengthen peace, two governments--Syria and Iran--have chosen to align
themselves with the forces of violent extremism in Iraq and elsewhere.
The problem is not a lack of dialog, but a lack of positive action by
those states.
As you know, I recently returned from travel to Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, and Kuwait to urge support for the Government of Iraq and the
new strategy. My interlocutors expressed their strong concern over the
growth of negative Iranian involvement in Iraq and al-Qaeda terror. At
the same time, they made clear their concern that the current Iraqi
Government was acting in a manner that reflected a sectarian rather
than national agenda.
We understand these concerns and we believe the Iraqi Government
understands them as well. Prime Minister Maliki and his government have
pledged not to tolerate any act of violence from any community or
group. That means that all those engaged in killing and intimidation,
whether Shia or Sunni, need to be confronted.
Only through new facts on the ground--tangible evidence of action
against all those who pursue violence can the Government of Iraq
establish the credibility at home and abroad that it needs to chart a
successful future.
Question. An important element in planning successfully is
sequencing. Can we bring the proper resources to focus at the right
time? Can the Iraqis and we maintain the ``hold'' long enough to build?
What should that building entail? As you understand it, would this be
done by uniformed forces, civilians, or Iraqis?
Answer. As you know, the President has decided to augment our own
troop levels in Baghdad and Anbar by 21,500. The mission of this
enhanced force is to support Iraqi troops and commanders, who are now
in the lead, to help clear and secure neighborhoods, protect the local
population, provide essential services, and create conditions necessary
to spur local economic development.
The Department of State is contributing robustly to this effort by
expanding our present close coordination with our military counterparts
in and outside of Baghdad, and with the Iraqi Government to capitalize
on security improvements by creating jobs and promoting economic
revitalization. There must be the fullest possible civilian-military
unity of effort if we are to be successful.
To that end, we will immediately deploy greater resources alongside
our military in Baghdad and Anbar. The centerpiece of this effort will
be our expansion of our Provincial Reconstruction Teams. We will double
our PRTs from 10 to 20, adding more than 300 new personnel. We will
expand our PRTs in three phases with the first phase occurring over the
next 3 months to complement our enhanced military efforts. In that
time, we plan to colocate nine new PRTs--six in Baghdad and three in
Anbar--with Brigade Combat Teams engaged in security operations.
The Department will recruit and deploy senior-level Team Leaders
for these nine new PRTs who will work jointly with brigade commanders
to develop plans for the ``build'' phase of clear, hold, and build.
Well-qualified officers have already stepped forward for these
assignments.
PRTs will target both civilian and military resources, including
foreign assistance and the Commanders' Emergency Response Program, as
part of a strategic plan to sustain stability, promote economic growth,
and foster Iraqi self-sufficiency where we have made security gains.
In the next two phases of our PRT expansion, we will add a new PRT
in North Babil and augment our existing PRTs with specialized technical
personnel, such as irrigation specialists, veterinarians, and
agribusiness development experts, based on local provincial needs.
PRTs will support local moderate Iraqi leaders through targeted
assistance, such as microloans and grants to foster new businesses,
create jobs, and develop provincial capacity to govern in an effective
and sustainable way. We intend to complete all three phases of our PRT
expansion by the end of the calendar year. Completion, however, will be
dependent both on funding levels and circumstances on the ground.
ALTERNATIVE PLANS: TROOP SURGE, PARTITION, WITHDRAWAL, OR STRENGTHEN
THE CENTER
----------
THURSDAY, JANUARY 11, 2007 [P.M.]
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:50 p.m., in
room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R.
Biden, Jr. (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Menendez, Bill Nelson, Casey,
Webb, Lugar, Corker, and Isakson.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM DELAWARE
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. I apologize
to our distinguished witnesses. As they know, the hearing was
supposed to start at 2 o'clock. They--please sit, gentlemen--
they adjusted their schedules to accommodate us, and,
unfortunately, neither Senator Lugar nor I have control over
the Senate floor. Nor do I want it. But I truly appreciate
their indulgence.
This afternoon, we begin our examination of the various
plans for securing our interests in Iraq. We obviously heard
from ``the plan'' this morning, the plan put forward by the
President of the United States. And I appreciate the Secretary
coming to attempt to make a case for that plan. But, as I said
at the outset of these hearings, in announcing these hearings,
the process here was to get a lay of the land, to get a
historical perspective, an intelligence perspective, which we
did, the previous 2 days. And then we began, with the
Secretary, to hear the credible alternatives that have been
offered--left, right, and center--Republican, Democrat,
Independent, think tank, and individual Members of the
Congress--for example, Jack Murtha, at some point, will come
and testify, and as will, I suspect, former Speaker Gingrich.
So, the whole idea here is for the public to understand what
the various alternatives offered by serious people are, that
are out there, so they understand there is not only a single
alternative--``Either you do this, or we,'' quote, ``leave,''
although that may be a plan, as well.
So, today we'll hear three starkly different, but well-
informed, proposals from thoughtful and very articulate
witnesses. While each of them has very different ideas on how
to proceed from this point out, they're united in their
devotion to this country and their desire to see us through
this difficult time.
We're going to begin today with Ambassador Peter Galbraith,
senior diplomatic fellow with the Center for Arms Control and
Non-Proliferation. He's also, from our perspective and the
perspectives of the people sitting behind me--his greatest
credential is, he was a staff member on this committee in
decades gone by, and we're delighted to have him back.
Ambassador Galbraith argues that we should accept a partition
of Iraq--that has already taken place, withdraw from Arab Iraq,
and redeploy a small force in Kurdistan that can strike at al-
Qaeda if necessary.
Next, we will hear from Dr. Frederick Kagan, resident
scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. Dr. Kagan has
authored a recent study that, ``calls for a sustained surge of
American combat forces into Iraq in order to restore and
maintain stability and security in Baghdad, reduce sectarian
violence, protect the Iraqi population, and help establish a
normal life for the Iraqi people.'' I found it very
interesting. I read your entire report, and I'm anxious to hear
you expound on it.
We'll then hear from Dr. Ted Galen Carpenter, the vice
president of defense and foreign policy studies at the CATO
Institute. Dr. Carpenter argues, and I quote, ``The President
should begin the process of removing American troops
immediately, and that process needs to be completed in no less
than 6 months.''
To state again for the record what is obvious: These are
all very well-informed, very bright, and very patriotic
Americans with three, essentially, totally different views as
to how to proceed from this point. And I am confident that
their testimony will help enlighten and inform the committee.
I would now yield to my colleague, Chairman Lugar, if he
wishes to make any opening statement.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
The President has offered a plan that he believes will
advance United States interests in Iraq and the Middle East. In
recent conversations with the President, I have tried to
underscore the need for a thorough effort to involve Congress
in the decisionmaking process. As we conduct dialog with the
executive branch, Members of Congress have a responsibility to
make informed and reasoned judgments about what the President
is proposing. Congress must carefully study how the President's
plan will affect the welfare of American service men and women,
the prospects for success in Iraq, and the future of our
broader strategic interests.
This morning, our committee had an opportunity to engage
Secretary Rice in a frank discussion about the President's plan
and the situation in Iraq. This afternoon, we will continue our
inquiry, with the help of an impressive panel of witnesses, who
represent competing points of view.
In my comments at the hearing this morning, I outlined what
I believe are United States primary strategic objectives in
Iraq, and they are: Preventing the use of Iraq as a safe haven
or training ground for terrorism; preventing civil war and
upheaval in Iraq from creating instability that leads to
regional war, the overthrow of friendly governments, the
destruction of oil facilities or other calamities; and
preventing a loss of U.S. credibility in the region and the
world; and preventing Iran, finally, from dominating the
region.
I suggest that, given these objectives, the outcome in Iraq
is intimately connected with what happens beyond Iraq's
borders. On this basis, I believe that any plan for Iraq must
include a vigorous and creative regional diplomatic component
that makes use of our strengths, including our stabilizing
military presence in the region.
The options that will be presented by our witnesses center
on fundamental questions of whether the United States should
continue its military presence in Iraq. As you make your
arguments, I'll be interested in how you prescribe the broader
strategic context of the Middle East that is vital national
security. My own view is that we must have a military presence
in Iraq indefinitely and that we ought to inform all the border
countries of that proposition, in addition to Iraqis. The
positioning of those forces is at issue, and hopefully you will
have some comments about that.
I'll look forward to your insights and our experts as they
come along the trail throughout the hearings that Senator Biden
has planned.
And I thank the chairman, again, for holding this hearing
this afternoon.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Ambassador Galbraith.
STATEMENT OF HON. PETER W. GALBRAITH, SENIOR DIPLOMATIC FELLOW,
CENTER FOR ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Galbraith. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members
of the Committee on Foreign Relations, thank you for the
invitation to testify before this committee on alternative
strategies toward Iraq. It's a special privilege for me to be
here, since the committee was my professional home for 14
years, and it is here where I had a great deal of my education
on Iraq, as some of the more senior members of the committee
may recall.
I have submitted a detailed statement, together with a one-
page summary of my plan, and I hope that they will be included
in the record of these hearings.
The Chairman. Without objection, they will be.
Ambassador Galbraith. And before I begin, I was asked by
the committee staff to clarify my relationship with the
Kurdistan Regional Government. I've sent an e-mail explaining
this. As described in my book, I've been friends with the
Kurdish leaders, and, for that matter, many other Iraqi
leaders, for a very long period of time, but I do not have a
paid relationship with the Kurdistan Regional Government.
Iraq has broken up, and it is in the midst of a civil war.
Reality, and not wishes, must dictate our strategy. President
Bush's new strategy relies on two elements that simply do not
exist: First, an inclusive national unity government in Iraq;
and, second, Iraqi security services--that is, the army and the
police--that are loyal to Iraq and not to their sect or ethnic
group. The Maliki government is a sectarian Shiite government
that is regarded as alien, and indeed even non-Iraqi, by the
Sunni Arabs, and as irrelevant by the Kurds. The government's
conduct--the protection of Shiite militias, its selective
provision of government services, the manner in which it
carried out Saddam's execution--provides no evidence that it
can transform itself into something different from what it is.
But even if Iraq had a genuine government of national
unity, it would be largely irrelevant. There is no part of the
country where the government actually exercises significant
authority.
In the southern half of Iraq and eastern Baghdad, Shiite
religious parties have created local theocracies that use
militias to enforce a version of Islamic law modeled on Iran,
but far stricter. The much-vaunted human rights provisions of
the Iraqi Constitution do not apply.
Kurdistan, in the north, is a de facto independent state
with its own army and its own flag. The Iraqi Army is barred
from the region. Flying the Iraqi flag is prohibited, and
central-government ministries are not present. Further, the
Kurdish people voted, 98.5 percent for independence, in a
nonbinding referendum held in January 2005.
The Sunni center is a battleground between insurgents that
command widespread local support and U.S. forces. And Baghdad
is the front line of the Sunni-Shiite civil war. The Mahdi
Army, the radical Shiite militia, controls the capital's Shiite
neighbors in the east, while al-Qaeda, its offshoots, and
Baathists control Sunni districts in the west. In Baghdad and
in other formerly mixed areas, extremists are engaging in
brutal sectarian cleansing, with a death toll that may well be
in excess of 200 a day.
Iraq's army and police reflect Iraq's divisions. They are
either Sunni or Shiite. The Shiite police include the death
squads that target Sunnis. In Sunni areas, the police are
either insurgent sympathizers or insurgents. Iraq's Army, while
somewhat better, is divided into Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish
battalions. They are ultimately loyal not to the nominal chain
of command, but to their political party leaders or, in the
case of the Kurds, to the Kurdistan Regional Government. Iraq's
security forces are not neutral guarantors of public security,
but combatants in a civil war. United States training has not,
and will not, make these forces into Iraqis; it will only
create more lethal combatants in a civil war.
The goal of a self-sustaining, unified, and democratic Iraq
would require a vast expansion of the United States military
mission in Iraq, to include disarming Shiite militias,
dismantling the theocracies, and policing Iraq's mixed areas in
order to end the civil war. The Iraqi Government has no
intention of taking on the Shiite militias, and Iraq's security
forces cannot police Iraq's mixed areas, since there are no
such forces that are trusted by both Sunnis and Shiites.
The President's plan, in short, does nothing to stop Iraq's
civil war or to build a unified Iraq. The alternative is to
accept the reality that Iraq has broken up, and to work with
its components. We should get out of the business of nation-
building in Iraq and respect the democratic decision of the
Iraqis to have a country of very strong regions and a powerless
center. Iraq's Constitution, adopted by 80 percent of Iraq's
people, is a roadmap to partition. It recognizes Kurdistan as a
self-governing region and permits other parts of the country to
form regions. Iraq's Council of Representatives has already
passed a law paving the way to the formation of a Shiite super-
region in the south in the next 15 months.
Under Iraq's Constitution, regions can have their own
armies, called regional guards, and exercise substantial
control over their natural resources, including oil. Except for
the short list of exclusive federal powers listed in article
110 of the Iraqi Constitution, regional law is superior to
federal law in Iraq. By design, Iraq's Constitution makes it
difficult for the central government to function, and its few
powers do not even include taxation.
The regionalization of Iraq is a fact. It also provides the
best hope for security, and, therefore, opens the way to a
United States withdrawal. Without any significant coalition
presence, Kurdistan has already made itself into the one secure
and reasonably democratic part of Iraq. The south is also
reasonably secure, and will become more so as it forms its
regional institutions. No purpose is served by a coalition
presence in the south, and it should be withdrawn immediately.
Regionalization makes for a more effective strategy in
combating the Sunni insurgency. Right now, U.S. forces battle
Sunni insurgents on behalf of a Shiite-led government and a
Shiite-dominated military. Sunnis see these forces as alien and
dangerous. Too many Sunnis see the choice today as one between
their own extremists and a pro-Iranian Shiite government that
sponsors anti-Sunni death squads. The Sunni extremists are not
trying to kill you, whereas the other guys are. By forming
their own region, Sunni Arabs can provide for their own
security, and there could be economic and other incentives to
combat extremists. In my view, the United States should state
that it will withdraw from the Sunni Arab region when a Sunni
regional guard is established.
So far, the Sunni Arabs have been the strongest opponents
of federalism in Iraq. But with Kurdistan already in existence
and a Shiite region likely on its way, the Sunnis are faced
with a choice between governing themselves or being governed by
a Shiite-dominated central government in Baghdad.
The United States has one achievable overriding interest in
Iraq today, which is to keep al-Qaeda and its ilk from having a
base from which they can attack the United States. If Sunni
Arabs cannot provide for their own security, then the United
States must be prepared to reengage in the Sunni areas. This is
best accomplished by placing a small over-the-horizon force in
Kurdistan. Kurdistan has the Western-oriented aspiring
democracy that the United States once hoped for all of Iraq,
and the Kurds are among the most pro-American people in the
world. They would welcome a United States base, not least
because it would provide them a measure of security against
Arab Iraqis, who may seek revenge against the Kurds for having
collaborated with the United States in Iraq. From Kurdistan,
the United States military could readily move back into any
Sunni Arab area where al-Qaeda or its allies established a
base. The Kurdistan peshmerga would willingly assist their
American allies with intelligence and other support.
By deploying to what is still, nominally, Iraqi territory,
the United States would avoid the political complications in
the United States and in Iraq involved in reentering Iraq
following a total withdrawal. Partition, as noted by the Baker-
Hamilton Commission and by many experts, is not an easy
solution, but many of the worst consequences of partition,
including sectarian killing and an Iranian-dominated Shiite
south, have already happened. And the United States has no plan
to reverse any of this.
Mr. Chairman, I'm often asked: What is the difference
between the plan that you and Les Gelb have put forward and the
plan that I have outlined? We agree that the future of Iraq is
up to the Iraqis. You and Les Gelb are more optimistic that
Iraq may hold together and, if you're right, I think that would
be terrific. I'm pessimistic that the country can hold together
over the long term. But, nonetheless, the fundamental premise
of both plans is that the United States should not be engaged
in nation-building in Iraq; this should be left to the Iraqis.
Partition is an Iraqi solution. It does not require the
United States to do anything, although we can, and should, take
steps, diplomatically and through our financial assistance,
that can smooth the process, and also to try to deal with the
regional consequences.
The alternative to partition is a continued U.S.-led effort
at nation-building that has not worked for the last 4 years,
and, in my view, has no prospect for success. That, Mr.
Chairman, is a formula for war without an end.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Galbraith follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador Peter W. Galbraith, Senior Diplomatic
Fellow, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, Washington, DC
Chairman Biden, Senator Lugar, members of the Committee on Foreign
Relations, thank you for the invitation to testify before this
committee on alternative strategies toward Iraq. It is a special
privilege to be here since the committee staff was my professional home
for 14 years and it is here where I began my education on Iraq.
GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR U.S. STRATEGY
It is clear that our present strategy for Iraq has failed miserably
both in concept and execution. Any new strategy should, I believe, be
based on the following premises:
First, the United States needs to extricate itself from Iraq as
soon as feasible so that we can address other more urgent threats to
our national security, including from nuclear North Korea and nuclear
ambitious Iran.
Second, any new strategy should focus on the objectives that are
achievable in Iraq consistent with the military and other resources we
are prepared to commit.
Third, the starting point for any new strategy for Iraq should be
the country as it is, not as we wish it were.
IRAQ: BROKEN APART AND IN CIVIL WAR
The reality of Iraq is stark. The country has broken up and is in
the midst of a civil war.
In the southern half of Iraq, Shiite religious parties and clerics
have created theocracies policed by militias that number well over
100,000. In Basra, three religious parties control--and sometimes fight
over--the 100,000 barrels of oil diverted each day from legal exports
into smuggling. To the extent that the central government has authority
in the south, it is because the same Shiite parties that dominate the
center also control the south.
Kurdistan in the north is de facto an independent state with its
own army and its own flag. The Iraqi Army is barred from the region,
flying the Iraqi flag prohibited, and central government ministries are
not present. The Kurdish people voted 98.5 percent for independence in
an informal referendum in January 2005.
The Sunni center is a battleground between insurgents that command
widespread local support and U.S. forces. The Iraqi Army, which we
proclaim to be a national institution, is seen by the Sunni Arabs as a
largely Shiite force loyal to a Shiite-led government that they see as
an ally of national enemy, Iran.
Baghdad is the front line of Iraq's Sunni-Shiite civil war. The
Mahdi army, the radical Shiite militia, controls the capital's Shiite
neighborhoods in the east while al-Qaeda offshoots and Baathists
control the Sunni districts in the west. In Baghdad, and in other
formerly mixed areas, extremists are engaging in brutal sectarian
cleansing with a death toll probably in excess of 200 a day.
TWIN PILLARS OF CURRENT STRATEGY
The Bush administration's strategy for Iraq rests on two pillars:
First, an inclusive and effective national unity government that
represents Iraq's Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds; and, second, the
development of effective Iraqi Army and police that can take over
security responsibilities from U.S. forces.
Iraq does not have a government of national unity. Prime Minister
Nouri al-Maliki pursues a sectarian Shiite agenda, as seen most
dramatically in the manner in which he carried out Saddam Hussein's
execution. The Maliki government is keen to fight the Sunni
insurgents--or to be more precise, to have the U.S. military fight
Sunni insurgents--but has resisted all steps to disband Shiite
militias. But, even if Iraq had a genuine national unity government, it
would be largely irrelevant. There is no part of the country where the
government actually exercises significant authority.
Iraq's Army and police are either Shiite or Sunni. In Baghdad, the
Shiite death squads that target Sunnis are the police. In Sunni areas,
the police are often insurgent sympathizers or insurgents. Iraq's Army,
while somewhat better, is divided into Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish
battalions. These are ultimately loyal not to the nominal chain of
command, but to their sects, or, in the case of the Kurds, to the
Kurdistan Regional Government. In a country in the midst of a civil
war, it is unrealistic to believe that Iraq's security forces can
somehow be different from the country itself.
Iraq's security forces are not neutral guarantors of public
security but combatants in a civil war. U.S. training has not made, and
will not make, these forces into Iraqis. It will only create more
lethal combatants in a civil war.
what would be required to achieve a democratic and unified iraq
To achieve the Bush administration's stated goal of a self-
sustaining unified and democratic Iraq, the United States would have to
undertake two major military missions that it is not now undertaking.
First, it would have to disarm, forcefully, Iraq's Shiite militias
and dismantle the Shiite theocracies that these militias keep in power.
This would bring the United States into direct conflict with Iraq's
Shiite power structure. The Shiites are three times as numerous as the
Sunni Arabs, possess more powerful armed forces, and have in
neighboring Iran a powerful ally.
Second, the United States would have to end Iraq's civil war. This
means deploying U.S. troops to serve as the police in Baghdad and other
mixed areas for an indefinite period of time. These are not tasks that
can be handled by Iraqi security forces since there are no such forces
that are trusted by both Sunnis and Shiites.
The Bush administration has no intention of undertaking either of
these missions which would require many more troops, mean significantly
greater casualties (especially if we tried to use our troops as
police), and probably not succeed.
IRAQ'S CONSTITUTION: A ROADMAP TO PARTITION
The alternative is to accept the reality--an Iraq that has broken
up--and work with its components. We should get out of the business of
nation-building in Iraq and respect the democratic decision of the
Iraqis to have a country of strong regions and a powerless center.
Iraq's Constitution, adopted by 80 percent of Iraq's people, is a
roadmap to partition. It recognizes Kurdistan as a self-governing
region and permits other parts of the country to form regions. Iraq's
Council of Representatives has already passed a law paving the way to
the formation of a Shiite ``super region'' in 15 months.
Under the constitution, Iraq's regions can have their own armies
(called Regional Guards) and exercise substantial control over their
natural resources including oil. Except for the short list of exclusive
federal powers listed in article 110 of the Iraqi Constitution,
regional law is superior to federal law. By design, Iraq's Constitution
makes it difficult for the central government to function and its few
powers do not even include taxation.
WITHDRAW WHERE WE HAVE NO ACHIEVABLE MISSION
By accepting the reality of Iraq, we can see a path to withdrawal.
The Shiite south is stable, albeit theocratic and pro-Iranian. If we
are not going to disband the militias and local theocracies--which we
allowed to become established during the CPA's formal occupation of
Iraq--there is no purpose served by a continued coalition presence in
the Shiite southern half of Iraq. We should withdraw immediately.
In the Sunni center, our current strategy involves handing off
combat duties to the Iraqi Army. Mostly, it is Shiite battalions that
fight in the Sunni Arab areas, as the Sunni units are not reliable.
What the Bush administration portrays as Iraqi, the local population
sees as a hostile force loyal to a Shiite-dominated government in
Baghdad installed by the Americans invader and closely aligned with the
traditional enemy, Iran. The more we ``Iraqize'' the fight in the Sunni
heartland, the more we strengthen the insurgency.
If the Sunni Arabs were to form their own region, they could take
control of their own security. Right now, the choice for ordinary
Sunnis is between what they see as a radical Shiite government that
sponsors anti-Sunni death squads and their own extremists. Within the
establishment of a Sunni region, the choice becomes one between
nationalist and traditional leadership on the one hand and the Islamic
extremists on the other. Outsiders can influence this choice by
providing economic incentives for a more moderate Sunni Arab
government. The United States should state that it will withdraw from
the Sunni Arab region when its Regional Guard is established.
So far, the Sunni Arabs have been the strongest opponents of
federalism in Iraq. But, with Kurdistan already in existence and a
Shiite region likely on its way, the Sunnis are faced with a choice
between governing themselves or being governed by a Shiite-dominated
central government in Baghdad.
BAGHDAD
Because it is Iraq's most mixed city, Baghdad is the front line of
Iraq's Sunni-Shiite civil war. It is tragedy for its people--most of
whom do not share the sectarian hatred that is fueling a killing spree
that is taking several thousand lives a month. Iraqi forces cannot end
the civil war because many of them are partisans of one side, and the
proposed surge of U.S. troops will not end it. There is no good
solution to Baghdad. Ideally, the United States could help broker a
political deal for power-sharing among Sunnis and Shiites (with space
for the much smaller Christian, Mandean/Sabean, Turkmen, and Kurdish
communities). But, the reality is that Baghdad is already divided. A
formal division into Shiite and Sunni sectors may be the only way to
halt the effort by Shiite militias to enlarge the Shiite parts of the
city.
Unless the United States is prepared to assume long-term police
duties in Baghdad, we should withdraw our troops from the city. If we
withdraw, there will be sectarian cleansing of mixed neighborhoods and
sectarian killing. And, this will be the case if we stay with our
current forces or even after the modest surge now being discussed.
KURDISTAN
Kurdistan is Iraq's most stable region. It is the one part of the
country that is the pro-Western, secular, and aspiring democracy that
the Bush administration had hoped for all of Iraq. The United States
should work to strengthen democratic institutions in Kurdistan as well
as the military capabilities of the Kurdistan military (the peshmerga)
which is Iraq's only reliable indigenous military force.
Iraq's Constitution provides for a referendum to be held by the end
of this year to determine the status of Kirkuk and other areas disputed
between Kurds and Arabs. Holding this referendum has the potential to
increase, significantly, violence in areas that are ethnically mixed.
On the other hand, Kirkuk has been a source of conflict in Iraq for
seven decades. Failing to resolve the matter at a time when there is a
constitutionally agreed process to do so is also likely to produce
conflict and is destabilizing over the long term.
Because of our special relationship with the Kurds, the United
States has clout that it does not enjoy elsewhere in the country. The
United States should engage in a major diplomatic effort to resolve the
boundaries of Kurdistan through negotiation wherever possible. The
Kurds, who hold the upper hand in much of this disputed territory,
should be cautioned about the dangers of overreaching. With regard to
Kirkuk, the U.S. diplomacy should focus on entrenching power-sharing
among the governorate's four communities--Kurds, Turkmen, Arabs, and
Chaldean/Assyrians--so that all have a stake in Kirkuk regardless of
the outcome of the referendum.
PREVENTING AL-QAEDA FROM HAVING A BASE
The United States has one overriding interest in Iraq today--to
keep al-Qaeda and like-minded Salafi terrorist groups from having a
base from which they can plot attacks on the United States. If Sunni
Arabs cannot provide for their own security, the United States must be
prepared to reengage.
This is best accomplished by placing a small over-the-horizon force
in Kurdistan. The Kurds are among the most pro-American people in the
world and would welcome a U.S. military presence, not the least because
it would help protect them from Arab Iraqis who resent their close
cooperation with the United States during the 2003 war and thereafter.
From Kurdistan, the U.S. military could readily move back into any
Sunni Arab area where al-Qaeda or its allies established a base. The
Kurdish peshmerga would willingly assist their American allies with
intelligence and operationally. By deploying to what is still nominally
Iraqi territory, the United States would avoid the political
complications--in the United States and in Iraq--involved in reentering
Iraq following a total withdrawal.
WILL IRAQ STAY TOGETHER?
Can Iraq survive as a loose federation? Over the short term, Iraq's
Kurdish and Shiite leaders are committed to the constitutional
arrangements while the Sunni Arabs say that they want a more
centralized state. Both Sunni Arabs and Shiites identify as Iraqis,
although they have radically different visions as to what Iraq should
be. The creation of Sunni and Shiite federal units, therefore, is not
likely to lead to a full separation. Rather, by giving each community
their own entity, federalism can help avoid the alternative where
Sunnis and Shiites fight a prolonged civil war for control of all Arab
Iraq.
The Kurds do not identify as Iraqis. They associate Iraq with
decades of repression and with Saddam Hussein's genocide. Almost
unanimously, Iraqi Kurds want their own independent state. Keeping
people in a state they hate is a formula for never ending conflict of
the sort that has characterized the entire history of modern Iraq. The
United States may--and for the time being probably should--delay
Kurdistan's full independence, but we cannot prevent it. Our real
interest is in preventing the violent break up of Iraq, and not in
holding together a country that brought nonstop misery to the majority
of its people for its entire history.
______
Partition and Withdraw: A Strategy to Get the U.S. Out of Iraq
Summary: Accept the partition of Iraq that has already taken place,
withdraw from Arab Iraq, and redeploy a small force to Kurdistan that
can strike at al-Qaeda if necessary.
Key Facts: Iraq has broken up and is in the midst of a civil war.
Kurdistan in the north is a de facto independent state with its own
army. The Shiite south is governed separately from Baghdad. The Iraqi
Parliament has approved a law paving the way for the formation of a
Shiite ``super region'' in 15 months. The Sunni center is a
battleground and Baghdad is the front line of the Sunni-Shiite civil
war.
Iraq's Constitution ratifies the country's partition, recognizing
Kurdistan as a self-governing region and permitting other parts of the
country to form regions. Under the Constitution, Iraq's regions can
have their own armies (called Regional Guards) and exercise substantial
control over their natural resources including oil. Except for the
short list of exclusive federal powers listed in Article 110 of the
Iraqi Constitution, regional law is superior to federal law. By design,
Iraq's Constitution makes it difficult for the central government to
function and its few powers do not even include taxation. To achieve a
unified and democratic Iraq, the United States would have to use its
military to end the civil war, build a strong central government over
the objections of the Kurds and many Shiites, and be prepared to remain
in Iraq indefinitely. Even so, the prospects for success would be
minimal.
Policy Recommendations:
1. Accept the reality of partition and work with the regions that
emerge to develop stable regional governments with competent security
forces.
2. Use deplomacy to smooth the path to partition by helping resolve
territorial disputes between regions, and notably between Kurdistan and
Arab Iraq over Kirkuk.
3. Facilitate a solution to Baghdad either by devising a plan for
power sharing between Sunnis and Shiites in the city or by dividing it
along current sectarian boundaries.
4. Mitigate the humanitarian consequences of Iraq's civil war with
assistance to displaced populations.
5. Withdraw coalition forces immediately from Iraq's Shiite south
where they are not needed for stability.
6. Withdraw rapidly from most of Baghdad recognizing that the U.S.
military is not prepared to become the police of the city.
7. State that the U.S. will withdraw from the Iraq's Sunni areas at
such time as the Sunnis are prepared to assume security for their own
region.
8. Retain an ``over-the-horizon'' U.S. military force in pro-
American Kurdistan that could intervene against al-Qaeda and other
global terrorist organizations if necessary.
9. Delay Iraq's formal breakup as long as possible while preparing
neighbors to accept peacefully the new reality.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
Dr. Kagan.
STATEMENT OF FREDERICK W. KAGAN, RESIDENT SCHOLAR, AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Kagan. Mr. Chairman, honorable members of this----
The Chairman. Again, welcome.
Dr. Kagan [continuing]. Committee, I'm very grateful for
the opportunity to speak before you today on this issue that is
of such great importance to our Nation.
