Maps

North and South Kivu

 

Attacks on Civilians in North and South Kivu*

As documented by Human Rights Watch
in this report

Click to expand Image

 

Attacks in the Lubero Area, North Kivu*

As documented by Human Rights Watch in this report

Click to expand Image

Summary

In January 2009, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda, following a dramatic shift in political alliances, launched joint military operations in
eastern Congo against an abusive Rwandan Hutu militia, some of whose leaders
had participated in the Rwandan genocide in 1994. The operations were intended
to neutralize the group, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (Les
Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda, FDLR), which
over the previous 15 years had preyed on Congolese civilians in the mountainous
provinces of North and South Kivu.

Government representatives said the operations would bring
peace and security to the region. They have not. Two successive Congolese
military operations—one conducted with Rwandan military forces, known as
operation Umoja Wetu, and the second conducted with the direct support
of United Nations peacekeeping troops, known as operation Kimia II—have
been accompanied by horrendous abuses by both government and rebel forces
against a civilian population in eastern Congo that has long suffered so much.

The attacks against civilians have been vicious and
widespread. Local populations have been accused of being
“collaborators” by one side or the other and deliberately targeted,
their attackers saying they are being “punished.” Human Rights
Watch has documented the deliberate killing of more than 1,400 civilians
between January and September 2009, the majority women, children, and the
elderly. The attacks have been accompanied by rape. In a region already known
as the “worst place in the world to be a woman or child,” the
situation has deteriorated even further. Over the first nine months of 2009, over
7,500 cases of sexual violence against women and girls were registered at
health centers across North and South Kivu, nearly double that of 2008, and
likely only representing a fraction of the total.

In addition to killings and rapes, thousands of civilians
have been abducted and pressed into forced labor to carry weapons, ammunition,
or other baggage across the treacherous terrain by government forces and FDLR
militia as they deploy from place to place. Some civilians have been killed
when they refused. Others have died because the loads they have been forced to
carry were too heavy. Between January and September, the attacks forced more
than 900,000 people to flee for their lives, seeking safety in the remote
forests, with host families, or in displacement camps. During the attacks or as
they fled, FDLR combatants or Congolese army soldiers pillaged their belongings
and then burned their homes and villages. Over 9,000 houses, schools, churches
and other structures have been burned to the ground in North and South Kivu. Many civilians, already poor, have been left with nothing.

Civilians have been targeted by all sides: the FDLR, the
Congolese army and, in some instances, the Rwandan army. Civilians look to the
UN peacekeeping mission in Congo, MONUC, for desperately needed protection.
MONUC has a strong mandate from the UN Security Council to protect civilians
and to use force to do so, but it has become a partner of the Congolese army in
the military operations, and it failed to put in place adequate measures for
civilian protection before operations were launched. Peacekeepers have made
notable efforts to protect civilians which undoubtedly have helped to save
lives, but in many instances they have arrived too late or not at all, leaving local
people exposed to attacks with nowhere else to turn.

The first military operation, Umoja Wetu (“0ur
unity” in Swahili), began on January 20, 2009, following a secret agreement
between Congolese President Joseph Kabila and his Rwandan counterpart, President
Paul Kagame. It resulted in the removal of Congolese rebel leader Laurent
Nkunda, whose armed group, the National Congress for the Defense of the People
(Congrès national pour la défense du peuple, or CNDP), had
received substantial support from Rwanda and had defeated the Congolese army in
successive battles in 2007 and 2008. Rwandan authorities detained Nkunda and
promoted Bosco Ntaganda, the CNDP’s military chief of staff, to take his
place. Ntaganda promptly agreed to integrate his troops into the Congolese army
and to give up the CNDP’s rebellion.

In exchange for Rwanda’s assistance in removing the
CNDP threat, President Kabila permitted Rwandan troops to return to eastern Congo and to conduct joint operations against the FDLR. Ntaganda, who has a track record of
human rights abuses and is wanted on an arrest warrant from the International
Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague, was made a general in the Congolese army. An
estimated 4,000 Rwandan troops, and possibly many more, then crossed the border
into eastern Congo, where they stayed for 35 days.

Following the departure of Rwandan troops on February 25 at
the end of operation Umoja Wetu, Rwandan and Congolese officials
emphasized that the military operations were not complete. They pressed MONUC
to join forces with the Congolese army to finish the FDLR. MONUC had been
authorized by the UN Security Council to support and participate in military
operations against the FDLR in December 2008, as long as such operations were
conducted in accordance with the laws of war. But MONUC had been deliberately
excluded from operation Umoja Wetu and many UN officials were deeply
troubled at the turn of events that had returned Rwandan forces to Congolese
soil. According to MONUC insiders, the MONUC leadership was worried about the
consequences of being excluded from future military operations, concerned about
a return of Rwandan troops if they did not step in, and confident civilians
would be better protected were the peacekeepers to be part of military
operations—so MONUC agreed to support the Congolese army.

In the rushed preparations that followed, MONUC officials
did not set out clear conditions for their support, did not insist on the
removal of known human rights abusers from the ranks of the Congolese army, and
did not adequately prepare for the protection of the civilian population. On
March 2, the Congolese army, with the direct support of MONUC peacekeepers, launched
operation Kimia II (“quiet” in Swahili), an operation that
continued at this writing.

Abuses by the FDLR

The FDLR responded to the offensive of the Congolese
government, which had previously supported the group, by committing attacks
against Congolese civilians. FDLR forces deliberately attacked civilians in
whose communities they had lived, accusing their neighbors of
“betrayal” and telling them that they would be
“punished” for their government’s policy. The evidence of
their brutal strategy was clear in letters from FDLR commanders, public
meetings, oral threats to individuals, and written messages left on footpaths,
many of which Human Rights Watch has collected. These messages and subsequent
interviews with FDLR combatants who fled the group, demonstrate a deliberate
tactic of retaliatory killings coming from a central FDLR command.

Human Rights Watch has documented previous attacks on
civilians by FDLR combatants, but this time the killings and other abuses were
significantly more numerous and widespread, and showed clear signs of being systematic.
Between late January and September 2009, the FDLR deliberately killed at least 701
civilians in North and South Kivu. Many people were chopped to death by machete
or hoe. Some were shot. Others were burned to death in their homes. The FDLR
targeted and killed village chiefs and other influential community leaders, a
tactic that spread fear throughout entire communities. In the worst single
incident, the FDLR massacred at least 96 civilians in the village of Busurungi, in the Waloaluanda area, on May 9-10, 2009. Some of the victims were first tied up
before the FDLR “slit their throats like chickens.” Others were
deliberately locked in their homes that were then burned to the ground. Some of
the victims knew their attackers by name.

The killing of civilians was invariably accompanied by rape.
Most of the victims were gang-raped, some so viciously that they later bled to
death from their injuries. Others were abducted to be sexual slaves. In over 30
cases documented by Human Rights Watch, victims told us that their FDLR
attackers said that they were being raped to “punish” them.

Human Rights Watch’s field investigations found the
FDLR forces to be responsible for numerous serious human rights abuses and
violations of the laws of war. On November 17, 2009, the FDLR’s
president, Ignace Murwanashyaka, and his deputy, Straton Musoni, were arrested in
Germany by German judicial authorities for alleged war crimes and crimes
against humanity committed between January 2008 and July 2009 by FDLR
combatants under their command. They were also charged with belonging to a
terrorist group. Other members of the FDLR’s political and military
leadership, including the group’s military commander in eastern Congo, Gen. Sylvester Mudacumura, and the group’s executive secretary, Callixte Mbarushimana,
based in Paris, France, should also be investigated for ordering alleged war
crimes and crimes against humanity, or as a matter of command responsibility.

Abuses by the Congolese army and other forces

Congolese civilians received little or no protection from
their government’s armed forces against the FDLR attacks. The Congolese
army, initially in joint operations with the Rwandan army in operation Umoja
Wetu, and later with the support of MONUC peacekeepers in operation Kimia
II, also targeted civilians, especially those they claimed collaborated
with the FDLR. Congolese forces violated their obligation under the laws of war
to minimize harm to civilians. They failed to distinguish civilians from
combatants and targeted the former, did not give effective advance warning of
attack when circumstances permitted, and made no efforts to permit civilians
caught up in the fighting to flee to safety. Most egregiously, they summarily
executed hundreds of civilians under their effective control. Between January
and September 2009, Human Rights Watch documented the deliberate killing of at
least 732 civilians, including 143 Rwandan Hutu refugees, by Congolese army
soldiers and their coalition partner (during Umoja Wetu, the Rwandan
Defence Force (RDF)).

Human Rights Watch has documented the killing of 201
civilians during the Umoja Wetu phase of military operations, many in
the area between Nyabiondo and Pinga, bordering Masisi and Walikale territories
in North Kivu. In two of the worst attacks during this phase of operations, 90
civilians were massacred in late February in the remote village of Ndorumo and
a further 40 civilians were killed in the village of Byarenga. The attacks were
perpetrated by Rwandan and Congolese coalition forces, although witnesses found
it difficult to distinguish between Rwandan army soldiers and former CNDP combatants
newly integrated into the Congolese army, who wore similar uniforms and spoke
the same language. In Ndorumo village, the coalition forces began killing
civilians after they had been called to a gathering at the local school. One
witness said the soldiers told the population they were “being punished
for being complicit with the FDLR.”

The killings continued during operation Kimia II, often
by newly integrated CNDP combatants. Human Rights Watch has documentedthe
deliberate killing of a further 531 civilians between March and September 2009.
The real figure is likely to be much higher—Human Rights Watch also
received credible reports of an additional 476 civilians killed by Congolese
army forces and their allies in the area between Nyabiondo and Pinga. However,
due to the remoteness of the area, we have not been able to confirm whether
they were caught in the crossfire or were deliberately killed, so these numbers
have not been included in our calculations.

Congolese forces also targeted Rwandan Hutu refugees living
in eastern Congo, whom they often accuse of being FDLR combatants or
“wives.” From April 27 to 30, 2009, in the worst incident
documented by Human Rights Watch, Congolese army soldiers deliberately killed
at least 129 Rwandan Hutu refugees, mostly women and children, when they
attacked the neighboring hills of Shalio, Marok, and Bunyarwanda in Walikale
territory (North Kivu).While there were FDLR combatants deployed in
these hills, all witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch reported that the
FDLR combatants had fled in advance of the attacks and were not present in any
of the makeshift refugee camps targeted by the Congolese army.

At Shalio Hill, Congolese army soldiers killed at least 50
refugees as they tried to flee. After the attack, one group of soldiers took 50
refugees from Shalio to Biriko, where the soldiers beat them to death with
wooden clubs and shot three refugees who tried to escape. Only one person
survived. A second group of soldiers took 40 refugees, all women and girls,
from Shalio to a nearby Congolese army position where they were kept as sexual
slaves, gang-raped and mutilated by the soldiers. Ten of the women managed to
escape, but the fate of the others is unknown. One who was later interviewed by
Human Rights Watch bore the marks of her mutilation: her attackers had cut off chunks
from her breast and stomach.

As with the FDLR, the killing by Congolese army soldiers was
often accompanied by the rape of women and girls. In North Kivu, 268 out of 410
sexual violence cases documented by Human Rights Watch were perpetrated by government
soldiers. In at least 15 cases, the women and girls were summarily executed
after being raped, some by being shot in the vagina. Husbands, children and
parents who desperately tried to stop the rape of their loved ones were also attacked.
In cases documented by Human Rights Watch, at least 20 family members were
killed when they cried out or otherwise protested against the rape.

The protection of civilians in Congo is primarily the
responsibility of the Congolese government and its security forces. Yet
Congolese government officials have failed to take adequate or effective steps
to protect civilians in eastern Congo. Human Rights Watch found that Congolese
army forces repeatedly violated international human rights and humanitarian
law. Responsible commanders should be investigated for ordering alleged war
crimes and crimes against humanity, or as a matter of command responsibility.

Congolese military planners, given the past practice of both
the FDLR and the government’s own forces, should have foreseen the grave
risks to the civilian population. Previous military operations in North Kivu in 2007 and 2008 had resulted in frequent FDLR retaliatory attacks against
civilians and Congolese army abuses. But Congolese decision-makers gave little
or no attention in planning the military operations to providing for the
protection of the civilian population. The authorities integrated highly
abusive militias into government forces, and failed to seriously address the
deeply entrenched problem of impunity.

On July 5, 2009, following exposure of some abuses by its
soldiers, the Congolese government announced a policy of “zero
tolerance” for human rights violations and put commanders on notice that
they would be held to account for the behavior of their troops. Four officers
were later arrested for their involvement in sexual violence, but Gen. Bosco
Ntaganda and other commanders implicated in serious human rights violations
remain in operational command.

Results of the operations

The Congolese government’s goal in both operation Umoja
Wetu and Kimia II was to neutralize the FDLR. The military
operations have had some impact on disrupting the FDLR. During nine months of
military operations, 1,087 FDLR combatants were repatriated to Rwanda by the UN’s Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration, and
Resettlement (DDRRR) program, representing a significant increase compared to
2008. The FDLR
have also been cut off, at least temporarily, from access to some markets and
other traditional economic supply routes. But the FDLR is also reportedly
recruiting new combatants and continues to raise funds and obtain weapons and
ammunition through its international networks. A UN Group of Experts in
November 2009 reported that military operations against the FDLR had failed to
dismantle the group’s political and military structures on the ground in
eastern Congo. The FDLR’s ability to conduct attacks on civilians remains
intact.

A comparison of the impact of military operations on the
FDLR and the harm to civilians starkly conveys the suffering endured by the
population. For every FDLR combatant that was repatriated to Rwanda during the
first nine months of operations, at least one civilian was deliberately killed,
seven women and girls raped, eight homes destroyed, and over 900 people forced
to flee for their lives. These are incomplete figures covering the period
January to September—and the military operations still continue.

Operation Kimia II has also not given sufficient
attention to the protection of the Rwandan Hutu refugees, who have been
isolated and preyed upon for years by all sides, nor to facilitating their
return to Rwanda. The establishment of safe humanitarian corridors, protected
by MONUC peacekeepers, could help to facilitate the repatriation of the
refugees and reduce abuses against them, including by the FDLR, who rely on
this community for filling its ranks and providing support.

The military operations are also likely to have a
significant future impact on local political and economic dynamics in eastern Congo that might undermine sustainable peace and efforts to bring the rule of law to this
troublesome region. Former CNDP commanders newly integrated into the Congolese
army appear to be using the operations as cover to gain control over
mineral-rich areas and to clear the land for the return of Congolese Tutsi
refugees and for cattle being brought in from Rwanda. The perceived dominance
and preferential treatment given to former CNDP commanders has already led a
number of local militia groups, often called Mai Mai, to abandon army
integration. Some have joined forces with the FDLR.

MONUC and civilian protection

MONUC has provided substantial support to operation Kimia
II including logistical and operations support, and an estimated US$1
million worth of service support such as daily rations during each month of
operations. MONUC disregarded crucial elements of formal legal advice given by
the UN Office of Legal Affairs on January 13 and did not establish conditions for
respecting international humanitarian law, as required by its mandate, before
it began to support the operations. On November 1, after eight months of
support to operation Kimia II, Alain Le Roy, the head of the UN
Department of Peacekeeping Operations announced during a visit to Congo that
MONUC would suspend its support to the Congolese army’s 213th
Brigade. MONUC’s own investigations had revealed army soldiers had killed
at least 62 civilians in the Lukweti area, just north of Nyabiondo. At the time
of writing, MONUC support was not suspended to any other army units despite credible
information that gross human rights violations were occurring elsewhere and
none of the commanders implicated in past serious human rights violations had
been removed from involvement in Kimia II operations.

The MONUC leadership ignored the important role played by
Bosco Ntaganda in operation Kimia II, where he was the de facto deputy
commander. MONUC could not legally support an operation in which Ntaganda,
wanted on an ICC arrest warrant for war crimes, played a part, as the
UN’s legal office pointed out to the MONUC leadership in a legal note on April 1, 2009. But the MONUC leadership disregarded the mounting evidence of
Ntaganda’s role, including copies of orders he had signed, minutes of
Congolese army internal meetings, his presence at the Kimia II command
center, and his frequent visits to the troops in the field. Instead MONUC hid
behind false assurances from the Congolese government that Ntaganda was not a
part of operation Kimia II. Other commanders who had a track record of
serious human rights violations and were commanders in operation Kimia II
were also not removed, despite concerns raised by MONUC staff about the
presence of these commanders and the risk they posed for civilians.

On June 2, 2009, the UN Policy Committee, which includes the
heads of all UN agencies, decided that MONUC should not participate in any form
of joint operations with Congolese army units if there were a real risk of
human rights violations. MONUC staff in Congo’s capital, Kinshasa,
struggled, belatedly, to put in place a policy of conditionality for the
mission’s support to operation Kimia II.

MONUC’s support of the Congolese armed forces,
particularly after receiving credible reports of gross violations of human
rights, raises serious concern that MONUC itself is implicated in these grave
abuses. In conflict with its mandate, MONUC ’s continued backing of operation
Kimia II has undermined its primary objective to protect civilians. Until
there are clear, measurable, and actionable conditions in place to ensure
operations with Congolese forces do not violate international humanitarian law,
MONUC should immediately cease all support for operation Kimia II.

Proper investigations are needed into the serious abuses
documented in this report, many of which amount to war crimes and could be crimes
against humanity. In line with the UN Security Council’s commitment,
as expressed in Resolution 1894 to advance and ensure protection of civilians,
the council should urgently deploy a Civilian Protection Expert Group to
eastern Congo to investigate the situation,
including the measures taken by MONUC to implement its mandate to protect
civilians, and to recommend concrete measures to improve civilian protection
and end impunity for the serious crimes.

Methodology

This report is the result of extensive field research
carried out from January through November 2009 in eastern Congo. It is based on
information collected during 23 fact-finding missions to 30 different locations
in North and South Kivu provinces where military operations have taken place,
or where displaced people have fled to escape the violence.  Four Human
Rights Watch researchers were involved. Human Rights Watch conducted 689
interviews with witnesses, victims, their family members, and those who buried
the dead, as well as an additional 300 interviews with local and provincial
authorities, church officials, civil society representatives, health workers,
former and current FDLR and Mai Mai combatants, their commanders, Congolese
army officers and soldiers, MONUC military and civilian officials,
representatives of other United Nations agencies, diplomats, and international nongovernmental
(NGO) representatives in North and South Kivu. We have also conducted
interviews with UN officials and foreign diplomats in Kinshasa, New York,
Washington, DC, London, Paris, Brussels and Pretoria.

Human Rights Watch also met with and discussed many of the
issues raised in this report with Congolese government authorities including President Joseph Kabila; the Vice Minister of Defense,
Oscar Masamba Matebo; the Minister of Justice,
Luzolo Bambi Lessa; and with Maj. Gen. Dieudonné Amuli Bahigwa, the
military commander responsible for operation Kimia II and a
number of his subordinates. In August 2009, Human Rights Watch also met with
the FDLR head, Dr. Ignace Murwanashyaka, in Mannheim, Germany.

The research for this report greatly benefited from reporting
by United Nations sources including internal UN documents and legal memos,
reporting from the UN Group of Experts, the UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial
executions, the UN’s DDRRR program and reporting by diplomats, other
national and international human rights and humanitarian organizations, legal
papers from judicial officials and other government documents.

This report documents killings and other abuses where
witnesses were able to clearly identify the group or armed forces to which the
assailants belonged. Cases where the perpetrator was not clear have not been
included in this report. Our statistics on the numbers killed are based on eyewitness
accounts, information from family members, and testimony from those who helped
to bury the dead. We have made every effort to corroborate our findings and
dismiss accounts that we did not find credible.

Many of those we interviewed were deeply traumatized by
their experiences yet were desperate to tell their stories about what had
happened to them. This report is, in part, a testimony to their immense courage
and will for the truth to be known.

Recommendations

To the Congolese Government and Army

• Cease
  immediately all attacks on civilians. Urgently put into place measures and
  mechanisms to deter, prevent and punish violations of international
  humanitarian and human rights law by Congolese army soldiers.
• Develop
  with United Nations assistance a clear strategy for civilian protection, with
  specific attention to protecting women and girls.
• Develop
  with the UN and other international partners a comprehensive multi-pronged
  disarmament strategy for armed groups, including the FDLR (see below).
• Immediately establish safe humanitarian corridors,
  protected with MONUC peacekeepers where possible, to permit Rwandan
  refugees and FDLR dependents who wish to return to Rwanda to do so in safety and dignity.
• Take the following measures in response to the serious
  human rights violations committed by Congolese army soldiers and to
  implement the declared policy of “zero tolerance” of abuses:
• Conduct impartial and credible investigations into the
  serious violations of human rights and war crimes committed during
  operations Umoja Wetu and Kimia II. Discipline or prosecute
  as appropriate those responsible, regardless of rank or position.
• Suspend from operational command officers implicated in
  serious human rights or laws of war violations pending investigation,
  including Lt. Col. Innocent Zimurinda.
• Instruct judicial authorities to immediately arrest Gen. Bosco
  Ntaganda and to transfer him to the jurisdiction of the International
  Criminal Court.
• Instruct judicial authorities to immediately re-arrest
  Col. Jean-Pierre Biyoyo, who was sentenced to five years in prison in
  March 2006 for child soldier recruitment but escaped from prison later
  that year.
• Introduce a vetting mechanism for the Congolese army to
  remove military officers implicated in serious human rights abuse,
  including those newly integrated from the CNDP and other armed groups.
• Strengthen the capacity of the military justice system by
  devoting greater resources for investigations.
• Establish a special chamber with Congolese and
  international judges and prosecutors within the Congolese justice system.
  The chamber’s mandate should be to prosecute serious violations of
  international humanitarian law, including sexual violence, and should
  include the capacity to investigate and prosecute senior military and
  civilian officials responsible for crimes, including as a matter of
  command responsibility.
• Increase cooperation with the UN’s DDRRR efforts to
  encourage FDLR and other foreign combatants to disarm voluntarily and
  return to Rwanda. Take all necessary measures to end immediately attacks,
  threats and intimidation by Congolese forces against DDRRR staff and their
  bases and to cooperate fully with their efforts.
• To discourage looting and other abuses, ensure all soldiers
  receive a regular and adequate salary. Create military barracks that
  provide a base for soldiers and their families.

To the FDLR Leadership

• Cease immediately all attacks on civilians. Take all
  necessary measures, including making public statements, to ensure that
  FDLR forces do not commit human rights abuses and violations of the laws
  of war.
• Carry out investigations into war crimes committed by FDLR
  forces and take appropriate disciplinary measures against any member of the
  FDLR, regardless of rank, found responsible.
• Stop blocking the return of Rwandan refugees to Rwanda. Support the establishment of safe humanitarian corridors to allow refugees to
  return home.

To the Rwandan Government

• Cooperate with Congolese and other judicial investigations
  into alleged violations of international human rights and humanitarian law
  committed by Rwandan armed forces during operation Umoja Wetu.
  Ensure that any commanders or soldiers found responsible are disciplined
  or prosecuted as appropriate, including as a matter of command
  responsibility.
• Publish an updated list of current FDLR combatants who are
  wanted on charges of genocide.