Iraq is clearly in a very dire situation right now, and no
objective observer could deny that. And we face, at this
moment, I believe, a series of very difficult choices among
options, none of which are pleasant, none of which can promise
success, all of which carry increased risk, of one form or
another.
I'd like to stress that I do believe that there is an
option that can succeed in at least offering us a chance to
move forward toward a road that would actually be acceptable to
us over the long term. And I do believe that that option is
embodied in the plan that I have presented at AEI, some time
ago, in the report called ``Choosing Victory.''
But I'd like, first, to highlight the fact that I believe
that we have come to a point of bifurcation in the history of
the world. And I don't think that's too strong a statement. I
think that it is impossible to overstate how much rides on the
outcome of the war in Iraq today.
A number of experts from various parties and persuasions
have looked at the possibility and likelihood of containing a
civil war in Iraq that is now underway, and preventing it from
spreading throughout the region, without actually tamping it
down and bringing it under control in Iraq. And the conclusions
are very, very poor; very, very pessimistic.
Judging from past civil wars, ethnosectarian conflicts
around the world, it is very clear that a civil war, allowed to
proceed unchecked in Iraq as the result of a precipitate
American withdrawal, is highly likely to spread violence
throughout the entire region, destabilize Iraq's neighbors, and
may quite possibly lead to regional conflict. This is not
something that the United States could view with any degree of
equanimity. This is not Southeast Asia, this is not a part of
the world that we can walk away from, this is a region that
will always be at the center of America's vital interests in
the world, and not an area where we can simply watch idly as
conflict expands and brings in ever more warriors.
Unfortunately, I think this nightmare scenario is not
improbable if we do not bring the violence in Iraq under
control and work hard to reestablish an Iraqi State that can
govern its territory and maintain its own security and defend
itself against foes, internal and external. And I do believe
that it is possible to do that.
We have not succeeded in Iraq, so far, because we have not
applied sound strategy to this conflict. I think that's very
clear. I've been making that case consistently, honestly, even
since before the war began. Sound strategy requires--sound
strategy in counterinsurgency requires, first and foremost,
providing security to the population. When people have to wake
up in the morning and wonder and worry if they and their
families will live to see the evening, they will not
participate in the political process in a normal way, they will
not participate in economic processes in a normal way, they
will not interact with one another, even with family and
friends and neighbors, in a normal way. That is a fact of human
nature, and it has been seen in many, many conflicts.
It is no surprise to me, therefore, that the Iraqis, thus
far, have not been behaving in the manner that we would like
them to behave in. That is to say, a manner that is
characterized by compromise and civility and inclusiveness.
When the violence has reached the point that we have allowed it
to reach through not working hard enough to bring it under
control, it is natural for Iraqi sects and groups to turn to
them--to turn to their own powers and their own capabilities to
defend each other, and it is, unfortunately, also natural for
them to begin to attack each other.
Iraq does not, in fact, have a long history of vast
sectarian conflict ripping it apart from age to age. The level
of violence that we're seeing now is unusual in Iraqi history,
as it is unusual in the history of most states. I do believe
that we can work to bring it under control, and I do believe
that bringing security to the Iraqi people, in the first
instance, will enable them to begin to make the difficult
choices and compromises that will be so essential to allow them
to move forward to create the sort of stable state that we
desire, and that they desire.
I do not believe that solutions such as partition will be
effective or will be, rather, tolerable. Unfortunately, it is
not the case that Iraq is now divided neatly into three zones
which can simply each be given its own government. Although
there has been sectarian cleansing going on in Baghdad and in
other cities in Iraq, Baghdad remains a mixed city. Many of its
neighborhoods remain mixed between sects. And actually dividing
the country into three zones will require, de facto, an
enormous amount more sectarian cleansing. Another word for this
process, I believe, will be ``genocide,'' as I believe that the
increasing escalation of violence that is the normal part of
any widespread sectarian cleansing generally leads to such
efforts.
I do not believe that the United States can stand by,
purely from an ethical perspective, and watch that occur. And I
would remind the committee that it was the position of
especially the Democratic Party and the Clinton administration
in the 1990s that it was intolerable for the United States to
stand idly by and watch as ethnic cleansing and genocide went
on in the Balkans. I really can't imagine how we could believe
that it could be tolerable now to permit, and, indeed, even
encourage, that to occur, when we are so clearly partially
responsible for the circumstances in which this violence has
developed.
But I want to emphasize, we are not in Iraq, in my view,
for the benefit of the Iraqis; we are in Iraq, in my view, in
pursuit of American national interests. And the national
interest, at this point, is the prevention of the development
of regional civil war and regional violence on a scale that
would be intolerable to us. And I believe that, purely in the
service of our own interests, if nothing else, it is vital that
we work to bring the violence under control.
Now, we have put forward a plan, which we have presented in
great detail, called ``Choosing Victory,'' in which we
recommend the introduction of additional U.S. forces into
Baghdad and into Al Anbar province. We believe that this plan
is workable. We brought together a group of military planners
with significant experience--recent experience--in Iraq. We
were advised, by General Jack Keane, the former Chief--Vice
Chief of Staff of the Army, and lieutenant general, retired,
David Barno, and a number of other officers who gave us their
wisdom. And we looked very carefully at what we believed the
military requirements would be of bringing security to the
vital Sunni and mixed Sunni-Shia neighborhoods in Baghdad as
the beginning of an operation to pacify the entire city, which
would then enable us to move beyond Baghdad into troubled areas
in Diyala, Salah ad-Din, and elsewhere. We also believe that it
was necessary to increase our forces in Al Anbar province,
which is another base of the Sunni insurgency, in order to
prevent insurgents from moving easily back and forth between
that province and Baghdad.
We emphasize that we do not believe that this security
operation, by itself, will lead to success in Iraq. It is,
rather, the essential precondition for moving forward with the
host of reconciliation initiatives, political developments, and
economic development that will be vital, in the end, to
resolving this conflict.
There has been much complaint about the fact that the Iraqi
Armed Forces are not ethnically mixed, not sectarianly mixed.
Of course they're not. You do not--you cannot recruit Sunni
Arabs into a force when the insurgents are terrorizing their
families and killing their family members when they join the
army. As we have seen in Tal Afar and Ramadi and in other
places, when you can bring security to an area, you can then
begin to recruit Sunni Arabs and other ethnicities and sects
into the armed forces and produce a more balanced force.
Security is the precondition.
I will freely say, because I have said it consistently all
along, that the Bush administration has made an error in not
prioritizing the establishment of security in Iraq. I do not
believe--and it was our considered opinion when we studied this
problem very carefully--we do not believe that the situation is
so far gone that no solution is feasible.
People have challenged the numbers of troops that would be
required to do this. I would say they should explain--the
burden is on them to explain what forces they think would be
necessary, and on what basis they make the calculation. We have
been completely open and transparent on the basis for our force
calculations, which are in line with traditional
counterinsurgency practice and also with the experience of
operations in Iraq previously. We believe that these forces
will be adequate to provide security in the areas of Baghdad
that we think is most important.
We recommended a significant reconstruction effort to
accompany this program. We are going to be continuing, in
subsequent phases of this project, to examine changes that we
think need to be made in the training of the Iraqi Army, the
training of the Iraqi police, reconstruction efforts, and the
development of Iraqi governmental structures, and so forth. We
clearly do believe our study is something that will take some
time, and the reconstruction of Iraq is something that will
take some time, but we are absolutely convinced that simply
allowing Iraq to collapse now by withdrawing our forces, or by
trying to carve off some piece of Iraq and protect only that,
is not in the interest of the United States of America and
will, in fact, put us in tremendous jeopardy over the long run,
and possibly even in the short run. And we, therefore, believe
that it is vital and urgent that we work now to bring the
situation under control.
I thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Kagan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Frederick W. Kagan, Resident Scholar,
American Enterprise Institute, Washington, DC
Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq--Phase I Report
(A Report of the Iraq Planning Group at the American Enterprise
Institute)
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Victory is still an option in Iraq. America, a country of 300
million people with a GDP of $12 trillion and more than 1 million
soldiers and marines, has the resources to stabilize Iraq, a state the
size of California with a population of 25 million and a GDP under $100
billion. America must use its resources skillfully and decisively to
help build a successful democratically elected, sovereign government in
Iraq.
Victory in Iraq is vital to America's security. Defeat will likely
lead to regional conflict, humanitarian catastrophe, and increased
global terrorism.
Iraq has reached a critical point. The strategy of relying on a
political process to eliminate the insurgency has failed. Rising
sectarian violence threatens to break America's will to fight. This
violence will destroy the Iraqi Government, armed forces, and people if
it is not rapidly controlled.
Victory in Iraq is still possible at an acceptable level of effort.
We must adopt a new approach to the war and implement it quickly and
decisively.
We must act now to restore security and stability to Baghdad. We
and the enemy have identified it as the decisive point.
There is a way to do this.
We must balance our focus on training Iraqi soldiers with a
determined effort to secure the Iraqi population and contain
the rising violence. Securing the population has never been the
primary mission of the U.S. military effort in Iraq, and now it
must become the first priority.
We must send more American combat forces into Iraq and
especially into Baghdad to support this operation. A surge of
seven Army brigades and Marine regiments to support clear-and-
hold operations that begin in the spring of 2007 is necessary,
possible, and will be sufficient to improve security and set
conditions for economic development, political development,
reconciliation, and the development of Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF) to provide permanent security.
American forces, partnered with Iraqi units, will clear
high-violence Sunni and mixed Sunni-Shia neighborhoods,
primarily on the west side of the city.
After those neighborhoods are cleared, U.S. soldiers and
marines, again partnered with Iraqis, will remain behind to
maintain security, reconstitute police forces, and integrate
police and Iraqi Army efforts to maintain the population's
security.
As security is established, reconstruction aid will help to
reestablish normal life, bolster employment, and, working
through Iraqi officials, strengthen Iraqi local government.
Securing the population strengthens the ability of Iraq's
central government to exercise its sovereign powers.
This approach requires a national commitment to victory in Iraq:
The ground forces must accept longer tours for several
years. National Guard units will have to accept increased
deployments during this period.
Equipment shortages must be overcome by transferring
equipment from nondeploying Active Duty, National Guard, and
Reserve units to those about to deploy. Military industry must
be mobilized to provide replacement equipment sets urgently.
The President must request a dramatic increase in
reconstruction aid for Iraq. Responsibility and accountability
for reconstruction must be assigned to established agencies.
The President must insist upon the completion of reconstruction
projects. The President should also request a dramatic increase
in Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds.
The President must request a substantial increase in ground
forces end-strength. This increase is vital to sustaining the
morale of the combat forces by ensuring that relief is on the
way. The President must issue a personal call for young
Americans to volunteer to fight in the decisive conflict of
this generation.
The President and his representatives in Iraq must forge
unity of effort with the Iraqi Government.
Other courses of action have been proposed. All will fail.
Withdraw immediately. This approach will lead to immediate
defeat. The Iraqi Security Forces are entirely dependent upon
American support to survive and function. If U.S. forces
withdraw now, the Iraqi forces will collapse. Iraq will descend
into total civil war that will rapidly spread throughout the
Middle East.
Engage Iraq's neighbors. This approach will fail. The basic
causes of violence and sources of manpower and resources for
the warring sides come from within Iraq. Iraq's neighbors are
encouraging the violence, but they cannot stop it.
Increase embedded trainers dramatically. This approach
cannot succeed rapidly enough to prevent defeat. Removing U.S.
forces from patrolling neighborhoods to embed them as trainers
will lead to an immediate rise in violence. This rise in
violence will destroy America's remaining will to fight and
escalate the cycle of sectarian violence in Iraq beyond
anything an Iraqi Army could bring under control.
Failure in Iraq today will require far greater sacrifices tomorrow
in far more desperate circumstances.
Committing to victory now will demonstrate America's strength to
our friends and enemies around the world.
INTRODUCTION
American forces in Iraq today are engaged in the pivotal struggle
of our age. If the United States allows Iraq to slide into full-scale
civil war, characterized by the collapse of the central government and
the widespread mobilization of the population in internal conflict, the
consequences will be epochal. Internal strife in Iraq has already
generated a large displaced population within the country and
significant refugee flows into neighboring lands. Those neighbors, both
Sunni and Shia, have already made clear their determination to enter
Iraq and its struggles if America withdraws and the conflict escalates
into greater sectarian violence or civil war. Iraq's diverse neighbors,
however, have opposing interests in how the conflict is settled.
Consequently, failure in Iraq now will likely lead to regional war,
destabilizing important states in the Middle East and creating a
fertile ground for terrorism.
Success in Iraq, on the other hand, would transform the
international situation. Success will give the United States critical
leverage against Iran, which is now positioning itself to become the
regional hegemon after our anticipated defeat. It will strengthen
America's position around the world, where our inability to contain
conflict in Iraq is badly tarnishing our stature. And success will
convert a violent, chaotic region in the heart of the Middle East and
on the front line of the Sunni-Shiite divide into a secure state able
to support peace within its borders and throughout the region. There
can be no question that victory in Iraq is worth considerable American
effort or that defeat would be catastrophic.
Some now argue that victory is beyond our grasp. America cannot (or
should not) involve itself in civil, sectarian conflicts, they say, and
the troops required to control such conflicts are larger than the U.S.
military could possibly deploy. Neither of these arguments is valid.
The United States has faced ethnosectarian conflict on at least five
occasions in the past 15 years. In Somalia, Afghanistan, and Rwanda,
successive American administrations allowed the conflicts to continue
without making any serious attempts to control or contain them. The
results have been disastrous. Inaction in Afghanistan in the 1990s led
to the rise of the Taliban and its support for Osama bin Laden and al-
Qaeda--and therefore indirectly to the 9/11 attacks. Inaction, indeed
humiliation, in Somalia led to a larger civil war in which radical
Islamists took control of most of the country by the end of 2006. In
late December, the conflict took a new turn as Ethiopian troops invaded
Somalia in support of the internationally recognized transitional
government. A civil war has become a regional war, as civil wars often
do. In Rwanda, civil war and genocide also spread, involving Congo and,
indeed, much of sub-Saharan Africa in widespread conflict and death.
One clear lesson of post-cold-war conflicts is that ignoring civil wars
is dangerous and can generate grave, unintended consequences for
America's future security.
The United States has recently intervened, along with its allies,
to control ethnically and religiously motivated civil wars on two
occasions, however, in 1995 in Bosnia and in 1999 in Kosovo. Both
efforts were successful in ending the violence and creating the
preconditions for peace and political and economic development. The
parallels are, of course, imperfect; much of the ethnic cleansing had
already been accomplished in both areas before the United States
intervened with armed force. In the Balkans, however, the levels of
violence and death as a proportion of the population were much higher
than they have been in Iraq. Additionally, the armed forces of the
states neighboring Bosnia and Kosovo were much more directly involved
in the struggle than those of Iraq's neighbors. Above all, the
introduction of U.S. and European forces in strength in Bosnia and
Kosovo has ended the killing and prevented that conflict from spreading
throughout the region, as it threatened to do in the 1990s. It is
possible to contain ethnosectarian civil wars, but only by ending them.
The United States has the military power necessary to control the
violence in Iraq. The main purpose of the report that follows is to
consider in detail what amount of armed force would be needed to bring
the sectarian violence in Baghdad down to levels that would permit
economic and political development and real national reconciliation.
Before turning to that consideration, however, we should reflect on the
fact that the United States between 2001 and 2006 has committed only a
small proportion of its total national strength to this struggle. There
are more than 1 million soldiers in the Active and Reserve ground
forces, and only 140,000 of them are in Iraq at the moment. Many others
are engaged in vital tasks in the United States and elsewhere from
which they could not easily be moved, and soldiers and marines are not
interchangeable beans. If this war were the vital national priority
that it should be, however, the United States could commit many more
soldiers to the fight. This report will address in greater detail some
of the ways of making more forces available for this struggle.
The United States could also devote a significantly higher
proportion of its national wealth to this problem in two ways. First,
the President has finally called for a significant increase in the size
of the ground forces--the warriors who are actually shouldering much of
the burden in this conflict. The United States can and should sustain
larger ground forces than it now has, both to support operations in
Iraq and to be prepared for likely contingencies elsewhere. Five years
into the global war on terror, the Bush administration has recognized
this urgent need and begun to address it.
Second, the United States can and must devote significantly more
resources to helping reconstruction and economic development in Iraq.
The American GDP is over $13 trillion; Iraq's is about $100 billion.
America's ability to improve the daily lives of Iraqis is very great,
even at levels of expenditure that would barely affect the U.S.
economy. Effective reconstruction and economic development are
essential components of any counterinsurgency campaign and are urgently
needed in Iraq. This report will consider how to improve some aspects
of these necessary programs, which will be considered in more detail in
subsequent phases of this project.
But reconstruction, economic development, national reconciliation,
political development, and many other essential elements of the
solution to Iraq's problems are all unattainable in the current
security environment. Violence in Iraq has risen every year since 2003.
Last year was the bloodiest on record, despite significant military
operations aimed at reducing the violence in Baghdad. The bombing of
the Golden Mosque of Samarra in February 2006 accelerated the sectarian
conflict dramatically, and the fighting has moved beyond insurgents and
organized militias to neighborhood watch groups engaging in their own
local violence. This development is ominous because it signals that
significant portions of the Iraqi population have begun to mobilize for
full-scale civil war. In this violent context, when so many Iraqi
individuals and families must worry about their physical survival on a
daily basis, American proposals that rely on diplomatic, political, and
economic efforts to resolve the crisis are doomed to failure. Such
efforts will not succeed until Iraq's population is secure from rampant
violence. Establishing security in Baghdad, and then in the violent
regions that surround it, must become the top priority of the American
military presence in Iraq today. Securing Baghdad to bring the violence
in Iraq's capital under control must be the centerpiece of a military
operation that should be launched as rapidly as possible. Effective
reconstruction and the building of Iraqi governing institutions will
accompany and follow this military operation. Without such an
operation, America's defeat in Iraq appears imminent, regardless of any
other efforts the United States might undertake. The remainder of this
report will consider the shape and requirements of such an operation,
the likely enemy responses, and the ways of overcoming them.
SECURING THE POPULATION
The recently released military doctrinal manual on
counterinsurgency operations declares, ``The cornerstone of any
[counterinsurgency] effort is establishing security for the civilian
populace. Without a secure environment, no permanent reforms can be
implemented and disorder spreads.'' This statement encapsulates the
wisdom of generations of counterinsurgent theorists and practitioners.
The importance of establishing security is manifold. First, people who
are constantly in fear for their lives and for their loved ones do not
participate in political, economic, or social processes in a normal
way. The fear of violence and death distorts everything they do, think,
and feel, and it often changes how they interact even with neighbors
and friends. When violence reaches a level at which most people feel
themselves to be in danger, as it has in many areas of Baghdad and
Anbar, then political processes largely cease to function.
It is not usually possible to use those collapsing processes to
redress or control the violence, moreover. In Iraq, as in many other
insurgencies, rebel groups take up arms in part to gain leverage that
the political process would not otherwise give them. The Sunni Arab
rejectionists in Iraq have preferred violence to democracy from the
outset because they know that they will not control a truly democratic
Iraq. They have, therefore, hoped to use violence and its threat to
force the Shiite majority to give them a much greater say in governing
Iraq than their proportion in the population would attain. As long as
they believe that violence is providing them with political leverage,
they will continue to prefer violence to dialogue. Encouraging the
Shiite government to negotiate with them without first containing the
violence only reinforces the Sunni Arab rejectionists' belief in the
efficacy of violence to advance their cause.
Ongoing violence within a state, finally saps the legitimacy of
that state's government in the eyes of its citizens. As the U.S.
military's counterinsurgency manual explains, the first indicator of a
government's legitimacy is ``the ability to provide security for the
population (including protection from internal and external threats).''
Providing security for its people is the core mission of any state.
Continual violence and death eliminate the people's support for the
government, leading to an increase in violence as individuals and
groups undertake to protect and avenge themselves independently of
state structures, legal institutions, or government sanction. Allowing
disorder to persist over the long term is extremely hazardous to the
health of any government. And America's objective in Iraq is creating a
secure and sovereign national government elected by the Iraqi people.
The U.S. Government has not given priority to providing security to
the Iraqi population from the outset of the war, however. The
inadequacy of coalition forces at the end of major combat operations to
maintain order is well-known and well-documented now. It is less well-
known that American forces continued to underemphasize the importance
of establishing and maintaining security even after the military
command and the administration recognized that insurgency and low-grade
civil war were erupting in Iraq. America's commanders in Iraq, notably
Generals John Abizaid, commander of U.S. Central Command since mid-
2003, and George Casey, commander of Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I)
since mid-2004, have instead emphasized the need for Iraqis to solve
their own security problems. The leading U.S. commanders have,
therefore, prioritized using U.S. troops to establish and train Iraqi
Security Forces. Indeed, American military commanders have never
pursued the defeat of the enemy even after it became obvious that Iraqi
forces lacked the ability to do so. As a result, the United States has
ceded the initiative to the enemies of the United States and the Iraqi
Government and permitted the steady deterioration of the security
situation.
The basis of the Abizaid-Casey strategy is twofold: American forces
in Iraq are an irritant and generate insurgents who want to drive us
out of their country, and the Iraqis must be able to create and
maintain their own stability lest they become permanently dependent on
our military presence. Both of these arguments contain elements of
truth, but realities in Iraq are much more complex.
The coalition presence in Iraq is an irritant in many areas, and it
has generated a number of insurgents particularly among former
Baathists, al-Qaeda and its affiliates, and Sunni Arab rejectionists.
But this argument is less helpful in evaluating courses of action than
is commonly supposed. U.S. forces in Iraq currently maintain a very
light footprint--140,000 troops in a country of 25 million people. Most
Iraqis surveyed report that they rarely if ever see American forces.
There is no reason to imagine, moreover, that it matters to the
insurgency whether there are 100,000, 140,000, or 200,000 Americans in
Iraq.
Insurgent rhetoric does not count our soldiers; rather, it
denounces the presence of any American troops on Iraqi soil. Osama bin
Laden launched the 9/11 attacks in part because of a far lighter
American presence in Saudi Arabia--a presence similar to what almost
every plan for withdrawal from Iraq proposes to maintain in the country
or the region for years to come. Increases on the scale proposed in
this report are extraordinarily unlikely to lead to any significant
increase in the ``irritation'' caused by our presence, particularly in
the most vivid manifestation of that ``irritation,'' which is the
propaganda of our enemies. We should remember that our enemies in Iraq
try to shift blame for their own mass murder attacks against innocent
civilians to the coalition forces that are assisting the Iraqi
Government. The problem in Iraq is not so much that coalition forces
are perceived as occupiers, but rather that coalition forces are
occupiers who have not made good on their primary responsibility--
securing the population.
The argument that Iraqis must be able to maintain their own
security is also valid but incomplete. American forces can clearly
leave Iraq, successfully, only when there is an Iraqi Government in
place that controls its own forces and maintains the safety of its
people. Training Iraqi Security Forces, both the Iraqi Army and police
forces of various types, is clearly an essential precondition for the
ultimate withdrawal of U.S. troops. It is not true, however, that the
United States should allow the violence in Iraq to continue until the
Iraqi Security Forces can bring it under control on their own or even
with our support.
In the first place, there is a world of difference between training
security forces that can maintain a peace that has already been
established and training those capable of conducting the complex and
large-scale counterinsurgency operations that the situation now
demands. The coalition and the Iraqi Government have been placing
nascent Iraqi units and their soldiers in extremely difficult and
dangerous situations that require sophisticated command structures,
excellent equipment, organization, superior leadership, and exceptional
individual discipline. By focusing on preparing the Iraqis to do
everything, the U.S. military command has set the bar too high. There
are tasks in Iraq, such as clearing enemies out of high-violence
neighborhoods and securing their populations, that only American forces
will be able to do for some time. These tasks will not have to be
repeated if they are done properly the first time. As new, properly
trained Iraqi units become available, they will be more capable of
holding areas that have already been cleared and secured than of
clearing and securing those areas themselves.
In the second place, the emphasis on training Iraqi forces to
establish security, themselves, ignores the transition from insurgency
to nascent civil war now going on in Iraq. Preparing a largely Shiite
Iraqi Army to suppress a Sunni Arab insurgency always posed a number of
daunting challenges--many Shia do not want to march into Sunni lands to
fight; the presence of Shia military units inflames Sunni Arab
sentiment as much or more than the presence of American forces; and
Shia military units are much more open both to corruption and to
committing atrocities that stoke the insurgency than are coalition
forces.
But the United States cannot rely on a primarily Shiite army to
bring order to a land torn by sectarian strife because that policy is
unlikely to end violence in a way that permits national reconciliation.
Shiite military units cannot be seen as honest brokers in mixed Sunni-
Shia neighborhoods. As the violence continues to rise, moreover, the
members of the army--all of whom belong to one sect or another--come
under increasing pressure to desert, commit atrocities, or otherwise
undermine efforts at national reconciliation. Something similar
happened to the large and professional Yugoslav Army in the early
1990s. Rather than keeping the fragmenting state together, the army
itself fragmented, sending weapons and experienced soldiers to the
various warring sides and fueling the civil war. If no external force
works to reduce the violence while the Iraqi Army is training, it is
virtually certain that the army will sooner or later break under the
sectarian strain--and with it will go Iraq's only hope for peace in
this generation.
Indeed, improved security is a precondition for rebalancing the
demographic composition of security forces, which is, in turn, a
prerequisite for preventing their involvement in sectarian or civil war
and establishing their legitimacy with the Iraqi population. The lack
of Sunni representation in security forces stems mainly from the
enemy's ability to hold hostage the families of potential recruits.
Recent efforts to reconstitute the police and recruit soldiers in
predominantly Sunni areas such as Tall Afar and Ramadi demonstrate that
improved security leads to more representative and legitimate security
forces.
The right strategy is to strike a balance among three concerns
rather than between two: The United States should be sensitive to the
danger of flooding Iraq with too many coalition soldiers and of making
the Iraqis too dependent on the coalition to do everything, but America
must balance those fears against the imminent danger of allowing the
security situation to collapse completely.
The strategy proposed in this plan attempts to redress the
imbalance in the United States approach so far. This plan proposes a
moderate increase in American troop levels, but one far below anything
likely to provoke a massive reaction by the Iraqi people. The plan
proposes to continue training Iraqi troops, placing them either in the
lead or in partnership with American units wherever possible. The plan
encourages such partnership efforts as a path to transferring control
of Iraq's security to well-prepared Iraqi forces directed by its
autonomous government, albeit on a more realistic timeline than the
ones currently under discussion. Above all, the plan proposes to
redress MNF-I's continual failure to prioritize securing the Iraqi
people.
MNF-I's strategy so far has focused on increasing Iraqi
capabilities, but the violence continues to rise faster than those
capabilities. Nascent Iraqi forces are not prepared to operate
effectively in areas where the enemy has succeeded in intimidating and
coercing the population or has established a strong defensive
capability. Coalition forces are needed to set conditions for the
development of ISF as well as the introduction of ISF into contentious
areas. The correct approach, embodied in the plan proposed below, works
both to increase Iraqi capabilities and to decrease the violence to a
level the Iraqis themselves can control. This strategy is the only one
that can succeed in creating a secure, autonomous, and democratic Iraq
free of sectarian violence, insurgency, and civil war.
THE CHALLENGE
The challenge facing the United States in Iraq comes primarily from
a series of enemies who are actively trying to stoke violence and
create chaos to destroy the current political and social order. Some
people examining Iraq have become so frustrated and confused by the
complexity of this challenge that they prefer to throw up their hands
rather than attempt to cope with it. The challenge is, nevertheless,
comprehensible. To understand it, one must first consider the geography
and demography of the capital region and then describe the enemy in
some detail.
Geography and Demography
Baghdad is the center of gravity of the conflict in Iraq at this
moment. Insurgents on all sides have declared that they intend to win
or die there. It is the capital and center of Iraqi Government. It is
the base of American power and influence in the country. It is the
largest and most populous city in Iraq. It is home to one of Iraq's
largest Shiite communities, but also to many mixed Sunni and Shiite
communities. Widely publicized American efforts to gain control of the
violence in Baghdad in Operation Together Forward (conducted in two
phases in 2006) connected American success in Iraq overall to success
in Baghdad. For good or ill, the pivotal struggle for Iraq is occurring
in its capital.
Baghdad is a city of some 6 million people that straddles the
Tigris River. Northeast of the Army Canal that divides the eastern side
of the city lies Sadr City, a Shiite slum of more than 2 million
people. Ministries and government buildings line the Tigris on either
side. On the western bank lies the Green Zone, an area secured by
American military forces that houses U.S. military and political
headquarters, critical Iraqi governmental institutions, and bases for
some American soldiers. On the western edge of the city is Baghdad
International Airport (BIAP), home of Camp Victory, one of the largest
U.S. bases in the country. The road from BIAP to the Green Zone is
known as ``Route Irish,'' which has gained notoriety for being one of
the most dangerous stretches of road in Iraq.
Baghdad is a mixed city on many levels. Most of Baghdad's Shiite
population live in and around Sadr City and its two satellite
neighborhoods of Shaab and Ur; many of the Sunnis live on the western
side of the city. But many neighborhoods and districts are themselves
mixed, especially those between BIAP and the Green Zone and immediately
around the Green Zone on both sides of the river. Rising sectarian
violence is changing this demographic pattern, however, and the mixed
neighborhoods are increasingly being ``cleansed'' and becoming more
homogeneous.
Neither the challenges in Iraq nor the solutions even to Baghdad's
problems are contained entirely in Baghdad, however. Anbar province,
the large, mostly desert area to the west of Baghdad, contains the core
of the Sunni Arab rejectionist insurgency. U.S. and Iraqi forces fight
insurgents for control of Anbar's largest cities, Ramadi and Fallujah,
while Marines work to root out al-Qaeda and other insurgent and
terrorist groups throughout the vast province. Insurgents move from
Anbar into Baghdad and back again, linking these two problematic areas
inextricably. Even the insurgents who regularly operate in Baghdad have
bases outside of the city, especially in the villages near Taji to the
north and Iskandariyah to the south. These two settlement belts provide
a great deal of support to the enemy operating in the capital. Diyala
province, which lies to the north and east of Baghdad, is another
important insurgent base. The Diyala River flows through its province's
capital city of Baquba and, finally, into the Tigris River just south
of Baghdad. Sunni rejectionists and al-Qaeda operatives follow the
Diyala River toward Baghdad and then, leaving its course, launch
strikes into the heart of Sadr City. Baghdad is, therefore, a nexus of
violence drawn from a number of regions outside the city. Baghdad also
contains its own internal violent dynamic into which these outside
forces flow.
The Enemy
There is violence in Iraq today because it suits certain groups and
individuals to disrupt the development of normal political and economic
life in that country through intimidation, terrorism, and killing.
Violence on this scale is not historically normal to Iraq (or virtually
any other country, for that matter), and it is not a force of nature.
Too often violent events in Iraq are reported in the passive voice, as
though no agent in particular caused them. This sense of directionless,
almost purposeless violence is one of the major factors hindering the
intelligent consideration of America's options in this conflict. Before
entering into the consideration of one such option, therefore, we must
first consider the enemies of peace and order in Iraq. These can be
broken into six main groups: Three Sunni Arab and three Shiite.
Sunni Arab Insurgent Groups. Sunni Arab violence in Iraq has gone
through three main phases. Even before coalition forces invaded in
March 2003, Saddam Hussein had prepared to sustain a guerrilla war if
he was attacked. He formed the Fedayeen Saddam, fighters trained and
motivated to conduct irregular warfare, and sprinkled them throughout
Iraq (most likely to suppress the Shiite insurgency he expected to
follow an American withdrawal, as had happened after the 1991
invasion). When major combat operations ended without securing much of
the country, these fighters joined thousands of soldiers and officers
of the defeated conventional army in an inchoate resistance. This
resistance was networked but not centrally directed, although Saddam
and his sons, Uday and Qusay, tried to organize it when they were in
hiding. When coalition forces killed Uday and Qusay in Mosul in July
2003 and captured Saddam in December 2003 near Tikrit, the Baathist
resistance was weakened but not destroyed. It continues to play an
important part in generating anticoalition violence, especially in
Anbar and Baghdad.
At the turn of 2004, however, a new force was emerging within the
Sunni Arab resistance--terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda in Iraq
(run by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi until his death in June 2006 and now by
Abu Ayyub al-Masri, also known as Abu Hamza al-Muhajer) and Ansar al-
Sunna. Al-Qaeda in Iraq focused its efforts on more spectacularly
violent and symbolic attacks, rather than conducting the smaller
attacks upon coalition troops using the improvised explosive devices
(IEDs) favored by the Baathists. Al-Qaeda in Iraq also favored
attacking Iraqi civilians and government leaders. Zarqawi struck Iraqis
who were cooperating with the government, but also attacked the Shiite
community aggressively with the avowed aim of provoking a Sunni-Shia
civil war. His efforts culminated with the destruction of the Golden
Mosque of Samarra in February 2006, which incited a dramatic increase
in the level of Sunni-Shia violence in Iraq, an increase that has
continued even after his death.
The increase in sectarian violence has spawned yet another type of
Sunni Arab group--vigilantes who organize as neighborhood defense
militias in Baghdad ostensibly to protect their areas from Shiite
attacks. These groups have formed primarily because American forces
have chosen not to provide security to the population and Iraqis have
been unable to do so; while Shiite militias (which this report will
consider presently) have ruthlessly targeted Sunni Arab civilians.
These groups tend to be self-organizing and to have more limited goals,
although some become tied to al-Qaeda in Iraq, Ansar al-Sunna,
Baathists, or other larger organizations. The rise of these vigilante
groups is in some respects the most disturbing phenomenon in Iraq. It
indicates a dramatic increase in popular participation in the struggle
and is a step on the road to the mobilization of the Iraqi population
for full-scale civil war. This vigilante violence is also more inchoate
and less subject to either negotiation or political control. It is an
extremely dangerous development that must be checked as rapidly as
possible.
The goals of these various groups are divergent but in some
respects complementary. The Baathists initially sought the restoration
of Saddam Hussein or one of their leaders to power. The trial and
execution of Saddam have largely eliminated that goal, but the Baathist
movement has resurrected itself as an Iraqi nationalist front aimed at
ridding Iraq of foreign ``occupying'' forces and restoring the rule of
the Sunni Arabs in some form. Baathists are also posing as defenders of
local populations against Shiite depredations. The absence of security
in Sunni neighborhoods makes this enemy's claim credible to local
populations and enables Baathists to recruit more insurgents to their
cause.
The ideology of al-Qaeda in Iraq and affiliated groups complements
that of the Baathists in some respects, but not in others. These
various groups agree that they want coalition forces out of Iraq and
the Sunni Arabs in control of the country. But whereas the Baathists
pursue a more secularist and nationalist agenda, the aim of al-Qaeda in
Iraq is to establish Taliban-style sharia government in Iraq. They hope
then to use Iraq as a base from which to expand their theocracy to
other Muslim states. Al-Qaeda in Iraq has been working tirelessly since
early 2004 to incite sectarian violence in the belief that it would
energize the Sunni community in Iraq and provide the terrorists with
the recruits they need to triumph there and elsewhere in the Muslim
world. To this end, they have focused on mass attacks against civilians
and major landmarks such as the Golden Mosque, while the Baathists have
focused much more heavily on coalition and Iraqi military targets. The
lines between these two groups are blurring, however, as the first
generation of fighters is being killed off and replaced by Sunni
nationalists with stronger Islamist leanings. It is becoming in some
ways more difficult rather than less to contemplate splitting these two
groups apart.
The aims of Sunni vigilante groups are more disparate and less
clear. Most were formed to protect local Sunni populations from Shiite
attacks, and that security function remains the core of their identity.
Some have taken advantage of opportunities to drive Shiites out of
their neighborhoods or nearby areas, contributing to the sectarian
cleansing in Baghdad. Some are drawn to the Baathist or terrorist
ideologies. These groups conduct small-scale attacks and are not
centralized or highly coordinated.
The Sunni Arab insurgent groups cooperate relatively well despite
disagreements about their ultimate aims. This cooperation results
mainly from their shared sense that the Sunni community is under attack
and fighting for its survival. The secular Baathists, Islamist
terrorists, and vigilante groups could not form a coherent political
program and would not try to do so. Baathists and Islamists cooperate
in attacking coalition targets, but even within the Islamist community
there is growing disagreement about the desirability or morality of
attacking Iraqi civilians--al-Qaeda in Iraq continues to pursue this
approach, but Ansar al-Sunna rejects it. Vigilante groups attack Shiite
civilians in the name of self-defense because of the lack of security
in and around their communities. As long as the Sunni Arabs feel
besieged and beleaguered, attempts to splinter these groups politically
are unlikely to be successful despite the differences in their aims and
targeting preferences. All of them draw great strength and their main
recruiting tools from the violence in Iraq and the growing sectarian
struggle. They are not likely to abandon their own use of force as long
as that violence remains at a high enough level to justify their
actions as attempts to defend the Sunni Arab community from attack
while they further their own ideological objectives.
Shiite Insurgent Groups. The Shiite political community in Iraq is
broken into a number of significant groups and parties, but Shiite
insurgents generally fall into one of three groups. The Jaysh al-Mahdi
(Mahdi Army) is nominally under the control of renegade cleric Moqtada
al-Sadr. This group took to the streets in large numbers in 2004,
especially in its strongholds of Najaf and Karbala, from which it was
cleared by a large scale yet careful coalition military operation. The
Badr Corps is the military arm of the Supreme Council for Islamic
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), of which Abdul Aziz al-Hakim is the leader.
This group was formed and supported by Iran in the 1980s and continues
to maintain close ties to Tehran, although the degree of Iran's control
of SCIRI and the Badr Corps is unclear. The third group of Shiite
fighters is the vigilantes who have sprung up in Sadr City and Shiite
and mixed neighborhoods in Baghdad, much as the Sunni vigilante groups
have grown in this period of chaos.
The Badr Corps and the Jaysh al-Mahdi share some goals and
concerns, but not others. They both seek to establish Shiite sharia law
in Iraq and to ensure Shiite domination of the country. They are both
concerned about Sunni rejectionism and the Sunni insurgency, which has
provided the principal justification for their efforts to recruit and
maintain their militias. Al-Qaeda in Iraq's relentless attacks on
Shiite civilians have powerfully supported their justification and
aided their recruiting.
Hakim and Sadr also agree in principle that the coalition forces
should withdraw rapidly, but they do not agree on the importance of
this objective or the need to take action to secure it. Sadr has long
identified the U.S. presence as an intolerable violation of Iraq's
sovereignty, and his forces have often attacked coalition forces in an
effort to force them to withdraw. Hakim and SCIRI have taken a much
more moderate approach. They understand that the aims of coalition
policy in Iraq would leave the Shiites in control of the country, and
they are more tolerant of the presence of coalition forces that keep
the Sunni insurgency under control. They have been far less aggressive
about attacking coalition forces. Both groups have, however,
consistently supported the killing and torture of Sunni Arabs to
cleanse areas and neighborhoods and create solid blocks of Shiite
habitation.
The Jaysh al-Mahdi and the Badr Corps will be the main military
rivals for power in a post-U.S. Iraq. Both observed the destruction of
Sadr's militia in 2004 and are reluctant to repeat that experience
because of the need to maintain their military force for use against
one another in the expected battle for dominance after the United
States leaves. This rivalry, which is manifested on the political as
well as the military plane, hinders the cooperation of these two
groups, which are also increasingly separate geographically: The Jaysh
al-Mahdi is based in Sadr City, whereas the main strength of the Badr
Corps is in the southern part of Iraq.
The political aims, rivalries, and maneuverings of the Jaysh al-
Mahdi and the Badr Corps are far removed from the aims of most of the
Shiite vigilante groups operating in Baghdad. Like their Sunni
counterparts, these groups are mainly concerned with defending their
neighborhoods against Sunni (especially al-Qaeda in Iraq) attacks. They
also opportunistically engage in sectarian cleansing and ``reprisal''
attacks (often the same thing). The strength and organization of the
Jaysh al-Mahdi and the Badr Corps makes it easier for Shiite vigilante
groups to cohere. Yet, as with all vigilante groups, negotiation and
political accommodation with local fighters is unlikely to be
productive by itself because they are responding to localized violence.
Crime. It is important to understand that a significant part of the
violence in Iraq is not orchestrated by any political group at all, but
is simply the crime and gang violence that flourishes in the absence of
order and government control. This problem is not restricted to Baghdad
or Anbar, moreover. The British raid against the aptly named ``serious
crimes unit'' in Basra in December 2006 underlines the breadth of the
difficulty. Many individuals and groups throughout Iraq have taken
advantage of the government's weakness to organize kidnapping rings,
smuggling rings, and other criminal enterprises. With much of the Iraqi
police force either engaged in sectarian violence or criminality, or
else devoted to the counterinsurgency effort, rule of law in Iraq is
extremely weak. Both insurgents and criminals have deeply infiltrated
the police and partially infiltrated the army, underscoring in a
different way the impossibility of handing responsibility for security
and maintaining the rule of law to either organization very rapidly.
Criminal activity is not merely a problem for civil society in
Iraq, however. It also supports the insurgency. A significant portion
of the insurgency's financial resources comes from criminal activities
of one sort or another--including a variety of scams that divert
revenue from the oil industry into insurgent coffers. Insurgents and
criminals can also hide behind one another, confusing efforts to
identify the agent behind particular murders and other sorts of
attacks. Criminality is an important issue for coalition forces in Iraq
that must be addressed in order to improve the overall security and
political situations.
THE PLAN
No military operation by itself can resolve Iraq's problems.
Success in Iraq can only emerge when political, economic, diplomatic,
and reconciliation initiatives resolve underlying tensions and
grievances and give the Iraqi people reason to accept the legitimacy of
their government. The security situation in Iraq and particularly
Baghdad is so grave, however, that political, economic, diplomatic, and
reconciliation initiatives will fail unless a well-conceived and
properly supported military operation secures the population first and
quickly. The purpose of this operation is to reduce sectarian violence
to levels low enough to permit political and economic development,
reconciliation, and the recruitment and training of an Iraqi Army and
police force with an appropriate regional and sectarian balance. This
report focuses on military operations in and around Baghdad because the
security situation there is deteriorating quickly and requires the
urgent attention of the United States Armed Forces. Subsequent working
groups and reports will consider initiatives vital to allowing the
Iraqis to take control of their country, armed forces, and security;
political developments; and regional issues. The emphasis on military
operations in this first phase of this project does not indicate any
denigration of the importance of the nonmilitary elements of a solution
to the crisis in Iraq.
Why Baghdad?
From the standpoint of security and violence, Iraq consists of
three zones. The Kurdish provinces to the north are extremely secure--
violence is rare and economic development (fueled by the period of de
facto autonomy in the 1990s) is well underway. Most of the Shiite
provinces to the south of Baghdad are very secure, although Basra still
faces a worrisome amount of violence and criminality. The vast majority
of attacks occur in the four provinces of Anbar, Baghdad, Salaheddin,
and Diyala, with Ninawa a more distant fifth. Polling data partially
reflect this distribution of attacks: Iraqis in the Shiite south and
Kurdish north overwhelmingly feel safe in their neighborhoods, while
those in the five violent provinces feel extremely unsafe.
Of these provinces, Anbar, Baghdad, and Diyala are currently of
greatest concern. Salaheddin, which contains Saddam Hussein's hometown
near Tikrit as well as Samarra, has been the scene of a large number of
attacks, but it contains relatively few large concentrated settlements
and is relatively farther from Baghdad. Ninawa is worrisome because it
contains Mosul, one of Iraq's largest mixed cities, but the clear-and-
hold operation that began in Tall Afar in September 2005 has reduced
the violence in this province greatly. Anbar has been a hotbed of the
insurgency almost from its outset, and two of its major cities,
Fallujah and Ramadi, have been centers of the fight against Sunni Arab
rejectionists since early 2004. Anbar serves as a base of Sunni
fighters who move into and attack targets in Baghdad. Diyala has also
become a critical battleground, especially the city of Baquba, where
Zarqawi was found and killed in June 2006. It is a mixed province in
which considerable sectarian cleansing and displacement have occurred;
and it is close enough to Baghdad that fighters on both sides commute
between the two cities. Diyala province is also becoming a significant
al-Qaeda base from which the enemy launches attacks against Shiites in
Sadr City, Baghdad.
Before the effects of the Samarra mosque bombing had become clear,
it might have been reasonable to consider operations along the
Euphrates, Tigris, and Diyala River valleys (that is, in Anbar, Ninawa,
Salaheddin, and Diyala provinces), postponing the more difficult task
of clearing and holding Baghdad. The rise of sectarian violence within
the capital and the repeated declarations of all sides that Baghdad is
the key to victory or defeat have removed this alternative option. The
violence in the central areas of Iraq is now so high that few reporters
venture far from the Green Zone. Consequently, events within a
relatively small area of the capital now disproportionately shape the
world's perceptions of the situation in the country. It is necessary to
focus on securing these areas in order to retain the American people's
support for the war and increase international support. More
importantly, it is necessary to prevent the sectarian cleansing in the
heart of Baghdad from spreading further through the rest of Iraq. The
populations of other mixed cities, such as Mosul, Kirkuk, and Tall
Afar, are watching how the coalition forces and Iraqi Government
respond to sectarian violence in Baghdad. If Baghdad is truly cleansed
and divided, then similar sectarian violence will follow in these other
mixed cities. The result will be a bloody civil war that permanently
destroys any concept of Iraq as a mixed state. For good or for ill, the
decisive struggle in this war will be played out in Iraq's capital.
Any plan for bringing security to Iraq must therefore address
Baghdad first of all, but it cannot entirely neglect Anbar and Diyala
provinces, which are tied so tightly to the challenges of Baghdad. This
report, therefore, identifies Baghdad as the main effort to which all
necessary resources should be devoted, and it identifies operations in
Anbar and possibly Diyala as supporting efforts--secondary operations
that help to accomplish the main effort but receive just enough force
to succeed without compromising the main effort.
Forces Required
Having identified Baghdad as the main effort, we can then consider
the problem of securing that city in more detail. There is considerable
theory and historical evidence about the numbers of troops required to
provide security to a given population in a counterinsurgency. The
military's counterinsurgency manual concludes that a ratio of one
soldier for every 40 or 50 inhabitants provides a good rule of thumb
for such calculations. COL H.R. McMaster and the 3rd Armored Cavalry
Regiment used a ratio of about 1 soldier per every 40 inhabitants to
secure Tall Afar in 2005. American soldiers and marines in Ramadi have
made considerable progress in securing that city, although much lower
force ratios have slowed and limited that progress. MG Peter Chiarelli
put down the Sadrist uprising in Sadr City in mid-2004, on the other
hand, with one division (under 20,000 soldiers) in a population of over
2 million.
The population of Baghdad is around 6 million, which would require,
in theory, around 150,000 counterinsurgents to maintain security. It is
neither necessary nor wise to try to clear and hold the entire city all
at once, however. The Jaysh al-Mahdi based in Sadr City has
demonstrated its reluctance to engage in a full-scale conflict with
American forces, ever since coalition forces defeated Moqtada al-Sadr
and his army in Najaf in the summer of 2004. Rather, the Jaysh al-Mahdi
now needs to preserve its fighters in order to maintain its strength
against the Badr Corps in the struggle for control of post-coalition
Iraq. Attempting to clear Sadr City at this moment would almost
certainly force the Jaysh al-Mahdi, into precisely such a confrontation
with American troops, however. It would also do enormous damage to
Prime Minister Nouri Kamel al-Maliki's political base and would
probably lead to the collapse of the Iraqi Government. Clearing Sadr
City is both unwise and unnecessary at this time.
Many attacks against Sunni neighborhoods in Baghdad emanate from
Sadr City. There are two ways to resolve that problem. The first is to
attack Sadr City by targeting known militia bases and concentrations
with discrete strikes. This option initially requires the fewest number
of forces. But such operations would almost certainly provoke a massive
political and military conflagration. They ultimately will demand high
force concentrations and generate instability in the current Iraqi
Government, as described above. This option is, therefore, extremely
risky. It would be better, instead, to secure the Sunni and mixed
Sunni-Shia neighborhoods by deploying American and Iraqi forces into
them and protecting their inhabitants from all violent attacks coming
from any area. This second approach also accords with sound
counterinsurgency practice, which favors defensive strategies aimed at
protecting the population over offensive strategies aimed at killing
insurgents.
The first phase of this plan, therefore, excludes military
operations within Sadr City and focuses on securing the Sunni and mixed
Sunni-Shia neighborhoods around the Green Zone and between that area
and Baghdad International Airport/Camp Victory. This approach
establishes security among a population of perhaps 2 million people,
which would require, according to historical norms, between 40,000 and
50,000 counterinsurgent troops. Generating proper force ratios to
secure the population in these neighborhoods is much more feasible than
generating the force ratios to confront the Jaysh al-Mahdi in Sadr City
or to secure the entire population of Baghdad at once. Yet securing the
population in these neighborhoods is likely to reduce levels of
violence elsewhere in Baghdad.
The working group also calculated the forces required for this
operation in another way. The area we have identified as being the
``critical terrain'' in Baghdad (because of its mixed ethnicity and its
geographic centrality) consists of about 23 districts. Clearing and
holding a city district in Baghdad requires an American force of about
one battalion (approximately 600 soldiers organized into four companies
of about 150 soldiers each). We have considerable evidence about what
force levels are necessary for such operations because of recent and
current operations in Baghdad. There is now about one battalion
deployed in the district of Dora (the area south of the Karadah
Peninsula just south of the Green Zone). Dora is a very dangerous
neighborhood that is difficult to control, and the troops there are
barely managing. Dora would benefit from reinforcements or from having
the adjoining areas brought more securely under control. Many other
neighborhoods that would be cleared under this proposal would require
fewer troops because they are less violent and large; some might
require more. On balance, current operations suggest that one battalion
per district would provide a sufficient overall force level to bring
the violence in these 23 districts under control.
There are three battalions in an Army Brigade Combat Team or BCT,
which, together with all of its supportinng elements, numbers around
5,000 soldiers. Twenty-three districts would require eight BCTs (which
would leave one battalion to spare as a Reserve), or around 40,000
soldiers. Since operations would be going on around the Green Zone and
Camp Victory, it would be necessary to maintain additional forces to
guard and garrison those areas, amounting to perhaps another BCT, for a
total of nine (around 45,000 troops total).
Whether we calculate the forces necessary based on historical
ratios or on units engaged in current operations, the results are very
similar: We can reasonably expect that between 40,000 and 50,000
soldiers could establish and maintain security in the 23 critical Sunni
and mixed districts in the center of Baghdad in the first phase of an
operation aimed at ending violence in the city, securing its
population, and securing Iraq.
Current and Proposed Deployments
The United States currently has approximately 140,000 troops in
Iraq, including about 70,000 in 13 Army Brigade Combat Teams and two
Marine Regimental Combat Teams (RCTs--the Marines slightly smaller
equivalent of brigades). Of the remaining 70,000 soldiers, many are
engaged in the enormous task of providing supplies to coalition
soldiers and to the 134,000 soldiers in the Iraqi Army, who are almost
entirely dependent on American logistics to survive and operate. A
large number of American troops are engaged in securing the long lines
of communication from Kuwait to Baghdad (600 miles) and from there to
U.S. forward operating bases (FOBs) around the country. Around 6,000
soldiers are now involved in training Iraqi Army and police units as
well. The BCTs and RCTs are the forces that would be used in clearing
and holding Baghdad, so the rest of this report will focus on them,
recognizing that the number of these units significantly
underrepresents the total size of the American combat presence in Iraq.
Seven BCTs, the largest concentration of the BCTs and RCTs now in
Iraq, operate in and around Baghdad. Five BCTs operate within the city
itself (although they mostly live on FOBs in the city's suburbs and
drive to their areas of operations to conduct patrols). One BCT
operates in the insurgent belts to the north around Taji and the
remaining BCT operates in the belts to the south around Iskandariyah
(the so-called Triangle of Death). Two Marine RCTs and one Army BCT
operate in Anbar. Their bases are located in Ramadi, Fallujah, and Al
Asad. The remaining five Army BCTs operate mostly to the north of
Baghdad in Ninawa, Salaheddin, and Diyala provinces in cities like
Mosul, Tikrit, Samarra, and Baquba.
An Army National Guard Brigade is stationed in a static defensive
position in Kuwait guarding the enormous supply and training areas
there. Recent news reports suggest that a brigade of the 82nd Airborne
Division has been ordered to Kuwait as well, although the purpose of
that deployment is not clear at the time that this report is being
written. The BCT of the 82nd Airborne Division might be deployed to
Iraq to engage in combat missions there in the near future; the
National Guard brigade could not leave Kuwait without endangering the
security of U.S. supply lines and bases.
The current deployment of U.S. forces in and around Baghdad,
therefore, provides approximately four BCTs (12 battalions or about
20,000 troops in all) for conducting combat operations in the city. The
equivalent of one BCT is required for base security. Such a force level
is evidently inadequate for clearing and holding any sizable portion of
Baghdad. The Army and Marine presence in Anbar is inadequate to
maintain even the most basic security in that province. The situation
in Diyala is almost as dire. Pulling troops from either province to
reinforce operations in Baghdad would almost surely lead to the further
collapse of those regions. Salaheddin is similarly problematic, while
security in Ninawa is extremely precarious. Any attempt to concentrate
forces in Baghdad by moving them from elsewhere in Iraq would
precipitate greater violence in the outlying areas. Such violence would
eventually move down the river valleys to Baghdad and undermine
attempts to succeed in the capital, as occurred in 2004. This plan
will, therefore, require a deployment of at least four Army Brigade
Combat Teams (approximately 20,000 soldiers) into Baghdad from outside
Iraq.
Because of the close relationship between the insurgency in Anbar
and the violence in Baghdad, it would be desirable to address both
areas at once. In reality, the United States simply cannot make
available enough forces to bring Anbar under control at the same time
as it tries to secure the critical neighborhoods of Baghdad. A
deployment of additional troops into Baghdad will, nevertheless, both
generate and suffer from spillover effects in Anbar. This very real
risk calls for a preplanned response. This report, therefore, proposes
to add two additional Marine RCTs to the two RCTs and one Army BCT that
are already in Anbar. This force (five brigade-equivalents, or about
18,000 soldiers and marines) is too small to secure the major cities in
Anbar, let alone the entire province. Five brigade-equivalents would,
however, suffice to cover the roads from Anbar to Baghdad, intercept
insurgents, and prevent the establishment of new rebel strongholds in
the province. Such operations would properly support the main effort in
Baghdad by controlling spillover effects.
The commander on the ground in Iraq could use the two additional
RCTs designated for Anbar elsewhere, of course. It might prove more
important to interdict movement between Diyala and Baghdad than to
reinforce American troops now in Anbar. In the worst case, the
commander could move these regiments into the capital if unexpectedly
high violence erupted in Baghdad itself during the clear-and-hold
operation there. By deploying these two additional RCTs into Iraq, the
commander on the ground will gain the flexibility to respond to
unforeseen difficulties or opportunities in and around Baghdad without
having to accept any additional risk in outlying areas.
The Army Brigade in Anbar, finally, was initially deployed to Iraq
in January 2006. By the time the recommended operations would begin, it
will have been in Iraq for nearly 15 months. This plan, therefore,
proposes to send a fresh Army BCT into Anbar to replace that unit,
which has already had its tour extended. It would require a total
deployment of five Army BCTs and two Marine RCTs in addition to the
forces already in Iraq. In an emergency, of course, the commander in
Iraq could keep the existing brigade in Anbar and use the brigade
designated to replace it as a further Reserve for deployment in Baghdad
or elsewhere. The plan, therefore, commits four additional BCTs into
Baghdad, designates two RCTs for Anbar but makes them available
elsewhere if necessary, and designates one BCT that could be used as a
Reserve in an emergency.
Clearing and Holding
What actually happens on the ground determines whether this or any
plan succeeds or fails. American forces have gained considerable
expertise in clearing and holding operations in Iraq from their
failures, such as the first Battle of Fallujah in April 2004, and from
their successes, such as operations in Tall Afar in September 2005.
(The report discusses the general character and specific phases of
clear-and-hold operations in several sections below.) Recent operations
in Baghdad emphasize the skill with which U.S. troops can clear enemies
from urban areas. In 2006, American forces in Baghdad conducted
Operation Together Forward (OTF) in two phases: The first from June 14
to July 24, 2006; the second from August 1 through October 24, 2006. In
both operations, the clear phase went well. Violence dropped in cleared
neighborhoods and some economic activity resumed.
But the U.S. command committed inadequate combat power to hold
operations, relying instead on Iraqi police and soldiers to maintain
the security that joint U.S. and Iraqi patrols had established. The
United States added two brigades (fewer than 10,000 troops) to support
the first phase of OTF and one brigade (plus additional detachments
coming to around 7,000 soldiers) to support the second. Because there
were too few American troops, and because American commanders wished to
rely heavily on Iraqi forces, U.S. troops did not remain in cleared
neighborhoods either to defend them or to support and improve the Iraqi
forces trying to maintain order there. The different Sunni and Shiite
enemy groups made a point of surging into the cleared but undefended
neighborhoods to demonstrate the futility of the operations, and they
also attacked neighborhoods that were not being cleared by American and
Iraqi troops. Violence overall in Baghdad soared.
The plan proposed in this report would use established practices
for clearing neighborhoods, but would provide adequate American forces
to hold them, in partnership with Iraqi forces. American units remain
in neighborhoods to secure the population and to support and strengthen
Iraqi forces until they are able to hold the area without coalition
support. These undertakings are firmly in accord with recommended
counterinsurgency doctrine.
Clearing operations generally proceed as follows. American troops
partner with Iraqi troops before the operation. They plan the operation
and train for it together. Since American and Iraqi units are already
operating throughout Baghdad's neighborhoods, they gather intelligence
in the targeted area prior to the operation. They determine the enemy's
strength and disposition, how the enemy is organized and conducts
operations, and so on. When the operation begins, joint U.S.-Iraqi
teams isolate the district through checkpoints and other outposts,
patrols, surveillance, and obstacles. American and Iraqi infantry then
sweep through the district. They cordon off each house or apartment
block and then knock on the door, asking to examine the inside. If they
are granted permission, they enter politely and then examine every part
of the structure for weapons caches and evidence of enemy activity. The
Iraqi forces with them provide a vital cultural interface with the
inhabitants both by communicating with them and by sensing
irregularities. On the rare occasions when the occupants attempt to
refuse permission to examine the house, Iraqi and U.S. soldiers enter
by force and continue their search.
When every structure in the district (including every mosque) has
been searched and all weapons caches and suspicious individuals have
been removed, neither the American nor the Iraqi soldiers leave the
neighborhood. Instead, they establish permanent positions in disused
factories, houses, apartments, government buildings, and, if necessary,
schools (although coalition forces prefer to avoid occupying schools
because it sends a bad signal to the neighborhood). American and Iraqi
teams man each position jointly. They allow traffic into the
neighborhood to resume, although they continue to man joint outposts at
critical intersections. They conduct regular joint foot and vehicle
patrols throughout the neighborhood, maintaining contact with the local
population and establishing trust. Over time, U.S. forces will assist
Iraqis in developing comprehensive, sustainable human intelligence
networks in the area.
The tactics described above are illustrative, not prescriptive.
They are based on practices that American units have used in Iraq in
the past. Commanders will apply techniques appropriate to the areas in
which they are operating. Every such combined operation requires that
American forces, Iraqi Army units, and Iraqi police formations all work
toward a common goal and within a single command structure. Unity of
effort is essential for success in this kind of endeavor.
According to military officers who have experience with clearing
operations in Iraq, after 2 weeks of improved security and continued
force presence, the local people typically begin providing the
coalition forces in their neighborhoods with valuable tactical
intelligence. As the enemy attempts to reinfiltrate the neighborhood,
locals report some of them. Savvy Iraqi or even American soldiers note
new faces and begin to ask questions. When bombs or IEDs go off, locals
reveal the perpetrators. Before long, they begin to warn coalition
troops when LEDs have been placed. At that point, violence begins to
drop significantly and economic and political progress can begin.
There is nothing novel about this approach to counterinsurgency. It
has been practiced in some form in almost every successful
counterinsurgent operation. It was successful on a local level in
Vietnam in the form of the Combined Action Platoon (CAP) program, which
many observers felt should have been extended to more of that country.
It has worked in Tall Afar and, insofar as it was applied, even in
Baghdad. It is working now in Ramadi and in south Baghdad. If properly
resourced, it can bring large sections of the capital under control.
Curiously, though proven effective, this approach runs counter to
the current MNF-I concept of disengaging from populated areas and
rapidly handing over security responsibility to Iraqi forces of dubious
capability.