To the UN Mission in

Congo (MONUC)

• Immediately cease all support to operation Kimia II
  until there are clear, measurable and actionable conditions in place to
  ensure the operation does not violate international humanitarian law and
  until all known commanders with a record of human rights abuses have been
  removed from any operational responsibilities. Make the conditions public.
• In cooperation with Congolese justice officials, arrest
  Bosco Ntaganda. Make his arrest a condition for future support to the
  Congolese army.
• Establish “protection support bases” in areas
  where civilians are most at risk. Deploy civilian and military teams to
  such bases, including protection specialists for a minimum of two months
  to build confidence with the local population and authorities. Use such
  bases to help state authorities reestablish security for the civilian
  population.
• Urgently develop a civilian protection plan with specific
  responsibilities for both civilian and military staff. Include critical
  elements of the protection plan in the memoranda of understanding between
  MONUC and troop contributing countries, in the rules of engagement, and in
  directives from the Force Commander. Regularly assess its effectiveness.
  Such a plan should include, but not be limited to:
• Ensuring that MONUC troops are deployed to areas that are
  designated as “must protect” within fourteen days, but that
  patrols are sent immediately.
• Ensuring that MONUC field base commanders are in regular
  communication with local authorities, traditional chiefs, and civil
  society and displaced person representatives in their area of
  responsibility, with special attention given to women’s groups and
  to identifying the risks to civilians and mitigating such risks.
• Ensuring that all MONUC field bases have sufficient
  interpreters available around the clock and seven days a week.
• Ensuring that MONUC peacekeepers carry out regular foot
  and vehicle patrols to the areas most at risk in their area of
  responsibility, as well as escorts to civilians, and women and girls in
  particular, who are traveling along potentially dangerous roads or paths
  to their fields, to the market or to collect firewood or water, and to
  displaced people either fleeing violence or returning to their village of
  origin along roads or paths where they may be at risk of attack.
• Ensuring the removal of all illegal roadblocks in their
  area of responsibility.
• Give priority to implementation of the comprehensive
  strategy to combat sexual violence, launched by MONUC in April 2009, and
  ensure it is integrated into MONUC’s protection strategy.
• Ensure that the DDRRR program has adequate human and other
  resources and the support needed from other components of MONUC to carry
  out its tasks, including sufficient radio transmitters, vehicles, access
  to MONUC helicopters, interpreters, and more resources devoted to
  information collection and intelligence gathering on FDLR movements,
  leadership structure, chain of command, financial support, and recruitment
  efforts.

To the UN Security Council,
the UN Secretary-General, the European Union, the United States, and Other International
Donors

• In line with UN Security
  Council Resolution 1894 to advance and ensure protection of civilians,
  urgently deploy a Civilian Protection Expert Group to eastern Congo to
  inquire into, and rapidly report on, civilian protection needs and
  challenges, including: (a) attacks against civilians, gender specific
  violence, and abuses against children by all parties in violation of
  international humanitarian law; (b) measures taken by MONUC to implement
  its mission-wide strategy on protection of civilians; and (c) the extent
  to which protection of civilians is sufficiently integrated into the
  Concept of Operations (CONOPS). The Civilian Protection Expert Group should
  recommend concrete measures to advance the protection of civilians, ensure
  unhindered humanitarian access and assistance, and end impunity for
  serious crimes in violation of international law.

• Ensure MONUC has the means to carry out its mandate, including
  the urgent deployment of additional peacekeepers authorized in November
  2008, and the rapid response capabilities, helicopters, and intelligence
  gathering support the mission has requested to provide civilian protection.

• Develop a new
  and comprehensive approach for disarming armed groups, including the FDLR,
  that emphasizes protection of civilians, apprehending those wanted for crimes
  in violation of international law, a reformed disarmament and
  demobilization program, and

  options for temporary resettlement of
  combatants and their dependents within or outside of Congo,

  among other measures.

• Conduct in-country investigations on the participation of
  the FDLR leadership in Europe and elsewhere on the alleged war crimes and
  crimes against humanity documented in this report, with particular
  attention on Ignace Murwanashyaka, based in Germany and currently under
  arrest for his role in alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity
  committed in eastern Congo, and Callixte Mbarushimana, based in France.

• Open up contact with the FDLR to explore options for
  temporary resettlement of FDLR combatants and their families within Congo or to a third country as agreed between the Rwandan and Congolese government in the Nairobi communiqué of November 2007.

• Implement changes to the memoranda of understanding (MOU)
  with troop contributing countries to permit greater flexibility and fewer
  limitations on the  physical location of troop deployment, the number
  of field bases, and the structural requirements necessary before a temporary
  base is established.
• Ensure that MONUC peacekeepers receive appropriate
  training on civilian protection before being deployed.
• Ensure that there is a significant human rights component
  in current security sector reform programs, including the creation of a
  vetting mechanism.
• Support measures to strengthen the military justice system
  and to create a special chamber to prosecute serious violations of
  international humanitarian law committed in Congo, as described above.
• Separate the UN human rights section from MONUC’s
  peacekeeping mission, with a direct reporting line to OHCHR to ensure it
  has the ability to investigate and report independently, credibly, and
  effectively on human rights violations by all sides.

To UN High Commissioner for Refugees

• Encourage and provide assistance to the establishment of
  safe humanitarian corridors to facilitate the return of Rwandan refugees.
• Increase the number of re-groupment sites and
  sensitization efforts for the repatriation of Rwandan Hutu refugees living
  in more remote areas such as the region between Nyabiondo and Pinga.

 

To
the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court

• As part of ongoing investigations in North and South Kivu,
  investigate the serious crimes committed by perpetrators from all sides since
  January 2009 including those documented in this report.  Reopen
  investigations on alleged war crimes committed by Bosco Ntaganda to
  include serious crimes committed in both the Ituri District and the Kivu
  region such as those in the Shalio Hill area in April 2009, the massacre
  at Kiwanja in November 2008, and ethnic massacres in Ituri including those
  at Mongbwalu in November 2002, among others.

 

Key Players

The Congolese Armed
Forces (Forces armées de la République démocratique
du Congo, FARDC):  The Congolese
national army, FARDC, created in 2003 has an estimated strength of 120,000
soldiers, many from former rebel groups who were incorporated following
various peace deals. About half of the Congolese army is deployed in eastern
Congo. Since 2006, the government has twice attempted to integrate the 6,000
strong rebel CNDP, but failed each time. In early 2009 a third attempt was
made to incorporate the CNDP as well as other remaining rebel groups, a
process known as “fast track accelerated integration.” Many who
agreed to integrate, however, remained loyal to their former rebel
commanders, raising serious doubts about the sustainability of the process.

National Congress for
the Defense of the People (Congrès national pour la défense
du people, CNDP): The CNDP is a
Rwandan-backed rebel group launched in July 2006 by the renegade Tutsi
general, Laurent Nkunda, to defend, protect, and ensure political
representation for the several hundred thousand Congolese Tutsi living in
eastern Congo, and some 44,000 Congolese refugees, most of them Tutsi, living
in Rwanda. It is estimated to have some 6,000 combatants, including a
significant number recruited in Rwanda; many of its officers are Tutsi. On
January 5, 2009, Nkunda was ousted as leader by his military chief of staff,
Bosco Ntaganda, and subsequently detained in Rwanda. Ntaganda, wanted on an
arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court, abandoned the
three-year insurgency and integrated the CNDP’s troops into the
government army. On April 26, 2009, the CNDP established itself as a
political party.

Democratic Forces for
the Liberation of Rwanda (Les Forces démocratiques de
libération du Rwanda, FDLR): The FDLR is a Hutu militia group based in eastern Congo, some of whose
leaders participated in the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. It seeks to overthrow
the government of Rwanda and promote greater political representation of
Hutu. In late 2008, the FDLR was estimated to have at least 6,000 combatants,
controlling large areas of North and South Kivu, including many key mining
areas. The FDLR’s president and supreme commander is Ignace
Murwanashyaka, based in Germany. He was arrested on November 17, 2009, on
charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The group’s military
commander in eastern Congo is Gen. Sylvester Mudacumura. The Congolese
government has often supported and shown general tolerance for the FDLR,
until early 2009 when its policy changed and the government launched military
operations against the group.

Rally for Unity and
Democracy (RUD)-Urunana: 
RUD-Urunana is a splinter group of the FDLR estimated at some 400 combatants
based in North Kivu, made up largely of dissident FDLR combatants. It was
created in 2004 by the United States-based former FDLR 1st vice-president,
Jean-Marie Vianney Higiro. Other political leaders are in Europe and North
America. Since the start of military operations against RUD and the FDLR in
January 2009, the two groups have reunited militarily.

Mai Mai militia: The Mai Mai militia groups are local defense groups
often organized on an ethnic basis who have traditionally fought alongside
the government army against “foreign invaders,” including the
CNDP and other Rwandan-backed rebel groups. In 2009 there were over 22 Mai
Mai groups, ranging greatly in size and effectiveness, in both North and
South Kivu. Some joined the Congolese army as part of the rapid integration
process, while others refused, angry at the perceived preferential treatment
given to the CNDP and unwilling to join the army unless they were able to
stay in their communities. The various Mai Mai groups are estimated to have
some 8,000 to 12,000 combatants.

Coalition of Congolese
Patriotic Resistance (Coalition des patriotes résistants congolais,
PARECO):  PARECO is the
largest of the Mai Mai groups, created in March 2007 by joining various other
ethnic-based Mai Mai militias including from the Congolese Hutu, Hunde, and
Nande ethnic groups. Throughout 2007 and 2008, PARECO collaborated closely
with the FDLR and received substantial support from the Congolese army,
especially in their battles against the CNDP. In 2009, many PARECO
combatants, particularly the Hutu, joined the Congolese army and its military
commander, Mugabu Baguma, was made a colonel. The Hunde and Nande commanders
were not offered equivalent command positions and remained outside the
integration process, along with the majority of the Hunde and Nande
combatants

Patriotic Alliance for a
Free and Sovereign Congo (Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et
souverain, APCLS):  The APCLS
is a breakaway faction of PARECO. Created in April 2008, it is largely made
up of ethnic Hunde and is led by General Janvier Buingo Karairi. It is based
in the area to the north of Nyabiondo, in western Masisi, with its
headquarters in Lukweti village and has an estimated 500 to 800combatants.
The APCLS is allied with the FDLR and refuses to integrate into the Congolese
army without guarantees that they will be deployed in their home region and
that the newly integrated CNDP soldiers will leave.

I. Background

Conflict in Eastern Congo

When the Democratic Republic of Congo held its first
multiparty elections in over 40 years in June 2006, there was widespread
optimism that the country would emerge out of years of brutal war. Congolese
citizens in the densely populated provinces of North and South Kivu in eastern
Congo on the border with Rwanda, an area deeply affected by two consecutive
wars from 1996 to 1997 and again from 1998 to 2003, were desperate for peace.
They voted overwhelmingly for presidential candidate Joseph Kabila, who
promised to end conflict in this troublesome region. Yet in the three years
following the elections, eastern Congo has remained locked in brutal conflict.
In 2009 alone, botched peace attempts combined with badly organized and abusive
military operations have led to nearly a million people fleeing their homes,
hundreds massacred, and thousands more women and girls raped. As one resident
of eastern Congo told Human Rights Watch, “We voted for peace, but all we
got was more war. When are they going to stop killing us?”

The ongoing conflict in eastern Congo has been marked by a
constant shift in alliances between a confusing array of belligerents. One-time
enemies turn into allies and back into enemies again in swift succession,
confusing Congolese citizens and political analysts alike. In the three years
since the elections, the Congolese government has failed to address the
underlying causes of the conflict and to effectively extend state control to
areas once occupied by the Rwandan army and its proxy forces. Instead the
government has sought secret deals with various rebel groups and, when
unsuccessful, used military force. To date, neither course of action has brought
peace or security to the area.

Two armed rebel groups have dominated recent events in
eastern Congo: a Rwandan Hutu militia called the Democratic Forces for the
Liberation of Rwanda (Les Forces démocratiques de libération
du Rwanda, FDLR), and the Congolese Tutsi-led National Congress for the
Defense of the People (Congrès national pour la défense du
peuple, CNDP). At different times, both groups have been either allies or
enemies of the Congolese government depending on its relationship with Rwanda. The difficulty in finding lasting solutions to the crisis is exacerbated by the
struggle for control of one of the richest regions in Congo.

The ongoing conflict in eastern Congo is also linked to the
after-effects of the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and can only be understood by
looking at political dynamics in both Congo and Rwanda. In Rwanda, growing restrictions on political space have promoted views among some Hutu, including those
in the FDLR, that they have little or no say in Rwandan political life and that
the Hutu population are being collectively punished for the genocide. Political
parties that oppose President Paul Kagame are blocked from operating freely and
the media faces severe restrictions on political reporting.

The Rwandan government often accuses its critics of “divisionism”
or “genocide ideology,” vaguely defined offenses to punish the
spreading of ideas that encourage ethnic animosity between the country’s Tutsi
and Hutu populations and the expression of any ideas that could lead to
genocide. Largely
aimed at the Hutu population, such offenses permit, among other measures, the
government to send away children of any age to rehabilitation centers for up to
one year—including for the teasing of classmates—and for parents
and teachers to face sentences of 15 to 25 years for the child’s conduct.
The government has repeatedly accused the Voice of America, the British
Broadcasting Corporation and other media outlets, as well as Human Rights
Watch, of promoting genocide ideology; accusations these organizations deny.
  

The tight control over political space, civil society and
the media has forced a number of moderate Hutu and some Tutsi to leave Rwanda. Critics of the Rwandan government, including many Congolese civil society groups
and the Congolese government, repeatedly call for an inter-Rwandan dialogue to
ease the tension between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda. Congolese civil society
groups claim that the failure to open political space in Rwanda is one of the underlying reasons for the continued suffering in eastern Congo. A European
diplomat who agreed with this analysis said to Human Rights Watch, “The
FDLR problem will not be solved if there is no political space for Hutu in Rwanda.”  

Democratic Forces for the
Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)

The FDLR are a predominately Rwandan Hutu armed group that uses
military force to seek political change and greater representation for Hutu in Rwanda.
Some of the FDLR leaders are believed to have participated in the genocide in
Rwanda in 1994 and the group has important ideological links to the former Hutu
Power movement. In the
years since the genocide, the Rwandan Hutu militia reorganized politically and
militarily, going through various name and leadership changes.
In 2000 the current configuration, the FDLR, was created. As of January 2009,
the group was estimated to have some 6,000 combatants in eastern Congo.
The vast majority of these combatants did not participate in the genocide since
they were too young at the time to have played a role.

The Congolese government has repeatedly turned to the FDLR
(and its predecessor movements) for support in its fight against Congolese
rebel groups backed by Rwanda and against the Rwandan army. In the 1998-2003
war, the well-trained Rwandan Hutu militias soon became some of the most
important frontline troops for the then Congolese national government of
Laurent Désiré Kabila, fighting alongside the Congolese army and
its other allies throughout the war.

Following the signing of a peace agreement ending the war, a
transitional government was launched in Kinshasa in June 2003, led by Laurent
Kabila’s son, Joseph. As part of the agreement, the Congolese government
was nominally committed to disbanding the FDLR and facilitating its members’
return to Rwanda. Some minimal attempts were made to do so, but the effort was
half-hearted and unsuccessful. With no outright war to fight and support from Kinshasa less frequent than before, the FDLR sought other sources of revenue. It turned to
the illegal trade in mineral resources and control over other economic activities.
In December 2008, the UN Group of Experts investigating arms trafficking estimated
the FDLR’s economic activities brought them millions of dollars a year,
including from the trade in minerals.

In 2006, the Kinshasa government again turned to the FDLR
for military support when a new Tutsi-led rebel group, the CNDP, emerged in North Kivu (see below). From late 2007 through 2008, the Congolese government continued to
support, arm, and collaborate extensively with the FDLR.
In December 2008, the UN Group of Experts provided detailed evidence of this
collaboration and support, including specific examples in which the FDLR
cohabited with the Congolese army and supported the Congolese army in
operations against the CNDP.

National Congress for the
Defense of the People (CNDP)

To deal with the continued threat of Rwandan Hutu militias
across its border and to exercise influence in the fertile and mineral-rich
North and South Kivu provinces, the Rwandan government has repeatedly backed
Congolese rebel groups willing to fight the Hutu militias. Since 1996, Rwanda has backed three different Congolese rebel groups (and sometimes other splinter factions) who
agreed to fight the Rwandan Hutu militias, but who also all sought to overthrow
the government in Kinshasa. The
most recent Rwandan-backed rebel group is the CNDP, which until January 2009
was led by a former Congolese Tutsi general, Laurent Nkunda.

While the degree of military and political support for each
of these groups has varied, Rwanda’s policy of continued support and
influence over Congolese proxy groups willing to fight the Rwandan Hutu
militias and enhance its influence in eastern Congo has been unmistakable.

Nkunda’s CNDP emerged during Congo’s historic
national elections in 2006, when it became clear that Tutsi political clout was
about to rapidly diminish. In the aftermath of the dramatic electoral defeat of
RCD-Goma, the former Rwandan-backed rebel group that had become a political
party, Nkunda presented himself as spokesman for and protector of Congolese
Tutsi. His program, he said, was to eliminate the FDLR, prevent the exclusion
of Tutsi from national political life, assure the security of Tutsi soldiers in
the national army, and bring about the return of some 45,000 Congolese Tutsi
refugees living in camps in Rwanda. Some
Tutsi leaders, fearful of losing economic gains made during the war years and
an ethnic backlash against them, insisted that Nkunda’s troops
constituted their last bulwark of protection.

From 2006 through 2008, Nkunda’s CNDP cemented and
expanded their area of control in Masisi and Rutshuru territories (North Kivu), where they created what one of Nkunda’s officers called “our
little state” with their own local administrators and an extensive
taxation system that brought in hundreds of thousands of dollars.
Nkunda’s CNDP also collected significant sums of money through voluntary
donations from the Congolese Tutsi diaspora and businessmen in Goma, sent to
bank accounts controlled by CNDP agents in Rwanda.

Support and recruitment in
Rwanda

Nkunda was joined by hundreds of former RCD-Goma troops and
new recruits, including Hutu, Tutsi, and other ethnic groups, although the vast
majority of the senior military officers were Tutsi. Nkunda also actively
recruited combatants in Rwanda. Between 2006 and 2008, hundreds joined the
CNDP’s ranks, including from the refugee camps in Rwanda, former
demobilized Rwandan soldiers, and active Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) soldiers,
some of whom were on “temporary” leave from their army.
Many joined voluntarily, but others were forcibly recruited or joined after
false promises of jobs; some were children. By late 2008, the CNDP were
estimated to have between 4,000 and 7,000 troops. 

The number of Rwandan citizens recruited into the CNDP remains
unknown, but an indication of the scale can be deduced from the UN’s
Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration, and Resettlement
(DDRRR) program, which is tasked with facilitating the return of foreign
combatants. Between January and October 2009, DDRRR staff had repatriated 448 former
CNDP combatants to Rwanda, including 83 children (see below).

The full extent of Rwanda’s support for Nkunda’s
CNDP was evident in the December 2008 report of the UN Group of Experts
monitoring arms trafficking in Congo. The report provided detailed evidence of
Rwanda’s ongoing support for the CNDP, including evidence that Rwandan
authorities “had been complicit in the recruitment of soldiers, including
children, facilitated the supply of military equipment, and sent officers and
units from the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) to the Democratic Republic of the
Congo in support of the CNDP.” The
report also provided specific evidence of Rwandan army support to a CNDP
offensive against the Congolese army on October 26-30,
and showed how Rwanda has served as a rear base for the CNDP’s financial
and communications networks.

Clashes and the Failure of Mixage

 

Nkunda’s CNDP posed a significant problem for
Kabila’s new government. Kabila’s election success had largely come
from eastern Congo, where the population voted overwhelmingly for him on the
basis that he promised to bring peace. In August and November 2006,
Nkunda’s forces fought against the Congolese national army, producing
substantial losses for both sides but no clear victor. In an effort to avoid
further military operations, President Kabila in December 2006 dispatched Gen.
John Numbi, the then head of the air force, to secretly negotiate a deal with
Nkunda. The two sides met in Rwanda in January 2007 in talks facilitated by the
chief of staff of the Rwandan army, Gen. James Kabarebe, where an agreement was
reached. Nkunda accepted a limited form of integration of his CNDP troops into
the ranks of the Congolese army, called mixage. In return the government
agreed to deploy these troops in the Kivu provinces to conduct military
operations against the FDLR. Nkunda gave a vague commitment to leave Congo temporarily for South Africa, a point that was later much disputed by both sides.

The deal failed. The integration did not work, and instead
of bringing much needed security to North Kivu, the deployment of the mixed
brigades led to a further deterioration of the security and human rights
situation. Nkunda-affiliated units killed, raped, and otherwise attacked
Congolese civilians to punish them for supposedly collaborating with the FDLR.
For their part, the Congolese army units of the mixedbrigades loyal to Kinshasa showed little willingness to fight the FDLR. By August 2007 the two sides were
once again on opposite sides of the frontline and fighting resumed.

In October and November 2007, diplomatic efforts led by the
United States and the European Union to broker a ceasefire between the
government and Nkunda’s CNDP rebels failed, with both sides blaming the
other for the failure of mixage. In December 2007, the Congolese army
launched a major offensive against the CNDP in Masisi, with logistical support
from MONUC peacekeepers. The offensive failed. Government forces were defeated
and soldiers deserted the battlefield in the thousands. Holding a strong
military position, Nkunda again called for peace talks.

More
Peace Talks Fail Again

In late 2007 and early 2008 two important agreements were
struck, which diplomats hoped would end the conflict in eastern Congo. The first was signed on November 9, 2007, in Nairobi, Kenya, and was known as the “Nairobi
Communiqué.” The agreement between the Congolese and Rwandan
governments stipulated that the Congolese government would stop all support to
the FDLR and would undertake military operations against the group if its
members refused to return voluntarily to Rwanda. The Rwandan government agreed
to block any support for armed groups in eastern Congo coming from its
territory, including to the CNDP. 

The second agreement, known in English as the “Goma
Agreement” (Acte d’Engagement in French), was signed on
January 23, 2008, following three weeks of intense peace discussions in Goma,
North Kivu, between the Congolese government and 22 armed groups, the most
important of which was the CNDP. It committed all parties to an immediate
ceasefire, disengagement of forces from frontline positions and integration of
troops into the Congolese army. The agreement also established a separate
commission to
provide a forum for negotiations of the armed groups’ political demands,
particularly those of the CNDP, to be facilitated by foreign diplomats.

Following these talks, the government launched a peace
program for eastern Congo, known as the Amani Program, or “Peace
Program” in Swahili. It quickly became clear that the Amani Program
sought to minimize the role of the new commission established by the Goma Agreement,
which Nkunda’s CNDP rebels saw as a crucial forum to negotiate their
political demands. Despite efforts by international representatives to move the
process forward, by July 2008 the Goma Agreement had collapsed.

Applicable Legal Standards

International humanitarian law (the laws of war) is binding
on all parties to an armed conflict, including non-state armed groups such as
the FDLR. Applicable international humanitarian law in Congo includes article 3
common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, the Second Additional Protocol
of 1977 (Protocol II) to the Geneva Conventions, and customary international
humanitarian law.

International humanitarian law requires the humane treatment
of civilians and captured combatants, prohibits violence to life and person,
including murder, torture and other mistreatment, the taking of hostages,
collective punishment, and outrages upon personal dignity. It prohibits rape
and other forms of sexual violence.

International humanitarian law also regulates the methods
and means of armed conflict. A fundamental principle is that all parties to a
conflict must distinguish between combatants and civilians, and may not
deliberately attack civilians or civilian objects. Acts or threats of violence
whose primary purpose is to spread terror among the civilian population is
prohibited.