It is vital to sustain the hold part of the operation for months
after the initial clearing operation. Previous failed clear-and-hold
operations in Iraq suggest that the enemy can reinfiltrate a cleared
area in about 90 days. Within 6 months, the enemy can be operating
openly once more. In a dense urban environment like Baghdad, the enemy
can reconstitute even faster. In addition, the enemy in Iraq has
historically pursued a pattern of going to ground when coalition forces
are present and waiting for them to leave. By withdrawing American
troops from the hold phase of an operation too quickly, the United
States plays into this enemy strategy. Any sound clear-and-hold
approach, therefore, will require the presence of significant American
forces in neighborhoods, supporting and strengthening Iraqi troops and
police, for at least 9-12 months after the start of operations.
Training
This long-hold period allows time for Iraqi troops and police to
gain the capability and confidence they need reliably to assume
responsibility for maintaining secured areas. Phase II of this project
will address the challenges of training Iraqi military and police
forces in greater detail, but some observations are appropriate here.
Discussions of military policy in Iraq frequently present efforts
to train Iraqi forces as antithetical to efforts to use American forces
to help bring security to the Iraqi people. The Iraq Study Group report
and several other proposals emphasizing training Iraqis have suggested
increasing the number of U.S. soldiers embedded within Iraqi units and
decreasing the number of Americans actually conducting operations.
These proposals claim that increasing the number of embedded trainers
will accelerate the training of Iraqi units. Such ideas ignore a
critical fact joint, sustained clear-and-hold operations that involve
both Americans and Iraqis working in partnership are one of the most
effective ways to train Iraqi units rapidly and to a high standard.
To begin with, the United States has a small pool of soldiers whose
job is to train indigenous troops--the Special Forces (which was
created in the 1960s to perform this mission). Those soldiers spend
their careers learning how to train others, and they are superb at it.
In the past year, however, Special Forces have come to concentrate more
heavily on what is called ``direct action''--tracking terrorists,
kicking in doors, and seizing enemies. The large size of the Iraqi
Army, furthermore, requires more trainers than the Special Forces can
provide. For both reasons, the training mission in Iraq has been given
to soldiers drawn from the conventional forces, both Active Duty and
National Guard. These soldiers receive some training in how to train
Iraqis and then embed with Iraqi units to accomplish their task.
America's flexible and creative soldiers respond well to this
challenge, but the skills of the conventional forces soldiers detailed
to this task are generally lower than those of the Special Forces
troops specifically trained for it. Although the U.S. Army is now
training more conventional soldiers for these responsibilities, it
cannot do so fast enough to embed enough trained, conventional soldiers
with Iraqi units rapidly. The more the United States tries to
accelerate training Iraqi units by embedding soldiers, the lower the
average quality of that training will be.
This kind of training also takes a much larger toll on the American
ground forces than most people imagine. The number of embedded trainers
is small compared to the total number of U.S. forces in Iraq, but the
effect on the Army is disproportionately high. Training teams have a
high proportion of officers and noncommissioned officers and a
relatively small complement of enlisted soldiers. Each training team,
therefore, effectively removes the leadership cadre of an American
battalion. The enlisted personnel of the battalion will often have
remained behind, and so the battalion is not counted as being
``deployed,'' but neither can it be used for combat without the
replacement of its leadership team. This process is having an important
negative effect on the deployability of units in the Army that would
appear on paper to be usable.
Iraqi units operating together with American units learn a great
deal very quickly. They interact with U.S. command teams as they plan
operations, and then they execute those operations alongside the best
and most professional soldiers in the world. There is no substitute for
this kind of training. It is one thing for an advisor to describe what
to do; it is another to watch a superb soldier and unit do it expertly.
If the only training of Iraqi troops is being conducted by embedded
American trainers, Iraqis will never see what excellence looks like.
When they fight alongside excellent soldiers, they see it vividly and
understand better what to aim for. Combined clear-and-hold operations
are an essential means for bringing the Iraqi Army up to the necessary
levels of capability as quickly as possible.
THE ENEMY'S RESPONSES
The enemy will respond to American and Iraqi efforts to establish
security in Baghdad. No one can predict their response with certainty,
but after nearly 4 years in this struggle planners can observe the
patterns in their behavior that suggest their likely reactions.
Different groups will, of course, respond differently to ongoing
operations. Above all, the action of clearing and holding a large part
of central Baghdad will change the relationship between groups and even
the political dynamics within Iraq. This report will not consider these
second-order effects in detail, but subsequent phases of the project
will do so. For now this report remains focused on the most essential
task facing the U.S. and Iraqi governments today: Defeating enemy
attempts to disrupt our efforts to establish security.
General Enemy Responses
The clear-and-hold operation occurs in four main phases: (1) The
deployment of U.S. and Iraqi forces to their designated areas, (2) the
establishment of those forces in their areas and efforts to acquire
necessary intelligence and physical bases from which to conduct
operations, (3) the clearing of the neighborhoods, and (4) holding
cleared areas. This report first considers the possible reactions of
all enemy groups taken together in each phase and then the possible
reactions of each individual group separately. The report will consider
what each enemy is most likely to do, and what actions each enemy could
undertake that would most endanger the mission and American interests.
Phase I: Deployment and Marshalling of Resources. This phase
extends from the announcement of the President's intention to conduct
clear-and-hold operations until all units involved in that operation
are physically on the ground in and around Baghdad and Anbar. In
general terms, this is a dangerous time. The President will have
announced his intentions, but American reinforcements will not yet have
arrived in theater. Enemy groups might take advantage of this interval
to increase sectarian cleansing and to establish themselves in strong
positions in targeted neighborhoods in the hopes of making the clearing
operations too painful for U.S. forces to conduct. This is the most
dangerous course of action they could take, but it is not the most
likely if the President acts quickly and decisively and forces arrive
in theater before spring. Many enemies in Iraq are fair-weather foes:
Violence generally drops after Ramadan and remains relatively lower
through the winter. It is most likely that the enemy will conduct an
expanded propaganda campaign aimed at intimidating civilians and
raising enemy morale during the first phase of American operations.
The best coalition responses include developing an effective and
clear information campaign that underlines the scale, duration, and
determination of the coming effort; stepping up the ``presence
patrols'' of units already in Baghdad; emphasizing that the aim of
coming operations is to protect civilians of all sects and ethnicities;
and countering enemy disinformation. To prevent sabotage in future
phases, coalition forces must secure the resources needed for
reconstruction and reconstitution of police in the targeted areas.
Phase II: Preparation. In this phase, coalition units begin to
arrive in their designated areas. They start developing intelligence,
establishing relationships with the population and ISF, and assessing
the overall situation. Extremists are likely to respond by increasing
the number of suicide bombings and targeted murders of civilians. Local
vigilante groups are more likely to go to ground and avoid direct
confrontations with coalition forces. Rather, these groups will rely on
indirect attacks on coalition forces, including IEDs and mortar fire.
They may also attack civilians. Some enemy groups may attempt to move
from threatened districts to areas they perceive as safer and wait out
the operation. U.S. forces must anticipate such movements, and units
must be prepared to conduct raids and other short operations to deny
the enemy safe haven in other areas. Most enemies will continue their
efforts to infiltrate the Iraqi Army and police units in their areas.
During this phase, the most damaging actions the enemy could take
would be to surge the level of their violence dramatically in an effort
to discredit the security effort and the Iraqi Government, to complete
sectarian cleansing campaigns, and to intimidate the population. This
course of action is less likely because most insurgent groups have only
a limited capability to surge on short notice, because most will avoid
using up all available fighters and suicide bombers at the outset of a
campaign, and because U.S. and Iraqi forces are already present and
patrolling in Baghdad. The appropriate coalition response is again to
increase presence and patrols throughout the capital, especially in the
areas beyond those designated for clearing operations, in order to deny
the enemy safe havens. The coalition will also have to conduct an
intelligent information campaign that makes clear that the violence is
the result of an increase in insurgent attacks aimed at harming the
Iraqi people, but that future operations will end the violence
permanently. The coalition must also be prepared for humanitarian
efforts to handle increased refugee flows within Baghdad and beyond.
Phase III: Clearing. The insurgents in Iraq have fallen into a
pattern in response to clear-and-hold operations. At the beginning of
such operations, they normally surge their attacks and target both
coalition forces and Iraqi civilians. They bring in specialized
capabilities, such as snipers and IED cells, to inflict casualties on
American and Iraqi forces in order to test their resolve. When it
becomes clear that the coalition intends to pursue the operation, most
enemy groups then go to ground. They use contacts in the Iraqi
Government to attempt to discredit the operation, constrain it, or
cancel it altogether. They expect that any clearing operation will be
short-lived, and that U.S. forces will leave vulnerable Iraqi Army and
police forces unsupported when the operations end. They, therefore,
conserve their fighters and weapons while the Americans are present.
They anticipate unleashing them on the civilian population if political
efforts to forestall the operation fail or Iraqi forces and Americans
leave. This surge--go to ground--surge pattern is the likeliest enemy
response to the clearing operations proposed in this report.
It requires careful consideration and response. First and foremost,
the American Government and the American people, as well as the Iraqi
Government and the Iraqi people, must understand the importance of
seeing the clear-and-hold operation through to its conclusion. If the
operation begins in March and violence begins to wane in May, the
governments and publics cannot, thereby, conclude that the operation
has succeeded beyond expectations and start to wind down. The United
States must continue to maintain its forces to support Iraqi troops in
their hold operations for months after violence in cleared
neighborhoods has begun to fall, because the odds are that the enemy is
trying to husband its resources for a future attack when U.S. forces
leave.
In addition, the American and Iraqi Governments and people must
recognize that a surge in enemy violence later in 2007 is very likely
even if this operation is successful. The insurgents regularly increase
the level of their violence in Ramadan each year. If this operation
begins in March and violence wanes through the summer, it is very
likely that the violence will escalate again in the fall. This pattern
is normal and to be expected. To the extent that a reduction in
violence is the measure of success of this operation, we must be
prepared to compare Ramadan 2007 with Ramadan 2006 rather than with
June or July 2007.
It should be possible, moreover, to mitigate the magnitude of the
late-2007 enemy surge. American forces working with Iraqis in permanent
positions in cleared neighborhoods will acquire a great deal of
intelligence about the enemy. They will be able to identify and stop
many attempts to infiltrate cleared neighborhoods again. As they gain
the trust of the population, they will receive more information about
enemies who escaped when the area was cleared. They will locate more
weapons caches and limit the flow of new weapons into the neighborhood.
Long-term presence will help reduce the enemy's ability to launch new
attacks later in the year.
During the third phase, the most dangerous course of action the
enemy might take is an Iraqi equivalent of the Tet offensive, in which
all or most enemy groups converge on coalition forces in large-scale
and spectacular attacks. Enemy groups conduct mass-casualty attacks on
mixed neighborhoods that coalition forces are attempting to clear,
suborn Iraqi security forces, and launch high-profile attacks in other
Iraqi cities. Some enemy groups might assassinate prominent civil or
religious leaders or destroy important religious landmarks.
This course of action is less likely because it requires the
insurgents to expend most of their fighters and weapons rapidly at the
beginning of the operation, something they have generally avoided in
the past. It can be countered by ensuring that clearing operations
proceed rapidly and simultaneously in multiple neighborhoods. The
coalition must also devote particular attention to protecting likely
high-profile targets in Baghdad and around the country. The United
States must maintain a sizable Reserve to offset the danger that the
enemy might attempt to generate high levels of violence in
neighborhoods or cities that are not being cleared. American commanders
must have uncommitted troops that can be sent to troubled areas rapidly
and on short notice without detracting from the main effort to clear
the designated communities. If U.S. commanders attempt to conduct this
operation with precisely the number of soldiers they think they might
need to clear neighborhoods, but do not retain a substantial Reserve,
they entice the enemy to choose this most dangerous option and severely
constrain their own ability to respond to this contingency. A
significant Reserve (at least one brigade combat team) is an essential
component of this or any sound plan.
Phase IV: Hold and Build. By this phase of the operation, U.S. and
Iraqi forces will have examined every structure in a neighborhood,
removed all weapons caches that they have identified, and detained many
suspicious individuals, some of whom will turn out to be members of
enemy groups. The hold-and-build phase of this operation is one of the
most dangerous for the population of the cleared neighborhood. The
detainment of suspicious individuals involves removing many of the
young, tough, armed men who were defending the neighborhood from
outside attack (whatever violence of their own they might have been
committing). Unless the coalition maintains a robust armed presence in
the cleared area, the remaining inhabitants--disproportionately
including the elderly, women, and children--will be highly vulnerable
to enemy strikes.
Past clearing operations followed by premature American withdrawals
have conditioned enemies to wait for this phase to strike.
Consequently, this plan argues that enemy groups are likely to revert
to their past pattern of surging violently, going to ground, and
subsequently surging very violently. Once the insurgents find that
American forces are remaining in force in cleared neighborhoods, they
will probably adopt a different approach. Surging fighters and weapons
into protected neighborhoods exposes the insurgents to losses without
giving them any benefits. They are more likely, therefore, to increase
the number of high casualty attacks, especially vehicle-borne IEDs
(VBIEDs or car bombs) and suicide bombers. It is extremely difficult to
stop all such attacks, and some will inevitably reach their targets. If
they are relatively low in number and isolated rather than massed, then
they will not likely be sufficient to derail reconstruction and
political development. Active patrolling, intelligence-gathering, and
control of critical access points can help reduce the number and
effectiveness of such attacks.
The enemy is likely, then, to attempt to move into uncleared
neighborhoods and destabilize them by striking less-well-defended
targets. The enemy may also attempt to increase the level of violence
in cities beyond Baghdad, attempt to conduct high-profile
assassinations, or try to destroy prominent religious landmarks. In the
worst case, they may try to surge back into cleared neighborhoods to
demonstrate the futility of the clearing effort.
The most effective responses to such insurgent efforts, once again,
rely on having a readily available Reserve Force. Reserves must be able
to reinforce cleared neighborhoods threatened by large surges of
violence, to control increasing violence in uncleared neighborhoods,
and to address attacks in cities outside of Baghdad. The plan in this
proposal designates one BCT as a Reserve for Baghdad and two RCTs in
Iraq as potential Reserves in case of emergency. The plan calls for
deploying those RCTs into Anbar province in the expectation that
threatened Sunni insurgents will return to their base. It might prove
necessary, however, to deploy one or both of those RCTs into Diyala,
another al-Qaeda base that emerges, or even into Baghdad or its nearer
suburbs.
These decisions can only be made by the commander on the ground in
light of changing circumstances, but his Reserve Forces can only
achieve the effects he desires if they are already near Baghdad. Kuwait
is 600 miles from the Iraqi capital--Reserve Forces held there might
take too long to arrive in response to a crisis. Forces stationed in
the United States, even if alerted for possible deployment, would
almost certainly take too long to respond. Reacting effectively to
likely enemy challenges requires positioning significant Reserve Forces
already near the scene of the fighting.
Specific Enemy Responses
Although the discussion above captures the likely aggregate of
enemy responses, it is important to consider how each individual enemy
group is likely to respond as well, since the particularities of those
responses can have a profound impact on the developing political
situation in Iraq. The major insurgent groupings are the Jaysh al-
Mahdi, the Badr Corps, al-Qaeda in Iraq and associated Islamist groups,
the Baathists and military nationalists, and vigilante groups on both
sides. As we have seen, the Shiite militias share many common aims but
are also rivals for power. They may cooperate in some scenarios, but
there is reason to believe that they can be kept apart in others. The
Sunni groups have cooperated more closely because of their sense of
being beleaguered, but their divergent aims and methods will likely
lead to different responses to the proposed clearing and holding
operations. Despite the conflicting sectarian makeup and aims of the
vigilante groups, on the other hand, their motivations and methods make
it likely that their responses to clear-and-hold operations will be
similar to one another.
Jaysh al-Mahdi. Moqtada al-Sadr's militia, the Jaysh al-Mahdi,
presents one of the greatest dangers to this operation. It is based in
Sadr City, which it largely controls through a Hezbollah model of
providing services, including security, that the local government is
unable to offer. It is impossible to estimate with accuracy how many
fighters the Jaysh al-Mahdi could muster in total, let alone how many
are still under Sadr's control. There are certainly thousands of armed
militiamen, however--more than enough to force a bloody showdown with
coalition forces if provoked or driven to full-scale conflict.
Moqtada al-Sadr himself has also become a force in the political
process, moreover. His 30-seat bloc of parliamentarians is an important
element of Maliki's government (although his recent ``walkout'' from
Parliament underlined the feasibility of forming a coalition government
without him if necessary--which was one of the reasons why his
followers returned to their seats relatively quickly). A full-scale
confrontation with the Jaysh al-Mahdi would not only be bloody, but it
would also be a political crisis of the first order in Iraq. It is thus
highly desirable to avoid such a confrontation if it is at all
possible.
The Jaysh al-Mahdi has been conducting numerous murderous raids
from Sadr City into Sunni and mixed neighborhoods and has caused many
of the American casualties in Baghdad. Clearing operations in Sunni and
mixed districts will lead to conflict with isolated groups of Jaysh al-
Mahdi fighters. Efforts to contain the flow of such fighters from Sadr
City into Baghdad will require coalition forces to patrol the borders
of Sadr City (which they are already doing) and possibly to restrict
access to Sadr City periodically. These actions will place coalition
forces in close proximity to the heart of the Jaysh al-Mahdi's power.
The desire to appear evenhanded by attacking Shiite militias even as
operations bring Sunni-sponsored violence under control also creates
pressure to launch isolated raids into Sadr City itself.
If coalition operations are skillfully conceived and executed, they
will not provoke a full-scale confrontation with Sadr and the Jaysh al-
Mahdi. It is not in Sadr's interest to engage in a full-scale
confrontadon. His experiences in 2004 in Najaf and Karbala made clear
that whatever political damage he might be able to cause through such
violence, American forces will decimate his fighters. He cannot afford
to lose his warriors. He is not popular within the Iraqi political
system and draws much of his political strength from his militia. He
also requires a strong military arm to confront the Badr Corps and
SCIRI in the fight for control of a post-coalition Iraq. Whatever harm
Sadrists might do to coalition hopes for success in Iraq by confronting
coalition forces directly, this path would almost certainly be
political suicide for Sadr. He is unlikely to choose direct
confrontation with the coalition unless it is forced upon him.
Invading or sealing off Sadr City would force Sadr to resist
coalition forces vigorously, regardless of the cost. Even launching
isolated raids in and around Sadr City is dangerous. Such raids might
lead to escalation on both sides and an unintended, major confrontation
that both sides wish to avoid. For that reason, this plan focuses on
responding to Jaysh al-Mahdi attacks by protecting the neighborhoods
they are targeting, rather than by striking at the sources of their
power.
Such defensive operations will, nevertheless, lead to the killing
and capturing of Jaysh al-Mahdi fighters, but they are not likely to
provoke Sadr or his unruly lieutenants into full-scale conflict. For
months, coalition forces have been engaged with Jaysh al-Mahdi fighters
in discrete operations. On each occasion when coalition forces have
captured or killed members of death squads, Sadr and the Jaysh al-Mahdi
leadership have abandoned their compromised militiamen, declaring them
``rogue elements'' or criminals masquerading as warriors. This past
restraint on their part is evidence of their desire to avoid a full-
fledged conflict. As long as coalition forces demonstrate similar
restraint with regard to Sadr City, it is likely that the Jaysh al-
Mahdi will remain relatively quiescent.
If large-scale conflict with the Jaysh al-Mahdi nevertheless
erupts, the plan proposed in this report would require substantial
modification. It would be necessary to abandon much of the effort to
clear and hold Sunni and mixed neighborhoods in central Baghdad in
order to focus instead on clearing Sadr City. Clearing operations in
Sadr City would be bloody--the Jaysh al-Mahdi has had a long time to
fortify the area--but the result is not in doubt. Coalition forces
would destroy the Jaysh al-Mahdi and clear the Shiite neighborhoods.
Depending on the political and security situation, it would then be
necessary to turn back to the problem of suppressing the Sunni Arab
insurgency and securing the neighborhoods in the center of Baghdad.
Large-scale conflict with the Jaysh al-Mahdi would probably lead to
the withdrawal of Sadr from the political process and might lead to the
fall of the Maliki government. Such an occurrence would be unfortunate
but not necessarily devastating. Even if the Maliki government fell,
executive power would remain in the Iraqi Presidential Council, which
could form an emergency government. Iraq would remain a sovereign
state. Conflict with the Jaysh al-Mahdi is clearly undesirable and
dangerous, and every effort should be made to avoid it. It would not,
however, necessarily lead to immediate coalition defeat.
The Badr Corps. Abdul Aziz al-Hakim's Badr Corps is an important
player in Iraqi politics, but it has relatively little presence in
Baghdad, where Sadr and the Jaysh al-Mahdi are the dominant militia
group. Hakim has already manifested his concern that Sadr is gaining
the upper hand in the Shiite community, particularly in central Iraq.
He could do little to influence the fighting in Baghdad directly except
by increasing the flow of Shiite fighters from the south into the
capital.
If coalition operations are clearly aimed at establishing security
in central Baghdad and not attacking the Shiite communities in and
around Sadr City, it is unlikely that the Badr Corps will play a very
large role. If the United States attacked Sadr City, however, Hakim
might make common cause with Sadr and attempt to inflame the south and
all of Shiite Iraq against the coalition. In this worst case, coalition
defeat is very likely--the Iraqi Government could not survive such a
challenge, and coalition forces could not likely handle the military
threat throughout Iraq. This is yet another reason to avoid any direct
attack on Sadr City or actions that are likely to lead to a full-scale
confrontation with Sadr.
It is even less in Hakim's interest to provoke a full-scale
confrontation with the coalition than it is in Sadr's. Sadr has gained
political influence by taking a strong anti-American position. Hakim
has been much more moderate, apparently concentrating on the likelihood
that the U.S. presence will lead in the end to a Shiite state that he
hopes to rule. No part of the plan proposed in this report directly
threatens the outcome he desires. On the contrary, clearing and holding
the Sunni and mixed neighborhoods in Baghdad and suppressing the Sunni
Arab insurgency in Anbar forwards Hakim's goals. It is very likely that
Hakim will publicly protest against Shiite casualties and denounce the
operation, but it is extremely unlikely that he will support Sadr or
throw large numbers of his own fighters into the fray--as long as the
core of the Shiite community is not threatened.
Iran. It is more difficult to estimate likely Iranian actions to
the various possibilities outlined above, but the range of Tehran's
possible responses is rather narrowly constrained. Iran is certainly
unlikely to watch the destruction of the Badr Corps or even the Jaysh
al-Mahdi with equanimity, and would probably increase dramatically the
level of its support for those groups, even including direct support
through Iranian advisors. This is yet another reason why courting a
full-scale confrontation with the Shiite militias in the first stage of
the operation would be unwise. Iran is likely to increase its support
of the militias and other fighting groups in Iraq in response to any
American operation. The impact of such an increase will be muted as
long as the United States sends and maintains an adequate troop
presence to secure and hold designated neighborhoods. Iran is highly
unlikely to court a direct military confrontation with the United
States during such an operation--by sending disguised fighters against
our supply lines in the south, for instance, or taking any other
military action that could be traced directly back to Tehran.
Al-Qaeda in Iraq and Other Islamist Groups. Al-Qaeda in Iraq is one
of the most dangerous enemies facing coalition forces, not because of
its power but because of its goals. Unique among the major insurgent
groups, al-Qaeda in Iraq aims directly at regional objectives and sees
operations in Iraq as merely a steppingstone to achieving larger goals.
This group is also motivated by an apocalyptic vision of the grand
struggle between righteous Islam and ``heresy'' within the Muslim
community (including Shiism), and between Islam and the infidel West.
Zarqawi, the group's leader until his death in June 2006, adopted a
Leninist strategy, according to which ``the worse it is, the better it
is'' for the insurgent groups. Zarqawi used a series of spectacular
attacks on Shiite (and even Sunni) civilians deliberately to ignite
sectarian conflict. This approach drew criticism even from other parts
of the global al-Qaeda movement--Aymara al-Zawahiri, the group's
ideological leader, criticized Zarqawi for his attacks on Shiites.
Other Islamist groups in Iraq, including Ansar al-Sunna, also question
the religious justification for attacking fellow Muslims in such an
instrumental way.
But Zargawi's strategy was effective. The Shiite community in Iraq
endured nearly 2 years of attacks without responding on a large scale,
but the bombing of the Golden Mosque in February 2006 proved too much
for that community to withstand. The cycling sectarian violence in Iraq
owes a great deal to Zargawi's determined efforts to provoke full-scale
civil war and chaotic violence, from which he thought his group would
benefit.
Al-Qaeda in Iraq can be expected to continue to pursue this
approach during the proposed clear-and-hold operation. In general
terms, the group will probably continue to target Shiite civilians,
both ordinary people and key figures in the government and within the
Shiite religious community. It is likely to work to generate more
spectacular attacks like the Golden Mosque bombing or mass-casualty
attacks in Shiite communities. If such attacks succeed in significant
numbers, they will undermine confidence in the clearing operation, spur
the Shiite militias to even greater sectarian violence, and may
ultimately break the Iraqi Government.
It is not clear how, specifically, al-Qaeda in Iraq and associated
groups will respond to the proposed clearing operation. Faced with a
substantial attempt to end the violence in Baghdad, they might embrace
an apocalyptic fight with coalition forces in the heart of the capital,
surging all of their resources against coalition and especially Iraqi
civilian targets. This approach would generate a lot of violence in the
initial phase of the clearing operation, but would not necessarily be
the most dangerous response they might make. By striking the coalition
when coalition forces were most prepared, the Islamists will lose many
fighters and use up their limited supply of suicide bombers and car
bombs. If the U.S. and Iraqi forces pursue the operation to its
conclusion, they will significantly reduce this particular enemy's
ability to undertake subsequent surges of violence, and the prospects
for the success of the operation will increase.
It is more likely that al-Qaeda in Iraq and other Islamist groups
will act as they have in the past: They will increase violence at the
start of the operation and then go to ground either in Baghdad
neighborhoods not designated for clearing or in the surrounding cities
and towns. There, they will hope to reconstitute and prepare for a
major surge of violence after the clearing operations have ended. They
will also prepare spectacular mass-casualty attacks against targets in
Baghdad and elsewhere.
The coalition must maintain great pressure on the Islamists in
Baghdad and beyond. Clearing and holding neighborhoods over the long
term will help mitigate the risks of attacks in those neighborhoods,
but the presence of large Reserves is once again essential to
preventing the Islamists from establishing safe bases elsewhere from
which to prepare devastating attacks. The regions around Taji, to the
north of Baghdad, and Iskandariyah, to the south, merit particular
attention. There are already two American BCTs operating there, one in
each region, and they should not be moved. They may need to be
reinforced. Additionally, because al-Qaeda has bases in Diyala
province, coalition forces may have to seal off the roads from Diyala
into Baghdad or to divert Reserves into Diyala itself. The main al-
Qaeda bases, of course, are in Anbar, which is why the proposed plan
devotes two additional RCTs to that province.
Baathists and Military Nationalists. These groups have sustained a
de facto working alliance with the Islamists because of the perceived
danger to the Sunni Arab community in Iraq, but they disagree both on
objectives and on methods (although the turnover in leadership is
leading to greater convergence, as noted above). The Baathists and
military nationalists include the most experienced insurgent fighters,
many drawn from the ranks of Saddam's army. They have focused their
attacks heavily on coalition forces, including Iraqi Security Forces,
which they regard as legitimate targets, but have eschewed attacks on
Iraqi civilians. They are not in favor of accelerating the civil war
simply for the purpose of generating chaos from which they hope to
benefit--on the contrary, they aim to bring the civil war under control
after they win the struggle, as they expect to do.
The aims of these groups are also confined more narrowly to Iraq.
They are unlikely to be as willing as the Islamists to condemn Iraq to
an annihilating sectarian conflict in the hopes of achieving some
greater regional benefit. They are much more likely, therefore, to
become open to negotiation and political persuasion if they come to
believe that their military struggle is hopeless.
The Baathists pose a significant danger in the first three phases
of the proposed operation. They are likely to launch a significant
propaganda effort during the deployment of coalition forces. They will
attempt to portray the planned operation as an assault on the Sunni
community. They may seek, thereby, to bring regional and international
pressure to bear on the United States to abandon the plan entirely. As
the operation begins, the Baathists are likely to launch increased
attacks against coalition forces. Because the Baathists are the most
militarily skilled among enemy groups, they may pose the most serious
challenge to forces clearing those neighborhoods where they have been
able to establish strongpoints and defensive positions. The worst case
scenarios involve increased cooperation between the Baathists and the
Islamists, including Baathist support for mass-casualty or spectacular
attacks on Shiite targets.
The coalition must counter Baathist propaganda efforts with
skillful information operations that emphasize that the coalition's
goal is to protect the population, both Sunni and Shia, from criminals
and terrorists. Initiating reconstruction activities in the immediate
wake of the clearing operation (a policy considered in more detail
below) will also help offset the impression that this mission is aimed
at harming the Sunnis. Most of Iraq's Sunni neighbors, and many Sunni
states beyond Iraq's borders, have become extremely concerned about the
danger of a spreading civil war. Many are quietly suggesting that an
American withdrawal would be disastrous and are advocating for a surge
aimed at bringing the violence under control. They might posture in
various ways publicly, but they are extremely unlikely to bring any
effective pressure to bear to stop an operation that suits their
interests, regardless of Baathist propaganda.
Greater Baathist cooperation with the Islamists cannot be
discounted, but it is not yet certain. The continual al-Qaeda in Iraq
attacks against Shiite civilians have alienated many insurgents on both
sides, and this trend is likely to continue. The Baathist desire to
rule a unified Iraq clashes with the Islamist willingness to destroy
Iraq in the name of larger regional gains, a fact that will make
increased cooperation between the groups difficult. But as time
elapses, and a younger generation of Iraqi nationalists takes
leadership positions in what was originally the Baathist resistance
movement, they may work more closely than their predecessors with the
Islamists.
Perhaps the most dangerous option the Baathists could choose would
be to try to force Sunni politicians to leave the government, possibly
by moving their base of operations out of Baghdad and into Anbar and
Diyala. The coalition must work to foreclose this option by retaining
control in Anbar and by maintaining a sufficient Reserve to respond to
shifts in Baathist attack patterns and movements.
Vigilante Groups, Sunni and Shia. The main justification for
vigilante groups on both sides is the need to protect their
neighborhoods from sectarian attacks. Many of these groups are also
involved in criminal activity, and some are taking advantage of the
situation to engage in sectarian cleansing of their own. It is highly
unlikely, nevertheless, that members of these groups would actively
resist a large-scale clearing operation. The most radical might join
hardcore insurgent groups. Some might attempt to accelerate sectarian
cleansing before coalition forces arrived in force. Most, however, are
likely to blend back into the population during the clearing operation
and wait to see what happens.