Individuals who willfully commit serious violations of the
laws of war, that is deliberately or recklessly, are responsible for war
crimes. This includes those who participate in or order war crimes, or are
culpable as a matter of command responsibility. States have an obligation to
investigate alleged war crimes committed on their territory.

Serious offenses, including murder, torture and rape,
deliberately committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any
civilian population are crimes against humanity.

Congo is party to the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (ICC), which may exercise jurisdiction for “the most
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole,”
specifically genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. In March 2004,
the Congolese government referred the situation in the country to the ICC,
inviting the ICC prosecutor to investigate crimes within the jurisdiction of
the Rome Statute on its territory. In June 2004 the ICC prosecutor announced
the opening of an investigation in the Congo,initially focused on Ituri, northeastern Congo, and in November 2008 announced the investigations were being expanded to include the Kivu
provinces of eastern Congo. The
crimes committed by FDLR forces, the Congolese army and its allies, documented
in this report, are subject to ICC jurisdiction.

Individual responsibility

Under international law, individuals are criminally liable
for the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity. This includes
attempting to commit such a crime, as well as assisting in, facilitating, and
aiding and abetting an offense. Commanders and other superiors are criminally
responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed or attempted
pursuant to their orders.Finally,
commanders and other superiors may be criminally liable as a matter of command
responsibility for crimes committed by their subordinates if they knew, or had
reason to know, of such crimes and failed to prevent the crimes or to punish
those responsible.

Command responsibility as a basis of liability for crimes in
violation of international law is well-established. The doctrine is provided in
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
ad hoc international courts, and
customary international law. 
It applies both to military commanders and to civilians in leadership roles,
and during internal as well as international armed conflicts.

Under article 28 of the Rome Statute, a superior shall be
criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the court,
committed by subordinates under the superior’s effective authority and
control, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over
such subordinates, where:

(i) The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded
information which clearly indicated, that the subordinates were committing or
about to commit such crimes;

(ii) The crimes concerned activities that were within the
effective responsibility and control of the superior; and

(iii) The superior failed to take all necessary and
reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their
commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for
investigation and prosecution.

The concept of crimes against humanity has been incorporated
into a number of international treaties and the statutes of international
criminal tribunals, including the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court.The definition of
crimes against humanity has been defined as a range of serious human rights
abuses committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack by a government
or organization against a civilian population.Murder, rape, and other inhumane acts
intentionally causing great suffering all fall within the range of acts that
can qualify as crimes against humanity.

Crimes against humanity include only abuses that take place
as part of an attack against a civilian population. So long as the targeted
population is of a predominantly civilian nature, the presence of some
combatants does not alter its classification as a “civilian population”
as a matter of law.Rather, it is necessary only
that the civilian population be the primary object of the attack.

The attack against a civilian population underlying the
commission of crimes against humanity must be widespread or systematic. It need
not be both.“Widespread”
refers to the scale of the acts or number of victims. A
“systematic” attack indicates “a pattern or methodical
plan.”International courts have
considered to what extent a systematic attack requires a policy or plan. For
instance, such a plan need not be adopted formally as a policy of the state.

Lastly, for individuals to be found culpable for crimes
against humanity requires their having the relevant knowledge of the crime.That is, perpetrators must be
aware that their actions formed part of the widespread or systematic attack
against the civilian population.While perpetrators need not be
identified with a policy or plan underlying crimes against humanity, they must
at least have knowingly taken the risk of participating in the policy or plan.  Individuals accused of
crimes against humanity cannot avail themselves of the defense of following
superior orders nor benefit from statutes of limitation. Because crimes against
humanity are considered crimes of universal jurisdiction, all states are
responsible for bringing to justice those who commit crimes against humanity.
There is an emerging trend in international jurisprudence and standard setting
that persons responsible for crimes against humanity, as well as other serious
violations of human rights, should not be granted amnesty.

II. Lead-Up to Military
Operations

Crisis Point

In August 2008, the Congolese army launched a military
offensive against the CNDP. Despite their superior numbers, the government
forces quickly lost ground. In September 2008, Nkunda held a conference with
CNDP members to review the group’s political position. The CNDP decided
to demand direct bilateral talks with the government and to broaden their
demands to include the removal of President Kabila from power.
On October 8, 2008, the rebels unexpectedly attacked and captured Rumangabo
military camp, one of the most important military bases in eastern Congo, and seized a large stock of weapons and ammunition. Then, on October 26, the CNDP
launched a major military offensive, rapidly overrunning Congolese army
positions in quick succession. Military support from UN peacekeepers to the
Congolese army was not enough to halt the advance and on October 29, 2008, Nkunda’s rebels approached Goma, causing widespread panic. The Congolese army
disintegrated, its soldiers looting, raping, and killing as they fled.
UN peacekeepers remained as the only credible military force to protect Goma
and its 500,000 inhabitants.

A diplomatic flurry ensued. US, European and other governments
quickly urged Rwandan President Kagame to intervene and use his influence with
Nkunda to halt the CNDP advance. Kagame protested that Nkunda’s rebels
were acting of their own accord and not on Rwanda’s orders, but he
nevertheless intervened. Nkunda called a halt to the advance and demanded
face-to-face peace talks with Kabila’s government.

To resolve the crisis, diplomats called an emergency summit.
International and regional leaders, including Presidents Kagame and Kabila, and
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon met in Nairobi on November 7, 2008. The UN and African Union (AU) agreed to appoint special envoys to help mediate a solution:
the UN appointed former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo and the AU
appointed former Tanzanian president Benjamin Mkapa. The two former presidents
immediately began their shuttle diplomacy and in the weeks that followed met
separately with both President Kabila and Laurent Nkunda. In early December
both sides agreed to send negotiating teams to Nairobi to begin direct talks.
Nkunda’s CNDP brought an extensive list of demands to the table.

Meanwhile, Kabila attempted to shore up his defeated army.
He sought military support from his former allies in the Southern Africa
Development Community (SADC), but no member state was willing to send troops.
The UN Security Council on November 20, 2008, authorized 3,000 additional
troops for MONUC, but it
soon became clear that the new troops would take months to arrive. Fearful that
Nkunda’s CNDP rebels would march on Goma should talks fail once again,
and aware that the Congolese army was in tatters, Secretary-General Ban on
December 4, 2009, requested the EU to urgently deploy a short-term bridging force
to Goma to help fill the gap until UN troops could arrive.But the EU declined to help.

Unable to find military support to back up his beleaguered
army, faced with a superior CNDP force, and engaged in talks in which the
Congolese government was in a weak position, Kabila turned to Rwanda for help. As one diplomat told Human Rights Watch, Kabila’s “back was up against
the wall.” 

Rwanda-Congo Deal

Rwanda too faced difficulties following the CNDP’s
advance on Goma. Rwandan President Paul Kagame had started to feel the
political costs associated with his support for Nkunda’s CNDP. The
December 12, 2008 publication of the UN Group of Experts report, which had been
made available to governments a month earlier, detailed evidence of
Rwanda’s support for the CNDP and led Sweden and the Netherlands to
withdraw nearly US$20 million in aid to Rwanda in protest.
In addition, officials in Rwanda had found it difficult to control the
increasingly headstrong Nkunda. The CNDP’s announcement that its goals
were national and included the removal of Kabila was not well received in Kigali.

On December 5, 2008, the Congolese minister of foreign affairs,
Alexis Thambwe Mwamba, and his Rwandan counterpart, Rosemary Museminali,
announced the upcoming joint military operation against the FDLR, named Umoja
Wetu. For
several weeks, bilateral talks continued in secret. Like previous negotiation
attempts, the key players included Rwandan General James Kabarebe and Congolese
General John Numbi.

In January 2009 the plan was put into operation. On January
5, Bosco Ntaganda, Nkunda’s military chief of staff, announced he was
removing Nkunda as leader of the CNDP for hindering peace in eastern Congo.
Ntaganda was being sought on an arrest warrant from the International Criminal
Court for war crimes committed in Ituri, northeastern Congo, between 2002 and 2004. According to CNDP insiders interviewed by Human Rights Watch, Ntaganda
had had many rifts with Nkunda since he joined the CNDP movement in 2006, which
may, in part, explain his decision to head the “putsch” against
Nkunda. He was
also likely urged on by Rwandan officials who knew Ntaganda well (he had served
in the Rwandan army) and who sought to exploit the divisions between the two
men for their own purposes.

Shortly after announcing Nkunda’s removal, Ntaganda’s
spokesperson announced that the CNDP delegation in Nairobi no longer had the
authority to negotiate at the peace talks on behalf of the CNDP.
Ten senior CNDP officers, under immense pressure from General Kabarebe, joined
Ntaganda’s putsch and signed a declaration of the cessation of
hostilities on January 16, which stated that the CNDP would integrate into the
Congolese army to disarm the FDLR through joint Rwandan and Congolese military
operations. The
declaration was read aloud by Ntaganda, flanked by Generals Kabarebe and Numbi,
and the Congolese minister of the interior, Célestin Mbuyu, at a hastily
organized press conference in Goma the same day. Seeing support ebbing away,
Nkunda responded to a request from General Kabarebe to come to Gisenyi, Rwanda, for consultations. On his arrival the next day, Rwandan authorities promptly
detained Nkunda and placed him under house arrest. Ntaganda was made a general
in the Congolese army.

Later on March 23, a new CNDP negotiating delegation signed
a political agreement with the Congolese government, which provided its troops
with amnesty for acts of war and insurgency (but not for war crimes, crimes
against humanity or genocide), release of political prisoners, and political
participation in Congo’s government.

Joint Military Operations

Umoja Wetu

On January 20, at least 4,000 Rwandan troops, and possibly
many more, crossed the border into eastern Congo to fight the FDLR in a joint
Rwandan-Congolese offensive named operation Umoja Wetu (“Our
Unity” in Swahili).
Although a joint offensive in name, many Congolese troops were distracted by
the complicated integration of former combatants from the CNDP, and other armed
groups into their ranks and were largely absent from the operation. Concerned
about negative public opinion from having concluded a deal in which Rwandan
troops were invited into Congo, Kabila’s government at first maintained
that the Rwandan soldiers present in Congo were only military advisors
to the joint operations and would not stay long. Then in a televised statement
on January 31, President Kabila extended the invitation declaring that the
joint operation would be finished by the end of February 2009, without making
any mention of the extent of Rwanda’s military involvement.

Rwandan troops quickly forged ahead, sometimes together with
former CNDP troops, attacking one of the main FDLR bases at Kibua, in Masisi
territory (North Kivu), and other FDLR positions around Nyamilima, Nyabiondo,
Pinga and Ntoto (North Kivu). While there were some military confrontations,
mostly notably in the area around Nyabiondo and Pinga, FDLR combatants often
retreated into the surrounding hills and forests in advance of the attacks.

After 35 days of military operations in North Kivu, and in
what was likely an agreed timeframe between Presidents Kabila and Kagame, the
Rwandan army withdrew from Congo on February 25. A goodbye ceremony and
military parade in Goma were attended by the Rwandan and Congolese foreign and defense
ministers, the head of MONUC, Alan Doss, and diplomats from Kinshasa and Kigali. General Numbi, one of the key architects of the deal, announced that the operation
had been a success.

Kimia II

Government representatives from both Rwanda and Congo emphasized that the mission was not complete and pressed MONUC to join forces with
the Congolese army to finish off the FDLR problem in North and South Kivu. In meetings following the Rwandan army’s departure, government officials
from both countries raised similar expectations in private.[64]
MONUC, which had deliberately been kept out of the planning and execution of Umoja
Wetu,

was put in a difficult position. While some diplomats and UN
officials recognized the serious limitations of the Congolese army’s
capacity to conduct these operations effectively and the potentially
catastrophic consequences for the civilian population in the Kivus, they
believed they had no choice but to go ahead. Some UN officials believed they
could do more to protect civilians by being part of the operations, rather than
being on the outside.

On March 2, the Congolese army jointly with MONUC
peacekeepers launched the second phase of military operations against the FDLR,
known as operation Kimia II (“quiet” in Swahili). On April
7, President Kabila appointed Maj. Gen. Dieudonné Amuli Bahigwa as the
Congolese army commander of the operation. Former
CNDP officers received important command positions. Bosco Ntaganda, a newly
made general in the Congolese army, was in effect deputy commander of operation
Kimia II. Aware that Ntaganda was wanted on an arrest warrant from the
ICC, and that the Congolese government, as a state party to the ICC, had a
legal obligation to arrest him, Congolese government officials kept
Ntaganda’s name out of the official organizational structure of operation
Kimia II. On May 29, the Congolese minister of defense wrote to Alan Doss, the head of MONUC, to say that Ntaganda was not playing a role in Kimia II.
The assurances, however, were false. According to at least five Congolese army
officers interviewed by Human Rights Watch, and internal Congolese army
documents, Ntaganda was the de facto deputy commander of operations for Kimia
II and was in charge of integrating CNDP soldiers into the Congolese army.
His regular presence in Goma and his repeated visits to troops on the
frontlines all demonstrated he played an important role.

Outcome of Military Operations
since January 2009

As a result of the Congolese army’s military
operations, a significant number of FDLR combatants have given up their weapons
and returned to Rwanda. Since the start of military operations in January 2009,
more FDLR combatants have voluntarily decided to give up their arms and return
to Rwanda than in previous years. Between January and September 2009, the
UN’s Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration, and
Resettlement (DDRRR) program, tasked with facilitating the return of foreign
combatants, repatriated 1,087 FDLR combatants to Rwanda. They have been joined
by 1,798 family members and 12,387 Rwandan refugees.

The return of such a large number of combatants and
civilians to Rwanda is significant. In combination with the destruction of a
number of FDLR bases, their exclusion from mining zones and other areas of
economic activity, where they previously reaped financial benefits, has, according
to some analysts, weakened the FDLR militarily.

However, the FDLR still retains capacity to carry out attacks
against villages and towns. Human Rights Watch has received reports that the
FDLR is recruiting new combatants and that the movement continues to raise
funds and collect weapons and ammunition through numerous international
networks, including through Tanzania, Burundi, Zambia, and Uganda.
The UN Group of Experts in their November 2009 final report concluded that
military operations against the FDLR had failed to dismantle the group’s
political and military structures on the ground in eastern Congo. The report
added that the FDLR had regrouped in a number of locations in the Kivus, is recruiting
new combatants, continues to benefit from support from some senior commanders
in the Congolese army, and has formed alliances with other armed groups in both
North and South Kivu. While
the FDLR have been pushed out of some mining areas and they no longer have
access to certain markets they previously depended on, the militia group
continues to control many important gold and cassiterite (tin) mining areas in
North and South Kivu providing it with crucial financial income.

The military operations may have also fanned the flames of
underlying issues in eastern Congo that have often led to conflict in the past,
namely land and control over natural resources. Many of the offensive
operations of Kimia II have been led by former CNDP commanders, who according
to some sources, have also sought to use the operations to gain control over
mineral-rich areas and to clear the land for returning Congolese Tutsi refugees
and cattle being brought in from Rwanda. The perceived leadership roles and
preferential treatment given to former CNDP commanders has also led a number of
former Mai Mai combatants, along with other disgruntled Congolese army
soldiers, to abandon the Congolese army, or refuse to join the integration
process. Some have joined forces with the FDLR, strengthening their ranks.

The human cost of the military operations can only be
described as devastating. Human Rights Watch researchers have collected
interview testimony indicating that between January and September 2009, over 1,400
civilians were deliberately killed by the FDLR, the Congolese army, and their
allies. This figure does not include civilians who may have been killed by
crossfire during the fighting and, furthermore, Human Rights Watch has credible
reports of 476 civilians killed by the Congolese army and its allies in a
remote area that Human Rights Watch has not been able to access in order to
establish the circumstances of the deaths.

In the same period, over 7,500 women and girls were raped
and over 900,000 people forced to flee their homes in North and South Kivu. Thousands of civilians have been pressed into forced labor and hundreds have
been abducted or arbitrarily arrested. In most locations where the FDLR or the
Congolese army has attacked, houses have been looted, with over 9,000 homes and
other structures destroyed, leaving already poor and destitute people with
nothing.

A comparison of the impact of military operations on the
FDLR and the harm to civilians starkly conveys the suffering endured by the
population. For every FDLR combatant that has been removed from combat through
being repatriated, one civilian has been killed, seven women and girls have
been raped, eight homes have been destroyed, and nearly 900 people have been
forced to flee for their lives. This human cost shows the need in the event of
continuing military operations for the Congolese armed forces and UN
peacekeepers to undertake comprehensive measures to ensure that civilians at
risk are better protected.

Rape as a weapon of war

The widespread use of sexual violence as a weapon of war is
a dramatic and appalling aspect of the military operations. Its continued
impact on the women and girls of eastern Congo is evident in the statistics. Since
the start of Congolese army operations in January, rape cases in many conflict
areas have doubled or even tripled compared to 2008. While the exact number of victims is unknown, the United Nations
Population Fund (UNFPA), the UN agency responsible for coordinating efforts on
tackling sexual violence in Congo, recorded that 7,540 women and girls were
raped in North and South Kivu provinces between January and September 2009, and
possibly many more. UNFPA recorded 3,207 new cases of rape in North Kivu and
4,333 in South Kivu for rapes by all perpetrators between January and September
2009, nearly surpassing the figures recorded during all of last year.[73]

Since many victims are unable
or unwilling to seek assistance at health centers, these figures are likely to
represent only a fraction of the total. During the course of its research,
Human Rights Watch has interviewed numerous rape victims who had no access to
healthcare or other assistance, largely because humanitarian actors were not
present due to the insecurity caused by ongoing military operations. Cases such
as these are therefore not included in UNFPA’s statistics. Figures are
also incomplete because some actors providing assistance to victims of sexual
violence do not report their statistics to UNFPA.

Individual health centers and small rape counseling centers
near the zones of conflict visited by Human Rights Watch reported sharp
increases in sexual violence. For one assistance provider in North Kivu, for
example, monthly cases of sexual violence tripled between late 2008, when the
average was less than 15 cases per month, and September 2009, when the average
was over 40 cases per month. In
Kaniola health zone, Walungu territory, 33 rape cases were reported for the
first six months of 2009, all by the FDLR, up from 16 cases reported in all of
2008. There
was a similar spike in rape cases along the Kigulube-Luyuyu axis in
northeastern Shabunda territory where FDLR combatants arrived in May 2009 and
Congolese army troops were preparing an offensive. Approximately 164 cases were
reported in this area in the month of May alone, up dramatically from previous months.

The vast majority of the
victims were raped by Congolese army soldiers or FDLR combatants. In South
Kivu, nearly 90 percent of cases of sexual violence recorded by UNFPA in 2009
were perpetrated by armed men. The breakdown of cases perpetrated by Congolese army
soldiers and other armed groups is unknown. One assistance provider for victims
of sexual violence in North Kivu recorded 3,106 cases of sexual violence
between January and July 2009 perpetrated by armed men. Half of these cases
were perpetrated by Congolese army soldiers. Human Rights Watch’s own research also found
that the over half of the rapes in North Kivu were perpetrated by soldiers of
the Congolese army.

III. Human Rights Abuses by
FDLR

and Allies

FDLR Structure

The FDLR is a highly organized armed group with a clear
chain of command. It has a political wing led by its president, Ignace
Murwanashyaka, based in Mannheim, Germany, who is the supreme commander of the
group, and a military wing known as the Forces Combattantes Abacunguzi (FOCA)
led by General Sylvester Mudacumura, based in eastern Congo. On November 17, 2009, German authorities arrested Murwanashyaka, and his deputy, Straton
Musoni, in Germany for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed
between January 2008 and July 2009 by FDLR combatants under their command.

Political structure

Ignace Murwanashyaka has presided over the FDLR’s
“Directors Committee,” made up of about 35 political and military
representatives of the FDLR, including the military high command led by General
Mudacumura. The
FDLR’s executive secretary is Callixte Mbarushimana, based in France, who regularly issues press releases and other documents. The FDLR also has 10 other
executive commissions, including for political affairs, defense, foreign
affairs, propaganda and mobilization, finance, social affairs, gender, and
legal affairs, among others.

In an interview with Human Rights Watch in August 2009,
Murwanashyaka explained that the Directors Committee meets every six months and
decides on the FDLR’s overall strategy, although the members do not need
to be physically present and can participate via phone or email. Murwanashyaka
said that in between regular meetings he is authorized to make decisions on his
own within the parameters of the general strategy decided upon in the Directors
Meeting.  

Military wing

Research conducted by independent experts, the UN’s
DDRRR program responsible for the voluntary demobilization of FDLR combatants,
and the UN Group of Experts investigating arms trafficking into Congo, has further clarified the FDLR’s military command structures.
According to their research, often based on interviews with former combatants,
the FDLR’s military wing, FOCA, until January 2009 was based in Kalonge,
in the Ufumandu area of Masisi territory near Kibua, where General Mudacumura
was based. The
FDLR’s estimated 6,000 combatants were divided into two divisions, each
consisting of four battalions. One division was based in North Kivu, commanded
by Colonel Pacifique Ntawunguka (also known as Omega). The second division was
based in South Kivu, commanded by Colonel Léopold Mujyambere (also known
as Musenyeri Achille). The FDLR also has a separate Reserve Brigade, which was
based near Kibua (Masisi territory), commanded by Lt. Colonel Félicien
Nzabanita (also known as Kalume André.) The Reserve Brigade is sometimes
called the Protection Unit, and is charged with protecting the military high
command, in particular General Mudacumura.

The Reserve Brigade has a special forces unit made up of 120
of the best-trained combatants. According to former combatants interviewed by
Human Rights Watch, UN DDRRR specialists, and the UN Group of Experts, since
January 2009 this unit has been charged with operations to retake areas that the
FDLR lost following military operations against them, and to carry out missions
“to do damage,” likely including targeted attacks against
civilians. The
unit is commanded by Capt. Vainquer Mugisha (possibly not his real name) who
reports directly to Lt. Col. Nzabanita, the commander of the Reserve Brigade.

Since the start of Congolese army operations against the
FDLR in January 2009 and the destruction of their bases in and near Kibua, much
of the military high command moved to the Ntoto area of eastern Walikale.

FDLR diaspora

According to independent experts, the FDLR has cells or
satellites in various countries around the world including in Burundi, Zambia, Congo-Brazzaville, Tanzania, Cameroon, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Malawi, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda, Norway, Sweden, Austria, Switzerland, Denmark, Canada, Belgium, France, and the United States. Representatives in these countries raise
funds and facilitate money transfers to the leadership in eastern Congo. They also carry out lobbying activities, recruit within the Rwandan diaspora,
facilitate travel for their leaders and help to spread the FDLR’s message
through contacts with the media and others.

The UN Group of Experts told Human Rights Watch that
throughout operations Umoja Wetu and Kimia II, the FDLR’s
international supporters have continued to facilitate money transfers and be
involved in the coordination of arms deliveries to FDLR troops on the ground.
FDLR support networks operating in Burundi facilitate ongoing recruitment for
the FDLR, as well as arms deliveries from Tanzania.
The Group has also tracked frequent telephone communications between FDLR
military commanders based in eastern Congo to at least 25 different countries
in Europe, North America, and Africa.

Rally for Unity and Democracy (RUD)-Urunana: an FDLR Ally

RUD-Urunana is a small splinter group of the FDLR based in North Kivu with an estimated 380 combatants, mostly former FDLR dissidents. It operates
largely in Lubero and northeastern Walikale territories, with its headquarters
in the Mashuta locality of Walikale. The RUD was created in 2004 by the US-based
former FDLR first vice-president, Jean-Marie Vianney Higiro. Other political
leaders are based in France, Canada, the Netherlands, and Cameroon, as well as two political leaders based in North Kivu. Like the FDLR, its political
objective is an inter-Rwandan dialogue and power-sharing in Rwanda. The Congolese military operations starting in January targeted the RUD as well as the FDLR,
leading them to agree a mutual pact of cooperation and to ally militarily.
Since the fighting began, their tactics have followed the same path as the
FDLR’s.

A Strategy of Deliberately Targeting
Civilians

Before January 2009 and the launch of operations Umoja
Wetu and Kimia II, FDLR members lived in numerous towns and villages
spread across North and South Kivu, intermixed with Congolese civilians. Their
relationships with local communities varied. In some locations, the FDLR lived
in relative harmony, while in others the relationship was more violent. One
constant was the FDLR’s ruthless economic exploitation of local
populations. In many of the areas controlled by the FDLR, Congolese state
authorities and administrative services were non-existent. FDLR commanders often
acted as local authorities and imposed a system of forced cohabitation,
administration, and exploitation on Congolese civilians who had no choice but
to live side-by-side with FDLR combatants.

When the Congolese army launched military operations against
the FDLR in mid-January 2009, the relationship between the FDLR and local Congolese
communities suddenly changed. Almost overnight the FDLR brutally turned on
their Congolese neighbors. The FDLR responded to the dramatic shift in the
Congolese government’s policy toward them and the launch of joint
Congo-Rwanda military operations by carrying out a strategy of unlawful retaliatory
attacks against the civilian population. FDLR combatants deliberately targeted
Congolese civilians with what they considered punishment for their
government’s policy and for what the FDLR perceived as the
population’s “betrayal.”

The scale and ferocity of the attacks depended on the nature
of the military operations against the FDLR. In some areas, FDLR combatants attacked
civilians before the Congolese army and their allies had arrived, sometimes deliberately
taking the civilians into their military positions as hostages, perhaps to be
used as human shields. In other areas, the FDLR retreated, waited for the Rwandan
or the Congolese army soldiers to come and go, and then returned to punish the civilian
population for “welcoming” or “collaborating” with their
enemies.

Between late January and September 2009, FDLR forces
deliberately killed at least 701 civilians. Many were chopped to death by machete
or hoe. Some were shot. Others were burned to death in their homes. More than
half of the victims were women and children. The FDLR also targeted and killed village
chiefs and other influential community leaders, a tactic especially effective
at spreading fear throughout entire communities.

The widespread killing of civilians was accompanied by rape.
In the first six months of 2009, the cases of sexual violence registered at
health facilities near the areas of conflict in North and South Kivu doubled or
tripled. FDLR combatants were responsible for nearly half of all the rapes documented
by Human Rights Watch. In over 30 cases documented by Human Rights Watch,
victims told us that their FDLR attackers said that they were being raped to
“punish” them. Most of
the victims were gang-raped, some so viciously that they later bled to death as
a result of their injuries. Some of the victims were killed when they were shot
in the vagina. The
killing and rape was accompanied by widespread and wanton burning of homes,
schools, health centers and other civilian structures. In dozens of places
across North and South Kivu, entire villages were burned to the ground and the
population’s goods were looted, leaving families utterly destitute.

The widespread and systematic nature of the attacks on
civilians across North and South Kivu in areas sometimes hundreds of kilometers
apart, the similarity of the messages from the FDLR to local communities—including in
public meetings, warning letters and direct verbal threats—as well as the
similarity of methods used during attacks, strongly indicate that the retaliatory
attacks were ordered from the FDLR’s central command. Dozens of former
FDLR combatants interviewed by Human Rights Watch and others confirmed that no
significant military operations could be carried out without clear orders from
the military leadership. A
senior FDLR commander who deserted in April 2009 told a European diplomat in a
transcribed interview that the FDLR leadership had ordered “punitive
action” against those who collaborated with the Congolese military
operations. The UN
Group of Experts also collected information from FDLR “signalers”
who pass on commands from the FDLR military command to individual units, some
of whom later deserted, that they communicated orders to attack population
centers, to carry out “reprisal” attacks against the Congolese
population and to treat all collaborators of the Congolese army as their
“enemies.”

Some local authorities and health workers who had lived near
FDLR positions for many years and knew the group well told Human Rights Watch
they believed the FDLR’s strategy of attacking civilians may have been
aimed at causing a humanitarian disaster with a high human cost so that the Congolese
government would be forced to call off the military operations.
A number of FDLR combatants who left the group since January 2009 and entered
the UN’s DDRRR program told UN officials that they had been given orders
to create a humanitarian catastrophe with the intention of pressing the
international community to call off its support for the military operations
against them.

Whatever the FDLR’s aims, under international law,
deliberate attacks on civilians are war crimes, and serious offenses committed
against civilians as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian
population are crimes against humanity.

Explicit Threats to “Punish”
Civilians

The FDLR
strategy of retaliatory attacks against civilians was clearly evident in threatening
letters the FDLR wrote to local authorities, written announcements left on
roads, public meetings FDLR commanders held with civilian populations, and in oral
threats FDLR combatants gave to civilians. In dozens of such verbal messages
collected by Human Rights Watch across towns and villages in North and South Kivu, the FDLR explicitly said that the civilian population would be “punished”
for the Congolese army’s military operations.

 

Warning
letters

The FDLR and its RUD-Urunana ally deposited letters and
other notes for civilian populations before, during, and after attacks in which
they explicitly warned people that they would be targeted or that further
attacks would follow. Human Rights Watch researchers collected information
about at least 16 such letters and written notes,
of which eight are on file at Human Rights Watch. Some letters bear the FDLR
stamp, others are signed by known FDLR commanders, and others are unsigned. The
letters are either in French or Kiswahili, the language commonly used in
eastern Congo.

In one such letter from during the Umoja Wetu
operation, addressed to the governor of South Kivu, a copy of which was given
to the UN peacekeepers on February 11, 2009, an FDLR commander warned that
anyone who collaborated with the Rwandan army would be considered a “mortal
enemy.” The letter added that if the population collaborated with Rwandan
soldiers, they would be considered as a “belligerent party” with
all “imaginable consequences.” 

In the Waloaluanda area of Walikale territory (North Kivu), the FDLR left threatening letters on footpaths frequently used by civilians. One
such letter was left on a footpath near Biriko village and found by two teenage
boys on March 6. According to a person who saw the letter, it said, “You
the Congolese population and you the FARDC, since you have decided it’s good to
force us out of our positions, we also will attack you the population and you
the FARDC…. [W]e will hit you hard.”

Dozens of kilometers away in the village of Mihanda, near Ziralo, Masisi territory, the FDLR left another letter for local authorities. According
to a person who saw the letter, it said, “You, the population of Mihanda,
be on guard. We are going to kill the pregnant women and open their stomachs
and we are even going to kill the young girls. The men will be decapitated like
the salted fish. Since they are trying to force us out of Congo, we will punish the population of Ziralo.”

Some letters were left after attacks and warned of further
bloodshed. On July 28, the FDLR left a letter during an attack on Ihembe town
in Kabare territory (South Kivu) where the hospital was looted, and several
houses burned, including the home of the traditional chief.
The letter the FDLR left behind, a copy of which is on file at Human Rights
Watch, said, “Today we burn, tomorrow we slaughter. We are only at the
beginning.”

Some letters referred to business relations between FDLR
combatants and local people and warned that the FDLR would attack if debts were
not paid, goods were not returned, or access to local markets were restricted. One
FDLR commander based near Karasi (South Kivu), Simba Guillaume, signed three
letters, copies of which are on file at Human Rights Watch. In one letter,
dated March 25, 2009, Guillaume asked the Karasi local authorities to return goods
that he claims were stolen from the FDLR. He warns that if “such
practices continue, the zone risks falling victim to desolation and suffering”
and goes on to make reference to attacks against civilians further north in
Masisi by adding, “What is happening in Masisi should serve as a lesson
to whoever wants to start a fire without knowing how to put it out.”

In southern Lubero, RUD commanders also wrote similar letters.
In April, RUD combatants left a letter in Miriki, a copy of which is on file at
Human Rights Watch, which said, “Those who will die, do not say you were
not informed in advance…We are angry against all people who provoke us…Leave
the area, our brothers… Those who refuse this advice will pay the
price!” 

Public
meetings

During the course of its research, Human Rights Watch
interviewed individuals who were present at 11 separate public meetings held by
FDLR or RUD commanders in North and South Kivu.
In each of these meetings the message was the same: if you are not with us, you
are against us and will be punished. In
some meetings FDLR or RUD combatants warned that if local populations did not
take action to stop the Congolese army’s operations, they would be
punished, indicating that some of the attacks on civilians may have been
carried out in an attempt to influence government officials to halt operations.
In a number of areas, following the public meetings, FDLR combatants
deliberately blocked and sometimes killed civilians who tried to flee.

In a meeting in late January in Funguramacho, a village near
Remeka in Masisi territory, the FDLR called everyone to attend a meeting,
including the local mwami (traditional chief). According to several persons
present, once everyone had gathered, the FDLR said, “We have heard that
they [the coalition forces] are coming to attack us. If you are against us,
before they come to kill us, we’re going to kill you.” 

In a similar meeting around the same time in Katoyi, Masisi
territory, a senior FDLR commander known as Vainquer Mogisha, also held a
public meeting. Persons present at that meeting told Human Rights Watch that
Commander Vainquer addressed the crowd and said, “Even if we were
together before, we are now enemies” and added that the FDLR were “sharpening
their spears and machetes.”
Another person at the meeting said, “The FDLR told us that if they were
shot at by anyone that they would hold us responsible and kill us.” Following
the meeting the FDLR “put up barriers so we couldn’t go anywhere. Then
they started killing civilians.” During
the three-week period which followed between January 23 and mid-February, FDLR
forces deliberately killed at least 86 civilians in this area.

In Lubero territory, an area hundreds of kilometers away
from the FDLR’s bases in Masisi, the RUD was also calling public meetings
and threatened the civilian population in ways similar to FDLR combatants. In
one such meeting in early February in Mbwavinya, RUD commanders said to those
they had gathered: “You need to revolt against these operations that were
sent to chase us out. You should call the authorities in Kinshasa and tell them
that you live well with [us] and that they need to stop the operations.”
When local authorities present at the meeting responded that they did not know
to whom to send such a message, the RUD commander replied, “If you don’t
send this message, we will cause trouble for you. Even if you leave, we’ll
follow you and cause problems for you wherever you go.”

Other oral threats

The FDLR also delivered numerous oral warnings and threats
to civilians whom they met in the market, on the road, or during an attack. The
threats were similar to those they pronounced at public meetings and in their
letters. Human Rights Watch interviewed 23 civilians who consistently described
oral threats they received from FDLR combatants, warning them that the
Congolese civilian population would be punished as long as the Congolese
government continued its military operations against the FDLR.

A health worker in the Waloaluanda region who treated FDLR
combatants as well as members of the local community reported to Human Rights
Watch the warning he received from one FDLR combatant in January at the
beginning of the military operations. The FDLR combatant said, “The day
when your soldiers come to force us out, that will also be the day when you
die. We’ll only return to Rwanda after exterminating the Congolese population
here and burning your villages.

A health worker from a different village in Waloaluanda
received a similar warning. He told Human Rights Watch that four FDLR
combatants came to the health center and told him the FDLR was planning to
attack the population to show the FARDC and the international community that
they were strong and had the force to commit atrocities. They told him they believed
that if the FDLR massacred the population, the international community would
pay attention, call off the military operations, and allow for an Inter-Rwandan
dialogue.

In Kibua, Masisi territory, in late January, FDLR combatants
told a group of civilians, “You have lived with us like brothers. But now
you have betrayed us and you will pay for your treason….”
Nearby in Kitarema village, FDLR combatants warned local people before the
operations started, “If the Rwandan soldiers arrive here, we will turn
this village into a battlefield.”

Once military operations were underway, FDLR combatants
threatened to punish civilians who, they said, had cooperated with their
attackers. After the FDLR attack on Mianga village on April 12, killing some 44
civilians and the local chief, the FDLR sent an oral warning to villagers in nearby
Ntoto. According to a villager present, the message was, “If we had to
kill the population of Mianga and their chief, it’s because they welcomed the
Congolese and Rwandan forces who came to chase us out. We’re ready to attack
again if anyone welcomes these forces.”

Massacres and Killings

The FDLR threats to punish Congolese civilians in response
to government military operations against them were not empty. Following the
launch of operation Umoja Wetu in January, FDLR forces began to brutally
attack dozens of villages and towns across North and South Kivu. Between late
January and September 2009, they deliberately killed at least 701 civilians. More
than half of the victims were women and children, and at least 10 percent were elderly.

Some of the worst and most brutal attacks documented by
Human Rights Watch occurred in the remote and mountainous region that straddles
the border between North and South Kivu provinces, covering the areas of Ufumandu
(Masisi territory), Waloaluanda (Walikale territory), and Ziralo (Kalehe
territory). The FDLR had many bases in this region, including their main bases
at Kibua and Kalonge in the Ufumandu area. They carried out economic activities
and had lived side-by-side with local populations in this area for many years
and as a result many victims were able to identify their attackers as FDLR
combatants, sometimes knowing them by name. The FDLR killed at least 135
civilians in the Ufumandu area, at least 253 civilians in Waloaluanda, and 84
civilians in Ziralo.

Human Rights Watch also documented attacks by the FDLR in
other areas of North and South Kivu provinces, including in Lubero and Rutshuru
territories of North Kivu and Kalehe, Kabare, Shabunda, Mwenga and Uvira
territories in South Kivu. In addition, Human Rights Watch documented killings
by RUD combatants, allied to the FDLR, in Lubero territory. (See annex for
further details.)  

Killings in Ufumandu area

The Rwandan army crossed the border into eastern Congo on January 20, just as many FDLR commanders had gathered at their base in and around
Kibua for the annual meeting of the high command.
The FDLR called a meeting with the population from several nearby villages at
which they accused the population, local leaders, and the Mai Mai armed group
with whom they had been allied, of having betrayed them. Seeing their support
collapse, the FDLR turned against the population and their Mai Mai allies.

As the Rwandan and Congolese coalition forces engaged in
operation Umoja Wetu advanced toward Kibua around January 25, the FDLR barricaded
roads and blocked civilians from fleeing the area. According to witnesses
interviewed by Human Rights Watch, when some civilians tried to flee, the FDLR
attacked them, killing dozens with gunfire, rocket-propelled grenades, and
machetes. “As I ran, I saw bodies everywhere,” said one person.
“They had all been killed by the FDLR.”

The FDLR also abducted as hostages at least 46 local
residents and took them to their military camp, apparently intending to use
them as “human shields” against the impending attack. Witnesses
said that when coalition forces attacked Kibua on January 27, the trapped
civilians tried to flee, but the FDLR hacked many to death while others died in
the crossfire. One person at Kibua abducted by the FDLR told Human Rights Watch
that he saw FDLR combatants kill at least seven people, including a pregnant
woman, whose womb was slit open.
Another saw an FDLR combatant beat a 10-year-old girl to death against a brick
wall. One
man taken to the military camp by the FDLR told Human Rights Watch:

When the FDLR learned that the coalition forces were coming
to chase them away, they went to hide in the Kibua forest. They forced many of
us to go with them to their camp… They took everyone

—

men, women, and children. We had
to stay with them there for two days. They threatened us and killed anyone who
tried to leave. Then we heard bombs [mortars], and as the bombs came closer to
us, we tried to flee. But many people didn’t make it and were killed. Some were
shot and others were killed by machete.  

In the days following the attack, the FDLR abandoned their
Kibua base heading south toward Ziralo or west toward Waloaluanda, taking with
them some of the civilians they had abducted, who were forced to carry the
FDLR’s baggage. Two men who had been abducted were later found killed;
the whereabouts of many of the others remain unknown.

On their route out of Kibua the FDLR continued to kill in
the days and weeks that followed, punishing the civilian population for the
attacks against the rebel group. In Kishonja in early February the FDLR forced
their way into a house and shot and killed a five-year-old and a six-year-old boy
in front of their mother. “We kill animals, and we’re killing you so you
must be animals,” they shouted at her as they killed the boys.
In Nyakabasa village around February 13, during a nighttime attack, the FDLR killed
a 25-year-old man as his mother looked on and then threw his body into a
burning house. She told Human Rights Watch that after they killed her son,

I ran outside, and an FDLR [combatant] grabbed me and cut
me everywhere with his machete. I was almost dead. He cut me on my head and on
my arms. He wanted to cut my neck, but I put up my hands to block it… There
were many combatants. Some were burning houses and others were killing people. While
two of them were beating me and cutting me with machetes, I pleaded, ‘Please,
can’t you pardon me?’ They said, ‘No, we can’t pardon you. You went
to get the government and the Tutsi so they would come to kill us and steal
your farms. But you won’t have your farm anyway because we’re going to kill
you.’ I said, ‘But I didn’t get the government….I’m just an old
woman.’ They said, ‘No, it was you and we will kill you.’
Then they continued to beat me and left when they thought I was dead.

In some areas the FDLR returned to punish and kill civilians
after Rwandan and Congolese coalition forces had passed through. This was the
case in Kipopo village, about 10 km southwest of Kibua where coalition forces
camped for two days before moving on. On February 13, just after their
departure, FDLR combatants attacked Kipopo at night, locking people in their
homes and setting them on fire. Seventeen civilians, including eight children, were
killed.

During a three-week period between January 23 and mid-February,
FDLR forces deliberately killed at least 86 civilians in Kibua and neighboring
villages, including many of those they had taken as hostages and used as human
shields in their camp. According
to family members and witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch, including
those who helped to bury the bodies, the victims included at least 16 children,
22 women, and nine elderly men. Nearly
half of the victims had been hacked to death by machete, knife, axe, or hoe, or
had been beaten to death with clubs. Another 18 were burned to death, and at
least 11 were shot. Dozens
of others were left injured. Following the attacks, thousands of local
residents fled the area, seeking safety in remote forest regions or in
displacement camps near Goma. To date many remained too frightened or
traumatized to return.

Killings in Waloaluanda area

Following their departure from Kibua, significant FDLR forces
moved westward to the Waloaluanda area, just across the border in Walikale
territory (North Kivu). Rwandan army forces pursued the FDLR into Walikale but
did not stay long and at the end of February 2009 withdrew from eastern Congo. In March 2009, the Congolese army, with the backing of UN peacekeeping troops, launched
its Kimia II operations against the FDLR. The change in military
operations did not alter the tactics of the FDLR and they continued to attack
and terrorize civilians. In the Waloaluanda area the FDLR carried out some of
their most brutal and deadly massacres, killing at least 253 civilians.

As in the Kibua area of Masisi, the FDLR had long
established military and civilian bases in the Waloaluanda area and had
intermixed with the local population for many years. In March, Congolese army forces
arrived in the area and established military positions in some villages and
towns, heightening tensions. FDLR combatants, sometimes together with their
dependents, withdrew from the villages, retreating to mountaintops or other
more remote positions. As in Masisi territory, they threatened local civilians
and said anyone who cooperated with the FARDC would be punished.

In rare instances, members of the FDLR may have sought to
reconcile with civilians. One FDLR member known as Gregoire, who claimed to be
the FDLR’s representative in the Waloaluanda region responsible for
“civilian affairs,” sent a letter on April 3, 2009 to the
Waloaluanda administrative chief and other community leaders. He requested
reconciliation between the FDLR and the local population and a return to the
“peaceful coexistence” they enjoyed before military operations
began. It is
unclear whether the request was genuine. Before community leaders had a chance
to respond, the FDLR attacked.

Mianga massacre, April 2009

According to witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch, early
in the morning on Easter Sunday, April 12, 2009, the FDLR attacked the village
of Mianga in the Waloaluanda area. FDLR combatants went directly to the home of
the local chief, Adrien Balume Lubula. The attackers burst into the house,
found the chief in his bed, and severed his head with a machete.
The FDLR then sought out and killed three other local authorities who worked
with the chief, whom they accused of collaborating with the FARDC. That same
day and in the days that followed, the FDLR deliberately killed a further 41
civilians, injured many others, and then torched the village, burning it
completely to the ground.

Congolese army forces had a small base in Mianga, but they proved
no match for the FDLR. When the FDLR attacked, at least 35 FARDC soldiers were
killed; the remainder fled, leaving the local population with no protection. No
Congolese army forces returned to Mianga in the weeks following the attack,
despite appeals from the local population and others to do so.

Twelve days after the initial attack, on April 24, a local
Mai Mai group, known as the Mai Mai Kifuafua, made up of local men and boys
from the area, went to assess the damage. They found many of the bodies still
in the open air, decomposing and barely recognizable. A Mai Mai Kifuafua combatant
who helped bury 38 bodies described to Human Rights Watch what he saw:

Some [of the victims] had been hacked to death in their homes.
Others were shot outside their homes and others were killed in the forest. We
buried them each in their own grave according to the custom. There were
children, women, and men.

Busurungi massacre, May 2009

During the night of May 9-10, FDLR forces attacked
Busurungi, one of the main towns in Waloaluanda, and its two neighboring
villages, Bunyamwasa and Moka. The FDLR combatants massacred at least 96
civilians, including 25 children, 23 women, and seven elderly men. It was the
largest single massacre by the FDLR since the start of military operations
against the group. Nearly half of the victims were shot or hacked to death by
machete. Some had been tied up and then had their throats slit. Others were
deliberately locked in their homes and burned to death or killed as they tried
to flee into the nearby forests for safety. A further 26 civilians were
seriously injured, the vast majority women and children. Two later died of
their injuries. Before they withdrew, the FDLR forces destroyed Busurungi,
burning to the ground 702 houses, three health centers, and several schools and
churches.

On the night of the attack, a witness whose son was killed
described what happened:

I was hiding in the house with my three children when the
FDLR attacked. They came into our house and said, ‘You the Congolese
people, you are here with these soldiers who don’t know how to fight. We
will kill you, and we will exterminate you.’  Then they grabbed my
18-year-old son, pulled him out of the house and killed him. After that, they
hacked to death by machete a 42-year-old woman and a 3-month-old baby girl who
were also hiding in my house.

The FDLR entered a church compound in Busurungi and abducted
and killed a local church official and his family. The FDLR first tied the official
to his wife and then slit both their throats. Then, according to a witness,
“The [church official’s] son was tied up with 10 other men in a
separate group, all in a line, before the FDLR slit their throats like
chickens.” His daughter-in-law
was burned to death with her four-year-old daughter and baby son.

Another witness told Human Rights Watch,

When the FDLR came, they circled the entire village and
started killing people. They stopped those who tried to flee with their own
hands. They raped the women, even the young girls, and then they started to
burn the houses. Some people who tried to leave their homes were stopped by the
FDLR and thrown back into their burning houses, even the children.

The FARDC tried to fight back a bit, but the FDLR outnumbered
them and a lot of FARDC soldiers were killed. The others fled into the forest.

I came back the next morning and saw bodies decapitated,
burned, and raped. I was scared so didn’t stay for long…. The women
were all naked so we knew they had been raped. Some of them were in their
homes, others next to the houses. Some were killed by bullet and others by
knife or machete. I saw two women who were pregnant, and the FDLR had cut open
their stomachs and removed the fetuses from their bodies. The nine children’s
bodies I saw had all been burned. One of them was killed first with a knife… I
left that day for Goma.