As long as peace is maintained in the cleared neighborhoods during
the hold phase, the members of these vigilante groups are unlikely to
cause much trouble. They retain a latent potential for violence if the
coalition allows a security vacuum to develop. Some of them will be
dissatisfied by the transition from being the big men around town,
protecting their people, to being unemployed youths. Employment
programs and other reconstruction efforts may help, but the coalition
and the Iraqis must also consider ways of addressing individuals' and
groups' loss of honor and prestige during this transition.
Reintegrating members of the vigilante groups into their neighborhoods
is not a simple process. Rather, it requires careful thought,
appropriate planning, and adequate preparation.
Timeline
The operations proposed in this plan would take most of 2007 to
complete. As we shall see, most of the necessary reinforcements would
not arrive in their designated areas until March; active clearing
operations would probably not begin until early April. Past examples
suggest that preparation and clearing operations will take about 90
days, and so should be completed by midsummer. It will then be
necessary to support Iraqi forces in hold-and-build operations through
the end of 2007 in order to continue to degrade insurgent networks,
prevent infiltration of cleared areas again, and mitigate likely enemy
efforts to launch an autumn surge against coalition, civilian,
symbolic, and high-profile targets. By early 2008, it should become
possible to begin moving some American forces out of the cleared areas
of Baghdad, although it is unlikely that large numbers of U.S. troops
could begin to return home until much later in 2008, for reasons
described below.
2007 will be a violent year in Iraq. If this proposal is not
adopted, then insurgent and sectarian violence will continue to
increase unabated, as it has every year since the invasion. If this
plan is adopted, then the pattern of the violence will probably change.
There will be a significant increase in violence as clearing operations
commence, probably followed by a reduction in violence in the summer,
followed by a substantial surge of violence in the fall. If the United
States continues on its present course, American and Iraqi casualties
will be spread more evenly over the year, but all will be wasted
because success is extraordinarily unlikely. If this plan is adopted,
there will probably be higher casualties in the spring and fall, but
far fewer by the end of the year. The coalition, moreover, will have
made significant progress toward establishing security in Iraq's
capital and paving the way for a sustainable transition to Iraqi
control and responsibility.
WHAT IF? WHAT NEXT?
Sound military planning requires considering ``branches and
sequels'': How to handle contingencies that are likely to arise during
the course of operations, and how to prepare for subsequent operations
when the current one has been completed. The consideration of enemy
courses of action above included a number of likely branches to handle
possible contingencies. The most probable branches include:
1. Deploying Reserve Forces into neighborhoods not being
cleared as enemy groups attempt to attack more vulnerable
targets;
2. Restricting movement between Baghdad and either Anbar or
Diyala or both, in order to prevent insurgents from shifting
their bases;
3. Deploying Reserves in areas of Baghdad being cleared to
overcome unexpected resistance;
4. Deploying significant Reserve Forces either to Anbar,
Diyala, or elsewhere in response to enemy efforts to launch
attacks outside of the capital;
5. Reinforcing security for high-profile targets (both people
and structures) in Baghdad, the north, and the Shia areas to
the south.
Less probable branches include:
1. Sealing Sadr City off either from the rest of Baghdad or
from Diyala;
2. Attacking into Sadr City in the event of an unplanned
major confrontation with Shiite militias (although this plan
stresses the desirability of avoiding such a confrontation as
much as possible);
3. Conducting operations against the Badr Corps in southern
Iraq in the event of a major confrontation with SCIRI. (Again,
this can result only from great misfortune or ineptitude on the
part of the coalition, since its aim should be to avoid such a
confrontation.)
Executing the more probable branches requires having a significant
Reserve ready and stationed within Iraq. Forces in Kuwait, let alone
the United States, are too far away to respond rapidly to most of the
likely contingencies. If commanders deploy only the force necessary to
conduct the clearing operation, optimistically assuming that the enemy
will not react or adapt to the clear-and-hold operation, they would be
pursuing an irresponsible and dangerous policy.
The operation to clear and hold the center of Baghdad is only the
beginning of a larger effort to pacify Iraq. It is difficult to predict
with any precision what operations would be necessary upon the
conclusion of this one, particularly since clearing and holding the
center of Baghdad would transform not only the security but also the
political situation in the country. Some sequels are very likely to be
necessary, however:
1. Bringing Sadr City under control (see below);
2. Redeploying forces from Baghdad to clear and hold Anbar,
beginning with Ramadi and Fallujah and then expanding up the
Euphrates and out to the Syrian border;
3. Moving forces from Baghdad up the Diyala to Baquba and
clearing that area;
4. Reinforcing security in the north, particularly in Ninawa,
including Mosul.
It is possible that the successful clearing of central Baghdad will
leave Moqtada al-Sadr and the Jaysh al-Mahdi still defiantly in control
of Sadr City. If that is the case, then U.S. and Iraqi forces will have
to clear that Shiite stronghold by force and disarm the militia. It is
also possible, however, that the clear-and-hold operation in central
Baghdad will weaken Sadr's power base in Sadr City and support a
predominantly political solution to that problem. The sectarian
violence now raging in Baghdad is one of the most powerful recruiting
tools for the Jaysh al-Mahdi, and one of its most potent overt
justifications. If that violence is dramatically reduced, it is likely
that some Jaysh al-Mahdi fighters will begin to fall away from the
group, reducing Sadr's leverage within the Shiite community and within
Iraq as a whole. Such a weakening might well induce him and many of his
followers to enter the political fold wholeheartedly rather than
halfheartedly, as they have so far done. The United States must be
clear, though, that the elimination of the Jaysh al-Mahdi as an
effective fighting force in Baghdad, either through negotiation or by
force, is the essential next step after the clearing of the central
areas of the city.
The sequence of these operations matters a great deal. The
persistence of the Sunni insurgency justifies the strength of the
Shiite militias and continues Maliki's dependence upon them. If the
United States insists on attacking Sadr and his supporters first,
Maliki and the Iraqi Government will have no leverage with him or
justification for permitting that attack, which will look like American
support to the Sunni insurgency. If, instead, the coalition begins by
clearing and holding Sunni and mixed Sunni-Shiite neighborhoods in
Baghdad, as well as conducting more aggressive operations in Anbar, the
United States and the Iraqi Government will show that they are
determined to suppress the Sunni insurgency and to protect both Sunnis
and Shiites. That demonstration will make subsequent operations against
Shiite militias much more politically palatable in Iraq. Eliminating
the raging Sunni insurgency will also eliminate the ostensible
justification for those militias, liberating Maliki to support their
disarmament. The challenges in Iraq are complex, but not an insoluble
puzzle if they are approached in the right order.
RECONSTRUCTION
Military operations alone cannot solve Iraq's problems. Any
complete solution must address a host of political, economic,
diplomatic, and social challenges as well as the security situation.
This proposal emphasizes the military portion of the solution because
it is urgent to bring the violence under control before it tears Iraq
apart completely. Subsequent phases and working groups will examine the
other aspects of the problem in much greater detail. Reconstruction
deserves consideration even at this early phase, even though it will be
addressed again in more detail.
Soldiers, whether American or Iraqi, moving through a neighborhood
to clear it inevitably do damage. Violence flares up, and innocent
people are invariably killed. Past experience shows that many
neighborhoods are willing to accept this price in the hope of having
security and peace thereafter, but it is important to provide them with
a more immediate and tangible compensation for the violence as well. In
addition, it is clear that high levels of unemployment in Iraq create a
pool of potential recruits for militias and violent organizations. The
lack of essential services in many neighborhoods also provides an
opportunity for more organized enemy groups such as militias to usurp
the government's traditional roles (the Hezbollah model).
For all of these reasons, therefore, every clear-and-hold operation
must be accompanied by an immediate reconstruction program. As military
commanders move into neighborhoods to establish security, they should
also reach out to local leaders to find out what essential services
must be restored quickly to permit a basic level of normal life to
resume. The military now encapsulates the most common list of essential
services in the abbreviation SWET: Sewage, water, electricity, and
trash removal. Most neighborhoods will require SWET packages to begin
operating, ideally within hours of the end of combat operations.
Managing this reconstruction effort is an enormous challenge, and
this phase of the report can only suggest some of the complexities
without offering detailed solutions. It is vital that the Iraqi people
associate the Iraqi Government with the reconstruction effort as much
as possible. Defeating the enemy's Hezbollah model requires getting
Iraqis accustomed to looking to their local and central government to
provide essential services. Even when the money and capability to
provide those services are coming from the coalition, therefore, it is
vital that the local inhabitants attribute the provision of the
services themselves to legitimate local leaders.
It is not possible, however, to conduct such efforts through the
Iraqi central government. The responsible ministries are often highly
corrupt and unable to perform their basic functions properly. Some of
the most important ``service'' ministries are controlled by Sadr and
his lieutenants--political figures whom the coalition emphatically does
not wish to legitimate or support. Few ministries actually have
connections to local government, moreover. Providing the ministries
with funds to conduct local reconstruction will most likely result in
strengthening the insurgency.
The American Government is not well organized to oversee extensive
reconstruction projects on a local level, however. Reconstruction
efforts to date have been disorganized. They have generated enormous
friction between responsible agencies, and they have had inadequate
results for the Iraqi people. Resolving these difficulties will require
a significant effort to reorganize the way the American Government does
business in such conflicts (an effort that we must undertake urgently,
since Iraq is not the first and will not be the last place the United
States will have to engage in reconstruction of one sort or another).
In the short term, however, the only organization capable of planning
and executing reconstruction projects in combat zones is the U.S.
military. The essential SWET programs, therefore, must be the
responsibility of local commanders. Those commanders will need
representatives from USAID, the State Department, the Department of
Agriculture, and other government agencies to advise them about
developing and executing their programs, but the responsibility and the
authority to dispense the necessary funds must lie with the commanders.
The absence of security has hampered reconstruction projects
throughout Iraq so far. Reports indicate that as much as 30 percent of
the resources designated for reconstruction projects has been diverted
to providing security for those projects. Insecurity raises the cost in
other ways as well, since local and international contractors and
employees demand higher wages and prices for operating in dangerous
areas. Establishing real security in central Baghdad and then
maintaining it with a large American troop presence will greatly
mitigate these problems, allowing a much higher proportion of
reconstruction funds to go to actually improving the lives of Iraqis
and encouraging them to reject violence.
It is not enough simply to restore essential services in cleared
neighborhoods, however. The American relationship with Iraq has been
deteriorating steadily over the past several months as U.S. leaders
have begun to chastise Maliki and other Iraqis for failing to contain
the violence and the militias on their own. The hectoring and insulting
tone that has entered this discourse is manifested in the notion of
``incentivizing'' the Iraqis to take responsibility for their own
security. Upon examination, however, it becomes clear that all the
incentives commonly suggested are negative: If the Iraqis do not disarm
the militias, then the United States will leave and abandon them to
genocide and civil war. This is not the way to encourage a desired
behavior or to maintain good relations with an ally.
The United States must develop a set of positive incentives to
encourage and reward Iraqis at all levels for taking the desired steps
toward pacifying their country. One such way would be to create a
second tier of reconstruction projects beyond SWET packages. As
commanders discuss with local leaders what essential services to
restore at the end of combat operations, they should also discuss what
reconstruction projects could dramatically increase quality of life in
the neighborhood thereafter. They should indicate that funds for those
projects will be released when the neighborhood fully complies with a
set of requirements to support coalition efforts to maintain peace:
Disarming remaining militias, turning over criminals, reporting
insurgent efforts to infiltrate the neighborhood again, warning
coalition forces about IEDs and imminent attacks, and so on. Any
neighborhood meeting these requirements would receive the Tier II
reconstruction package.
This approach would redress another problem with a reconstruction
program aimed only at restoring services in cleared areas: It allows
reconstruction to proceed in neighborhoods that were stable to begin
with. Giving SWET packages exclusively to cleared areas, in effect,
rewards bad neighborhoods and punishes good ones. A Tier II package
could go to any neighborhood in which basic security prevails and the
inhabitants of which comply with the requirements of the program. Since
the initial focus of operations in Baghdad would be on Sunni and mixed
neighborhoods, a Tier II program would also help to ensure that
Baghdad's Shiites received tangible benefits from the operation as
well.
In addition to these programmed reconstruction activities, Congress
should also fund the Commander's Emergency Response Program at a high
level. This program has proven invaluable since the start of the
insurgency because it allows local commanders to allocate resources on
the spot to critical reconstruction efforts as the need for them
arises. It gives commanders necessary flexibility and allows them to
target funds to projects that directly support ongoing operations or
forestall impending crises.
MAKING THE FORCES AVAILABLE
This plan requires the deployment to Iraq of an additional five
Army BCTs and two Marine RCTs. Any lesser force will entail a much
greater risk of failure. The strain on the Army and Marines of
maintaining even the current level of forces in Iraq is well-known, and
this proposal does not underestimate the challenge of generating
additional forces for the 18-24 months required by this plan. It is,
however, possible to do so within the constraints of the All-Volunteer
Force.
There are currently 13 Army BCTs and 2 Marine RCTs in Iraq. The
Army and Marines have already developed their plans for rotating fresh
units into the country over the course of 2007, and they are as
follows:
One BCT and two RCTs are scheduled to deploy to Iraq in the
first quarter.
Four BCTs will deploy in the second quarter.
Six BCTs will deploy in the third quarter.
One BCT and two RCTs will deploy in the fourth quarter.
Since the aim of this force generation model has been to maintain a
steady state of 15 brigades and regiments in Iraq, the Pentagon has
planned to remove the same number of units from Iraq as are sent in. In
place of this approach, this plan proposes to extend the tours of most
Army BCTs now in Iraq from 12 months to 15 months, and of the Marine
RCTs from 7 months to 12 months. This plan also proposes to accelerate
the deployment of the four BCTs scheduled to enter Iraq in the second
quarter so that they arrive instead in March. These changes in the
deployment schedule would produce a surge of two Marine RCTs and five
Army BCTs in the first quarter and sustain it throughout 2007, using
only Active-Duty Forces already scheduled to deploy to Iraq in that
year.
Sustaining such a large presence through 2008, which is probably
necessary, requires mobilizing about six National Guard brigades that
are not currently scheduled to deploy. The President has the legal
authority to make such a callup, but Pentagon policy has, hitherto,
been to avoid using so many National Guard brigades in Iraq in 2008.
The proposed deployment plan would require a change in Pentagon policy,
but not additional congressional authorization. Even though these
brigades would not deploy until well into 2008 (and into a much more
benign security environment than the active units now in Iraq face),
the military must begin to alert and prepare them right now. Adopting
the plan proposed in this report requires changing Pentagon policy
immediately to grant the chief of staff of the Army full access to the
National Guard and Reserve.
Extending the tours of units and mobilizing the National Guard and
Reserve will place a greater strain on soldiers and their families. If
there were any option that did not threaten to place an unbearable
burden on the military, other than the defeat of the United States,
this plan would propose it. Maintaining anything like the current
course will continue to strain the military badly and will also lead to
failure. Withdrawing forces now will accelerate defeat, violence, and
failure. It is worth considering in some detail what that failure would
look like.
It is possible to surmise what will occur in Iraq when the U.S.
Armed Forces withdraw in the current environment on the basis of what
has happened in the past when U.S. forces have withdrawn prematurely
from areas in Iraq. Enemy groups round up Iraqis who collaborate with
Americans and their own government, then publicly torture and kill
these people, often along with their entire families. Death squads
commit horrific atrocities against one another but most often against
innocent civilians, leaving their mangled corpses on streets and in
yards. To many Americans watching from afar, these are just dead bodies
and evidence of failure. But to the soldiers preparing to withdraw,
they are people the United States has betrayed and abandoned to
horrible deaths.
As soldiers establish themselves in neighborhoods, they work hard
to gain the trust of the locals. That trust is essential in persuading
local leaders and citizens to provide critical information soldiers
need to identify and capture enemies, avoid ambushes and IEDs, and
perform almost any military mission. American soldiers and marines are
well aware of the reciprocal obligation they undertake to protect those
Iraqis who trust them enough to provide intelligence. One of the
greatest frustrations American soldiers are experiencing today is the
inability to fulfill that implicit promise.
American withdrawal from Iraq will be a searing and scarring
experience. U.S. soldiers will be forced to confront the results of
America's defeat on the most personal level. Terrorists will videotape
death squads operating with American troops stacking arms in the
background. Al Jazeera and other Muslim media outlets will play the
tapes endlessly, accompanied by claims that the Americans were
committing or abetting the atrocities. The process of such a defeat
will demoralize the Army and Marines far more dramatically and
permanently than asking brigades to serve a few additional months in
the course of a successful operation that brings the United States
closer to victory. The strain on the Army and Marines is very real and
a serious concern, but it is not correctable with any simple solution--
not even immediate withdrawal.
The President has already embraced an essential element of the
longer term solution for the strain, however: Increasing the end-
strength of the ground forces. It has been clear for some time that the
Active-Duty Army and Marines were too small for the challenges they
face in Iraq, Afghanistan, and around the world. The President's call
for enlarging them comes not a moment too soon.
For some time now, skeptics of such enlargement have argued that it
would not be possible to recruit more soldiers in time of war into the
volunteer force, but recruiting does not appear to be the factor
limiting the expansion of the ground forces. Instead, the ability of
the training base to accept new recruits and give them basic soldier
skills before sending them to their units regulates the pace of
expanding the Army and the Marines. Part of the problem is that the
training base is not expansible and has not been prepared for a serious
effort to build the sort of ground forces the nation needs in this time
of crisis. That inadequacy must also change. In addition to making a
national call for young people to serve in the military, the President
must also make a priority of expanding the ground forces training base
as quickly as possible to permit a more rapid expansion of the Army and
Marines. Current estimates suggest that the Army could grow by only
about 7,000 soldiers per year for the next few years. That figure is
wholly inadequate. Many estimates of the appropriate size of the active
Army suggest that the United States needs at least 50,000 more
soldiers--or even more. The United States cannot wait 5 years to
achieve this necessary increase in end-strength. The Secretary of
Defense must make it a priority to create the capability to expand the
Army much more rapidly, and the United States should maintain that
capability indefinitely to avoid finding the country again unable to
add forces rapidly in wartime in the future.
The most serious challenge in accelerating the deployment of
brigades scheduled to enter Iraq this year, however, has nothing to do
with the number of people in the Armed Forces. The Army and Marines
have worn out their equipment. Tanks, Bradleys, and Humvees are not
designed to drive thousands of miles a year, but they have been doing
so for years in extremely harsh conditions. News reports indicate that
many units in the Army are at low levels of readiness because they do
not have enough functioning equipment to take to the field. Units
regularly swap equipment with one another as they prepare to deploy.
Sometimes soldiers getting ready to move to Iraq do not receive the
equipment they need until a few weeks before they start their
deployment.
Congress has recognized this problem and has appropriated funds to
``reset'' the Army and Marines--primarily by buying or repairing the
necessary equipment. But even recent increases in these appropriations
have not brought America's military industry to anything like full
mobilization. Army depots are operating far below their maximum
capability despite this equipment crisis. This situation is
unacceptable. The Department of Defense must request and Congress
should authorize an additional significant increase in funds for
reequipping the military, and all available military industrial
resources should be brought to bear on this challenge as rapidly as
possible.
Many of the proposals in this section can be summed up briefly: The
Nation must be put on a war footing. That does not mean a return to the
draft. It is possible and necessary to maintain a volunteer military
while fighting this war and beyond. It does, however, mean abandoning
peacetime bureaucratic routines within the Pentagon and throughout the
defense establishment. It means that the President must issue a call to
arms. It means that Congress must provide the necessary financial
support. It means that everyone involved in the defense of the Nation
must make supporting the troops fighting this war the number one
priority. It is disgraceful that the Nation has not been placed on a
war footing even this far into such an important conflict, but it is
essential to transform this state of affairs if the United States is to
conduct the operations necessary to avoid imminent defeat and pursue
victory.
OTHER PROPOSALS AND THEIR CHALLENGES
There are a number of other proposals for resolving the crisis in
Iraq, most of which fall into one or more of the following categories:
Train Iraqi forces and transition more rapidly to full Iraqi
control (the current U.S. military strategy).
Increase the training of Iraqi forces and engage Iraq's
neighbors to reduce the violence (the core of the Iraq Study
Group report).
Partition Iraq (Senator Joseph Biden's [D-Del.] proposal).
Withdraw U.S. forces immediately (House Speaker Nancy Pelosi
(D-Calif.] and Senator Carl Levin's [D-Mich.] suggestion).
None of these proposals offers any prospect for success in Iraq;
all, in fact, make defeat and regional war far more likely.
Train and Transition
This is the current U.S. military strategy as outlined repeatedly
by MNF-I commander, GEN George Casey. This approach is at odds with the
``clear-hold-build'' strategy outlined by Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice and President George W. Bush more than a year ago. The
American Military command has never tried to implement clear-hold-build
because it has never given U.S. forces in Iraq the mission of providing
security to the Iraqi people. MNF-I has instead focused on training
Iraqi forces and has used its mobile units reactively to regain control
of insurgent strongholds. The exceptions to this principle proved the
rule: Operations Together Forward I and II used American forces to
clear neighborhoods, but sought to rely exclusively on Iraqis to hold
them afterward--the main reason for the failure of those operations.
The creation of a trained Iraqi Army of more than 130,000 soldiers
in just a few years starting from scratch has been an amazing
accomplishment. The determination of Iraqi soldiers, who put their
lives on the line just to enlist in an environment in which terrorists
regularly target recruiting stations, is astonishing. But as the
capabilities of the Iraqi Army have steadily increased, the sectarian
violence has increased even faster. Unless the United States takes
action to bring the violence down to a level at which the growing Iraqi
Security Forces can control it, then the violence will ultimately
destroy those security forces as well. Although MNF-I has repeatedly
published maps of Iraq with expanding areas of green, denoting regions
that have been ``transitioned'' to Iraqi control, these graphics and
metrics do not correctly indicate whether the United States is
succeeding or failing in Iraq. Despite these transitions, the United
States is on a glide-path to defeat and not victory. The current
strategy has clearly failed and must be replaced quickly.
Train and Negotiate
The Iraq Study Group (ISG) proposed to increase the number of
embedded trainers, eliminate almost all other U.S. combat forces in
Iraq, and negotiate with Iran and Syria to control the violence. This
report has already considered why simply embedding more soldiers with
Iraqi units is not likely to increase the capability of the Iraqi Army
rapidly and may even slow down its improvement by removing
opportunities for the Iraqis to conduct operations together with
America's outstanding soldiers and marines. The ISG report also ignores
the significant delay before new Iraqi forces can take the field, even
with accelerated training. What will happen to the insurgency and
violence in that time? Clearly it will continue to grow. Very likely it
will rapidly grow beyond the point at which any plausible increase in
Iraqi forces' capabilities could control it.
The ISG counters by proposing that the United States and the Iraqi
Government open negotiations with Iran and Syria in an effort to
persuade them to contain the growing sectarian violence. It is beyond
the scope of this report to consider whether the Iranians or Syrians
are likely to be helpful in such negotiations, but there is no reason
to imagine that they could control the violence in Iraq even if they
wished to.
Iran provides Shiite groups of all varieties with weapons,
expertise, advice, and money. Syria tacitly permits the movement of
insurgents across its borders. This assistance to the rebels increases
the overall level of violence in Iraq, as well as the lethality of
certain insurgent attacks. But could the Iranians and the Syrians turn
the violence off?
To begin with, there is ample evidence that the various
insurgencies in Iraq have developed their own multifarious sources of
funding, mostly resulting from criminal activities and corruption that
they siphon off for their own purposes. They also have an ample stock
of high explosives: Saddam Hussein packed his country with ammunition
warehouses for more than a decade. As one observer put it: ``There's
enough high explosives in Iraq now to maintain the current level of
violence for a thousand years.'' If the Iranians cut off their
supplies, the insurgents would still be able to fund their enterprises.
They would still have the wherewithal to make IEDs and car bombs, and
they would still recruit suicide bombers. Outside sources of assistance
help them, but the withdrawal of those resources would not stop them.
Could the Iranians order SCIRI or the Jaysh al-Mahdi to stop their
attacks? It is extremely unlikely. To begin with, although SCIRI and
Jaysh al-Mahdi are Shiites, they are Arabs, not Persians. It will
always be difficult for Iraqi Shiites to obey explicit instructions
from Iranians for cultural reasons. But, above all, the escalating
violence in Iraq results less from Iranian encouragement than from the
internal dynamics of Iraq itself.
The Shiite community in Iraq remained remarkably quiescent under
increasing Sunni attacks through 2004 and 2005, despite rapidly growing
tensions between Iran and the United States. The explosion in sectarian
violence followed the bombing of the Samarra mosque. The recruiting and
propaganda of Shiite groups relies heavily on portraying them as
defenders of the Shiite people against Sunni assaults. It is difficult
to imagine how they would explain abandoning their fight in the face of
continuing Sunni attacks simply because the Iranians tell them to do
so. The vigilante groups that are in some respects the most worrisome
manifestation of the nascent civil war will not listen to the Iranians
at all. These are mostly local, self-organized groups aimed at
preventing and avenging attacks on their communities. The only way to
bring such groups under control is to establish security, thereby
removing their only real reason for being.
And who could bring the Sunni Arab insurgents under control? Syria,
still less Iran, does not control al-Qaeda in Iraq or Ansar al-Sunna.
Such groups take orders from no state and cannot be made to stop their
activities by a diktat from Damascus or Tehran. The Baathists are no
more likely to stop their fighting simply because the Syrians intervene
with them. To begin with, the Baathists are Iraqi nationalists,
unlikely to take orders from foreign regimes. Neither are they
organized into a neat hierarchical system that would facilitate Syrian
discussions with them. When the United States destroyed the Iraqi
Baathist state in 2003, it also destroyed the political and some of the
social hierarchy in the Sunni Arab community. The lack of a clear
hierarchy that controls its followers has severely hindered the U.S.
ability to negotiate with the insurgents during its attempts to do so
and will limit the Syrians no less.
The problem with relying on Iraq's neighbors to control the
violence is less that they will not do so than that they cannot. This
approach is a blind alley that will lead nowhere because it
misrepresents the fundamental nature of the problem in Iraq.
Partition Iraq
This approach takes as its basis the assumption that Iraq naturally
falls into three parts. Supporters of it usually point to one of two
mutually contradictory facts: Iraq has three main social groups (Sunni
Arabs, Shiites, and Kurds), and the Iraqi state was formed in 1921 from
three Ottoman vilayets or administrative districts. Iraq, advocates of
this view say, is an artificial creation that would be more stable if
we allowed it to fall back into its natural, trinary form.
To begin with, the fact that the Ottoman Empire chose to rule what
is now Iraq via three administrative districts does not make the
present Iraqi state an artificial creation. On the contrary, from
prehistoric times the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers and the land between
them have formed a single community, often composed of multiple
ethnicities and religions but functioning as an economic and often
political unit.
Ottoman administrative practice should not convince modern
observers that Iraq is by nature a tripartite state. The Ottomans did
not align territory according to modern concepts of national self-
determination. They divided and conquered, as did most other empires.
The notion of some preindependence Iraqi system in which each social
group controlled its own area in peace is a myth. Any such tripartite
structure would itself be an artificial innovation with no historical
basis.
The Ottoman vilayets (of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra) were not
themselves homogeneous ethnic or sectarian groupings. Mosul, Baghdad,
Baquba, and Kirkuk, four of Iraq's principal cities, have long been
mixed at both the metropolitan and the neighborhood level.
Even now, a high proportion of Iraqis live in mixed communities.
Partitioning the country could only result from the migration of
millions of people. Many would resist. Bloodbaths would ensue. When
this process occurred in the Balkans in the 1990s the international
community called it ``ethnic cleansing'' and ``genocide.'' It is
difficult to imagine how the United States and the international
community could now accept and even propose a solution that they
rightly condemned not a decade ago.
These principled considerations parallel practical concerns. Who
would get Baghdad? The capital is now mixed between Sunni and Shia.
Depriving one group of that city and giving it to another would create
an obvious sense of victory and defeat between the groups--not
something that bodes well for subsequent stability. If the
international community sought to divide Baghdad, where would it draw
the line? The Tigris seems an obvious choice, but it has already become
impossible. There are many Sunnis living east of the river and many
Shiites living to the west. Jaysh al-Mahdi fighters are working hard to
seize more territory on the West Bank and drive the Sunnis farther out.
If the United States allows this process to continue, as advocates of
partition suggest, America will de facto be giving Baghdad to the
Shiites at the cost of the dislocation of 2 or 3 million Sunnis. Again,
this is a process that can only come at the price of hideous suffering
and death. Last, there is the problem of oil. The Kurds have oil
fields. The Shiites have oil fields. The Sunni Arabs do not. Fear of
the loss of oil revenue is one factor driving the Sunni insurgency now.
Partitioning Iraq would make that fear a permanent reality. Why would
the Sunnis stop fighting? They would not. Partition is not only a
historical abomination and an invitation for sectarian cleansing and
genocide on a vast scale--it is also a recipe for perpetual conflict in
Mesopotamia.
Iraq does not break down cleanly into Kurdish, Shia, or Sunni Arab
areas either demographically or historically. Rather, within these
broad categories there are serious fissures and rivalries which have
been exploited by overlords (Ottoman, British, and Iraqi) to maintain
central control. These rivalries will not disappear by a simple ethnic
or sectarian realignment or oil-sharing scheme. Shia factions will war
with each other, and Shia violence could spill into other Arab Shia
tribes in the region. Sunni tribal forces, urban Baathists, Islamic
radicals, and other interested states will not allow a peaceful Sunni
heartland to be established, even if they could somehow be reconciled
to a strip of the upper Euphrates and the Anbar desert. The integration
of Kurds into this realignment, and the minority populations that live
in Kurdish areas, is far more complicated than most observers
recognize, starting with the fact that there are two rival Kurdish
parties now, reflecting important linguistic and tribal distinctions.
Considering the presence of large numbers of Turkmen, Yazidi, and other
minority groups in the lands that a partition would give to Kurdistan
presents another set of problems that partitioning will only
exacerbate.
Withdrawal
Advocates of immediate withdrawal fall into a number of camps. Some
propose pulling American forces out of Iraq because they opposed the
war to begin with. Others argue that we have already lost and that
further efforts to turn the tide are useless. Still others claim that
American interests would be better served by withdrawing to other parts
of region--or withdrawing from the region altogether. Slightly more
sophisticated advocates of this plan argue that the American presence
in Iraq is an irritant and permits a sort of laziness on the part of
the Iraqi Government. Consequently, they say, a U.S. withdrawal would
both reduce the violence and force the Iraqis to contribute more
effectively. Many of these arguments are irrelevant or invalid. All
face a challenge that advocates have an obligation to answer: What will
happen in Iraq and in the region following a withdrawal of U.S. forces,
and why will that be better for America than attempting to win?