The massacre in Busurungi occurred just days after Congolese
army forces attacked Rwandan Hutu refugee camps and FDLR military positions in
the nearby hills of Shalio, Marok, and Bunyarwanda, killing many refugees (see
below). Local residents of Busurungi and FDLR combatants interviewed by Human
Rights Watch said they believed the Busurungi massacre may in part have been
revenge for this earlier attack.

As in Mianga, the Congolese army had a military base in
Busurungi but government soldiers were unable to repulse the FDLR attack and
protect civilians. An estimated 50 FARDC soldiers were killed; the remaining soldiers
fled.

As in other FDLR attacks, the attack on Busurungi did not
come without warning. The FDLR had sent threatening letters and messages to the
population of Busurungi before the attack, accusing them of betrayal for
supporting the government’s military operations against the FDLR. One man
from Busurungi recalled seeing these warnings, “We often found letters
from the FDLR saying that they would be in Busurungi soon to burn the village
because the people of Busurungi supported the government army and [supported]
the operation to chase the FDLR. We gave these letters to the FARDC commander.”

Two weeks before the massacre, on April 28, the FDLR raped
and killed two women and a 14-year-old girl on their farm just outside
Busurungi. A man who later found the bodies said the victims had been tied up
with sticks in their vaginas, suffered cuts all over their bodies, and had their
skulls crushed.

Manje massacre, July 2009

On the night of July 20-21, the FDLR attacked Manje village,
some 20 kilometers southwest from Busurungi. Manje had become a haven for many
displaced people who had fled from the surrounding villages, hoping to find
safety with Congolese army forces based in the area. It proved to be wishful
thinking. The FDLR massacred an estimated 30 civilians, more than half being shot
or hacked to death by machete. Others were deliberately burned to death in
their homes. The insurgents
also burned an estimated 182 houses to the ground.
As in the earlier massacres, witnesses reported that they were accused by the
FDLR of being collaborators of the Congolese army and for failing to have paid
off their debts to the FDLR. 

One victim, interviewed by Human Rights Watch, was raped and
abducted by the FDLR during the attack in Manje. She lost her mother, father,
grandmother, and cousin during the attack, as well as 15 of her neighbors. She
told Human Rights Watch:

They attacked at night, locked people in their houses and
then burned them in their homes. I was saved by the grace of God, but nobody in
my family survived. I went to the toilet when the bandits [FDLR] were already
in the village. I heard them attacking and burning houses, so I didn’t go back
inside the house. But then they found me while I was trying to flee and took me
and 10 other women and girls into the forest to rape us. I was raped by four of
them at least, but then I lost consciousness and couldn’t count them. I was in
the bush with them for one week. I don’t know what happened to the others. When
I managed to escape, they were still in the camp with about 30 FDLR combatants.

FDLR forces may have initially pretended to be Congolese
army soldiers to gain easy access to the village. According to one woman who
was in Manje the night of the attack, “When the FDLR came, they pretended
to be FARDC. Others welcomed them and they ate together and didn’t realize it
was the enemy because they spoke the same language. But then they started to
attack.” A
later MONUC assessment mission to Manje found the FDLR had been able to enter
the village freely because they knew the Congolese army password.

During the attack, the FDLR also took three men hostage, two
of whom they later killed. The third was given a letter warning that the FDLR would
soon attack Hombo, a town some five kilometers from Manje.
Many people had fled from Manje to Hombo after the July 21 attack but when they
received the message from the FDLR they fled again, fearing further attacks.

Killings in Ziralo area

Following the fall of the FDLR’s Kibua base, some FDLR
forces moved south toward the Ziralo area, crossing the border into Kalehe
territory (South Kivu). Here too the FDLR continued to spread terror,
deliberately targeting civilians and burning villages. The FDLR attacked some 19
villages and towns, deliberately killing at least 84 civilians in this area
between January and July 2009. In each case they accused the local population of
betraying them by supporting military operations against the FDLR. In some
cases the FDLR killed people they alleged to be supporters of its former
allies, the Mai Mai.

After leaving Kibua some FDLR forces deployed in the Kinono
forest just south of the provincial border. From there they attacked the
surrounding villages, including Lulere, Kalangita, and Kirambo, among others,
killing local residents and abducting dozens of civilians, possibly to serve as
human shields, but likely also for sexual and other purposes for the combatants. 

In late January 2009, the FDLR attacked Busheke village,
near Tushunguti, one of the main towns in the Ziralo area, killing 14 civilians,
including 12 women and girls whom they raped before killing. A young woman who
had been married shortly before the attack told Human Rights Watch the horror of
that day and the ensuing months:

The FDLR attacked just after I got married. I was in the house
with my husband. My sister came in and said the [FDLR] were raping women in the
village and had captured our mother and father. We decided to flee, but as soon
as we got outside of the house, they caught us as well. There were five of them.
They entered our house and started to loot all our goods. They then killed my
husband with a machete and two of them raped me. They also killed my father and
raped my mother and sister before killing them as well, all with machete. Ten
other Hutu women and girls from my village were raped and killed with machete
the same night. They abducted me and brought me to their camp where I was made
the “wife” of Captain Jean Claude. He raped me every day until I
managed to escape six months later… The FDLR said they were brothers of the
Congolese Hutu and didn’t understand why we had welcomed the FARDC. That’s why
they were punishing us.

Throughout the following months the FDLR continued to attack
civilians in Busheke, Lulere, Shanje, Mihanda, Bunyangungu, Bwishi, and other
villages and towns. As in other areas, the FDLR sometimes left letters or
messages behind saying they were punishing the population because it had allegedly
welcomed the Congolese army.

On May 15, 2009, the FDLR attacked Mihanda, a village in the
Ziralo area of Kalehe territory (South Kivu), killing seven civilians who were
hiding in the forest and burning some 135 houses. One eyewitness told Human
Rights Watch:

The FDLR attacked when the FARDC had left the village to
attack an FDLR position. They killed seven civilians who were hiding in the
forest, including two women, two girls, a man, and two baby boys. Another
civilian was wounded. Three of the women and girls were raped before being
killed by machete… I buried them all in a mass grave two days after they were
killed. They [the FDLR] left a letter on the road as they left which said they
were punishing the population because we had welcomed the FARDC and that they
had attacked in revenge because the FARDC had gone after them in the bush.

Killings in other areas

Human Rights Watch also documented killings by the FDLR in
other areas apart from Ufumandu, Waloaluanda and Ziralo, including in May in Chiriba
village, Kalehe territory (South Kivu); in Burai, Rutshuru territory (North
Kivu) on May 22; in Ntoto, Walikale territory (North Kivu) in April, May, and
August; and in Mikumbi and Mungazi, Walikale territory in April. (See chart for
full list of killings.) In each of these incidents the pattern was the same:
the FDLR deliberately killed men, women and children, hacking them to death
with machetes, burning them in their homes or shooting them, nearly always
accusing their victims of betraying them and collaborating with the Congolese
army and its allies.

Targeting local chiefs

Since the start of military operations in January 2009, the
FDLR has summarily executed at least eight local chiefs whom they accused of having
welcomed the Congolese and Rwandan armies, failing to stop the military operations
against the FDLR, or providing information to the coalition forces about their
whereabouts. Family members and those who worked with local authorities have also
been targeted. In some instances, local chiefs were executed publicly in a
clear attempt to terrorize the population.

One local authority worried about the attacks on chiefs told
Human Rights Watch:

All of this [targeting of chiefs] is to show us that things
will get even worse. The chief is the reference point of the population. People
will flee if the chief is gone. The FDLR have started a tactic of targeting the
chiefs, and the military planners haven’t considered this when carrying
out the operations.

According to informed sources interviewed by Human Rights
Watch, the following chiefs, local administrators, and their subordinates have
been killed by the FDLR since January 2009:

• On January 27, 2009, the FDLR assassinated a local administrator in Kikoma, Masisi territory, along with some of his colleagues.
• On February 14, in Pinga, Walikale territory,
  the FDLR assassinated a local chief one hour after he had participated in a
  meeting with a MONUC protection officer.
• In late February, the FDLR killed Ngeleza,
  the Bayangana chief, near Oninga, Walikale territory, saying that he had
  encouraged the population to flee.
• In mid-March, FDLR combatants shot dead the secretary
  of the chief in Kailenge, near Pinga in Walikale territory.
• On April 12, the FDLR decapitated Adrien Balume
  Lubula, the local chief in Mianga, Waloaluanda area, Walikale territory, while
  he was in bed at his home. The FDLR then went on to kill several men who worked
  for the chief.
• In late May in Shabunda territory, the FDLR
  killed the village chief of Nzovu, Kabakenge, along with several of his family
  members as they tried to flee. Three of the chief’s female relatives were
  raped before they were killed.
• On June 17-18, the FDLR abducted and killed
  by machete Chiza Nyamaboba, the secretary of Chiriba locality, in the Mubugu
  area of Kalehe territory.
• On July 16, the FDLR publicly executed the
  acting chief of Mulambula locality, in Walungu territory (South Kivu). FDLR
  combatants accused him of collaborating with the Congolese army, and then chopped
  off his head and paraded it around the village as a warning to those who
  collaborated with the government.
• On July 27, the FDLR assassinated the chief
  of Irhegabarhonyi in Kabare territory (South Kivu), with hammer blows to the
  head. The
  chief had earlier been visiting his family in Bukavu and when he returned the
  FDLR accused him of visiting “FARDC areas.”
• On September 26, when the FDLR attacked the
  village of Kafukiro in the Nindja area (Kabare territory, South Kivu), they
  brutally killed the village chief in his home with blows of a machete and club,
  then burned 42 homes.

The FDLR attempted to kill another two village chiefs, but
were unsuccessful. On March 29, a local chief in the Ufumandu area, Masisi
territory, was burned alive in his home by the FDLR. He later received
emergency treatment and survived. On
July 28, following an FDLR attack on Ihembe, the main town of the Nindja area,
in which the FDLR burned the chief’s home, the attackers left a letter
with a specific warning to the village chief saying, “Even if you escaped
today, there are no guarantees for tomorrow. You could be killed any day,
whether during the day or night.”

FDLR combatants also abducted and injured village and other
traditional chiefs, often through severe beatings with sticks or with their
guns. On July 30, the FDLR abducted the chief of Chulwe village, Kabare
territory, soon after the Congolese army set up a base in the area. He was
taken to an FDLR position, where he was badly beaten but managed to escape four
days later.

In February, in Buhuli, Masisi territory, the FDLR attacked the
local chief at his home. They beat him so badly that he needed hospitalization,
and then looted all his goods before burning down his home.
In March 2009, an elderly local chief from the Katoyi, Masisi territory, was detained
and beaten by the FDLR before he was tied up, taken to a neighboring village
and ordered to give the FDLR five goats or be killed. With assistance from the
community, the chief was able to obtain the demanded goats and he was released.
Weeks later he was still sick and suffering from the injuries inflicted during
the beating.

 

Killings by RUD-Urunana in Southern Lubero

Since January, RUD forces have attacked civilians in a
manner similar to the FDLR, likewise calling it punishment for civilians’
perceived support of Congolese army operations. Human Rights Watch has
documented 70 civilians deliberately killed by RUD and FDLR combatants in
Lubero, northeastern Walikale, and Rutshuru territories (North Kivu).

One such attack occurred on the night of April 17, 2009, when RUD combatants attacked Luofu and Kasiki villages in southern Lubero territory,
killing at least seven civilians, including five young children who burned to
death in their homes. At least seven other civilians were injured and 300
houses were burned to the ground.

The father of three young boys (ages three, four, and six)
who burned to death in their home told Human Rights Watch what happened,

[RUD] came and circled my house. When we tried to leave,
they said, ‘You can’t leave or we’ll kill you.’ I was
able to move out a bit and get some distance from the house, but my three young
boys were still inside, sleeping on a single bed. Then I saw the combatants
light a fire directly on my house and my three boys burned to death.

Earlier the same day, RUD had sent a warning that Luofu
would be attacked if a local businessman was unable to pay a debt the rebels
said he owed them. A few days before the attack on Luofu, Congolese army
soldiers supported by MONUC peacekeepers had begun operations against the
rebels in the area. The timing of the attack on Luofu strongly suggests it was
retaliation for these operations.

Rape and Sexual Slavery

The FDLR has a long and horrific record of perpetrating rapes
and other forms of sexual violence against the women and girls of eastern Congo. But since the start of military operations against the group in January their
involvement in such crimes has increased dramatically. As part of its strategy
to target and punish Congolese civilians for the government’s military
operations, the FDLR has deliberately used sexual violence as a weapon of war.

Between January and September
2009, Human Rights Watch documented 290 cases of sexual violence perpetrated by
FDLR combatants in North and South Kivu in areas affected by military
operations. This information was compiled through interviews with the victims,
family members, and rape counselors or health workers who interviewed the
victims. In case after case, rape victims told the same
story: during the rape, FDLR combatants accused their victims of “siding
with the government,” of “welcoming the coalition forces,” or
being the “wives” of Rwandan or Congolese army soldiers. The FDLR
attackers repeatedly told their victims they were being raped to
“punish” them. 

For example, on February 9, 2009, FDLR combatants raped a 48-year-old
woman in the Ufumandu area in Masisi territory. “The FDLR hit me on the
back and on the head,” she told Human Rights Watch. “Then they took
me by the throat and tried to strangle me….They said ‘We’re raping you
because you’ve joined the government side.’”

On March 25, in the Ziralo area of Kalehe territory, seven
FDLR combatants gang-raped a 60-year-old woman. When her daughter resisted
being raped, the attackers shot her in the vagina, killing her. Before the FDLR
departed they turned to the mother and reportedly said, “You voted for
your President Kabila… Now he is sending his soldiers to chase us out. Since
your president sent soldiers to kill us, we will take it out on you and rape
and kill you.”

In another case in May, the FDLR abducted five women on
their way to the market near Mihanda village in Ziralo. One of the victims told
Human Rights Watch her attackers said, “You made us suffer. We’ve
always been here, and now they’re trying to chase us out. You, the
mothers and fathers here, are complicit with the government forces, and because
of that, we are going to punish you. Since you’re Congolese, we can never
pardon you.” Then
the FDLR attackers raped the women.

In the cases investigated by Human Rights Watch, most victims
of sexual violence by FDLR combatants were gang-raped, in some cases by as many
as seven or eight soldiers at a time. The FDLR sometimes tied their victims to
trees before raping them, violently inserted objects into the victims’
vaginas, such as sticks or the barrel of a gun, cut them with machetes or
knives, or brutally beat them during the rape. Some women and girls were killed
after being raped, sometimes by being shot in the vagina. Others were killed if
they resisted when the FDLR tried to rape them. Some victims were so violently
raped that they later bled to death; others suffered debilitating and often
chronic injuries. The psychological harm to the survivors is undoubtedly
immense.

A doctor working with rape victims at a hospital in Bukavu, South Kivu, described to Human Rights Watch the brutality he had witnessed. “When the
FDLR rape, it’s not just rape, but torture afterwards… Some burn their
victims, some introduce objects into their vaginas, some shoot into their
victims’ vaginas… From a medical perspective, the cases of rape by the
FDLR are the most severe.”

In mid-May, the FDLR raped three women and a 16-year-old
girl in Mirenge, near Kibua in Walikale territory. The only survivor told Human
Rights Watch that the 16-year-old girl died immediately after the rape when her
uterus ruptured, and the two other women died three weeks later because they
were unable to access medical treatment.

On April 5, the FDLR attacked Lulere village, in the Ziralo
area. A 30-year-old woman who was raped during the attack told Human Rights
Watch what happened to her,

It happened in the evening. I went out to get water, and
when I came back, I saw everyone fleeing. I ran into the house to get my baby,
but when I got there, the Interahamwe [FDLR] immediately came in and closed the
door with us inside. There were four Interahamwe who came in the house. And
there were four of us inside: my oldest daughter who was 23 years old, another
woman, me, and the baby. They wanted to rape my daughter, and when she
resisted, they shot her. After killing her, they tortured and raped me. They
used the barrel of the gun as a bat and hit me on my ears and on my head. Three
of them raped me, and they said, ‘If you resist only once, we will kill
you like we just killed your daughter.’ After each of them raped me, they
went on to the other woman who was in the house.

On March 4, FDLR soldiers raped a 30-year-old woman at her
farm near Lulere village (Ziralo). She was eight months pregnant and lost her
baby. When her 16-year-old daughter, who was with her, resisted being raped,
the FDLR combatant took her by force, inserted the barrel of his gun into her
vagina and shot her dead.

On May 18, FDLR combatants tied a 32-year-old woman to a
tree near Katahunda (Ufumandu) before four of them raped her. The woman told
Human Rights Watch, “When they found me, they put me on a tree and tied
my feet and my hands to the trunk. Then four of them raped me. They told me, ‘If
you try to move, we’ll kill you.’ I was tied so tightly that it wasn’t
possible to move at all… Now I suffer a lot. My uterus came out because of
the rape.”

FDLR combatants raped the old and the young alike. The
youngest case documented by Human Rights Watch was the rape of a nine-year-old
girl on January 27 in Ngwilo village, Masisi territory. A rape counselor who
later interviewed the victim said the girl had fled with her mother when they
ran into the FDLR. They first raped her mother and inserted a large stick in
her vagina, which led to her death. When the young girl cried out, the FDLR
raped her as well.

The oldest rape victim documented by Human Rights Watch was
an 85-year-old woman raped by five FDLR combatants in early July in a village
in Masisi territory. She later told a rape counselor that her attackers had found
her on a footpath as she fled from the fighting. According to the notes taken
by the counselor, the elderly woman told the FDLR that she was fleeing, that
she was tired and asked them to pardon her. But the FDLR forced her down on the
ground, beat her and dragged her into the nearby forest by her legs where she
was gang-raped by five FDLR combatants.

Scores of women were abducted and forced to serve as sex
slaves in FDLR camps, where they were raped repeatedly for weeks or months at a
time.

One such case was of a 60-year-old woman from Lumbishi, near
Ziralo, abducted in January 2009. She was with the FDLR for four months before
managing to escape:

I was on the road going to my daughter’s house in Ziralo.
They took all my money and raped me. Then they took me into the bush, and I was
there for four months. A lot of women were taken hostage by the FDLR in
Lumbishi. They beat me if I was tired when they wanted to have sex. When there
was an attack, everyone moved together, the FDLR and those who were taken
hostage. They shot those who weren’t capable of moving so they wouldn’t give
out any secrets. I left many unburied corpses behind me in the forest,
especially those of women and young girls who weren’t capable of having sex
anymore.

A number of women became pregnant because of the rape.
Despite increased sensitization and awareness in eastern Congo about sexual violence, the stigma is still strong. After FDLR combatants raped or held them as
sex slaves, women and girls, and their babies born from rape, are rarely
accepted back into their families and communities. One 15-year-old girl, ostracized
by her family after giving birth following months of sexual slavery to the FDLR,
despairingly asked a Human Rights Watch researcher, “Should I kill my
baby or should I kill myself? I have no future.”

In some cases, the FDLR forced civilian men and boys to rape
women or girls, sometimes their own family members. In February 2009 in Miriki,
Lubero territory, the FDLR stopped a group of six young people and forced the
three boys to rape the three girls in the group.
On July 2, in Remeka, Masisi territory, the FDLR tried to force a man to rape
his 28-year-old daughter-in-law, after she had already been raped in his
presence by seven FDLR combatants. When he refused, they killed him.

Burning
and Pillage

The FDLR’s strategy of retaliatory attacks against
Congolese civilians to “punish” them also included the widespread
and wanton burning of thousands of homes, schools, health centers, churches and
other structures throughout North and South Kivu. In some villages, not a
single structure was left standing. According to information collected by Human
Rights Watch in missions across North and South Kivu, the FDLR burned or
otherwise destroyed at least 7,051 homes and other structures between January and
September 2009. The destruction was often accompanied by the pillaging of goods,
leaving civilian populations utterly destitute. In many cases, civilians were
forced at gunpoint to transport the looted goods to an FDLR camp. Many of the
civilians were later beaten, raped, or disappeared.

One man told Human Rights Watch what he saw in Masiba
village, in the Mubugu area of Kalehe territory, on April 25 when the FDLR
attacked and burned some 200 homes in the village,

They came at night when we were in our houses. They made us
get out of our homes, and then they looted all our goods and set our houses on
fire. When they finished the operation, they made the youth transport all their
looted goods to their camp in the forest.

The same thing happened in nearby Mwenga village (Kalehe
territory) where 50 houses were burned on the same day.

Some local officials believed the
FDLR were deliberately burning homes to create large numbers of displaced
people as part of their strategy to influence the government to call off its
offensive.In some places, the FDLR burned villages that were
deserted after local populations had fled earlier attacks, possibly in an
attempt to stop them from returning. This was the case on July 30, when the FDLR
burned the village of Kingete, in the Ufumandu area of Masisi territory,
destroying nearly 100 homes.

In the Nindja area of Kabare territory (South Kivu), a MONUC
mission confirmed that in June and July 2009, the FDLR systematically pillaged
and burnt down 706 houses in Mudaka, Tshololo, Buhira,
Kabuye II, Kalinganya, Lwizi and Kabona villages. Many of these villages had been former FDLR bastions taken
over by the Congolese army. But as the government soldiers advanced, they left
no soldiers behind to protect the villages, allowing FDLR combatants to return,
burn homes, and otherwise punish the civilians.

Satellite imagery collected by the American Association for
the Advancement of Science (AAAS) provides visual and shocking confirmation of
the widespread destruction of homes and villages. Analyzing pre- and post-attack
imagery in a 100-square-kilometers radius around Busurungi, in Walikale territory
(North Kivu), AAAS estimated that 1,494 homes and other structures were
destroyed between January 19 and September 22, 2009. The damage amounted to an
estimated 80 percent destruction rate. Some of the destruction in the satellite
imagery was recent, having taken place between August 31 and September 22. In
its report published on October 13, AAAS added that it believed further destruction
had taken place outside the bounds of the imagery it had in its possession.

IV. FDLR Responsibility

According to international humanitarian law, all parties to
a conflict must distinguish between combatants and civilians, may not deliberately
attack civilians or civilian objects, and must treat all persons under their
control humanely. Individuals who willfully commit serious violations of the
laws of war, that is deliberately or recklessly, are responsible for war
crimes, including those who participate in or order war crimes, or are culpable
as a matter of command responsibility.

The similarity of FDLR threats to civilians, the
determination that civilians were legitimate targets and needed to be
“punished,” plus the numerous similar attacks across areas that
were hundreds of kilometers apart, all point to crimes by the FDLR being
systematic and ordered from a central command. On November 17, 2009, the FDLR president, Ignace Murwanashyaka, and his deputy, Straton Musoni, were arrested by
authorities in Germany for their role in alleged war crimes and crimes against
humanity committed by FDLR forces under their command in eastern Congo between January 2008 and July 2009. They were also charged with belonging to a
terrorist group. Research by Human Rights Watch found that Murwanashyaka, as
well as several other FDLR leaders and commanders, should be investigated for
ordering alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by FDLR
forces and as a matter of command responsibility.

 

Ignace Murwanashyaka

Dr. Ignace Murwanashyaka is the president, legal
representative, and supreme commander of the FDLR. Murwanashyaka himself
confirmed this in a meeting with Human Rights Watch on August 10 when he said,
“I am the president and I preside over the military and the political
branches. As such, I am the supreme commander. [General] Mudacumura does not
give me orders, I give him orders.” 

While Murwanashyaka lives thousands of miles away from the
forests of eastern Congo, and probably has not been in eastern Congo since 2006, he wields a powerful influence over the FDLR combatants and is in regular
communication with FDLR commanders on the ground. In various individual and
group meetings with FDLR commanders and low-ranking combatants held by Human
Rights Watch and others over the past few years, FDLR members have confirmed
that decisions for the group are made by their president, Murwanashyaka,
including decisions about military operations.
Two recent interviews provide clear examples. A commander from General
Mudacumura’s protection unit who deserted the FDLR in April 2009 said
during an interview with a diplomat that the FDLR leadership in Congo was in regular contact with the leaders in Germany and that military and political
instructions are made and coordinated from Europe.
In September 2009, senior FDLR commanders met with a small number of UN DDRRR
specialists to discuss the ongoing military operations and opportunities for
voluntary disarmament, and they said they could make no decision without
“orders from our hierarchy,” and referred specifically to needing
instructions from “our president, Ignace” before they could act.

The regular contact between Murwanashyaka and FDLR military
commanders in eastern Congo, including General Mudacumura, is also clear from telephone
records. Between September 2008 to August 2009, the UN Group of Experts
recorded 240 phone communications between Murwanashyaka and FDLR commanders
based in eastern Congo, an average of at least one phone communication per day. 
According to witnesses interviewed by the Group of Experts, Murwanashyaka “was
involved in giving military orders to the high command during some of these
communications.” The
Group of Experts also documented that Murwanashyaka had been “involved in
coordinating the transfer of arms and ammunition to FDLR units and relaying
specific instruction on their use.”

In an interview with Human Rights Watch, Murwanashyaka
confirmed he played a direct role in the FDLR’s chain of command, was
seen by commanders and combatants as the ultimate decision-maker, and said that
he was “the supreme commander.”

On August 10, Human Rights Watch presented information to
Murwanashyaka about alleged crimes by FDLR combatants, including copies of
threatening letters and messages to villagers from FDLR forces. Murwanashyaka
said he was “not informed about these abuses,” but that it was
possible they had been carried out by Rwandan army soldiers or Congolese Hutu
to “blacken our [the FDLR’s] name.”
When Human Rights Watch said a number of the victims of abuses had clearly been
able to identify their attackers as FDLR since they knew them by name and had
lived side-by-side with them for many years, he said he would “verify the
information” and “order an immediate investigation into the
events.” 

Regarding the massacre at Busurungi on May 9-10, documented in
the previous chapter, where the FDLR allegedly slaughtered at least 96
civilians, Murwanashyaka said he had heard about killings in this village but
“after consulting with the FDLR’s assistant executive secretary and
following their own investigation,” he had been informed that “no
civilians had died there but only soldiers.”
He did not respond when asked if the FDLR’s own investigation considered
the children who died at Busurungi, including babies, to be soldiers.

Phone records recorded by the UN Group of Experts, however, demonstrate
that Murwanashyaka had frequent communication with FDLR commanders at the time
of the Busurungi massacre. Between May 5 and May 16, the Group recorded 14
communications between Murwanashyaka and FDLR commanders in the field. On May
9, the day the attack began, Murwanashyaka received four text messages from two
satellite phones used by General Mudacumura’s staff, and he replied to the
last one almost immediately after receiving it. The next direct communication
between Murwanashyaka and General Mudacumura’s staff was on May 11, at
the end of the attack on Busurungi, when Murwanashyaka received another text
message. While the contents of the messages are unknown, it is plausible that
Murwanashyaka was being informed of preparations for the attack on Busurungi,
and could have been involved in issuing the attack order. 

In addition to information provided by Human Rights Watch,
Murwanashyaka had access to information on FDLR abuses reported by others,
including an October 15 report by the UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial executions
that documented serious violations of human rights committed by his
subordinates.

Murwanashyaka told Human Rights Watch that he would launch
his own investigations into the allegations made by Human Rights Watch,
including those documented in this report, and agreed to share the results by August 24, 2009. At the
time of this report’s publication no response had been received, despite
reminders sent to Murwanashyaka by email on September 24 and 30, 2009.

Human Rights Watch believes there is sufficient information
linking Murwanashyaka to specific FDLR attacks in which widespread abuses
occurred that he should be investigated for his role in ordering alleged war
crimes and crimes against humanity.

Murwanashyaka should also be investigated for criminal
liability as a matter of command responsibility. Information on ongoing abuses
provided by Human Rights Watch and others indicates that he knew or should have
known of serious international crimes by forces that were under his command. Human
Rights Watch has, to date, found no instance where Murwanashyaka sought to
prevent or take serious action to punish individuals under his effective
control who were responsible for serious crimes in violation of international
law.

On November 17, 2009, Ignace Murwanashyaka was arrested by
German authorities for his role in alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity
committed in eastern Congo between January 2008 and July 2009 by FDLR
combatants under his command. He was also charged with belonging to a terrorist
group.In
a press statement issued on the day of Murwanashyaka’s arrest, German
authorities said, “FDLR militias are believed to have killed several
hundred civilians, raped numerous women, plundered and burned countless
villages, forcing villagers from their homes and recruiting numerous children
as soldiers.”

Gen.
Sylvester Mudacumura

Gen. Sylvester Mudacumura has been the military commander of
FDLR forces in eastern Congo since 2003.
According to former FDLR combatants interviewed by Human Rights Watch and
others, General Mudacumura has clear and immediate command responsibility over
FDLR forces. “It is Mudacumura who gives all the overall instructions and
commands, and others follow his orders… No operation could ever be done
without his consent,” one former FDLR combatant told Human Rights Watch.
In another case, a senior FDLR deserter from the Reserve Brigade told UN
officials that Lt. Col. Félicien Nzabanita, commander of the Reserve
Brigade, which conducted several of the larger attacks on civilians during Umoja
Wetu and Kimia II, “never made any decisions unless they were
coming from Mudacumura.”

The UN Group of Experts has collected information from FDLR
“signalers” who pass on commands from the FDLR military command, under
General Mudacumura’s authority, to individual FDLR units. A directive
delivered in March 2009, at the start of operation Kimia II, was
particularly telling. According to the “signaler” who passed on the
message, later interviewed by the Group, General Mudacumura ordered all FDLR
units in North and South Kivu to do the following:

(i) to “attack population centers in order to create
a humanitarian catastrophe” with the aim of forcing the international
community to react by “forcing the Rwandan government to negotiate with
the FDLR”;

(ii) to “prioritize re-supplying operations by
attacking the FARDC to recover weapons and ammunition”;

(iii) to “cut off main roads by attacking vehicles in
order to paralyze commercial activities so that the local population becomes
unhappy towards its government and demands the end of hostilities against the
FDLR”; and

(iv) to consider “all Congolese as our enemies”
and as such “all resupply operations are authorized to assure the
survival of our men and to destabilize the security of the local population
which will increase their unhappiness with their government.”

Human Rights Watch believes there is sufficient information
linking General Mudacumura to specific FDLR attacks in which widespread abuses occurred
and that he should be investigated for his role in ordering alleged war crimes
and crimes against humanity.

General Mudacumura should also be investigated for criminal
liability as a matter of command responsibility. Information on ongoing abuses
provided by Human Rights Watch and others indicates that he knew or should have
known of serious international crimes by forces that were under his command. Human
Rights Watch is not aware of any action taken by General Mudacumura to prevent
or take serious actions to punish individuals under his command who were
responsible for serious crimes in violation of international law.

Other Commanders

The FDLR’s operational commanders who are also in the
chain of command of the FDLR and should be investigated for their role in alleged
war crimes and crimes against humanity include Col. Pacifique Ntawunguka,
commander of the FDLR’s North Kivu division; Col. Léopold
Mujyambere, commander of the South Kivu division; Lt. Col. Félicien Nzabanita
(also known as Kalume Andrei), commander of the Reserve Brigade; and Capt.
Vainquer Mugisha (likely not his real name), commander of the Special Forces Unit.

According to one former FDLR commander interviewed by Human
Rights Watch, the attack on Busurungi described above was ordered by Lt. Col. Nzabanita,
who stayed at a military base near Shalio throughout the massacre.
Former FDLR combatants interviewed by the UN Group of Experts also reported
that Lt. Col. Nzabanita ordered the attack on Busurungi and gave the
following directive, “Attack those who killed our population at
Shalio.” (The order appears to refer to the earlier Congolese army attack
on Rwandan Hutu refugees in the area of Shalio Hill, discussed below.)

Research conducted by Human Rights Watch indicates that Capt.
Vainquer Mugisha played a direct role in the attacks on civilians in the
Ufumandu area in January and February 2009, including attacks at Kibua, Remeka,
and Katoyi, among others, and that he was responsible for taking civilians
hostage to be used as human shields at an FDLR military base where many were
subsequently killed. In
Katoyi, numerous persons heard Captain Vainquer tell a crowd of people in late
January, “Even if we were together before, we are now enemies… we are sharpening
[our] spears and machetes.” Shortly thereafter the FDLR began to kill
civilians. According
to numerous former FDLR combatants interviewed by the UN Group of Experts,
Captain Vainquer also led the operation in Busurungi, with various units of the
Reserve Brigade, under Lt. Col. Nzabanita’s command.

Research conducted by Human Rights Watch and the UN Group of
Experts indicates that attacks in the Bunyakiri area of Kalehe territory (South
Kivu) between April and June 2009 may have been planned and executed by
commander “Simba Guillaume,” likely an alias for Capt.
Pierre-Célestin Rurakabije, the commander of the 1st company
of the Reserve Brigade’s 3rd Battalion, known as the Mirage Battalion,
located in Ramba near Bunyakiri. In
March 2009, Simba Guillaume sent three letters to the population and local
leaders in Karasi (Mubugu groupment, Kalehe territory) in which he explicitly
warned of attacks on civilians (see above). Soon after these messages were
delivered, the FDLR launched several attacks on villages in the area, including
the attack on Chiriba in May 2009 when 10 civilians were killed. Accounts from
former FDLR combatants and other witnesses collected by the UN Group of Experts
identified Guillaume as the military commander of these attacks. The Group also
recorded regular phone communication between Guillaume and General
Mudacumura’s staff, including a total of 107 communications between
January and April 2009.

Human Rights Watch believes there is sufficient information
linking each of the above military commanders to specific FDLR attacks in which
widespread abuses occurred that they should be investigated for their role in
ordering alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity.

V. Abuses by

the Congolese
Army and Other Forces

Congolese civilians desperately seeking protection from the
brutal FDLR attacks were cruelly let down. The Congolese army, the FARDC, in
joint operations with the Rwanda Defence Forces (RDF), in operation Umoja
Wetu, and later with the support of MONUC peacekeepers in operation Kimia
II, also targeted and committed horrific abuses against civilians. The
Congolese army effort drew extensively on units from the former Tutsi-led rebel
group, the CNDP, which had been hastily integrated into the army in January and
February and had previously fought the FDLR.

During offensive operations, the coalition forces repeatedly
accused civilians of collaborating or sympathizing with the FDLR, with horrific
consequences. Between January and September 2009, Human Rights Watch documented
the deliberate killing of at least 732 civilians, including 143 Rwandan Hutu
refugees (see next chapter), by Congolese army forces and their coalition partner.
The majority of the victims were women and children.
Human Rights Watch also received reports of hundreds of other deaths that we
have not yet been able to confirm.

In 2009, the killing of civilians began during the Umoja
Wetu operation. At least 201 civilians were killed during this phase of
military action, including 90 people massacred in late February in the remote
village of Ndorumo and a further 40 in the village of Byarenga, both in North
Kivu. The attacks were perpetrated by Rwandan and Congolese coalition forces,
although witnesses found it difficult to distinguish between Rwandan army
soldiers and former CNDP soldiers newly integrated into the Congolese army, as
they wore similar uniforms and spoke the same language.

During the Kimia II operations, the killing of
civilians by government forces got worse. Human Rights Watch has collected
testimony relating to the killing of 388 Congolese civilians between March and
September 2009 by Congolese army soldiers, often former CNDP soldiers. Many of
the killings took place in the area between Nyabiondo and Pinga, bordering
Masisi and Walikale territories, in North Kivu province. This remote area,
where Congolese government authority has been sorely lacking, had long been a political
and military stronghold of the FDLR. It was also home to the Patriotic Alliance
for a Free and Sovereign Congo (Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre
et souverain, APCLS) militia, a primarily Hunde armed group led by
self-appointed General Janvier Buingo Karairi, allied to the FDLR. Apart from
these armed groups, the area was also populated with thousands of local
inhabitants, as well as displaced people and refugees who had fled there from
other zones of conflict.

Human Rights Watch has received reports, including lists
with names of victims, of an additional 476 civilians allegedly killed by
Congolese army soldiers and their allies in the area between Nyabiondo and
Pinga, including 90 killed during Umoja Wetu and 386 killed during Kimia
II. However, due to the remoteness of the area, Human Rights Watch has not to
date been able to confirm whether they were caught in the crossfire or were
deliberately killed. These numbers have not been included in our figure of 732 deliberate
killings by government forces.

In addition to the area between Nyabiondo and Pinga, Human
Rights Watch also documented killings by Congolese army soldiers in Masisi,
Walikale, Lubero, Rutshuru, Kalehe, Shabunda, and Walungu territories of North
and South Kivu.

During both Umoja Wetu and Kimia II
operations, Congolese and coalition forces violated their obligations under the
laws of war to minimize harm to civilians. They failed to distinguish civilians
from combatants and targeted the former, failed to treat humanely persons under
their control, did not give effective advance warning of attack when
circumstances permitted, and made no efforts to permit civilians caught up in
the fighting to flee to safety. While some civilians may have been caught in
the crossfire during military confrontations with the FDLR, the cases
documented by Human Rights Watch in this report are those where civilians were
deliberately targeted or summarily executed.

The Congolese army and coalition forces appeared to consider
civilians who had lived in close proximity to the FDLR for many years as
“sympathizers” or “collaborators” with the FDLR and who
deserved “punishment.” In numerous accounts collected by Human
Rights Watch, Congolese army soldiers reportedly told civilians variations of: “Since
you collaborated with the FDLR, we will punish you.”
Dozens of victims and witnesses said to Human Rights Watch that at the time of
the attacks, there were few or no FDLR combatants or their allies present. In
the vast majority of cases, the combatants had temporarily retreated or fled
into the forests in advance of government or coalition soldiers arriving.

Some of the killings were extraordinarily vicious. Victims
had limbs severed, and some of the bodies were chopped into pieces almost
beyond recognition. Many of the victims were killed by machetes or knives;
others were stabbed to death with a bayonet or were clubbed to death by large
wooden sticks. Some were shot dead at close range while trying to flee.

Alongside the killings, thousands of women and girls were
raped. In North Kivu, in 349 of the 639 sexual
violence cases documented by Human Rights Watch, the victim or other
witnesses clearly identified the perpetrators as government soldiers.
In at least 15 cases documented by Human Rights Watch, Congolese army soldiers
summarily executed the women and girls they had raped. Family members,
including husbands, children and parents who tried to stop the rape of their
loved ones, were also targeted, and at least 20 were killed when they cried out
or otherwise protested the violence.

Hundreds of civilians were pressed into forced labor by
Congolese army soldiers to carry ammunition or other baggage, or to fetch water
and firewood. Some were killed when they refused; others died because the loads
they were forced to carry were too heavy. The violence against civilians was
often accompanied by widespread looting and the wanton destruction of homes,
schools, and other structures, leaving victims with no hope for the future.

Massacres and Killing of Civilians

during Operation Umoja Wetu

Rwandan army soldiers entered Congo in late January 2009 and
joined Congolese army units in operation Umoja Wetu against the FDLR.
The five-week operation was jointly commanded by Rwandan and Congolese army
officers based in Goma, North Kivu, and the neighboring border town of Gisenyi, Rwanda. In some locations coalition soldiers were well-behaved. Congolese
civilians reported that Rwandan troops, in particular, paid for the food they
bought from local people while on operations and made a deliberate effort to
maintain good relations. But
such good behavior was not repeated everywhere. In a number of areas, coalition
forces were responsible for the targeted killing of civilians, rape, arbitrary
arrests, and the destruction of homes. According to Human Rights Watch
research, at least 201 civilians were killed by coalition forces during
operation Umoja Wetu.

Human Rights Watch documented the massacres of civilians by
coalition forces in Ndorumo and Kinyumba villages in Masisi territory, and in
Byarenga and Langira villages in Walikale territory. Human Rights Watch also
documented the killings of civilians in other villages including in Ibondo,
Maniema, Muirya, Bwambira, and Kailenge in Walikale territory; in Matanda and
Chirundo, Masisi territory; and in Kitcho village, Lubero territory.

Victims and witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch
found it difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish Rwandan army soldiers
from former CNDP combatants recently integrated into the Congolese army who
played an important role in the operation. The soldiers of both armies often
wore identical camouflage uniforms, many were Tutsi, and spoke Kinyarwanda (the
main language of Rwanda). Rwandan army soldiers did have a small Rwandan flag
on the upper sleeve of their uniforms, but this was not always easy to spot. In
some cases former CNDP combatants had the same army uniforms though they
usually removed the Rwandan flag. A
significant number of CNDP combatants were in fact former Rwandan army soldiers
or were Rwandan citizens who had been recruited into the CNDP in 2007 and 2008.
In most cases witnesses simply identified their attackers as “Tutsi
soldiers” in camouflage uniforms.

The responsibility for investigating the human rights abuses
committed by coalition forces, some of which are described below, and to
determine who was involved, is ultimately the responsibility of the Congolese
government, which invited Rwandan troops to participate in the joint operations
and on whose territory the abuses were committed. The Rwandan government should
provide full support to such investigations and commit to holding to account
any of their soldiers who may have participated in the war crimes.

 

Ndorumo massacre

In late February, Rwandan and Congolese soldiers arrived in Ndorumo,
Masisi territory, a remote village nestled among the forested hills largely
made up of ethnic Hunde, with a small minority of Hutu. The coalition soldiers
set up a military position at the local primary school and told the population
not to be frightened since they were government soldiers who had come to bring
peace. The APCLS militia, an ally of the FDLR, had a military position in
Lukweti, a few kilometers from Ndorumo, but according to witnesses interviewed
by Human Rights Watch, there were no APCLS or FDLR combatants present in Ndorumo
the day the coalition forces arrived.

Within just two hours of their arrival, the coalition forces
called a meeting at the local school, but as people gathered they began to
shoot and kill civilians. There was no military combat in the village, nor did
the FDLR or APCLS militia attack the coalition forces. Instead the coalition
forces randomly and without warning began to attack local civilians who they
accused of collaborating with the FDLR. A local chief told Human Rights Watch:

The soldiers arrived at the school and said they wanted to
meet with the population. Some civilians had already gathered in the classrooms
when they instead started killing us. They said we were being punished for
being complicit with the FDLR, but there weren’t even FDLR in our village
when they attacked.

During a two-day killing spree, coalition soldiers killed
some 90 civilians in and around Ndorumo village, sending a stark warning that
civilians would be punished for their perceived support of the FDLR and its
allies. The victims included 30 women, four children and eight elderly men.

A woman whose husband, father-in-law, and sister-in-law were
killed during the attack described what happened:

When the Tutsi soldiers came to our village, they said that
peace had arrived. But then they started killing us. My husband was shot in the
head while I was with him. His whole skull shattered into several pieces. My
father-in-law was shot in his side. They cut my sister-in-law into pieces with
a machete. They put the pieces together in different piles. That’s what I
found when we went to look for her. It’s hard to know how many were
killed in total, but every family has their own story.

According to witnesses interviewed by Human Rights Watch,
coalition soldiers also killed a 20-year-old female student, who was studying
at her home, by chopping her to pieces with a machete. They tied a 40-year-old
woman’s hands behind her back, shot her in the breast, and then threw her
body in the river. Coalition soldiers cut to pieces a 70-year-old man with a
machete and battered to death a 54-year-old man with a club. They cut off the
hand and decapitated a 50-year-old man they found at his farm, and then left
with both the head and the hand. As they attacked civilians they repeatedly
accused them of collaborating with the FDLR or their APCLS allies.

After two days of brutality, the coalition soldiers left Ndorumo.
Villagers who had survived the attacks by fleeing to neighboring villages or
hiding in the surrounding forests returned to bury the dead. A local authority
told Human Rights Watch he participated in the burial of 90 civilians.
He reported that the victims were all civilians and did not include any FDLR or
APCLS combatants. Many of the victims had been shot in the head, indicating
they may have been summarily executed. Others were killed by machetes. He
believed an additional 30 civilians may have been killed in the forests
surrounding Ndorumo, but their bodies were never found.

Byarenga
massacre

In February, coalition forces attacked civilians in Byarenga
village in the Mutongo area of Walikale territory. FDLR and APCLS combatants
who were present in the village during the attack reportedly put up some
resistance before they fled, leaving the civilian population behind. The
coalition soldiers deliberately attacked civilians. According to a witness
interviewed by Human Rights Watch, a coalition soldier told the local
population, “We will exterminate all of you because it’s you who
guard the FDLR.”

At least 40 civilians were killed, the majority women,
children and the elderly. Most were killed by machetes or knives, others were stabbed
to death with bayonets, and some were shot dead while trying to flee. The
coalition forces stayed in Byarenga for four days. According to a local chief
who participated in the burials after the coalition forces had departed, the
victims included 11 women, nine children, and 20 men. According to witnesses,
coalition soldiers also raped 10 women during the attack. Before leaving the
village, the coalition soldiers burned the primary school, and destroyed at
least 10 houses, including the home of the customary chief.

Other killings

Coalition forces also killed scores of civilians in smaller
attacks or individual incidents where they accused civilians of being FDLR
combatants, even when they carried no weapons, or of collaborating with the
FDLR.

In one such incident around January 27, 2009, soldiers beat
to death a 25-year-old man and his four-year old daughter from Masiza village,
near Bibwe, as they fled fighting in their village. A witness told Human Rights
Watch,

We were fleeing… we saw the soldiers just ahead of us.
They told us to stop. I ran immediately into the forest. It was a big group of
soldiers. They were wearing tache tache [camouflage] uniforms with
little flags. The soldiers had radios with big antennas. We were a group of
five civilians. My friend and his daughter were captured by the soldiers…
They asked my friend, ‘Where are the FDLR?’ He replied that they
had already fled. Then another soldier said, ‘No, this one here is an
FDLR. We should kill him.’ So they killed my friend and his daughter, by
beating them to death with a large stick covered with nails. 

The Rwandan flag on the soldiers’ uniforms indicates
that the assailants in this incident may have been Rwandan army soldiers.

In an incident on February 6 in Bunje village, Kalehe
territory, coalition soldiers killed a 55-year-old man after gang-raping his
wife and tying him up outside the house. His wife told Human Rights Watch:

The soldiers came saying they were going to chase out the
FDLR….That night the soldiers arrived at my house and knocked on the door.
They only spoke Lingala. I thought peace had arrived, so I opened the door.
Then as soon as they entered, they tied up my husband and three of the soldiers
raped me. My husband said, ‘We thought peace had arrived. What are you
doing?’ Then they took my husband outside and I heard a gunshot. I later
realized they had killed him. Another woman in my compound was raped the same
night.

The use of Lingala, the most popular language in western Congo, by the attackers in this incident, suggests that the perpetrators were likely
soldiers from the Congolese army.

Other Abuses during

Operation Umoja Wetu  

Sexual violence

The attacks on civilians by the coalition soldiers during
operation Umoja Wetu often included sexual violence against women and
girls, and also in at least one case, against a man. Human Rights Watch
documented 42 cases of rape by coalition soldiers who were deployed against the
FDLR in January and February 2009.