The War Was Wrong From the Beginning. This argument for withdrawal
is without any logical foundation. Whatever the wisdom or folly of the
initial decision to invade Iraq in 2003, the problems the United States
faces there now are real and imminent. The lives of millions of people
literally hang in the balance in a country poised on the brink of full-
scale civil war. The issues at stake are far too important to allow
resentment at an earlier decision to prevent a rational assessment of
the best course of action today. America has a responsibility to pursue
its own interests in Iraq, and those interests require establishing
security and a legitimate government. And America has an obligation to
the Iraqi people that it would be immoral and reprehensible to ignore.
The War Is Already Lost. The war is not lost. The legitimate,
elected Iraqi Government remains stable and commands the support of the
majority of the Iraqi people. The Armed Forces of Iraq are at their
posts, training and fighting every day. The levels of violence in Iraq
per capita are far lower than those of Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s,
and the United States was able to contain those conflicts. By any
measure, victory in Iraq is still possible if the United States has the
will and the skill to seek it.
Those who disagree with this assessment still have an obligation,
moreover, to propose a positive strategy for moving forward. Accepting
defeat might solve an immediate problem, but international politics
will not stop when we have done so. What will happen in Iraq? What will
happen in the region? What will the United States have to do? Will that
situation actually be better or worse than attempting to fight through
a difficult time now? Advocating immediate withdrawal without answering
these questions persuasively and in detail is irresponsible.
Many who prefer immediate withdrawal implicitly or explicitly
believe that the United States can find a ``soft landing'' that will
contain the violence and prevent it from spreading throughout the
region. After all, no sensible and responsible person could advocate an
approach that would ignite the entire Middle East in full-scale
sectarian war. A forthcoming study from the Saban Center for Middle
East Policy at the Brookings Institute, whose interim findings have
been publicly presented, casts serious doubt on the likelihood of any
``soft landing,'' however. The study's codirector, Kenneth Pollack,
argues that the history of civil wars strongly suggests that the Iraq
conflict will spill over onto Iraq's neighbors on a large scale. It is
highly likely not only to involve them in Iraq's struggles, but to
ignite secondary civil wars within those states that may spread even
further. He argues that there is no natural checking mechanism that
would build up any sort of resistance to this conflict spreading. On
the contrary, refugee flows from Iraq are already changing the
demographics of the region and will continue to do so. Refugees will
appeal to similar ethnic and sectarian groups in their new host
countries to involve themselves in the larger struggle. War will
spread, involving American interests and allies. It is nearly certain
that the United States will find itself reengaging in the Middle East
on far worse terms than it now faces. Withdrawal promises at best a
partial relief from the immediate pain at the expense of far worse
suffering for years to come.
The United States Could Accomplish Its Regional Goals Better by
Leaving. Various attempts at sophisticated argumentation claim that
America could best regain its lost leverage in the Middle East by
pulling back from Iraq and focusing on other issues. Again, advocates
of this approach rarely consider the likely consequences of withdrawal
and how the prospects of regional war will probably destroy any
leverage the United States might hypothetically gain. They ignore
completely, moreover, the fact that America's defeat in Iraq will
destroy its credibility in the region and around the world for years to
come.
When the United States first invaded Iraq in 2003, the Iranian
regime was clearly frightened. It responded to that fear by lying low
and reducing the level of tension with the West. By mid-2004, Tehran
had decided that the United States was bogged down in a war it was
losing. The Iranians seized that opportunity to move forward
aggressively with their nuclear program despite international
opposition, to court conflict with the United States, and to increase
support for Shiite militias in Iraq. What will happen if the United
States withdraws from Iraq and abandons that country to chaos? The
likeliest outcome is that Iran will seek and possibly achieve hegemony
in the region. Iran is by far the largest and strongest state in the
Middle East, even without nuclear weapons. The creation of a power
vacuum on its western frontier would make it stronger still. With
neither a strong Iraqi nor an American presence, Tehran's writ would
run throughout the gulf region virtually unopposed. It is very
difficult to see how such an outcome restores any degree of leverage in
the Middle East to a defeated United States.
The American Presence in Iraq Is the Problem. This argument is
simply untrue. There are two simple tests to apply: How has the pattern
of violence in Iraq correlated with the size of American forces, and
whom are the insurgents attacking? If the irritating presence of
American soldiers were the primary cause of violence in Iraq, then more
American troops should lead to more violence and fewer troops would
produce less violence. In fact, the opposite has been the case. When
the United States has increased force levels in Iraq in the past in
order to provide security for elections and the constitutional
referendum, violence dropped significantly. When U.S. forces cleared
Tall Afar, Mosul, and Sadr City in 2004, violence dropped. As MNF-I has
attempted to reduce the American presence in Iraq prematurely, violence
has increased. Correlating American presence with violence does not
suggest that American forces are the problem, but rather that they are
part of the solution.
The idea that American troops are the irritant in Iraq does not
explain the fact that attacks by Iraqis on other Iraqis are steadily
increasing. If the American troop presence is causing the bloodshed,
why are Iraqis killing each other, rather than coalition forces, in
growing numbers? This explanation also suffers from the fact that
repeated anecdotes reveal that many Iraqis prefer to see American
troops rather than Iraqi police. Sunnis in Baghdad warn each other that
they should trust Iraqi Government forces only when they are
accompanied by American soldiers. It is difficult to see in such
examples proof of the theorem that the U.S. presence is the source of
the problem, still less that removing U.S. forces would lead to peace.
CONCLUSION
America faces a serious challenge in Iraq today, and there are no
simple or easy solutions. The proposal described in this report is only
the essential first step on a long road. Successful counterinsurgency
strategy requires a skillful blend of military, political, economic,
diplomatic, and social initiatives. Although attempts to suppress
rebellions through brute force have succeeded in the past on occasion,
the methods required to implement them are repugnant to Americans and
have rightly been rejected. The emphasis on military power in this
proposal does not come from any belief that such power can bring
success on its own. On the contrary, the successive phases of this
project will examine various aspects of training the Iraqi Security
Forces, transitioning to Iraqi governmental control, and other
political, economic, and diplomatic developments that are essential
components of any successful strategy.
But there is no prospect for any positive developments in Iraq
today until the security situation is brought under control. Political
processes cannot resolve, absorb, or control communal and terrorist
violence at the current levels. Economic development cannot even begin
in earnest amidst such bloodshed. Diplomatic approaches cannot resolve
a conflict that is driven by internal factors. The top priority of
American strategy in Iraq today must be to secure the population and
bring the violence under control. Making political progress of any sort
a precondition for the start of such an operation will virtually ensure
failure and defeat.
There is risk in any military operation, and America and the Iraqi
Government and people face a number of clever and determined enemies.
The United States has consistently underestimated the skill and
capability of these enemies and relied on overly optimistic assumptions
about what would happen in Iraq. It is time to accept reality. The
fight in Iraq is difficult. The enemy will work hard to defeat the
coalition and the Iraqi Government. Things will not go according to
plan. The coalition and the Iraqi Government may fail. But failure is
neither inevitable nor tolerable, and so the United States must
redouble its efforts to succeed. America must adopt a new strategy
based more firmly on successful counterinsurgency practices, and the
Nation must provide its commanders with the troops they need to execute
that strategy in the face of a thinking enemy. The enemy has been at
war with us for nearly 4 years. The United States has emphasized
restraint and caution. It is time for America to go to war and win. And
America can.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Dr. Kagan.
Dr. Carpenter.
STATEMENT OF DR. TED GALEN CARPENTER, VICE PRESIDENT OF DEFENSE
AND FOREIGN POLICY STUDIES, CATO INSTITUTE, WASHINGTON, DC
Dr. Carpenter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank
the committee for the invitation to offer my views this
afternoon.
I have provided a longer written statement, and I would
request that that be included in the record.
The Chairman. In the case of all of you, if you have a
written statement that exceeded or was different than what your
verbal testimony is, that'll be included in the record.
Dr. Carpenter. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Optimism about the United States mission in Iraq has faded
dramatically in the past few months. The bipartisan Iraq Study
Group accurately concluded that the situation was, ``grave and
deteriorating.'' The Pentagon's report to Congress in November
2006 paints a similarly dismal picture, with attacks on United
States troops, Iraqi security forces, and Iraqi civilians all
at record levels. Yet, proponents of the war refuse to admit
what is increasingly obvious: That Washington's Iraq occupation
and democratization mission is failing and there is little
realistic prospect that its fortunes will improve. Something
much more dramatic than a modest course correction is needed.
It is essential to ask the administration and its
supporters at what point they will admit that the costs of this
venture have become unbearable. How much longer are they
willing to have our troops stay in Iraq? Two years? Five years?
Ten years? How many more tax dollars are they willing to pour
into Iraq? Another $300 billion? $600 billion? One trillion?
And, most crucial of all, how many more American lives are they
willing to sacrifice? Two thousand? Five thousand? Ten
thousand? It is time for the supporters of the war to be
specific.
Proponents of the mission avoid addressing such unpleasant
questions. Instead, they act as though victory in Iraq can be
achieved merely through the exercise of willpower, that we can
simply choose victory.
Whether or not one describes it as a civil war, the
security situation in Iraq is extraordinarily violent and
chaotic. Moreover, the nature of the violence has shifted, with
the principal component now sectarian strife between Sunnis and
Shiites. The Iraq Study Group noted that 4 of Iraq's 18
provinces are, ``highly insecure.'' And those provinces account
for 40 percent of the country's population.
A November 2006 U.N. report highlights the extent of the
growing bloodshed. The carnage is now running at at least 120
victims each day. We must remember, this is occurring in a
country of barely 26 million people. A comparable pace in the
United States would be a horrifying 1,400 deaths per day, or
nearly 500,000 a year. If political violence were consuming
that many American lives, there would be little debate about
whether the United States was in a civil war.
In addition to the growing violence, there is mounting
evidence that the majority of Iraqis no longer want United
States troops in their country. The bottom line is that the
United States is mired in a country that is already in the
early stages of an exceedingly complex multisided civil war,
and this is not just a war between Sunnis and Shia, this is a
war with multiple factions, including internal conflicts among
the various sects. It is also a situation where all significant
factions, save one--the Kurds--want American troops to leave.
That is an untenable situation.
Increasing the number of United States troops in Iraq by
21,000 or so is a futile attempt to salvage a mission that has
gone terribly wrong. It would merely increase the number of
casualties, both American and Iraqi, over the short term, while
having little long-term impact on the security environment.
Moreover, the magnitude of the proposed buildup falls far short
of the numbers needed to give the occupation forces a realistic
prospect of suppressing the violence. Experts on
counterinsurgency, for many, many years, have consistently
concluded that at least 10 soldiers per 1,000 population are
required to have a sufficient impact. And, indeed, many experts
have argued that, in cases where armed resistance is intense
and pervasive, which certainly seems to apply to Iraq,
deployments of 20 soldiers per 1,000 may be needed. Given
Iraq's population of 26 million, such a mission would require
the deployment of at least 260,000 ground forces, and probably
as many as 520,000. We simply don't have the troops for that
kind of mission.
A limited surge of additional troops is the latest illusory
panacea offered by the people who brought us the Iraq quagmire
in the first place. It is an idea that should be rejected, and,
instead, the United States needs to withdraw from Iraq.
Proponents of staying in Iraq offer several reasons why a
prompt withdrawal would be bad for the United States. They
argue that al-Qaeda's 1,300 fighters will somehow take over
Iraq, that a United States withdrawal will embolden Islamic
radicals worldwide, that a withdrawal will lead to a regional
Sunni-Shiite proxy war, and that leaving Iraq without achieving
our goals would betray a moral obligation to the Iraqi people.
I deal with all of those allegations, at some length, in my
written statement. Suffice it to say here that those arguments
vary in terms of plausibility. Some, especially the notion that
al-Qaeda will be able to take over Iraq, are farfetched;
others, especially the concern about a regional proxy war, have
some validity. All of them, though, are ultimately deficient as
a reason for keeping United States troops in Iraq.
A decision to withdraw and leave Iraq to its own fate is
certainly not without adverse consequences. America's terrorist
adversaries will portray the pullout as a defeat for U.S.
policy. But staying on indefinitely in a dire and deteriorating
security environment is even worse for our country.
The costs, both tangible and intangible, of a prompt exit
must be measured against the costs of staying in Iraq.
Moreover, even if the United States absorbs the costs of a
prolonged mission, there is no realistic prospect that anything
resembling victory resides at the end of that effort. Indeed,
most of the indicators suggest that we would be merely delaying
the inevitable.
The intangible costs are already considerable. America's
reputation in the Muslim world is at its lowest level in
history, largely because of the Iraq mission. America's
reputation elsewhere in the world, including among longstanding
allies and friends, has, likewise, taken a major hit. The All-
Volunteer Force has been strained to the breaking point, and
the social wounds that the Vietnam war inflicted on our
society, which took so long to heal, have been ripped open. Our
country is, once again, bitterly divided over a murky war. The
longer we stay in Iraq, the worse all of those problems will
become.
The tangible costs are even more depressing. The financial
tab for the Iraq mission is already some $350 billion, and the
meter is running at approximately $8 billion a month, and that
is before the President's new escalation. Furthermore, even
those appalling figures do not take into account substantial
indirect costs, such as the expense of long-term care for
wounded Iraq war veterans.
The United States needs to adopt a decisive withdrawal
strategy, measured in months, not years. A longer schedule
would simply prolong the agony. Emotionally, deciding to leave
under current conditions will not be easy, for it requires an
implicit admission that Washington has failed in its ambitious
goal to create a stable, united, democratic secular Iraq that
would be a model for peace throughout the Middle East. But that
goal was unrealistic, from the outset. It is difficult for any
nation, and especially the American superpower, to admit
failure. However, it is better to admit failure while the
adverse consequences are manageable. Failure in Iraq would be a
setback for the United States, particularly in terms of global
clout and credibility, but one of the advantages to being a
superpower is that the country can absorb a setback without
experiencing catastrophic damages to its core interests or
capabilities. Failure in Iraq does not even come close to
threatening those core interests and capabilities. Most
important, a withdrawal now will be less painful than
withdrawing years from now, when the cost in blood, treasure,
and credibility will be even greater.
The withdrawal needs to be comprehensive, not partial. The
only troops remaining in Iraq should be a modest number of
special forces personnel who would work with political factions
to eradicate the al-Qaeda interlopers in their country. It must
be clear to Iraqis and to populations throughout the Muslim
world that Washington has no intention of trying to maintain a
military presence in Iraq. That has already become a lightning
rod for the Muslim world. Above all, United States policymakers
need to absorb the larger lesson of the Iraq debacle. Launching
an elective war in pursuit of a nation-building fantasy was an
act of folly. It is a folly that policymakers should vow never
to repeat.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Carpenter follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Ted Galen Carpenter, Vice President of
Defense and Foreign Policy Studies, Cato Institute, Washington, DC
Optimism about the U.S. mission in Iraq has faded dramatically in
the past few months. The bipartisan Iraq Study Group conceded that the
situation in Iraq was ``grave and deteriorating.'' The Pentagon's
report to Congress in November 2006 paints a similarly dismal picture,
with attacks on U.S. troops, Iraqi security forces, and Iraqi civilians
at record levels.
Yet proponents of the war refuse to admit what is becoming
increasingly obvious: Washington's Iraq occupation and democratization
mission is failing, and there is little realistic prospect that its
fortunes will improve. Something much more dramatic than a modest
course correction is needed.
It is essential to ask the administration and its hawkish backers
at what point they will admit that the costs of this venture have
become unbearable. How much longer are they willing to have our troops
stay in Iraq? Five years? Ten years? Twenty years? How many more tax
dollars are they willing to pour into Iraq? Another $300 billion? $600
billion? $1 trillion? And most crucial of all, how many more American
lives are they willing to sacrifice? Two thousand? Five thousand? Ten
thousand?
Proponents of the mission avoid addressing such unpleasant
questions. Instead, they act as though victory in Iraq can be achieved
merely through the exercise of will power.
THE DIRE SECURITY SITUATION IN IRAQ
Whether or not one describes it as a civil war, the security
situation in Iraq is extraordinarily violent and chaotic. Moreover, the
nature of the violence in that country has shifted since the February
2006 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra, one of Shia Islam's
holiest sites. The Sunni-led insurgency against United States and
British occupation forces and the security forces of the U.S.-sponsored
Iraqi Government is still a significant factor, but it is no longer the
dominant one. The turmoil now centers around sectarian violence between
Sunnis and Shiites. Baghdad is the epicenter of that strife, but it has
erupted in other parts of the country as well. The Iraq Study Group
noted that four of Iraq's 18 provinces are ``highly insecure.'' Those
provinces account for about 40 percent of the country's population.
A November 2006 U.N. report highlights the extent of the growing
bloodshed. The carnage is now running at approximately 120 victims each
day. This is occurring in a country of barely 26 million people. A
comparable pace in the United States would be a horrifying 1,400 deaths
per day--or nearly 500,000 per year. If violence between feuding
political or ethno-religious factions was consuming that many American
lives, there would be little debate about whether the United States was
experiencing a civil war.
In addition to the casualties in Iraq, there are other human costs.
The United Nations estimates that some 1.6 million people have been
displaced inside Iraq (i.e., they are ``internal refugees'') as a
result of the fighting. Another 1.8 million have fled the country
entirely, mostly to Jordan and Syria. Moreover, the pace of the exodus
is accelerating. Refugees are now leaving Iraq at the rate of nearly
3,000 a day. The bulk of those refugees are middle and upper class
families. Indeed, there are affluent neighborhoods in Baghdad and other
cities that now resemble ghost towns.
THE COMPLEX NATURE OF THE VIOLENCE
The mounting chaos in Iraq is not simply a case of Sunni-Shiite
sectarian violence, although that is the dominant theme. The Iraq Study
Group notes the complexity of Iraq's security turmoil. ``In Kirkuk, the
struggle is between Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen. In Basra and the south,
the violence is largely an intra-Shia struggle.'' Implicitly rejecting
the arguments of those who contend that the violence is primarily a
Sunni-Shia conflict confined to Baghdad, the members of the commission
point out that ``most of Iraq's cities have a sectarian mix and are
plagued by persistent violence. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki warns
that conflicts in the various regions could be ``Shiite versus Shiite
and Sunni versus Sunni.''
There is also mounting evidence that the majority of Iraqis no
longer want U.S. troops in their country. The bottom line is that the
United States is mired in a country that is already in the early stages
of an exceedingly complex, multisided civil war, and where all
significant factions save one (the Kurds) want American troops to
leave. That is an untenable situation.
ILLUSORY SOLUTION--SEND MORE TROOPS
Increasing the number of U.S. troops in Iraq by 20,000 or so is a
futile attempt to salvage a mission that has gone terribly wrong. In
all likelihood, it would merely increase the number of casualties--both
American and Iraqi--over the short term while having little long-term
impact on the security environment. Moreover, the magnitude of the
proposed buildup falls far short of the numbers needed to give the
occupation forces a realistic prospect of suppressing the violence.
Experts on counterinsurgency strategies have consistently concluded
that at least 10 soldiers per 1,000 population are required to have a
sufficient impact. Indeed, some experts have argued that in cases where
armed resistance is intense and pervasive (which certainly seems to
apply to Iraq), deployments of 20 soldiers per thousand may be needed.
Given Iraq's population (26 million) such a mission would require
the deployment of at least 260,000 ground forces (an increase of
115,000 from current levels) and probably as many as 520,000. Even the
lower requirement will strain the U.S. Army and Marine Corps to the
breaking point. Yet a lesser deployment would have no realistic chance
to get the job done. A limited ``surge'' of additional troops is the
latest illusory panacea offered by the people who brought us the Iraq
quagmire in the first place. It is an idea that should be rejected.
CONSEQUENCES OF LEAVING
Proponents of staying in Iraq offer several reasons why a prompt
withdrawal would be bad for the United States. Those arguments vary in
terms of plausibility. All of them, though, are ultimately deficient as
a reason for keeping U.S. troops in Iraq.
Allegation: Al-Qaeda would take over Iraq
Administration officials and other supporters of the war have
warned repeatedly that a ``premature'' withdrawal of U.S. forces would
enable al-Qaeda to turn Iraq into a sanctuary to plot and launch
attacks against the United States and other Western countries. But al-
Qaeda taking over Iraq is an extremely improbable scenario. The Iraq
Study Group put the figure of foreign fighters at only 1,300; a
relatively small component of the Sunni insurgency against U.S. forces.
It strains credulity to imagine 1,300 fighters (and foreigners at that)
taking over and controlling a country of 26 million people.
The challenge for al-Qaeda would be even more daunting than those
raw numbers suggest. The organization does have some support among the
Sunni Arabs in Iraq, but opinion even among that segment of the
population is divided. A September 2006 poll conducted by the Program
on International Policy Attitudes at the University of Maryland found
that 94 percent of Sunnis had a somewhat, or highly, unfavorable
attitude toward al-Qaeda. As the violence of al-Qaeda attacks has
mounted, and the victims are increasingly Iraqis--not Americans--many
Sunnis have turned against the terrorists. There have even been a
growing number of reports during the past year of armed conflicts
between Iraqi Sunnis and foreign fighters.
The PIPA poll also showed that 98 percent of Shiite respondents and
100 percent of Kurdish respondents had somewhat, or very, unfavorable
views of al-Qaeda. The notion that a Shiite-Kurdish-dominated
government would tolerate Iraq becoming a safe haven for al-Qaeda is
improbable on its face. And even if U.S. troops left Iraq, the
successor government would continue to be dominated by the Kurds and
Shiites, since they make up more than 80 percent of Iraq's population
and, in marked contrast to the situation under Saddam Hussein, they now
control the military and police. That doesn't suggest a reliable safe
haven for al-Qaeda.
Allegation: The terrorists would be emboldened worldwide
In urging the United States to persevere in Iraq, President Bush
has warned that an early military withdrawal would encourage al-Qaeda
and other terrorist organizations. Weak U.S. responses to challenges
over the previous quarter century, especially in Lebanon and Somalia,
had emboldened such people, Bush argues. Hawkish pundits have made
similar allegations.
It is a curious line of argument with ominous implications, for it
assumes that the United States should have stayed in both countries,
despite the military debacles there. The mistake, according to that
logic, was not the original decision to intervene but the decision to
limit American losses and terminate the missions. That is a classic
case of learning the wrong lessons from history.
Yes, al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups apparently concluded that
the Lebanon and Somalia episodes showed that U.S. leaders and the
American people have no stomach for enduring murky missions that entail
significant casualties. They are likely to draw a similar lesson if the
United States withdraws from Iraq without an irrefutable triumph. That
is why it is so imperative to be cautious about a decision to intervene
in the first place. Military missions should not be undertaken unless
there are indisputably vital American security interests at stake.
A decision to withdraw and leave Iraq to its own fate is not
without adverse consequences. America's terrorist adversaries will
portray a pullout as a defeat for U.S. policy. But the cost of staying
on indefinitely in a dire security environment is even worse for our
country. President Bush and his advisors need to consider the
possibility that the United States might stay in Iraq for many years to
come and still not achieve its policy goals. And the costs, both in
blood and treasure, continue to mount.
Allegation: The conflict will spill over Iraq's borders and create
regional chaos
That concern does have some validity. The ingredients are in place
for a regional Sunni-Shia ``proxy war.'' Predominantly Shiite Iran has
already taken a great interest in political and military developments
in its western neighbor. Indeed, Washington has repeatedly accused
Tehran of interfering in Iraq. There is little doubt that Iran wants to
see a Shiite-controlled government in Baghdad and would react badly if
it appeared that Iraq's Sunni minority might be poised to regain power
and once again subjugate the Shiite majority. The current Iraqi
Government is quite friendly to Iran, and Tehran can be expected to
take steps to protect the new-found influence it enjoys in Baghdad.
But Iraq's other neighbors are apprehensive about the specter of a
Shiite-controlled Iraq. Saudi Arabia, in particular, regards the
prospect of such a state on its northern border as anathema, worrying
about the impact on its own Shia minority--which is concentrated in the
principal oil-producing region. There are indications that wealthy
Saudis are already providing funds to Sunni forces in Iraq.
A regional Sunni-Shiite proxy war in Iraq would turn the Bush
administration's policy there into even more of a debacle than it has
already become. Even worse, Iraq's neighbors could be drawn in as
direct participants in the fighting. Washington should take steps to
head off those dangers.
Probably the best approach would be for the United States to
convene a regional conference that included (at a minimum) Iran, Saudi
Arabia, Syria, Jordan, and Turkey. The purpose of such a conference
should be to make all parties confront the danger of the Iraqi turmoil
mushrooming into a regional armed struggle that ultimately would not be
in the best interests of any country involved. Ideally, that
realization might lead to a commitment by the neighboring states to
refrain from--or at least bound the extent of--meddling in the
escalating violence in Iraq
Ultimately, though, maintaining a U.S. military occupation of Iraq
to forestall a possible regional proxy war is simply too high a price
to pay, both in money spent and American lives sacrificed.
Allegation: Leaving Iraq would betray a moral obligation to the Iraqi
people
In addition to their other objections, opponents of withdrawal
protest that we will leave Iraq in chaos, and that would be an immoral
action on the part of the United States. Even some critics of the war
have been susceptible to that argument, invoking the so-called Pottery
Barn principle: ``You broke it, you bought it.''
There are two major problems with that argument. First, unless some
restrictions are put in place, the obligation is seemingly open-ended.
There is little question that chaos might increase in Iraq after U.S.
forces leave, but advocates of staying the course do not explain how
the United States can prevent the contending factions in Iraq from
fighting the civil war they already seem to have started. At least, no
one has explained how the United States can restore the peace there at
anything resembling a reasonable cost in American blood and treasure.
Leaving aside the very real possibility that the job of building a
stable democracy might never be done, the moral obligation thesis begs
a fundamental question: What about the moral obligation of the U.S.
Government to its own soldiers and to the American people? There is
clearly an obligation not to waste either American lives or American
tax dollars. We are doing both in Iraq. Staying the course is not a
moral strategy; it is the epitome of an immoral one.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF STAYING IN IRAQ
Leaving Iraq is clearly not cost-free, but the costs (both tangible
and intangible) of a prompt exit must be measured against the costs of
staying the course. Moreover, even if the United States absorbs the
costs of a prolonged mission, there is no certainty that anything
resembling victory resides at the end of that effort. Indeed, most of
the indicators suggest that we would be merely delaying defeat.
Damage to America's standing in the world
Even the September 2006 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq
conceded that the U.S. occupation of Iraq had served as a focal point
and inspiration for Muslim extremists. Equally worrisome, it had also
served as a training arena for such militants to hone their military
and terrorist skills. An al-Qaeda letter intercepted by the U.S.
military indicates that the organization itself regards a continued
U.S. military presence and, consequently, a long war in Iraq as a boon
to its cause.
A December 2006 Zogby poll of populations in five Arab nations
reveals just how much anti-U.S. sentiment has increased throughout that
region. Opinions of the United States, which were already rather
negative, have grown significantly worse in the past year.
Outside the Arab world, there also has been a hardening of
attitudes toward the United States. Even among longstanding friends and
allies (in such places as Europe and East Asia), the United States is
viewed in a significantly more negative light. The longer we stay in
Iraq, the worse those problems will become.
Straining the All-Volunteer military
Even some hawks are concerned about the negative impact of the Iraq
mission on the All-Volunteer Force (AVF). They should be concerned. In
December 2006, GEN Peter J. Schoomaker, the Army's Chief of Staff,
bluntly told a House committee that the Active-Duty Army ``will break''
unless there was a permanent increase in force structure. And that is
before any contemplated additional deployments to Iraq.
The military leaders are not exaggerating. Already the Army has
struggled to meet its recruiting goals, even though it has diluted the
standards for new recruits, including by issuing waivers in cases where
there is evidence of criminal behavior or mental illness. Indeed, the
Iraq occupation has been sustained to this point only through
extraordinary exertions, including an unprecedented number of ``stop
loss'' orders, preventing military personnel from returning to civilian
life when their terms of enlistment are up, and recalling members of
the Reserves--including some people in their forties and fifties. The
AVF is straining to the breaking point already, and the longer we stay
in Iraq, the worse those strains will become.
Costs in blood and treasure
The tab for the Iraq mission is already more than $350 billion, and
the meter is now running at approximately $8 billion a month.
Furthermore, even those appalling figures do not take into account
indirect costs, such as long-term care for wounded Iraq war veterans.
Except when the survival of the Nation is at stake, all military
missions must be judged according to a cost-benefit calculation. Iraq
has never come close to being a war for America's survival. Even the
connection of the Iraq mission to the larger war against radical
Islamic terrorism was always tenuous, at best. For all of his odious
qualities, Saddam Hussein was a secular tyrant, not an Islamic radical.
Indeed, the radical Islamists expressed nearly as much hatred for
Saddam as they did for the United States. Iraq was an elective war--a
war of choice, and a bad choice at that.
DECIDING TO LEAVE
The United States needs to adopt a withdrawal strategy measured in
months, not years. Indeed, the President should begin the process of
removing American troops immediately, and that process needs to be
complete in no more than 6 months. A longer schedule would simply
prolong the agony. It would also afford various Iraq factions
(especially the Kurds and some of the Shia political players) the
opportunity to try to entice or manipulate the United States into
delaying the withdrawal of its forces still further.
Emotionally, deciding to leave under current conditions will not be
easy, for it requires an implicit admission that Washington has failed
in its ambitious goal to create a stable, united, democratic, secular
Iraq that would be a model for peace throughout the Middle East. But
that goal was unrealistic from the outset. It is difficult for any
nation, and especially the American superpower, to admit failure.
However, it is better to admit failure when the adverse consequences
are relatively modest. A defeat in Iraq would assuredly be a setback
for the United States, particularly in terms of global clout and
credibility. But one of the advantages to being a superpower is that
the country can absorb a setback without experiencing catastrophic
damage to its core interests or capabilities. Defeat in Iraq does not
even come close to threatening those interests or capabilities. Most
important, a withdrawal now will be less painful than withdrawing years
from now when the cost in blood, treasure, and credibility will prove
far greater.
The withdrawal needs to be comprehensive, not partial. The only
troops remaining in Iraq should be a modest number of Special Forces
personnel who would work with political factions in Iraq inclined to
eradicate the al-Qaeda interlopers in their country. It must be clear
to Iraqis and populations throughout the Muslim world that Washington
has no intention of trying to maintain a military presence in Iraq.