As with other attacks, the perpetrators accused their
victims of being wives or supporters of the FDLR. In late January in Remeka,
Masisi territory, a 21-year-old woman was raped by two coalition soldiers soon
after they arrived in her village. She told Human Rights Watch what happened,

I was in my house preparing the food when the soldiers
arrived. It was the morning. They were in camouflage military uniforms, and
they spoke Kinyarwanda. They said that I was a wife of the FDLR, even though
I’m not. I’m a Congolese Hutu, and I lived in the same village with the FDLR,
but to them we were all FDLR wives. They asked me to sleep with them. I
refused. Then they started to beat me with a bat and they kicked me. Then they
raped me. I was already pregnant and I lost my baby. It was my first pregnancy.
Now I can’t sleep. My head hurts, my whole body hurts, and I’m always cold.

There appears to have been an increase in cases of male rape
since the launch of military operations against the FDLR.
However, there are almost no statistics due to the shame and fear associated
with male rape in Congo. At least one of those cases occurred during operation Umoja
Wetu. On February 20, soldiers raped a 52-year-old man at his home in
Murambi, near Ngungu in Masisi territory. According to a rape counselor who
later interviewed the victim, he identified his attackers as former CNDP combatants
integrated into the Congolese army. The soldiers accused the man of having
built his house on a hill that belonged to the Tutsi. First they raped the man’s
wife and then killed her by shooting her in the vagina. Then the attackers
turned on him, raped him, tied his penis tightly with a cord, and dragged him
by the cord through his farm. Three weeks later the victim managed to make it
to a rape counseling center seeking help, but he died shortly after as a result
of his wounds.

Unlawful destruction of homes and other structures

 

Coalition soldiers also engaged in wide-scale and wanton
destruction of homes and villages. During operation Umoja Wetu,
coalition forces burned at least 1,357 homes in 14 different villages in
Lubero, Walikale, and Masisi territories of North Kivu. In most cases, soldiers
blamed civilians for having lived with the FDLR or their allies and punished
them by burning their homes, sometimes in apparent frustration after they were
unable to find the FDLR. The widespread destruction of homes and other civilian
structures without a militarily justified reason is a form of collective
punishment against the civilian population.

On February 14, 2009, for example, coalition soldiers, retreating
from a frontline position and reportedly angry that they had failed to find FDLR
members, instead attacked the three neighboring villages of Lushoa, Mashuta,
and Numoo, near the border of Walikale and Lubero territories, to
“punish” the civilian population for having collaborated or lived
with the FDLR. They burned 97 houses and a health center in Lushoa, 63 houses
and three classrooms in Mashuta, and 13 houses in Numoo.
The next day, on February 15, coalition soldiers burned another 170 houses, a
health center, two classrooms, and a school office in the village, Bushalingwa,
and 135 houses in neighboring Kishonja village.
The destruction of health facilities and schools violates the laws of war and
has severely increased the health risks to the population, who in many cases
have also lost their homes, and sharply curtailed their children’s
education.

Arbitrary arrests, torture and illegal transfers to

Rwanda

Human Rights Watch documented the arbitrary arrest in Goma
of at least two Congolese Hutu civilians during operation Umoja Wetu,
who were taken across the border to Rwanda, where they were held illegally for
days or weeks. The detainees were tortured by Rwandan military authorities to
force them to confess to being FDLR combatants or sympathizers. Human Rights
Watch received credible reports of 23 similar cases.[247]

In interviews with Human Rights Watch, two of these
civilians detained at different times and locations described similar practices
used. They were initially arrested in Goma by soldiers in Congolese army or
police uniforms who later changed into Rwandan army uniforms before
transferring the detainees to Rwanda. The change of uniforms and the subsequent
detention in Rwanda strongly indicates that those carrying out the arrests were
Rwandan officials. In both cases, the detainees were tortured, including by
being badly beaten, and reported that other detainees with whom they were held
were also beaten.

In one case, on February 13, a 27-year-old Congolese Hutu
trader who sold potatoes, charcoal, and maize was arrested in Goma along with
three other men and held for 17 days. He said:

I was outside my home in Goma when a FARDC soldier and two
policemen stopped and put me in their car, along with three other Hutu
civilians. They took us first to Kinyangote, near Buhimba [outside Goma], and
then they took us back to a house in Goma near … the public beach. There they
beat me with pieces of wood and [kicked me with] their military boots. I now
have scars all over my legs and lower back. They told me that I needed to
accept that I’m Rwandan and that I was a member of the FDLR.

At midnight the same night, they made us cross the border
to Rwanda…Two of those who had arrested us in Goma switched into Rwandan army
camouflage uniforms before taking us across the border. One of them had been
wearing a police (PNC) uniform, and the other was in a solid green FARDC
uniform… When we got to Rwanda, they took us to Mutobo camp,
and we spent the night there.

The next morning, they took us back to Gisenyi where they
brought us to a military camp. We spent four days there without eating, and
they beat us a lot. They put each of us in little cells. They would put
my arms above my head with my wrists chained together, and my legs spread out.
Then two soldiers would come and beat me at the same time with a baton from my
feet up to my hips. They did this regularly for four days….They kept telling
us to say that we’re Rwandan. Once when I said that I was Congolese, a
Rwandan major who was there put his pistol in my mouth. I don’t know if
he wanted to kill me, but by chance another soldier of a higher rank came and
took the pistol from him. Eventually [I was released] and they took me in a
military vehicle back to the border. I have no idea why I was targeted, why
they arrested me, or why they freed me when they did.

In a separate incident, a 28-year-old Congolese Hutu
civilian told a similar story. He too was arrested in Goma on February 13,
taken to a house in Goma near the public beach on Lake Kivu where some of the
arresting officials changed into Rwandan military uniforms before transferring
him across the border to a military camp in Gisenyi, where he was held and
regularly beaten until February 26, when he was released. He told Human Rights
Watch: “They beat us and tortured us, trying to get us to say we were
FDLR. We refused, and then they said, ‘Even if you’re not FDLR, you
work with the FDLR.’”

In both of these cases, the detainees said that General
James Kaberebe, the Chief of Defense staff of the Rwandan army, who played a
leading role in Umoja Wetu, was present at the camp and gave the order
to beat the detainees. Other soldiers in the camp had identified the officer as
General Kaberebe to the detainees. One former detainee said, “One day
James Kabarebe came to meet us. He gave the orders to beat us because we
wouldn’t say we were FDLR. When he arrived, he asked me the same
questions and wanted me to accept that I’m an FDLR… Then he gave the
order to his men to beat us. I heard him give the order.”

Of the 25 cases of arbitrary arrest by the coalition forces
involving the illegal transfer of Congolese civilians to Rwanda reported to
Human Rights Watch, none of the detainees was ever charged with any offense.

On February 25, 2009, Rwandan soldiers began to withdraw
from eastern Congo and in the following days ended the joint Rwandan-Congolese
military operation Umoja Wetu. The Rwandan government praised the
operation and said it had “seriously weakened” the FDLR and urged
the Congolese government to continue its military operations against the FDLR. 

Massacres and Killings during Kimia
II

On March 2, the Congolese army launched its next phase of
operations against the FDLR, called Kimia II, this time with substantial
logistical, tactical, and other support from MONUC peacekeepers (see below).
Despite MONUC’s mandate under UN Security Council Resolution 1856 to help
protect civilians and
the insistence of UN officials that their support of the operations would help
to decrease any harm to civilians, this phase of military operations was even
more deadly to civilians than operation Umoja Wetu.

Human Rights Watch has documented the deliberate killing by Congolese
army soldiers of 505 civilians in North and South Kivu since the start of
operation Kimia II from March through to September 2009. Many of the
killings occurred in the remote forest region between Nyabiondo and Pinga, on
the border between Walikale and Masisi territories. Others were killed by
Congolese army soldiers on operations against the FDLR in Masisi, Walikale,
Lubero, and Rutshuru territories in North Kivu and Kalehe, Shabunda, and
Walungu territories in South Kivu. As previously described, the cases Human
Rights Watch has documented do not represent the full scale of killings.

 

Massacres in Nyabiondo-Pinga area

As during the Umoja Wetu operation, the area between
Nyabiondo and Pinga was the target of military operations during the Kimia
II operations, demonstrating that the FDLR had not been pushed out of this
area during operation Umoja Wetu, as had been claimed. As before,
civilians paid the price. Although this zone had been attacked by coalition
forces in February, FDLR forces and their APCLS militia allies had not been
defeated and had simply fled or retreated to the surrounding forests and
returned to the villages soon after the coalition forces departed. In March,
Congolese army forces, largely drawn from CNDP soldiers newly integrated into
the Congolese army, some of whom may have participated in the earlier Umoja
Wetu operation, returned to the edges of the area to continue their
offensive. The soldiers established military positions surrounding the zone
from where they launched dozens of attacks. As before, FDLR and APCLS
combatants retreated or fled in the face of the offensive. When Congolese army
soldiers arrived into the villages where the combatants had previously been
based, they often found only civilians, whom they accused of supporting the
FDLR and its allies.

According to dozens of victims and witnesses interviewed by
Human Rights Watch, Congolese army forces deliberately killed at least 270
civilians in this area alone between March 5 and September 29. Victims and
witnesses repeatedly identified the perpetrators of these attacks as
“Tutsi soldiers” in camouflage uniforms, indicating that they may
have been former CNDP soldiers newly integrated into the Congolese army.

Some local authorities speculated that the brutal attacks
may in part have been motivated by long-standing land disputes and ethnic
hostilities, and that the primarily Tutsi former CNDP soldiers were seeking to
empty the area of its primarily Hunde
inhabitants to prepare the way for the return of Congolese Tutsi refugees
residing in refugee camps in Rwanda (see below).
Others speculated that the soldiers may have been interested in gaining control
over the rich mineral resources found in this region, including gold, diamonds,
and cassiterite (tin ore).

Very little information about the wide-scale brutalities has
come out of this area. MONUC has a peacekeeping base at Nyabiondo, but at the
time of writing did not regularly patrol further north than Lwibo, in part
because the area is controlled by the FDLR and its APCLS allies who view the
peacekeepers as enemies, since they support Congolese army operations. Fearing
possible attack, and also due to poor road conditions that permit only foot
patrols, MONUC has not regularly patrolled past Lwibo, the last Congolese army
position north of Nyabiondo. The
fear of being attacked by Congolese army soldiers along the 10-kilometer
stretch of road between Lwibo and Nyabiondo has restricted population movement
and thereby significantly limited information flows.

Mashango massacre

One of the deadliest attacks by Congolese army soldiers
occurred in early August at Mashango hill, just east of the town of Lwibo. During the course of the day, Congolese army soldiers killed at least 81 civilians
as they attacked in quick succession five hamlets within a few kilometers of
each other around the hill. According to witnesses, only one of the hamlets,
Buboa, housed a number of APCLS combatants. The other four hamlets—Mashango,
Bubangi, Butsindo, and Katanda—housed
only civilians. The attacking soldiers made no distinction between the two and
killed civilians by decapitating them, chopping some victims with a machete,
clubbing others to death or shooting them as they tried to flee.
The victims included 30 women, 12 children, and five elderly men.

A woman who survived the attack described to Human Rights
Watch what happened,

We were in our homes in Mashango when the [soldiers]
arrived. They started shooting and we all fled into the forest. A 60-year-old
man in the same group with me was shot dead while we were fleeing. I also saw
the soldiers kill a 14-year-old boy and a 12-year-old boy while they were
trying to flee. When we got here [Lukweti], I realized that my husband had also
been killed during the attack. There were no Mai Mai or APCLS combatants in our
village. The soldiers only came to attack us, the civilians.

In Katanda hamlet, the last one attacked during the
offensive, Congolese army soldiers decapitated four young men, cut off their
arms, and then threw their heads and limbs 20 meters away from their bodies.
They also raped 16 women and girls, including a 12-year-old girl. They later
killed four of the women and girls.

Ndorumo massacre

On around August 15, Congolese army soldiers again attacked Ndorumo
village (see above for the first attack). The attack followed a failed
offensive against APCLS militia earlier that day in Lukweti, a few kilometers
from Ndorumo. The consequences were again horrific for the civilian population:
an estimated 50 civilians were killed including at least 20 women and 3 young
boys. As
before, witnesses reported that no APCLS combatants were present at the time of
the attack. But Congolese army soldiers apparently angry at their earlier
failure in Lukweti to defeat the APCLS militia wanted to punish the civilians
for their perceived support to their enemies.

One woman lost three of her young children when they were
burned to death in their home. She also witnessed her father being killed. She told
Human Rights Watch:

The Tutsi soldiers want to exterminate us. They come to
attack us in places where there are no combatants or soldiers to provide for
our security. When they come, they say they want to push us out of our land so
they can occupy it. Some have already come with their cows and are taking over
the land just above our village.

Other
killings in Nyabiondo-Pinga area

Congolese government soldiers also randomly but repeatedly
killed civilians on their way to or from military operations against the FDLR
and the APCLS militia. The killings often occurred as army soldiers passed
through the villages and towns in the Nyabiondo-Pinga area or as they
encountered civilians on the roads and footpaths. The incidents were often
short in duration and included soldiers randomly shooting at civilians, beating
them, or burning their homes with no advance warning. Human Rights Watch
received credible information from local authorities and eyewitnesses about 139
civilians killed in such incidents between March and September 2009. The
widespread nature of the killings over a period of many months indicates that
Congolese army soldiers perceived the local population of this area as
collaborators of the FDLR and APCLS militia and sought to punish them.

For example, in March, the FARDC attacked Lukweti, killing
four civilians with no warning and without any attempt to verify if combatants
were in the area. As they marched through the village, they randomly set fire
to homes and shot those who ran away. A mother whose six-year-old son died
during the attack told Human Rights Watch, “The soldiers set fire to our
house, and my son burned to death inside. They burned four other houses, and
another baby boy burned to death inside one of them as well.” The witness
then recounted how soldiers shot and killed a 24-year-old woman and a
50-year-old man as they attempted to flee the area.

Killings
along road between Nyabiondo and Lwibo

Congolese army soldiers also targeted civilians on the
10-kilometer stretch of road running northeast between Nyabiondo and Lwibo.
Since the start of operation Kimia II in March, at least 83 civilians
have been killed and dozens of women and girls raped on this isolated stretch
of road. Since
March, Congolese army soldiers have controlled the road and established
military positions at Nyabiondo, Kinyumba and Lwibo, key villages along this
axis. The
victims were all civilians coming from APCLS and FDLR-controlled areas north of
Lwibo. They were attempting to reach the main market in Nyabiondo to sell their
goods or buy essential supplies. According to information received from local
authorities and eyewitness accounts, the perpetrators of these killings were
Congolese government soldiers who attacked the civilians because of their
perceived collaboration with the FDLR and its allies. The Congolese government
soldiers also apparently sought to steal the civilians’ goods.

Due to the frequent attacks, many civilians stopped
traveling along this road. As a result, the population has suffered from
further poverty, a lack of supplies, and greater isolation in an already desolated
area. When a Human Rights Watch researcher traveled the road in early October
2009, all villages between Nyabiondo and Lwibo were completely deserted. MONUC
peacekeepers carry out some patrols on this road from their base in Nyabiondo,
but their presence has not been regular enough to prevent the attacks on
civilians.

Local authorities to the area north of Lwibo have been keeping
a record of the attacks and killings along the Nyabiondo-Lwibo road. In an
interview with Human Rights Watch, they presented detailed information about
the deaths of 56 civilians from the village of Misheeshe, who had been killed
by FARDC soldiers on the road near the Congolese army’s base at Kinyumba,
from March through September. At
least 25 civilians from other villages were also killed along the same stretch
of road during the same period.
Although Human Rights Watch was unable to confirm the circumstances in each of
the killings, the information provided by local authorities was consistent with
eyewitness accounts that we collected.

In July, Congolese army soldiers near Lwibo decapitated a
male civilian who was on his way to the market in Nyabiondo. The soldiers then
paraded his head around Nyabiondo, telling the population they had killed an
APCLS combatant.

“I’ve never seen the Kimia II soldiers
actually track the FDLR,” a local chief in Nyabiondo told Human Rights
Watch. “They launch operations in Kinyumba, Lwibo, and Kilambo, but there
are no FDLR there. What we see instead is them going after civilians. The whole
population is viewed as a member of or complicit with either the FDLR or the
APCLS.”

On September 28, a group of young women and girls were on
their way to market in Nyabiondo to buy notebooks, pens, and uniforms for the
start of the school year. Several of them told Human Rights Watch that the
group was abducted while on the road and gang-raped by Congolese army soldiers
deployed at Kinyumba. The women and girls were kept overnight. Another group of
women and girls was abducted early the next day and also raped. In total, the
two groups numbered about 20 young women and girls.

The commander of the APCLS, General Janvier, told Human
Rights Watch that because of the continued attacks by the Congolese army on
civilians, especially those going to the market, the APCLS militia attacked the
FARDC at Kinyumba on the afternoon of September 29. 
“People consider us as sub-humans that don’t exist. So we wanted to
show them that we have power,” General Janvier said. “The people
have the right to go freely to get their provisions.”
During the FARDC counter-attack on the APCLS militia, with support from MONUC
attack helicopters, some of the abducted women and girls managed to escape, but
at least five were killed by FARDC soldiers as they tried to flee, including a
13-year-old.

Motivation for attacks in
Nyabiondo-Pinga area

Several local authorities, Congolese army commanders and others
told Human Rights Watch that they believed the motivation for the attacks on
civilians by former CNDP soldiers integrated into the Congolese army in the
Nyabiondo-Pinga area is about control over land and the return of Congolese
Tutsi refugees from Rwanda. One
former CNDP officer now integrated into the Congolese army told Human Rights
Watch that the operations in the Nyabiondo-Pinga area were intended to
“kill civilians and terrorize the Hunde and Hutu population” so
that the land would be cleared for the return of Congolese Tutsi coming back
from Rwanda.[278]

Several thousand Tutsi civilians lived in the mountainous
area between Nyabiondo and Pinga
including many Tutsi who came to Congo from Rwanda following ethnic pogroms
there in 1959. In
1992-93, ethnic clashes erupted between Hutu, Hunde and Tutsi ethnic groups who
lived in this area and in other towns and villages in Masisi. The clashes,
which were largely about control over land, left thousands dead. Many Tutsi
fled the area to seek refuge in other parts of Congo and eventually fled to
Rwanda following the arrival into Congo of a large number of Hutu refugees and
those responsible for the genocide in Rwanda.

One of the CNDP’s main political objectives is the
return of the Congolese Tutsi refugees from Rwanda back to Congo. There are an estimated 44,000 Congolese refugees in official refugee camps in Rwanda, in addition to other unregistered Congolese Tutsi who live in host families or who bought
their own land in Rwanda. Some
acquired Rwandan citizenship. Many harbored the desire to return to Congo one day.

UNHRC has not yet officially begun the process of returning
Congolese Tutsi refugees from Rwanda back to Congo, deeming the situation too
insecure. Yet between April and November 2009, several thousand refugees and
possibly other Rwandan citizens crossed the border to Congo, the majority since August. On
November 16, 2009, Human Rights Watch witnessed an estimated 90 civilians who
had crossed the border from Rwanda into Congo at Kibumba (27 kilometers northeast
of Goma) between 4 a.m. and 8 a.m., before the border post officially opened.
Once on the Congolese side of the border, the refugees boarded mini-buses which
took them to Kitchanga, Kilolirwe and other locations still considered areas
controlled by the CNDP. Some were escorted by Congolese army soldiers who local
people said were former CNDP combatants. Upon
arrival in Kitchanga, most have settled in a camp for displaced people waiting
for the security situation to improve in their villages of origin; for some
this is the area between Nyabiondo and Pinga.

It is unclear what has sparked this seemingly sudden
population movement. Those interviewed by Human Rights Watch in Kibumba and
Kitchanga cited hunger in Rwanda, educational opportunities in Congo,
possibilities of accessing their land in Congo, and news of peace and security
in eastern Congo as the reasons why they decided to leave Rwanda this year.Yet given that most are still living in
camps once they arrive in Congo, it is possible they may have been encouraged
to return or they believe there are new opportunities. 

The lack of transparency on the returns process and a formal
agreement with UNHCR and the Congolese government to facilitate such returns is
fuelling renewed ethnic tension in Masisi. Ongoing military operations in the
area are likely to put both the returnees and local populations at risk of
further attacks.

Killings in other areas during Kimia II

Congolese army soldiers also killed civilians in other areas
where they conducted operations against the FDLR, including in several villages
in southern Lubero territory in March and April; in Kalangita village in the
Ziralo area, Kalehe territory, on September 27; and in other villages in
Rutshuru, Masisi, Walikale, Lubero, Kalehe, Walungu, and Shabunda territories
of North and South Kivu (see annex for further details). Killings took place
during rape and looting incidents; when the FARDC failed to find FDLR
combatants during an operation and instead fired randomly at civilians; when
soldiers accused civilians of being collaborators or sympathizers with the
enemy; or when civilians collapsed after soldiers forced them to carry loads
that were too heavy. Human Rights Watch recorded the deaths of a least 118
civilians in such incidents.

On July 8, the FARDC killed a 33-year-old man and his
four-year-old son in Miano, in the Ufumandu area of Masisi territory, when the
man tried to protect his wife from being raped. His wife told a rape counselor
what happened:

I was in the house when the soldiers came. There were
gunshots and I didn’t know what to do. They called my husband and asked for
$500. They said they would kill him if he didn’t give it to them. We only had
$200 so we gave them that. They said it wasn’t enough, so we gave them two
radios and three goats. When they were getting ready to leave, one of them said
that I was pretty and he couldn’t leave without raping me. When my husband
begged him not to rape me, the soldier shot at my husband and the same bullet
hit my oldest son. Both of them died. Then he raped me.

On June 30, the Congolese army soldiers killed a
two-year-old boy in Lusirantaka, Masisi territory, because he had started to
cry when his mother was gang-raped by seven Congolese army soldiers.

In May, in the Bunyakiri area, Kalehe territory, a
40-year-old man was forced to transport goods for the FARDC from Mubongo to
Bulambika, but the load was too heavy for him and he collapsed. He later died
at a health center. In a
similar case also in May, 150 civilians were forced to transport baggage for
the Congolese army from Ufumandu to Hombo, a distance of over 50 kilometers.
According to witnesses, one of the civilians died on the way because the load
was too heavy.

On March 22 in Mubugu, Kalehe territory, the FARDC abducted
a local man to serve as their guide and show them the location of nearby FDLR
positions. When the man succeeded in leading them to a path used by the FDLR,
the soldiers summarily executed him, claiming he must have been an FDLR combatant
to know where the position was.

Other Abuses during Kimia
II

Sexual violence

Operation Kimia II continued the brutal trend of
sexual violence that had begun during operation Umoja Wetu. In North Kivu, in 350 of 527 sexual violence cases documented by Human Rights Watch during Kimia
II, the victim or other witnesses clearly identified the perpetrators as
Congolese army soldiers. More than half of the victims were gang-raped by two
or more soldiers, sometimes by as many as seven or eight. In research conducted
by Human Rights Watch, the youngest victim was only three years old, and the
oldest was 70 years old. Human Rights Watch documented cases of rape by newly
integrated soldiers, including those from the former CNDP and Mai Mai groups,
but also by soldiers who were previously in the Congolese army.