Above all, U.S. policymakers need to absorb the larger lesson of
the Iraq debacle. Launching an elective war in pursuit of a nation-
building chimera was an act of folly. It is a folly they should vow
never to repeat in any other country.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Dr. Carpenter.
I'd like to--because my colleagues have been so patient
today, why don't I yield my time and I'll ask questions last on
our side. And I'll yield first to Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate the courtesy.
I want to thank all of the panelists for their testimony.
I'd like to start with you, Dr. Kagan. Did you have an
opportunity to advise the White House about your plan?
Dr. Kagan. Senator, I have not spoken with the President,
but I have spoken with individuals in the White House.
Senator Menendez. Are they senior officials of the White
House?
Dr. Kagan. Yes, Senator.
Senator Menendez. Is the plan that you heard the President
describe last night, would you say it is largely your plan?
Dr. Kagan. Senator, it's very difficult for me to tell. The
President gave a very general speech--the elements of the plan
relating to the change of mission, the new strategy to try to
secure Iraq, the commitment of five additional combat brigades
to Baghdad, certainly those are things that we recommended. I
have not yet seen, in any detail, the actual military proposal
that the President intends to pursue, and so, I can't really
say to what extent this is my plan.
Senator Menendez. Do you agree with the essence of his plan
last night?
Dr. Kagan. Well, I certainly believe that the change in
strategy is essential, that the--we must commit to trying to
establish security in Baghdad first. And I do believe that we
need additional forces in order to do that.
Senator Menendez. So, what is the timeframe for that? How
long do we stay there, under--even under your plan--let's
assume, for argument sakes, this is your plan--how long do we
stay?
Dr. Kagan. Our estimates were that we would be able to
establish security in Baghdad, at least in the neighborhoods
that we were proposing to operate in, by the end of 2007. We
believe that we would need to sustain this higher force level
into 2008 in order to support operations in Al Anbar, Diyala,
and elsewhere. And we believe that somewhere in the 18- to 24-
month period, we would be able to begin turning over
responsibilities to Iraqi forces and withdrawing.
Senator Menendez. OK. Now, we lead--under your plan, we
lead this fight, do we not?
Dr. Kagan. Under my plan, we would be working together with
the Iraqis to clear and hold neighborhoods.
Senator Menendez. But we've heard a lot of testimony,
including before this committee the other day--yesterday I
think--and we've heard from others, that the Iraqis don't have,
at this point, the ability to show up for the purposes that
have been outlined in the securing of Baghdad. Isn't that true?
Isn't that pretty much recognized?
Dr. Kagan. Senator, when we developed our plan, we took
into account the possibility that the Iraqis would not come in
the numbers that might be desirable. And so, we attempted to
define a force level for American troops that would be
adequate, even if the Iraqis disappointed us.
Senator Menendez. You know, it just seems to me that we
need to be honest with the American people in this plan. This
plan, as I see it, including that which is described by the
President, wants to be sugarcoated under the guise that Iraqis
are going to lead, and we are somehow going to follow and give
them assistance. And I clearly have the picture that these
American troops who will lead, will be at the forefront, will
be the targets, and we will have some Iraqis assisting along
the way. And that is a fundamentally different mission than
both the President tried to suggest and I heard Secretary Rice
try to suggest, this morning, in her opening statement. And I
think it's not quite--well, it's not quite honest about what is
taking place.
Now, before I came to this afternoon's hearing, I got a
notice that the New Jersey National Guard troops currently
stationed in Iraq are going to have their tours extended by 120
days as a result of the President's policy to add to the war
effort. And I think there is some release out saying that
extension of troop tours by both the Guard and Reserve is now
going to be part of the policy of the United States for up to
an additional year. Isn't that going to have real consequences
on a military that is already far stretched and cannot meet
these challenges--on morale, on performance in the field, and
ultimately on the very recruitment that we need to build up the
Armed Forces strength of the United States?
Dr. Kagan. Senator, I and the Active Duty and retired
officers who developed this plan are all very concerned about
the strains on the Army and the Marine Corps and the National
Guard and Reserves, but we think that, set against that, we
must also be extremely concerned about the prospect that the
damage that'll be done to the volunteer force by defeat in
Iraq, which we believe will be drawn out, at painful and
extremely emotionally searing event, and we think that it will
actually do much greater damage to the force than the
relatively short----
Senator Menendez. Is there an answer to how many lives and
how much money?
Dr. Kagan. Senator, it was not----
Senator Menendez. Where is it that you define, Dr. Kagan,
and those who advocate along your lines--where is it that you
define that if you do not have success, as you have pointed out
a way that you believe we can achieve success, where is the
tipping point? Because to listen to those advocates who say
that we cannot fail in Iraq and believe that failure, in terms
of the military options, is the driving force in--i.e., to
create security--we have had escalations and they have not
succeeded. Because, in my mind, we haven't had the political
surge to do it. Now, you reject that.
The point being, at what point, when you do not succeed
again, if you do not succeed again--at what point will you come
and tell us, ``Well, if we had another 20, 30, 40,000 troops,
we could ultimately succeed here''? It just seems to me that
we've been through this in our history before. Where is the
tipping point in which you are willing to admit that a
different course, than even the one you suggest, is
appropriate?
Dr. Kagan. Senator, I have high confidence that the plan
that we proposed will bring down the level of violence in
Baghdad, and I believe that that will be a positive good, even
if we ultimately have to withdraw from the country because of
other unfortunate developments in the political realm. I
believe that we need to take this opportunity to try to restore
order and try to get ourselves on a track that will avoid some
of the terrible consequences of defeat. If that doesn't work,
then obviously we will have to reconsider.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
Dr. Carpenter, very quickly--I have about a minute left--in
your testimony--in your written testimony, you talk about
bringing others in a regional conference, including Iran, Saudi
Arabia, Syria, Jordan, and Turkey. You heard that maybe--I
don't know if you heard--the Secretary of State's answers to
two of those partners along the way of not having them engage.
Could you give your own reflections on that, and how does
bringing Saudi Arabia and Turkey to the table at the same time,
in a regional context, gives us an opportunity to offset some
of her concerns, and--how do you view that?
Dr. Carpenter. Senator, I think it is absolutely essential
to involve all of Iraq's neighbors in an attempt to try to at
least quarantine the violence in that country and prevent it
from becoming a regional proxy war, or, even worse, a regional
war. That simply cannot be accomplished without involving Iran
and Syria. As distasteful as we rightfully regard those
governments, they are important actors in the region. And one
of the basic lessons I think we need to learn for American
foreign policy generally is that it is not very effective to
refuse to talk to one's adversaries, that the most difficult
task of diplomacy is getting results from regimes that you,
quite frankly, wish didn't exist. It's easy to talk to one's
friends; it is very, very difficult, but ever so necessary, to
talk to one's adversaries. And we are not going to get any kind
of solution, even the limited solution of quarantining the
violence in Iraq, unless we draw in Iran and Syria, as well as
Iraq's other neighbors, into this process.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I'm
going to follow your good example and yield to Senator Corker.
The Chairman. If I can interrupt for just one moment, I
would say to my colleagues, if, in fact, you have additional
questions, in light of the relatively small number here, my
intention would be to allow you to go back for a second round,
if the panel would be willing to stick around.
Thank you.
Senator Corker. Thank you, gentlemen. I appreciate it.
I enjoyed your remarks. And, again, I want to thank our
chairman for the distinguished panelists that we continue to
have in these meetings.
I think that we talk a great deal about ending the war in
Iraq and withdrawing our troops, but I think we all know that
the war in Iraq is going to continue for years, in one way or
another, if we leave. And so, I'd like for each of you to
respond, if you will, to us, if we, in fact, do withdraw, if,
in fact, President Bush's plan is not followed--I'd like for
you all to paint the picture--I know there's going to be
tremendous civil strife, tens and thousands of lives will be
lost in the following period--describe to us, if you will, if
withdrawal does occur in a timely fashion--6 months, 9 months--
how you view Iraq to be when that occurs.
Ambassador Galbraith. Let me take a crack at that, Senator.
Certainly, if we withdraw, there is going to be continued
sectarian killing between Sunnis and Shiites. Iran will
exercise enormous influence in Iraq. For decades Iran sponsored
the Shiite religious parties that, as a result of the U.S.
invasion, now control Iraq's government. The central government
will not exercise any more authority than it does now, which is
to say it will have basically no authority. Kurdistan will
continue to be, de facto, independent.
And if we stay in Iraq, all of this will also be the case.
There is a civil war in Iraq which we are not containing that
civil war. There is terrible sectarian killing, and we're not
able to stop it. An increase in the number of troops is not
going to help control the killing. Our troops are not trained
to be police. They don't speak the language. They don't have
the local knowledge. And if they are relying on so-called Iraqi
troops, you have to ask the question: Who are those Iraqi
troops? They are going to be either Sunni or Shiite or Kurdish
peshmerga. If a Sunni or Shiite stops at a roadblock manned by
troops or police of the opposite sect, his life is in danger.
Unless a Baghdad resident knows the local troops or police are
from his own sect, he's not going to feel safe.
So, the short answer is that Iraq after withdrawal and Iraq
today are not going to look very much different. There is just
the one achievable goal, which is one that Senator Lugar
mentioned. We can, I think, disrupt al-Qaeda.
Dr. Kagan. Senator, if I may, I must respectfully disagree.
Iraq, after withdrawal, will look very different. It is not the
case that we are doing nothing at all to contain the civil war,
and we should not delude ourselves into imagining that if we
left, it would simply continue in this similar fashion.
It is certainly true that when Iraqis come to Iraqi
checkpoints manned only by Iraqis, at this point, they're
frequently nervous if those Iraqis are from another sect,
unless there are American soldiers present with them. And right
now, we have been very effective in a number of places in
maintaining order, keeping a lid on things, working together
with Iraqi troops that are there; who do perform infinitely
better when we are there and are much more restrained in their
behavior and much more tolerated and trusted by the Iraqi
population. And you can even see this on Sunni blogs in Iraq,
where Sunnis warn each other, ``If the Iraqi police come by
themselves, we should be very worried about that. If they come
with American troops, it's OK.'' Now, that's obviously not a
good sign for being able to do any sort of rapid transition to
the Iraqi police, but that's hardly news. It does mean, first
of all, that the Iraqis are less hostile to our presence than
many people make out, and it also means that we are playing an
important role.
If we were to withdraw precipitantly, the violence would
increase dramatically--I think, by orders of magnitude. I think
you would end up seeing millions of people displaced. We're
already seeing this process underway, and it's extremely
unfortunate. I believe that Iraq's neighbors would begin to get
involved. They would have to, in terms of self-defense. There
are already 900,000 Iraqi refugees in Jordan, for instance. I
believe that they would attempt to resolve this problem by
moving their own forces forward into Iraq in order to stem the
refugee tides and contain the violence before it reaches their
borders. I think they would be drawn rapidly into the conflict.
I think some of them would seek to be drawn into the conflict
by supporting one side or the other. I think, before very long,
you would find that the regional--that Iraq's neighbors would
see themselves as stakeholders in various parts of the outcome
of this conflict, and would begin mobilizing increased degrees
of military power to back their stakes.
In short, I believe it's very likely that we would find
ourselves in the midst of a regional conflict in a region from
which we cannot leave, in an area which we simply cannot
abandon, and with the stakes much higher, and the conditions
for us much worse, even apart from the humanitarian catastrophe
that would be involved.
Senator Corker. And that sounds a lot like escalation to
me, but--go ahead.
Dr. Carpenter. Senator, first of all, I would agree with
almost everything that Ambassador Galbraith said. I think it's
important to emphasize that the civil war is already underway
in Iraq. We have a situation--I've already cited the number of
people dying on a daily basis: 1.6 million people have been
displaced internally, largely moving from areas where they are
an ethnic minority to one where they are in the majority, so
ethnic cleansing and the sectarian divide is growing almost by
the day; 1.8 million people have already left the country
entirely, and those are primarily the middle-class Iraqis, the
very people that we want as the building blocks for a strong
civil society--they're leaving. This is with the American troop
presence there.
We face the prospect now of trying to play referee in an
ongoing multisided civil war. I can't think of anything that
would be a more futile and frustrating task than trying to play
that role.
And, for Dr. Kagan, I think it's important to stress that
this kind of commitment would be open-ended. We would be
refereeing this conflict, year after year after year. There
would be no discernible end in sight.
As Ambassador Galbraith has already delineated, Iraq has
already fragmented. We're seeing this process proceed. But it
is very, very unlikely that it's going to be reversed.
Senator Corker. Well, thank you for your comments. And I
really do ask these questions without bias. And I know my time
is up, but let me--so, what you're saying is, you would sense
no intensified killing, no escalation whatsoever, whether we
are there or not there. You think it will remain exactly as is
today. That's what Dr. Galbraith said.
Dr. Carpenter. I think we're going to see an
intensification where--whenever we leave, whether that is 6
months from now or 6 years from now. What we need to focus on--
and I agree with him fully--is making sure that al-Qaeda cannot
use any portion of Iraq for a safe haven. I think that danger
is exaggerated, but it's not insignificant. We do have to deal
with that problem. And we need to focus on a limited attainable
objective--namely, quarantining that violence in Iraq so that
it does not become a regional war. And I believe there is a
reasonable prospect of convincing even Iran and Syria that a
proxy war can easily spiral out of control and it would not be
in their best interest to tolerate that kind of development,
that it is better to quarantine this conflict and allow the
dynamics in Iraq to play themselves out. Perhaps, at some
point, the various factions in Iraq will agree on compromise,
either a reasonably peaceful formal partition or a very loose
federation with adequate political compromise, but they have to
determine that. We cannot determine that outcome for them.
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
I say to my friend from Florida, I have taken his advice
and--if it's all right with him, right?
Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. I was fully prepared to give back the favor
that Senator Nelson gave me yesterday, but--thank you.
Mr. Chairman, thank you. And I appreciate this opportunity.
Not that I don't want to see my colleagues, but this is a nice
way to do a hearing. [Laughter.]
You get to this end quicker this way. No; I'm grateful for
this opportunity, and I'm grateful for the three of you
spending the time and providing the scholarship that you
provide for this important discussion today.
My friends in the media should cover this, as they did this
morning's hearing, but that's not the way things are done here.
But let me get right to a couple of basic questions. And I
think I'll direct some of these at each member of the panel,
but, in particular, I guess, the first one, I'd direct in--with
specificity, to Dr. Galbraith--Ambassador Galbraith.
You mentioned the presence of, and the activity of, what
you called ``local theocracies.'' That's the first time I had
heard that kind of pinpoint analysis of what's happening,
really, in neighborhoods, so to speak, on that. You talked
about local theocracies operating, and action taking place at
the local level, which is in contravention of, or in conflict
with, the Constitution. Could you amplify that?
Ambassador Galbraith. Senator, we talk about Iraq as if
there were a functioning Iraqi Government, and that the
violence is somehow directed against that government. But the
reality is very different. Various Shiite political parties
control different parts of the south. In Baghdad, the Mahdi
Army controls the Shiite neighborhoods. These political parties
and militias enforce their own law. If you're accused of a
crime or some offense against the religious law, you don't
necessarily go to the state-run courts but, quite often, end up
before an ad hoc court that will hand out a summary punishment.
Although the sale of alcohol, for example, is not illegal in
Iraq, Christians who sell alcohol have been summarily executed
based upon unofficial religious law.
Nonetheless, the Shiite south is relatively a stable
situation. To get rid of religious party rule would entail a
major military operation involving several hundred thousand
troops.
The one place in the south that is not stable is Basrah
where three different Shiite parties are vying for the control
of the city, and, more importantly, are vying for the control
of the smuggling of oil. I have been told by Iraq's Oil
Ministry that 100,000 barrels less a day enters the pipeline
near Basrah than actually gets on the ships in the Persian
Gulf. And this oil is funding these three parties and their
militias.
Senator Casey. And the next question I have pertains just
to diplomacy, generally. I'll direct it to the Ambassador, but
certainly, Dr. Carpenter, Dr. Kagan, can also weigh in on this,
and you should, if--I think we've got enough time. The question
of diplomacy. Ambassador, if you had a--I want to say ``if you
had a magic wand''--but if you had the opportunity to construct
a diplomatic strategy, starting today and going forward, forget
about the past--there's a lot we could talk about, what I would
judge failures, but let's just start from today, going
forward--what's the best strategy, in your mind, in terms of
dealing with the cards we've been dealt, in terms of an overall
fully engaged diplomatic strategy?
Ambassador Galbraith. Well, first, I think we need to be
clear about our objectives. And even if we wished Iraq were to
hold together, we need to be realistic about what is
achievable. I believe our top priority should be to avoid--or
minimize--the violence that accompanies Iraq's breakup. This
violence could escalate sharply if the regional states were to
intervene. There is a danger Turkey might intervene in Kirkuk,
where a referendum is supposed to be held at the end of this
year. Iran might increase its already large role in Iraq. The
Saudis have threatened to intervene on behalf of the Sunnis,
although I think that's largely an empty threat. Our diplomacy
should be aimed at helping Iraq's neighbors face up to the new
realities in Iraq, try to make whatever is going to develop as
palatable to them as possible.
I don't subscribe to the notion, in the Baker-Hamilton
Report, that talking to Iran or Syria would improve the
situation in Iraq, because Iran, in fact, supports the same
Shiite-led government that we do. The people in power in Iraq
are Iran's best friends. Iran has no desire to undermine the
Iraqi Government, even if it opposes our presence. And Syria is
not a large player; and so, there isn't much to be accomplished
there.
I do believe, however, that we should talk to Iran and
Syria on other issues. As President Kennedy said in his
inaugural address, ``we should never negotiate out of fear, but
we should never fear to negotiate.'' I think this advice is
highly relevant to Iran and Syria. I might add that I also like
this line because it was my father who wrote it for President
Kennedy.
The Chairman. I should be attributing that to your father,
then, rather than President Kennedy. That's a great line, and
it's a good point.
Senator Casey. I wanted to ask one more question, but, Dr.
Carpenter, Dr. Kagan, if you wanted to weigh in?
Dr. Kagan. Sure. I think we have to be realistic about what
diplomacy can achieve and what diplomacy cannot achieve. I'm
not going to say, a priori, that we should or should not
negotiate with any state in the region. What I am going to say
is that the problems in Iraq that we're facing right now are
internal Iraqi problems, primarily. The money for the
insurgency is coming primarily from corruption and crime and
other things that are internal to Iraq. There are weapons that
are coming into Iraq, but, as a friend of mine in the United
States military said once, there's enough high explosive in
Iraq to keep this conflict going at this level for 1,000 years.
There is no real prospect for cutting off supply to this
insurgency or to this violence, and thereby turning it off. And
therefore, with all of the goodwill in the world, I do not
believe that the Iranians or the Syrians are capable of helping
us materially in Iraq, even were we to talk to them.
Neither do I believe that it would be effective to try to
negotiate with the states or the region in order to get them to
hold the ring while their coreligionists slug it out in a
vicious sectarian genocidal civil war. I think, you know, it is
very odd to me that people are ready to say that the Iraqis are
irrational and will not act in their own interests, and that
they're simply hopeless, and yet say that, nevertheless, the
Iranians will be perfectly rational, despite evidence to the
contrary, and other states in the region will behave with
perfect rationality, even as the stakes go up and the
atrocities mount. I find that, frankly, unlikely.
Senator Casey. I know we're out of time. Thank you.
The Chairman. You had one other question?
Senator Casey. One quick one. I don't know if it's a yes or
no. But in terms of the mechanics of constructing a diplomatic
strategy, going forward, what does that mean, specifically, in
any of your opinions? Does it mean Secretary Rice, who's
leaving, I guess, tomorrow, and will be there for an extended
period of time--does that mean she's--in your judgment, stays?
Does it mean an envoy? What does it mean? Does it mean the
President has to have more personal involvement? What are the
building blocks of that kind of a--we can all talk about
diplomacy, but what does that mean, practically, in terms of
time and personnel and attention, if you get my drift?
Dr. Carpenter. There are a number of possible options. I
would suggest putting a special envoy in charge. I think that's
probably the more direct approach. We also have to be
realistic. As much as it might be constructive over the long
term to engage with Iran and other countries on a variety of
issues, the more issues we add to the agenda, the greater the
likelihood of a breakdown. And I speak, specifically, if we
start bringing in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute into the mix.
That almost guarantees failure. I would have a very narrow,
very focused agenda, and that is, let's prevent the tragedy in
Iraq--and it certainly is that--from becoming a full-blown
regional tragedy. That goal, I believe, is attainable. There's
no guarantee that we're going to succeed, but we ought to make
the effort, and I think there is at least a reasonable prospect
we can succeed with that narrow, but extremely important, goal.
Senator Casey. Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to ask, of the panel,
reaction to these observations. It would appear that--this may
be over generalized, so correct me if I'm wrong--but prior to
now our United States forces were, if not on the periphery of
Baghdad, were clearly not embedded, as the term is now being
used, in the nine police districts of Baghdad. So, if our
forces acted within the city, they were on patrol or had been
called upon, coming in from the outside, took action, perhaps
alongside the police or the army, and withdrew again to the
outskirts of the city. And this, at least, is the mode of
operations that is being pointed out as permitting a great deal
more Iraqi casualties, irrespective of whether those killings
are civil war or sectarian violence. But the killings escalated
because of certain events. So, it would appear that the plan
now being presented by the President is to have Americans
embedded; although it is yet been revealed, specifically, what
the role of the Americans will be. Some have said, no, it will
not be a door-to-door visit alongside an Iraqi police officer;
rather, we'll be back at the headquarters, we'll be monitoring
the conduct of the Iraqis to make sure that it is neutral with
regard to whomever they might encounter on patrol. And, in this
way, essentially, there'll be, potentially, better goodwill
built among the populace so that the government may have some
chance of operating and coming to decisions.
Now, I would suggest that this may be the most important
goal. But, on the other hand, weigh this against the fact that
some who are arguing this already in the Senate or Congress or
the public would say, ``This is the last chance, this is an
opportunity to stop the unacceptable violence in the Baghdad
area. If it doesn't work, we're out of there.'' And they mean
out of Iraq, not out of Baghdad. Now, this concerns me a great
deal, because I see that domestic political dynamics might very
well lead that way. The President asked for support of his
policy, and should it--for some reason, not work very soon, or
maybe not work very well at all, and people say, ``That's
enough.''
Now, leaving aside the strategies you all have presented
today, in which perhaps you, Dr. Carpenter, have come closest
to advocating a total withdrawal of American forces from Iraq.
Although I suspect you would have disagreement, as to what
American forces do. Some of us have argued that the important
objective, really, is to have Americans in Iraq somewhere, and
for quite a while, largely to reduce the potential for
sectarian violence across the region, and, likewise, to prevent
a series of tragedies that could result. It is also important
for Secretary Rice on her tour now, or subsequent ones, to
convey explicitly that we are going to be there; and,
therefore, they can count on that. It's not a negotiation, but
it's information. Likewise, maybe if she is successful, she
gets a roundtable of all the groups that are involved, the
nations, so they all inform each other of what their intent may
be. Everybody, sort of, hears it, so that the chances for some
regional stability are enhanced in that process.
Now, Ambassador Galbraith has suggested that Americans
might, in fact, reside in Kurdistan as--or the Kurd part of the
country, as at least one place that they are welcomed and
relatively safe as may be in the area, but this could be any
number of places, and I don't want to game that out.
I'm just asking, I suppose, for some advice as to whether,
in this current political situation, not only in Iraq, but in
the Middle East and here, is it not a more prudent step to
think in terms of how we maintain a presence, and that we argue
about that, as opposed to numbers, surges, precisely what the
Americans will do, door to door or in the headquarters?
Does anyone have a general comment on this?
Ambassador.
Ambassador Galbraith. Senator Lugar, the point you make is
very similar to the one that I've made in my testimony. That
is, the United States does have some remaining achievable
objectives. The most important is one that you mentioned:
Namely, disrupting al-Qaeda. That is one reason not to withdraw
completely. There is some advantage to having United States
forces in Iraq as a deterrent. Being in Kurdistan would help
stabilize the situation as between Kurdistan and Turkey. I
think the independence of Kurdistan is inevitable. It may not
be desirable, but it is inevitable. But it's not immediate.
And, in that sense, a United States presence can help bring
stability to that region, and provide reassurance to Turkey, as
well as deter any kind of action that might be taken by the
surrounding states.
The reason I argue for a United States military presence in
Kurdistan is that that's where our forces would be welcome. If
they are anyplace else in the country, they will have to devote
large resources to force protection.
I want to come back to a fundamental problem, which I think
everybody who has a plan for Iraq must address--what happens
after you've done all these things, be it the President's plan
or my proposal for a redeployment to Kurdistan? The situation
in Iraq is not going to change in any fundamental way. The
government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki reflects the will
of the 60 percent of the Iraqi population--the Shiites--who
voted for it. The Shiite electorate wishes to define Iraq as a
Shiite state. And even Sunnis who despised Saddam Hussein are
not going to accept that definition of the state. On the other
hand, the Shiites are not going to give up on it. So, you are
never going to get to an inclusive state. I don't discuss the
Kurds, because, for all practical purposes, they're out of Iraq
already.
Dr. Kagan. Senator, if I could respond, as well. I--first
of all, Ambassador Galbraith has made this point repeatedly,
but I do find it a little bit odd--I understand the Kurdish
perspective, but I find it a little bit odd to say that the
Kurds are out of there already, when the President of Iraq is a
Kurd, and when there is a substantial bloc of Kurdish
representatives in Parliament--in the Iraqi Parliament who have
been extremely active. The Kurds may think that they're out, in
some respects, but they're clearly continuing to play. And I
think the reason for that is that they understand that, at the
end of the day, it is not in the interests of Kurdistan for
Kurdistan to break off from Iraq and have vast sectarian civil
war going on immediately to their south, which will inevitably
push refugees in their direction and involve them in violence
along their borders. That's not in their interest. And I credit
the Kurds with more self-interest--more understanding of their
self-interest than that, than to think that they imagine that
that's going to be a happy scenario for them.
I'm very concerned about the practicalities--the military
practicalities, of a plan for maintaining United States forces
in Kurdistan, with the expectation that they will be doing
things in Iraq. Where will they draw their supplies from? They
certainly can't maintain a supply line the length of Iraq into
Kurdistan without having a very substantial presence that would
run against the concept. They will have to draw their supplies
from Turkey. Well, the Turks might well allow that to happen,
for a variety of reasons, but I'm curious about what demands
the Turks would end up making on the Kurds in return for
support of our presence there. After all, the people who most
adamantly oppose the idea of an independent Kurdistan are the
Turks. And the problems of the PKK and the fear of terrorism
based in Kurdistan, I fear, could lead to a very, very nasty
situation very rapidly.
In addition to that, Kurdistan is far away from any of the
regions where we would have to be most concerned about al-Qaeda
infiltration. And I think we have to ask ourselves: What do we
think the military operations look like? Are we going to fly
our soldiers in helicopters across uncontrolled hostile terrain
spotted with surface-to-air missiles and a variety of other
dangers, to land in unknown places, conduct operations and
leave? Those are very daunting military operations. It's much
harder--if your concern is dealing with al-Qaeda, it's much
harder and more dangerous to our soldiers to undertake those
kinds of operations than it is to attempt to bring the security
situation under control more generally and have a firm base in
Iraq from which you can deal with these things on a local
basis.
I'm also very concerned about the prospect of having
American soldiers flown in, on call, from local Iraqis to deal
with what problems that they report. We've seen that, all too
often, when our soldiers are flying in from afar, coming in
from afar, and do not know the local situation, they can easily
be drawn into actions that are counterproductive. When they're
present, and when they can understand the neighborhood--and to
talk about local knowledge at this point and say that our
soldiers don't have it, when many of them are going back on
their third tours into Iraq, I must say, I think we have a
pretty fair amount of understanding of Iraq in the army, at
this point--our soldiers on the ground are able to recognize
situations that they should not involve themselves in, but only
if they're there.
Dr. Carpenter. Mr. Chairman, if I could respond briefly. In
one sense, the President's new proposal is regressive, in that
it further Americanizes the war, which I think is exactly the
opposite direction that we ought to be going.
There is also an inherent contradiction in his speech last
night. On the one hand, he contends that it would be absolutely
disastrous for the United States to leave Iraq with something
less than a victory; on the other hand, he sets up these
milestones for the Iraqi Government with, certainly, the
implied threat that if the Iraqi Government does not meet those
milestones, our commitment is not unlimited and it's not open-
ended, that we might then withdraw, presumably with something
less than a victory. I would maintain he can't have it both
ways. If it is true that any withdrawal from Iraq with less
than a victory would truly be disastrous for the United States,
then we are stuck in Iraq indefinitely; we have to stay there
even if the Iraqi Government were the biggest collection of
villains or buffoons on the planet, because our own vital
interests would dictate that we stay.
I would argue that, in fact, it would be far less than a
disaster for the United States to leave Iraq, and that,
ultimately, we have a choice of leaving now, having spent $350
billion and 3,000 American lives, or the committee can have a
similar hearing 2 years from now, when the costs may very well
be $600 billion and 5,500 or 6,000 American lives. That's the
choice we really face.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
The Chairman. I'd say to my colleagues, I've just been
informed there is a--is it a vote or a live quorum? There's a
live quorum that just began. I would suggest--it's up to the
Senator from Florida--he can begin his questions, if he'd like
to do that, or we can recess and go, and then I'll ask my
questions last. Are you ready to go?
Well, what I'm going to do is turn the gavel over to the
Senator from Florida, and we'll go vote, and hopefully by the
time he finishes his questions, if we're not back, if you could
recess for 3 or 4 minutes, and we'll take the intervening time,
because I have some questions, and anyone else who has any more
can come back. But I'd like to spend 10 minutes with you. So--
if I may.
So, I--I'm going to go vote. I guess others are, as well.
But the chair is yours, sir. And we'll be back shortly.
Senator Bill Nelson. So, I get to completely run the----
The Chairman. You get to completely run the committee. You
can get unanimous consent for anything you want if you're the
only one here. [Laughter.]
And so--I've always enjoyed it when I was in that position.
Senator Bill Nelson. Can I----
The Chairman. As a matter of fact, you have a lot more
power than any chairman has.
Senator Bill Nelson. You mean I can get unanimous consent
on changing the rules about seniority? [Laughter.]
The Chairman. Yeah, you could probably do that, until I
come back and seek a vote on it. [Laughter.]
But--no, but it's all yours, sir.
Senator Bill Nelson [presiding]. Well, what do you all
think the President meant when he said America's commitment is
not open-ended?
Dr. Carpenter. I have to admit I'm a bit cynical about it.
I think it is an empty threat, it is a bluff, it is an attempt
to get the Maliki government to do what Ambassador Galbraith
has demonstrated pretty clearly it is not either willing or
capable of doing. And this threat is not going to be taken
seriously by the Maliki government. They feel that we are in
Iraq for the long term and that they will not respond to this
setting of milestones without penalties. And, frankly, if you
don't have very specific penalties, milestones become largely
meaningless.
Ambassador Galbraith. We're not far from the day when the
Maliki government might be just as happy to see us go. The
civil war can end either in power-sharing--regionalization is a
type of power-sharing--or it can end in victory for one side.
Scholars who have look at civil wars fought since World War II
note that, maybe, 15 percent have ended with power-sharing
while the other 85 percent have ended with one side winning.
And who's going to win the civil war in Iraq? The Shiites are
three times as numerous, and they have, in neighboring Iran, a
very powerful ally. The Shiites have much larger armed forces
than the Sunni Arabs, and they control the mechanisms of the
state. The Sunni Arab countries that might ally with the Iraqi
Sunnis are relatively weak states. The Saudis have money, but
limited ability to project power. Jordan is far from the
populated parts of Iraq. The Syrian position is ambivalent.
Syria is an ally of Iran, and it's ruled by the Alawites, who
are a Shiite sect, even though Syria is a Sunni majority state.
So, the alternative to power-sharing and regionalization is a
Shiite victory in the civil war which, in turn, might well lead
to the genocide that Dr. Kagan has warned about. But, from the
point of view of the Maliki government, a U.S. withdrawal may
not be the end of the world.
Dr. Kagan. Senator, I think that--I disagree with the
notion that the Iraqis think that we're staying there forever.
I think, on the contrary, that the Iraqi Shia, for the most
part, decided some time ago that we were going to be out
quickly. And I believe that the Iraqi Sunni Arabs have also
decided that we are on the way out. And I believe that the
various intelligence estimates that we heard at the end of last
year suggest that a number of these groups are already ready to
do their victory dances, because they think that they have
defeated us and that we will be, shortly, leaving. And I think
that we have seen the beginning of a dominance dance in Iraq
already, as rival Shia groups begin to position themselves for
a contest that they expect to occur within their own community
over which Shia group will run a Shia-dominated Iraq.
I don't think that the problem is convincing the Iraqis
that we are going to leave at some point. I think that the
Iraqis expect us to leave shortly. And I don't think that the
Maliki government has been failing to do what it is that we
want them to do because they think that we're going to be there
forever and that that's a good thing. I think that they have
not been doing what we wanted them to do, in the first
instance, in many cases, because they were incapable of it,
because we were expecting of them things that were
unreasonable, and the standards that we have set for what we
want the Iraqi security forces to be able to do by themselves,
I've thought, have been unreasonable for a long time, which is
why I think that it's very important that the President come
forward with a plan that recognizes the limitations of those
forces and the importance of having American forces in the
lead. I recognize that's not what he said, but that is what we
recommended, and I believe that that would be the appropriate
way to approach this problem.
There's been a lot of talk about incentivizing the Iraqi
Government. And I have to confess that I have a problem with a
lot of that conversation, because what we're really proposing
to incentivize them with is the threat of unleashing complete
genocide on the Iraqi people by pulling out and allowing the
civil war to escalate unchecked and making no effort to
restrain it. I find that to be a somewhat ambivalent ethical
position to take, to say that, ``If you don't do what we say,
we're going to allow you to plunge into this horrible abyss.''
It also is a strange position to take toward a government that
we wish to regard as an allied government, that our notion of
incentivizing them is hurling repeated threats of such
catastrophe at them.
I think it's worth discussing what we could do to incentive
the Maliki government, either positively or negatively, but I
don't think that it's appropriate for us to throw threats at
them that we will simply withdraw, in spite of our concern for
them, in spite of our ethical position, and in spite of our own
interests, simply as a way of attempting to compel them to do
the things that we think they need to do.
Senator Bill Nelson. What are your expectations of the
Maliki government? And when?
Dr. Kagan. I expect that the Maliki government will, in the
first instance, tolerate the operation that we are proposing,
and they have already shown that they will tolerate it. I
expect them to send Iraqi forces to assist in it, and they have
already begun to do that, as General Pace testified, earlier in
the day. I expect that to continue, although I, frankly, expect
to be disappointed by the number of troops that actually show
up, as we regularly have been. But I expect them to show up in
greater numbers than they have before. I expect them to
cooperate with us actively as we work to establish security for
their people in the capital. And I expect, as that security
proceeds, that they will begin to make important strides in the
direction of the reconciliation initiatives that are going to
be so important to the long-term settlement of this conflict.
I do expect them to undertake those things. I expect that
the process will be arduous, there will be setbacks, and there
will be disappointments.
Senator Bill Nelson. So, you think it will meet the
President's test.
Dr. Kagan. I believe that we will be able to attain a
stable and secure state in Iraq.
Senator Bill Nelson. Well, I hope you're right, but I don't
believe it. And that's my impression.
Ambassador Galbraith. Mr. Chairman.
Senator Bill Nelson. And my impression is that increased
troops in Anbar province will help, but not in Baghdad.
Mr. Galbraith.
Ambassador Galbraith. Here's what I expect from the Maliki
government. I expect it to say what it wants us to hear, and I
don't expect it to do very many of those things at all. Perhaps
the best example of this is the Prime Minister's repeated
statements that militias are incompatible with the functioning
of a democratic Iraq, and then he does precisely nothing about
the militias. And that is not because he's weak, that's not
because he's dependent on the Sadrists for support, but it is
because he is part of the system of sectarian Shiite rule that
includes the Shiite militias.
The character of the Maliki government was perhaps best
demonstrated by the manner in which it executed Saddam Hussein.
In his rush to execute Saddam for a 1982 crime against
supporters of his Dawa Party, Maliki cut short Saddam's ongoing
trial for the Kurdish genocide, a case that involved a thousand
times as many dead as did the Dujail case. He acted over the
protests of the Kurds and, in the rush to execution, did not
follow Iraq's constitutional procedures that require all three
Presidents to ratify a death sentence. He allowed the Mahdi
Army militiamen to participate in the execution. That wasn't
incompetence, that was the way his government is.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Carpenter. Just a minute, and then
I'm going to have to run to make this vote.
Dr. Carpenter. I would take a position roughly midpoint
between what Ambassador Galbraith has said and what Dr. Kagan
has said. I think the Maliki government will participate, with
some vigor, in operations to crack down on the Sunni insurgents
and Sunni neighborhoods in Baghdad, and it will do little or
nothing when it comes to operations to crack down on the Shiite
militias. This is a sectarian government, as much as the Bush
administration really doesn't want to admit that reality, and
it is a participant in the ongoing civil war. It is not a
neutral arbiter. We have to understand that point.
What I worry about is the American troops increasingly
being embedded with Iraqi security forces. I think that was one
of the worst proposals of the Iraq Study Group; and,
unfortunately, it's one of the main things the Bush
administration has adopted. One of the reasons we have been
able to keep----
Senator Bill Nelson. Why? Why, on the embedding?
Dr. Carpenter. Why they adopted it? Or why is it----
Senator Bill Nelson. Why do you disagree with the
embedding?
Dr. Carpenter I think one of the reasons that we've been
able to keep casuality rates relatively low is the American----
Senator Bill Nelson. OK. So, you think it would increase
American casualties.
Dr. Carpenter. It makes them more and more vulnerable.
They're going to be dependent on their security on their Iraqi
counterparts.
Senator Bill Nelson. OK.
The committee will stand in recess, subject to the call of
the Chair. Thank you all very much.
[Recess.]
The Chairman [presiding]. We'll come back to order.
I thank you for your patience. I know the Ambassador, after
14 years up here, knows what it's like here. The reason why
Senator Lugar and I hung around over there, we were told there
was going to be an immediate vote, and they're still--it
probably won't occur til tomorrow morning. But, I apologize.
Gentlemen, I--the reason I asked you to stay is, I've been
impressed with what you've written in the past and how cogent
your arguments are for your various positions. And, as I said
earlier, my intention, along with Chairman Lugar, is to try to,
as thoroughly and as clearly as possible, lay out for our
colleagues what options people--bright people think exist out
there, because I don't think any one of us would suggest
there's any, ``good answer'' left. I know what each of you are
proposing is not what you would do if you could wave a wand and
come to a--what you would think would be the best outcome for
Iraq and for the United States.
But let me start off with a broad question and ask each of
you to respond--in any order. And that is--tell me, if you
will--and this may be a way to meet my objective of trying to
focus, for my colleagues and for me, the alternatives--how does
what you are proposing differ--and why--from what the President
has proposed? In other words, maybe starting with you, Dr.
Kagan, I read your report, ``Choosing Victory: A Plan for
Success in Iraq.'' I may be mistaken, but it seems as though
what the President proposed has the elements of what you have
proposed, but not, if I may, the weight of how you proposed it.
And you very clearly lay out that the first stage in the
process is the Sunni neighborhoods, if I'm not mistaken--is it
19 or--you list a specific number.
Dr. Kagan. Twenty-three, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Twenty-three. Then Sadr City, then Anbar
province--which makes sense to me. I mean, if you're going to
adopt the proposal, or if you think the best outcome, and the
way to achieve it, is to surge force, you have been, in my
view, the most thoroughly honest, in the sense of laying out,
from beginning to end, what you think has to happen for there
to be success.
And so, why don't we start--as succinctly as you can, but
take what time you need. Tell me how--and I'm not looking for
you to criticize the President. I'm just--I'm just trying to
have everybody understand where the gaps are, so that when they
take a look, they know what they're talking about, what's being
said. Tell me how what you have proposed, in broad strokes or
as specific as you can get, is different than--not just what we
heard last night, but the actual plan, which obviously the
President didn't have a chance to go into every jot and tittle
of his plan--how it differs, as best you know it.
Dr. Kagan. Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much for your
kind remarks about our report and also for the opportunity to
speak with you about this.
I will answer your question directly, but I would like to
offer a couple of caveats. First of all, I don't feel like I
know what the President's plan is, in any great detail. We can
look at some----
The Chairman. Fair enough.
Dr. Kagan [continuing]. Of the things that he said.
The Chairman. I'm not sure, either.
Dr. Kagan. And I'd also like to make the point that we are
going to have, apparently, a change of command in Iraq shortly,
from General Casey to General Petraeus, I hope--a man for whom
I have a tremendous amount of respect.
The Chairman. I share your view about Petraeus.
Dr. Kagan. And when General Petraeus takes command, he will
have to look at the situation afresh and develop a plan that
he's going to be comfortable executing. He's certainly not
simply going to take the plan that has been developed, you
know, before he got there, and execute it. So, I would expect
to see some changes, even in the plan that has been outlined so
far, when the actual commander gets there. That would be
normal.
Having said that, I think that the plan that the President
outlined, insofar as he did, is similar to ours in its large
aspects, apparently differs from ours in some more tactical
details, which I think are extremely important.
He did say that he would change the strategy and that he
would change the mission of United States forces in Iraq from
having the primary goal of training and transitioning to having
the primary goal of establishing security. And I think that's a
terrifically important change in strategy. It is the one that
we recommended.
And I'd like to make a point that people are focusing on
the number of additional troops that will be sent in as being
the delta between what we've been doing and what we will be
doing. And that's actually not right. We have, already,
something like 20 or 25,000 American soldiers in and around
Baghdad. They have not had it as their primary mission to
establish and maintain security in Baghdad for most of the
time. That will now become their mission. So, we're actually
talking about an increase of, you know, more like 40 or 50,000
American soldiers dedicated to this mission over what we've had
previously. And so, the change is actually rather more
significant than people have been focusing on. And that is in
accord with what we recommended.
He did say that he would send five additional combat
brigades to Baghdad as rapidly as they can get there. And that
is also what we recommended. And that is the size of the force
that we recommended.
There's been some confusion because of the way the
administration has presented numbers to match the brigades, and
I believe that that has to do with--there are different ways of
counting how many troops there are in a brigade. So, we gave a
total force increment for Iraq of 35,000. The President is
talking about 20-some thousand. I think that's a difference in
counting, more than anything else, because we recommended five
additional Army brigades and two additional Marine regimental
combat teams. The President said that it would be five American
brigades and one regimental combat team. So, the forces that
he's proposing are very parallel in size to the forces that we
proposed. And we think it's very important to have all of those
forces. And, if it were me, I would continue to fight for the
additional regimental combat team, as well, because I think
it's important to have reserves available for this operation.
Now, the President did say that the Iraqis would be in the
lead. He did talk about our forces supporting them. And he did
talk about increasing the number of our forces embedded in
Iraqi units conducting these operations. Those statements are
not in accord with what we had recommended. We believe that, in
the first instance, this has to be an American-led operation,
simply because there are not enough Iraqi forces, and they are
not trained adequately to be in the lead. And so, that is an
area of divergence.
The Chairman. If I could interrupt for a moment, we heard
testimony yesterday from a counterpart of yours, different
organization, but--Mr. O'Hanlon, and asked him how many,
``politically reliable,'' not just trained, but politically
reliable combat forces he thought were available from the Iraqi
side right now, and he gave a number of 5,000. What is your
sense of the number of available trained Iraqi forces that
could be, ``counted upon'' to fill the mission you have
envisioned for them?
Dr. Kagan. I'm sorry to say that it's not really possible
to answer that question with any degree of precision, because
I'm not sure that that knowledge actually exists.
The Chairman. Well, quite frankly, I would have been
disappointed if you had--had you given me a number, because I
share your view. I don't know----
Dr. Kagan. Right.
The Chairman [continuing]. How anybody knows that number.
Dr. Kagan. And that's why we--that's why we--when we sat
down to look at this operation, we attempted to design an
operation that could succeed even with a very low level of
Iraqi participation.
The Chairman. Gotcha.
Dr. Kagan. We think that the Iraqi participation is
important, not so much because it will provide bodies, but
because we need the--we need to have an Iraqi face on the
operation, as much as possible, and the Iraqis to interact with
their own populations, as much as possible, with our forces
present. But we are not relying on large numbers of Iraqi
forces coming, and we certainly do not want them to be
operating on their own----
The Chairman. Quite frankly, that was my reading of your
report. The second thing is--it leads me to this point, I hope
I don't come across as being cynical here, but I believe the
reason why the President and his team rejected Maliki's plan,
which was, ``You Americans stay outside the city, we'll go in,
you essentially reinforce us''--is that they feared one of two
things, probably both: That they would not be competent to do
the job, and they would essentially be Shia--I don't want to be
too--Shia forces cleansing Sunni areas, and that what we would
be doing is indirectly giving a green light to what would be
further sectarian violence rather than limiting or eliminating
sectarian violence.
Dr. Kagan. Mr. Chairman, of course, I don't know--I don't
know the details of the plan that Maliki presented or why the
administration----
The Chairman. All I know is----
Dr. Kagan [continuing]. Reacted as it did.
The Chairman [continuing]. What was characterized by----
Dr. Kagan. I understand.
If I had been presented with such a plan by the government,
I would have opposed it, on more or less precisely those
grounds.
The Chairman. Yeah. OK.
And you mentioned Tal Afar as an example in your report,
and I think you did in your statement. And in 2005, we had
roughly 5,000 American forces, with some Iraqi forces--but
5,000 American forces, if memory serves me--in a city, in a
population of about 200,000. We're talking about--and I
understand your point, I think it's a fair point--there are
roughly 25,000 American forces in and around Baghdad with a
mission other than the one that's now being assigned them. So,
it's arguably--it's intellectually credible to say that, since
the mission is being changed, the multiplier effect here is--
add those 25,000, that have been there, to the 15 or 16 or 17,
whatever the number comes to--to President's total of 21,500,
and--at least that's what the Secretary said today, four going
to Anbar. So, let's say you're adding, on top of that--you're
talking roughly--you could argue, 40,000 folks with a new
mission. Because I was wondering how you get to the
counterinsurgency ratio that most of the military people with
whom I have spoken, as far back as 3 years ago with General
Donovan, who was very frustrated that he wasn't getting the
support--the number of troops he needed, and his talking about
Anbar province--I remember him saying--and I'm paraphrasing--
that every officer learns in war college that the ratio needs
to be, and then he named it and said--not 100 to 1, not 150 to
1, and so on.
So, if you were to use your numbers in the multiplier, my
word--since it's a different mission, arguing you actually have
more people moving here is in the 25,000 range already, then I
assume that's how you make your argument that the
counterinsurgency ratio required is closer to what is taught at
the academies and the war college and--than it otherwise would
be. Is that----
Dr. Kagan. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I think if you look at the
population of the area that we were proposing to clear and
hold, in the first instance, it's something under 2 million----
The Chairman. Right.
Dr. Kagan [continuing]. Which would call for a force ratio
of between 40 or 50,000 in----
The Chairman. Right.
Dr. Kagan [continuing]. Order to meet that. And that is the
force ratio that we--that our plan would bring into that area,
because we would make full use of the forces that are already
there----
The Chairman. Gotcha.
Dr. Kagan [continuing]. And this increment.
The Chairman. I will not belabor this, but this is helpful
to me--one further apparent difference is--the President said,
last night, and I asked the Secretary today, and others did, as
well, that they are not limiting this effort to the 23
neighborhoods. Now, I don't know whether they answered the
question for political reasons or if substantively it's
correct. I'm not sure which. When it was asked, ``Do they have
the green light to go into Sadr City? Do they have the green
light to deal with the militia?''--the answer was, ``Yes; that
would be the case.'' But is your understanding that the first
phase, or the phase the President is talking about, or Petraeus
may be talking about, is more in line with your plan--to only
focus on the 23 neighborhoods, 2 million people, as opposed to
the totality of Baghdad and 6-plus-million people?
Dr. Kagan. Mr. Chairman, we've been explicit, on a number
of occasions, that our plan does see, in the initial phase,
focusing on the 23 Sunni and mixed Sunni-Shia neighborhoods and
not going into Sadr City, in the first instance. Now, that was
predicated on a number of assumptions about the difficulty that
would be entailed in going into Sadr City--in part, assuming
that the Maliki government would not be forthcoming with
support for doing that. If, in fact, the Maliki government is
going to be forthcoming with that support, then that would
change the equation, but we have not had the opportunity to go
back and reevaluate, you know, what our force ratio assumptions
would be in that circumstance.
The Chairman. Well, I'd respectfully suggest, if that is
the case, the force ratios are a little out of whack, and
you're going to be dealing with the different situation.
The last question on this point, and again, I have so many
questions. My temptation would be to keep you here all night,
all of you. Where Petraeus has been successful--and he has
been--in the past, north of Baghdad, in dealing with an
insurgency, it's been an insurgency, as opposed to sectarian
strife and a civil war. Say it another way. A mixed
neighborhood in Baghdad is different than going into Tal Afar,
where the insurgents are the former Baathists, Saddamists, et
cetera, and/or al-Qaeda, and their target being us and/or
government troops. When you go into a neighborhood--and I want
the public to understand we're not talking about a neighborhood
of 500 people, we're talking about neighborhoods that are tens
of thousands of people--when you go in a neighborhood where the
problem is within the neighborhood, if it's a mixed
neighborhood, people are, figuratively speaking, crossing the
street, killing each other, and/or if it's not an integrated
neighborhood, primarily a Shia neighborhood, you have death
squads wearing uniforms and/or the Mahdi Militia coming in and
taking them out. That's a little different circumstance than
dealing with an insurgency, isn't it?
Dr. Kagan. Mr. Chairman, I have to, respectfully, disagree
with your premise. Tal Afar actually is a mixed city. It is
mixed Sunni/Shia. It's also mixed between Arab and Turkoman and
Kurd. And all of those factions were, in fact, shooting at one
another, and H.R. McMaster, the commander of the unit that
cleared Tal Afar in 2005, has described, in great detail, there
would be circumstances where Sunni snipers would climb turrets,
fire into Shia neighborhoods to commit casualties, and then
those same Sunni snipers would actually climb down, cross over
into the Shia neighborhoods and fire back into the Sunni
neighborhoods to commit atrocities in precisely the same sort
of effort, to incite sectarian civil war within Tal Afar. And
so, it actually was very similar to what's going on in Baghdad,
and, in many respects----
The Chairman. Had the mosque--had the Samarra mosque been
taken out, at that point?
Dr. Kagan. No, Mr. Chairman; it hadn't. And, even so, there
was this very high level of intersectarian violence. And, in
addition to that, the Sunni insurgents had established real
strongholds in Tal Afar. They had video booths where they would
tape their messages and beheadings. I mean, they had a real
professional apparatus, and were ready to receive us.
The Chairman. Gotcha.
Dr. Kagan. Because we've been operating continually in a
lot of the Baghdad neighborhoods that we're talking about going
into, in most of those areas they don't have anything like the
same degree of preparation. But, no; I think we actually
already have seen success in dealing with this sort of
sectarian conflict.
The Chairman. OK. Last question for you, if I may. We
heard, this morning, about the successes that are taking place
in Anbar province, according to the Secretary. And she cited
that certain of the tribal chiefs, very upset with the al-
Qaeda, have sent their sons to Jordan to be trained to come
back, ostensibly, and be a resistance to al-Qaeda intervention,
and, I suspect, to not be as cooperative with the insurgency,
the former Saddamists and Baathists. Can you tell me if you
know anything about that?
Dr. Kagan. Mr. Chairman, only what I've seen in newspapers
and what I've heard about. I mean, it does appear that some of
the sheikhs in Anbar have become frustrated with the ongoing
civil war. And I think it's very important to understand that
the Sunni Arab insurgency is not monolithic, either.
The Chairman. No.
Dr. Kagan. And there is divergence of views even within the
Islamist wing. Al-Qaeda in Iraq says that it's OK to kill Iraqi
civilians. Ansar al-Sunna has taken the position, often, that
it isn't. There are disputes among these groups about tactics,
techniques, goals, and so forth. And I think what we're seeing
in Anbar province is the beginning of a splintering of this
movement. Now, I think if we continue the process of
establishing security to make it possible for these guys to
participate more directly, and if the Maliki government will
reach out in a situation of improving security, to offer the
necessary reconciliation to bring them into the fold, I think
it's possible that we can see significant political progress.
The Chairman. Question for the three of you. And you need
not answer it, if you choose not to. If you had to take a bet,
how many of you would bet that Maliki is the Prime Minister in
November of this year?
Dr. Carpenter. The answer to that question, Mr. Chairman,
depends very much on whether we are serious about pressing the
Maliki government to take on the Shiite militias and to
neutralize Muqtada Sadr. If we are serious about that, I think
that places Maliki in an almost impossible position and that
that will severely undercut his political base. It would make
it very likely that he would not be Prime Minister by November.
If this is merely a rhetorical flourish on the part of the Bush
administration, and this is substantively an effort to go after
the Sunni neighborhoods in Baghdad, and to suppress the Sunni
insurgency, and the talk of going after the Shia militia is
just political cover, then I think Maliki may be a skillful
enough politician to survive and be Prime Minister at the end
of the year.
The Chairman. Ambassador.
Ambassador Galbraith. I think Dr. Carpenter's analysis is
as good as any. The problem is that the Maliki government rests
on a narrow margin within the I'tilaf, within the Shiite
Alliance. In the electoral battle between Abel Abdul Mahdi and
Jaafari, Jaafari prevailed by one vote. And other elements,
notably the Kurds, but perhaps some of the Sunnis, might well
prefer Mahdi to Maliki. Indeed, the Bush administration may
tire of Maliki, because he's not much more effective than
Jaafari. Although he doesn't have some of Jaafari's annoying
personal traits, he hasn't been much more effective as a
leader.
No matter who is the Government of Iraq we're going to get
tired of them, because they're not going to be effective,
because they don't have the agenda that we want them to have,
and they don't exercise the power that we wish they would.
The Chairman. Mr. Ambassador, let's just ask: In your
partition scenario, what happens to Iraqis' oil wealth?
Ambassador Galbraith. The Iraqis are on the verge of
concluding a deal that will, at least for some period of time,
share the oil revenues on the basis of population. The
distribution of oil revenues has never been a central issue.
The central issue has been who controls the oilfields. And that
has been central for the Kurds, and some of the Shiites,
because they do not want to go back to the situation where
Baghdad cuts the check and Baghdad has all the power.
The Chairman. Right.
Ambassador Galbraith. Like any federal system, frankly,
they understand that it works only when there are local sources
of revenue. But, in terms of how that revenue is distributed,
there is a broad consensus to share it. Now, if Iraq does not
hold together as a state, then you----
The Chairman. Well, under your scenario, it's not a state,
correct?
Ambassador Galbraith. Well, it--my view is that, over the
long term, it will not survive as a single state.
The Chairman. Right.
Ambassador Galbraith. Which, incidently, doesn't mean that
I think it's going to split into three states. If you asked
them, both Sunnis and Shiites would say, ``Yes; we're Iraqis.''
The trouble is, they have such radically vision of what that
means that I believe it is better to do what the Shiites want
to do and what the Sunnis still resist, which is to have their
own regions. But that's really a decision for the Sunnis to
make. The Kurds, it's entirely different. They----
The Chairman. No, I----
Ambassador Galbraith [continuing]. They don't want to be
part of Iraq.
The Chairman. No; I got that, about the Kurds. My concern
is that I don't see, absent essentially letting a civil war
rage from Anbar province down through Basrah, and let the
outcome dictate who runs the show in those two areas--short of
that, I don't know what's left for the Sunnis. I mean, if they
end up with three different states, in effect, the inclination
to share oil ain't gonna be around, and there's nothing there,
there in Anbar province.
Ambassador Galbraith. First, if the Kurds actually leave,
they will take with them a percentage of Iraq's oil reserves
that is approximately the same as their share of Iraq's
population. So, that's----
The Chairman. Right.
Ambassador Galbraith [continuing]. That's not a big issue.
So, the issue is in Arab Iraq.
The Chairman. Right.
Ambassador Galbraith. Will the Shiites be prepared to give
to the Sunni region a percentage that is equal to the Sunni
percentage of the population? I don't know the answer to that.
Right now, the Shiites have agreed to such a formula. That
they'll continue to be generous toward the Sunnis in conditions
of an ongong civil war, or if the civil war intensifies, is not
likely. And, in fact, it----
The Chairman. Right.
Ambassador Galbraith [continuing]. Could have a very bad
ending. And that is why, with regard to Arab Iraq, I believe
that the plan that I've put forward and that you have put
forward is the only way to go. It is a plan that protects the
Sunnis by allowing them to have their own region, to provide
for their own security, and, if it's implemented soon, would
come at time when there is still enough political will there to
guarantee them a share of revenue. This revenue-sharing should
be done through legislation--as has already been agreed--and
not by trying to change the Iraqi Constitution, which is as
difficult to change as our own. But if the Sunnis don't move to
establish their own region, if the civil war spins on for
another year or two, I think it's unlikely----
The Chairman. Just--let me just--one of things I want to
get straight here, make sure I understand it. The legislation
that's already agreed to is agreed to, in principle, by a
committee, a group of people meeting. There has not been any
legislation introduced, there has not been any legislation
passed, am I correct in that? The Iraqi Parliament has not
passed any legislation saying that--I remember, I was in--over
the Fourth of July, I met with Mr. Maliki in his office, and I
asked him about two issues. One was federation or regionalism,
as their Constitution calls for, and the second was about
allocation of oil revenues. He said, ``Aw, the Constitution has
already taken care of that.'' And I said, ``Well, with all due
respect, Mr. Prime Minister, you and I may be the only two who
have read the Constitution. It doesn't say that. It says
`equitable share,' or some such language, but there's no
guarantee what that means.'' Said, ``There's no need for
that.''
So, I just want to be clear that whether or not there is--
if you know if there is, or is about to be introduced--
legislation that the tribal chiefs in--the tribal leaders in
Anbar province can say, ``I know I'm now going to get''----
Ambassador Galbraith. Well, the----
The Chairman [continuing]. ``20 percent of the revenue, or
whatever.''
Ambassador Galbraith [continuing]. The legislation that is
pending is an oil law, and it's a very complicated law that
entails many compromises. It's one thing to say, as does the
Constitution, that the regions have control over new oil, but
to implement that, in terms of----
The Chairman. It's very hard.
Ambassador Galbraith [continuing]. Pipelines and everything
else is difficult. But the oil law will do this and it is
mostly agreed. Some issues remain between Kurdistan and Arab
Iraq, but there's a good chance that they'll be resolved.
The Chairman. Well----
Ambassador Galbraith. It also includes the provisions for
revenue-sharing, which, however, will be done in a separate
law. The problem is this. The Sunnis do not consider 20 percent
to be their share of the population, and they don't consider
it, therefore, to be their fair share of the oil wealth. And,
furthermore, until 2003, they got 70 to 80 percent of the oil
wealth.
The Chairman. Oh, I know that. That was----
Ambassador Galbraith. So, 20 percent is--even if we think
it's fair, they don't think it's fair.
The Chairman. Well, you know, it's amazing how people's
attitudes change when faced with the realistic alternatives
they may face. In my meeting with major oil executives--not
just American-based companies, but foreign companies--I don't
understand why, 3 years ago, the President didn't bring some of
these guys in, and bring in the major informed elements of the
three communities, and say, ``Look, you know, you're not--
listen to these guys, they're not going to invest the $40
billion you need to develop your fields unless you have a
national oil policy, unless you have some reason to make them
believe you're going to be able to do this without any real
prospect of them being blown up.'' But that goes another way.
Let me ask another question, and I won't keep you much
longer. Up until recently--and I'm not sure what I think right
now, but up until recently, I have come away from my visits to
Iraq with the following sense of things: That, from 2004--
really, early 2005, up until mid-2006, the Kurds, although
overwhelmingly wanting independence, reached the tentative
conclusion that--if they seek independence, or if the nation
falls apart, and they are able to declare themselves
independent because there is an all-out civil war--that they
are not about to give up on Kirkuk, and the Turks aren't about
to let them have their way in Kirkuk; and that, although, on
the one hand, they would look like they're in pretty good
shape, they would be inviting both the Iranians and the Turks
to come after them. And so, it's better for them to be in a
position where this gets played out over a longer haul, as long
as they're able to maintain the autonomy they now have; and
that the Sunnis, at least the tribal leadership, has reached
the conclusion they're not going to be in control like they
were--I mean, 70 percent of the oil, 90 percent of the power,
et cetera--in their lifetimes, and it's better to work out some
accommodation where at least they're secure, as long as they
actually have a source of revenue. And the Shia, although they
now have met their expectation and desire to be the dominant
political force, absent some kind of ultimate arrangement, they
are not going to be in a position to be able to pr 