The very soldiers tasked to protect Congolese women and
girls were instead targeting them, sometimes accusing them of being FDLR wives
or supporters. But in
many cases, the sexual violence was linked to pillage and looting, whether in
the victims’ homes, their farms, or while women and girls were on their
way to the market. The government’s failure to pay its soldiers and provide
them adequate food rations while on operation contributed to an environment
where such violence flourished (see below for further information).

On March 24 in Nyamatovu village, Kalehe territory (South Kivu) Congolese army soldiers looted a home, raping a woman. She told Human Rights
Watch:

It was at night. Three soldiers came in with military
uniforms and rifles. They knocked their guns on the door and said, ‘If
you refuse to let us in, we’ll kill you.’ Then they came into the house
and said, ‘Get on the bed. You, animal, if you don’t do it, we’ll kill
you.’ When my children heard this, they fled, and until now I don’t know
where they are. I was raped by two of the soldiers. When the third soldier
wanted to, he heard cries outside so they left. The others had already pillaged
everything in my house. They were so violent. When they raped me, they said, ‘If
you cry, we’re going to kill you.’ I was scared of their guns and knew it
would be my death if I made any noise.

In Katoyi, Masisi territory, in early July, Congolese army
soldiers came to the home of a young pregnant woman. She told a rape
counselor: 

I was seven months pregnant and in the house with my
husband when the soldiers came in and asked for a casserole dish. We gave them
one, but they refused it and said it was too small. My husband said we didn’t
have a bigger one. When he said that, they started to beat my husband. Then
they went into the bedroom and started looting all our goods. When my husband
protested, they shot him dead. Then they turned to me and said, ‘Look, your
husband is dead and we can kill you too.’ Then they told me to get down and
take my clothes off. They said they didn’t have time to touch me but they
wanted to see how a baby stays in his mother’s stomach. Then they pulled my
legs apart and started to rape me. When the blood started to flow, they left
me. One of them wanted to cut open my stomach, but the other refused. The next
day I lost my baby. It was a boy. I thought I was going to die.

Sometimes women and girls were attacked as a group when on
the way to market and raped by government soldiers, often after they pillaged
their goods. For example, in Chambombo, in the Ziralo area, six soldiers
stopped a group of four women returning from the market in Lumbishi in late March
2009. A woman in the group who was six-months pregnant at the time and later
miscarried, told a rape counselor:

While coming back from the market, we met soldiers who had
put up a barrier on the road. They asked us each to give them $5. If we
didn’t have it, we couldn’t pass. We all had just bought beans, so
we didn’t have any money left…They made us put our sacks on the ground
and their boss gave the order to the others to take our beans from us. They
took the beans and said, ‘We’re going to put our hands in your
vaginas to look for money because women always hide money there. Then they
started to beat us. There were a lot of them. Each group of soldiers searched
one of us. Six soldiers then took each of us into the bush. They started to
rape us at 3 p.m., and it continued all night. When they finished the operation
in the morning, they shot in the air and left. Because I was pregnant, I
started to bleed immediately and lost my child. When my husband found out what
happened, he chased me away and said he couldn’t stay with me… So now I
am left alone. The soldiers were wearing camouflage uniforms. They were Tutsi
and very tall. They’re now integrated into the FARDC.

Congolese army soldiers also abducted women and girls and
held them as sexual slaves for weeks or months at a time. A 27-year-old woman
raped in mid-April by two soldiers in Bitonga in the Ziralo area and then taken
as a sexual slave for a month, told Human Rights Watch:

I was in the farm with nine other women when the soldiers
came and raped us. I was raped by two soldiers. They were in military uniforms
with guns. They spoke Kinyarwanda, and there was a mix of Hutu and Tutsi. They
then took me into the bush with them for one month. During all this time, hour
by hour, whoever wanted to, came and had sex with me. We were in a camp in the
forest near Bitonga. Every few days they moved to a new location. There were a
lot of other women in the camp who had been abducted from different villages.
One day they sent me to get firewood, and I took advantage of the opportunity
to flee.

Human Rights Watch also documented an increase in rape of
men and boys in 2009, mostly by Congolese army soldiers. 
In early May, five men and 10 women were raped when Congolese army soldiers
attacked Kaseke village, near Mutongo in the Nyabiondo-Pinga area. The men were
holding a meeting when their attackers arrived and accused them of being Mai
Mai. According to one of the men, who was raped five times by different
soldiers, the soldiers who raped them were Tutsi soldiers in green FARDC
uniforms who spoke Kinyarwanda and came from the direction of Pinga. Another
soldier eventually came and helped the victims flee.In early October 2009, soldiers in Masisi territory raped a man after
raping his wife. The rape was so violent that the man died one hour later.

Many victims, health workers and counselors faced retaliation
after reporting on sexual violence cases committed by Congolese army soldiers. A
19-year-old woman who complained to the authorities after she was raped by
soldiers in Masisi was then attacked and raped a second time.
A 14-year-old girl who was raped by a Congolese army officer on the road
between Masisi and Loashi in mid-2009 wanted to complain, but before she was
able to do so she was arrested by army soldiers and accused of being a spy for
the FDLR. When local human rights activists intervened, they received anonymous
death threats.

A rape counselor in South Kivu was herself raped in January
2009 by newly integrated CNDP combatants who accused her of denouncing them and
reporting on the rapes. They said they knew her name, but not her face and
demanded to know if it was her. She tried to give a different name, but the
soldiers did not believe her. She was badly beaten and violently raped. The
soldiers put a shoe into her vagina and spit at her. Despite the pain and the
violence of the rape, and the dangers associated with her work, she told Human
Rights Watch that she would not give up. She continues to serve other victims
of rape.

Forced labor

Since the start of military operations against the FDLR, Congolese
army forces have pressed hundreds of civilians into forced labor to carry their
supplies, ammunition, and other equipment to the frontlines. The journeys are
long and difficult, and the loads often very heavy. At least two men died after
collapsing under loads that were too heavy for them to carry and at least ten
others were killed when they refused or were physically unable to lift the load
assigned to them. Human Rights Watch researchers were direct witnesses to the
forced labor of civilians by Congolese army soldiers in five different
locations throughout North and South Kivu during the course of their research.

Civilians have also been abducted to serve as
“guides” and show the FARDC soldiers the paths usually taken by the
FDLR or their military positions. These civilians risked being punished and
beaten either for not knowing where the FDLR may be hiding, or, if they did
seem to know where to go, sometimes they have been accused of being an FDLR member
or collaborator. Civilians traveling with soldiers as porters or guides also
risked falling into ambushes by the FDLR or being targeted later by FDLR
combatants who accused them of having “collaborated with” or
supported the enemy forces.

In March 2009, 100 men were forced to transport supplies for
the FARDC from Kirundu to Busurungi and then to Kibua (Masisi). One man in the
group described what happened:

The FARDC there made us transport their baggage all the way
from Kirundu to Busurungi and then to Kibua. It took three days. There were
over 100 civilians, all men taken from villages along the way to transport
their baggage. If you walked slowly, they beat you. They beat me badly several
times, and that’s why I’m still sick and can’t walk well. Some beat me with the
butt of their gun and others whipped me on my legs. The soldiers didn’t give us
food so we had to find what we could in the villages. It was when I was looking
for food that I managed to flee.

The same man was twice again pressed into forced labor by
army soldiers.

An 18-year-old student from Funguramacho (near Remeka,
Ufumandu) had a similar story:

Our soldiers go in front of each house every morning to
force all the men to transport their baggage. I’ve been taken three times, and
each time they whipped me badly. The first time was in February. I was taken in
Funguramacho and transported baggage to Kibua…There were 12 civilians and we
transported 12 boxes of ammunition. If we said we were tired, they beat us and
told us to walk faster. There were children among us

—

five kids from the primary school,
some as young as eight, who had to carry the soldiers’ children on their backs.
The second time I was taken was also in February. They were waiting for us
outside my school in Funguramacho. When we came outside, they took us and
forced us to carry all the beer for the soldiers to Katahunda. There were two
of us…The third time was in May 2009. I was taken at Funguramacho and had to
go to Kashovu and then back to Funguramacho. There were four of us, and they
made us transport four jerry-cans of whiskey.

Many civilians suffered serious and long-term injuries as a
result of the physical beatings and the heavy loads. A 29-year-old man from
Remeka, in the Ufumandu area, was stabbed in the eye on May 27, 2009, when he refused to transport baggage. “The doctors say they don’t know if I’ll see
again,” he told Human Rights Watch.

In many areas, Congolese army soldiers also forced civilians
to carry out services for them such as collecting firewood and water, or
constructing their temporary huts. In some locations the use of civilians for
this work led local authorities to bitterly complain that their populations
were being used as “slaves.”

Extortion and pillage

Congolese army soldiers deployed on operations against the
FDLR systematically pillaged villages, extorted illegal “taxes”
from civilians, and looted their goods as they fled combat or traveled to and
from the market. The problem of extortion and looting was compounded by the
failure to pay soldiers or when salaries were months delayed. Even when
salaries were paid, the current wage of $45 per month for a foot soldier is not
enough to feed him and his family, making looting and extortion of civilians
during military operations almost inevitable. Looting and pillage were part of
nearly all attacks on villages by the Congolese army documented by Human Rights
Watch during the course of its research in North and South Kivu throughout 2009.
The effect on civilian populations already suffering from immense poverty,
displacement, and other hardships has been incalculable.

Congolese army soldiers regularly erected roadblocks and
other checkpoints where they extorted money from civilians. Sometimes the sole
purpose of such a roadblock was to engage in illegal taxation. Former CNDP
soldiers newly integrated into the army, often still unpaid and whose ranks had
yet to be confirmed, were at the forefront of such extortion. The soldiers
erected illegal barricades on important road junctions at Kilolirwe, Kitchanga
and Mushake, in Masisi territory (North Kivu), for example, where they demanded
payment for passage, especially from trucks required to pay US$100, and
sometimes up to US$300, and 20 liters of petrol to pass.
In another case in Ngungu, also Masisi territory, civilians were forced to pay
300 Congolese francs (about US$0.38) to enter and exit the twice-weekly markets
at Gasake, Remeka, Ngungu, Miano, and Murambi. Traders were required to hand
over 5 to 6 kilograms from each sack of consumable merchandise they were
carrying such as flour, rice, or beans. The barriers in this area were
controlled by Col. Innocent Zimurinda, formerly of the CNDP.[309] 

The extortion increased tensions between the soldiers and
the local population and on a number of occasions, MONUC peacekeepers had to
intervene. In one incident, at an important road junction on the road near
Sake, MONUC peacekeepers fired warning shots in the air to try to force the
newly integrated CNDP soldiers to comply with MONUC’s request to
immediately remove a barrier, after the soldiers had demanded money from the
peacekeepers.

In some areas Congolese army soldiers acted like common
criminals to extort money. In Kirumba, Lubero territory, soldiers regularly
conducted extortion raids known by local people as “Operation Fenêtre”
(“window” in French). Soldiers would arrive at the window of a
home, put the barrels of their guns through the window and then demand money.
Fearful the soldiers might shoot, local people handed over whatever they could
to save themselves. Then the soldiers moved on to the next house.

Arbitrary arrests

Congolese army soldiers arbitrarily arrested civilians whom
they accused of being collaborators or sympathizers of the FDLR and detained
them without charge for days or weeks, often beating them and demanding payment
before they were released. During the course of its research, Human Rights
Watch documented over 160 such cases.

In Miriki, Lubero territory, between February 13 and March 7, 2009, just after Congolese army forces arrived in this former FDLR stronghold, they
arrested 40 people, including the local police commander, Lubiho Maruho. They
were all accused of having collaborated with the FDLR. When the FDLR attacked
Miriki on March 7, most of the detainees were able to escape. When the
Congolese army soldiers counter-attacked and retook the town, they again
arrested Maruho, the police commander, whom they summarily executed for his
perceived collaboration with the FDLR.  

A local chief from southern Lubero was arrested on March 9, 2009, by soldiers who accused him of telling the FDLR to attack. He was released
when his family members and friends paid over $1,000.
A displaced person from Iroba, in the Mubugu area (South Kivu), told Human
Rights Watch about the arrest of his mother in April 2009 by Congolese army
soldiers after she was accused of being close to the FDLR. She was released
only after her son paid the soldiers a goat, a chicken, and $100.

In Mikumbi village, in Walikale territory, several young men
were arrested in April and held in underground prisons by soldiers who accused
them of having accepted to live with the FDLR. They were freed after the local
community paid 27 goats and $1 per prisoner.

Responsibility for the Crimes

As noted above, international humanitarian law applies to
all parties to a conflict, including the Congolese and Rwandan armies, who must
distinguish between combatants and civilians, not deliberately attack civilians
or civilian objects, and treat humanely all persons in their custody.
Individuals who willfully commit serious violations of the laws of war, that is
deliberately or recklessly, are responsible for war crimes. This includes those
who participate in or order war crimes, or are culpable as a matter of command
responsibility. States have an obligation to investigate alleged war crimes
committed on their territory.

Crimes committed during Umoja Wetu

Operation Umoja Wetu was a joint military operation
with Congolese and Rwandan armed forces. Both governments are responsible for
investigating the behavior of their troops during the operations, including the
massacres committed at Ndorumo and Byarenega documented above, among others. As
the alleged violations took place on Congolese territory, the Rwandan
government should actively cooperate with Congolese and other judicial
investigations into alleged violations of international human rights and
humanitarian law committed by Rwandan armed forces during operation Umoja
Wetu, and provide any information it may have on abuses committed by former
CNDP troops. The Rwandan government should also ensure that any commanders or
soldiers found responsible are disciplined or prosecuted as appropriate,
including as a matter of command responsibility.

The Rwandan government should also order an investigation
into the arbitrary arrest, illegal transfer and torture of Congolese citizens
in Gisenyi, Rwanda, including the alleged criminal responsibility of Gen. James
Kaberebe.

Crimes committed during Kimia II

Responsibility for Nyabiondo-Pinga area killings

The attacks in the area between Nyabiondo and Pinga were
largely commanded by former CNDP officers operating under the command of the 2nd
Operational Zone of North Kivu (a designated military zone where operations
were being conducted), whose headquarters was in Mushake (Masisi territory).
The overall commander of the 2nd Operational Zone at the time of the
attacks was Col. Bernard Biamungu. Each operational zone is designated into
sectors and the 21st and 22nd Sectors were involved in
the military operations that carried out attacks on civilians. According to
Congolese army commanders interviewed by Human Rights Watch and local
authorities in the area, the units responsible for the attacks in the area
between Nyabiondo and Pinga attacked from Congolese army military positions at
Lwibo, Kinyumba, Kinyana, Kivuye, Miaandja, Pinga, and Kitchanga, all locations
under the control of the 21st and 22nd Sectors.

As in other locations in North and South Kivu, officers in
these sectors have been frequently moved around, tactics that may be deliberate
to make it difficult to identify command responsibility. Based on information
received from Congolese army commanders, local authorities and witnesses, the
following Congolese army commanders should be investigated for ordering alleged
war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by Congolese soldiers in the
Nyabiondo-Pinga area, and as a matter of command responsibility:

• Col. Innocent Kabundi, a former CNDP officer who was
  commander of the 22nd Sector based in Kitchanga from February
  through June 2009.
• Col. Innocent Kahina, also known as “India Queen,”
  commander of the 22nd Sector based in Kitchanga since around August
  2009. Colonel Kahina was released from prison in Kinshasa in early 2009,
  apparently for health reasons, where he was awaiting trial for alleged
  crimes against humanity committed in Ituri, northeastern Congo.
• Lt. Col. Salongo Ndekezi, deputy commander of the 21st
  Sector based in Katale. Colonel Salongo was previously a commander of an
  armed group in Ituri where he participated in massacres on an ethnic basis
  in Mongbwalu amongst other locations. He joined the CNDP along with Bosco
  Ntaganda in 2006 or 2007.
• Lt. Col. Ngabo Alphonse, a former CNDP officer and
  commander of the 213th Brigade based north of Nyabiondo under
  the command of the 21st Sector.

Others in chain of command

Other senior officers not present during the attacks in the
Nyabiondo and Pinga area, as well as in other locations, should also be
investigated for their role in alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity.

According to informed sources with knowledge of the chain of
command in the Congolese army, Gen. Bosco Ntaganda, the de facto deputy
commander of Operation Kimia II, and the most senior former CNDP
officer, gave the order for military operations to proceed in the area between
Nyabiondo and Pinga. The
majority of the commanders who participated in the operation were former CNDP
and retained a direct link to General Ntaganda.

According to the same sources, Col. Bobo Kakudji, the North
Kivu commander for Operation Kimia II, and General Amuli, the overall
commander of Kimia II, had little control over commanders in this area,
had not approved the operations, and may not even have been aware of them when
they first began.[322]
While there is no evidence that links these two officers to the crimes, as the
two most senior military commanders in North Kivu, they should ensure that
judicial investigations are promptly carried out and those responsible held to
account.

In November 2008, the government established and sent a
special military tribunal, called the Military Operational Court (cour
militaire opérationnelle) to prosecute crimes committed by its
soldiers in the context of military operations. Between January and September
2009, 35 army soldiers and officers, including two commanding officers, were
tried for crimes related to human rights violations in North Kivu and a further
10 army soldiers in South Kivu. See
below for further information.

Human Rights Watch repeatedly met with General Amuli and
Colonel Kakudji to inform them about human rights violations documented in this
report. On October 22, 2009, following a detailed briefing on the abuses
committed in the area between Nyabiondo and Pinga, General Amuli committed to
create a small team to work alongside MONUC to identify incidents where the
chain of command might have broken down and where incidents were not reported to
him. He further agreed to launch a joint verification mission with MONUC to
look into the allegations of killings and massacres in the area between
Nyabiondo and Pinga. At the
time of writing, the investigations had not yet begun.

Human Rights Watch also advocated for investigations into alleged
crimes committed in other areas of North and South Kivu by Congolese army soldiers,
including crimes of sexual violence.

VI. Congolese Army Attacks on Rwandan Hutu Refugees

Thousands of Rwandan Hutu refugees live in eastern Congo, though the exact figure is unknown. These
refugees were part of the nearly one million Hutu who fled to Congo (then
Zaire) in 1994 following the Rwandan genocide and after the then-Tutsi rebels,
led by Paul Kagame, overthrew the Hutu government responsible for it. The
refugees congregated in sprawling refugee camps based around Goma and Bukavu
where they were intermixed with militia forces and others who had perpetrated
the genocide. The
Hutu combatants quickly regrouped and transformed several refugee camps into
military bases from where they launched attacks against the new Tutsi-led
government in Rwanda.

In 1996, Rwandan troops
invaded Congo and attacked the refugee camps, killing thousands of civilians as
well as combatants. In the chaos, the Rwandan Hutu refugees fled in different
directions: some returned to Rwanda while thousands of others fled westwards
into Congo’s thick jungles. The Rwandan army together with a hastily
constituted Congolese rebel group, the Alliance for Democratic Liberation
(AFDL), pursued the Hutu combatants and fleeing refugees, killing tens of
thousands of the refugees in remote forest locations as they moved westwards.
Many of the remaining Rwandan refugees were scattered across Congo, some eventually turning up in neighboring countries such as Congo-Brazzaville (Republic of Congo), Angola and the Central African Republic.

Many of the Hutu refugees who remained in Congo regrouped, often living close to Rwandan Hutu militias for protection (including since 2000
the FDLR) but also because the militias manipulated the refugees for their own
political purposes and discouraged them from returning to Rwanda. Today, the refugees are effectively hostage to the FDLR combatants. FDLR commanders use the
refugees for forced labor, recruit the youth into their ranks, and continue to
actively discourage any return to Rwanda.

Despite the obstacles imposed by the FDLR, some 12,387
refugees returned to Rwanda from Congo between January and October 2009.
Many of them left in a large wave following the fall of the FDLR’s main
bases in Masisi territory when control over the refugees appeared to
temporarily weaken. During
February alone, UNHCR was able to repatriate 3,211 Rwandan refugees, a monthly
figure much higher than at any time over the past few years.

But the numbers of returnees dropped soon after Congolese
army soldiers arrived in Hombo, on the border between North and South Kivu,
where many of the refugees had gathered, waiting for transportation assistance
back to Rwanda. A number of factors contributed to the reduction, including the
slow speed at which UNHCR was able to get trucks to the area to assist in the
returns, as well as stricter control by some FDLR commanders who wanted to
prevent refugees from returning. But
the most important factor appears to have been the Congolese army attacks on
Hutu refugees during military operations against FDLR forces, and the failure
to provide the refugees and other civilians an effective humanitarian corridor
by which to escape from FDLR zones of control.

Human Rights Watch documented the slaughter of at least 143
Rwandan Hutu refugees by Congolese army soldiers during operation Kimia II since
March 2009. The vast majority were women and children killed in the area around
Shalio, some 40 kilometers northeast of Hombo. Many of the refugees were
summarily executed after they were taken into custody by Congolese army
soldiers, while others have “disappeared.” Dozens of women and
girls were raped, and some were kept as sexual slaves, and then killed. Deeply
traumatized and fearful of further attacks, many refugees hid in small groups
in the forests of North and South Kivu, avoiding main roads or towns, with
little or no access to healthcare or adequate food, and with few possibilities
to find ways to return to Rwanda.

Operation Kimia II has not given sufficient attention
to the protection of the refugees, who have been isolated and preyed upon for
years by Hutu militias, nor to facilitating their return to Rwanda. The establishment of safe humanitarian corridors, protected by MONUC peacekeepers, could
help to facilitate the repatriation of the Rwandan Hutu refugees and reduce
abuses by the FDLR, which relies on this community for filling its ranks and
providing support.

 

Shalio Area Massacre

After Congolese and Rwandan coalition forces pushed the FDLR
out of their main bases in Kibua and Kalonge in late January 2009, hundreds of
refugees living there fled south and west, sometimes alongside FDLR combatants,
sometimes on their own. After days of walking, many gathered in Biriko, a
village on the border between Masisi, Walikale, and Kalehe territories. After
an attack in March by Congolese army soldiers left at least 13 refugees dead,
the survivors continued west where many gathered on the hills near the small
town of Busurungi, in the Walualoanda area of Walikale territory. They set up
make-shift camps on three of the hills known as Shalio, Marok, and Bunyarwanda,
where they found other Rwandan refugees. The area had previously hosted a
number of FDLR camps and is likely to have been known to the refugees.

Between April 27 and 29, Congolese army soldiers—many
of them former CNDP fighters—attacked the refugees and carried out one of
their worst massacres, killing 129 refugees, mostly women and children.
While there were FDLR combatants positioned in these hills, all witnesses
interviewed by Human Rights Watch reported that the FDLR combatants fled in
advance of the attacks and were not present in any of the make-shift refugee
camps targeted by the Congolese army soldiers.

In Shalio, the refugee camp was located halfway up the hill
and housed between 450 and 550 refugees, mostly women and children, in about
100 thatch huts covered with plastic sheeting. Early in the morning on April 27
Congolese army soldiers surrounded the refugee camp and started firing.
According to persons present during the attack and interviewed by Human Rights
Watch, there was no warning, and at least 50 refugees were killed as they tried
to flee. Some
of the victims were shot in the neck; others were killed by machete. A number
were tied up first and then were clubbed to death with blows to the head. One
man was buried alive up to his chest and then stabbed in the eye with a
bayonet. Another man had his legs and arms tied together before the soldiers
shot him.

One woman told Human Rights Watch:

When the Tutsi soldiers attacked us at Shalio, I lost six
members of my family, including my eight-year-old daughter, 12-year-old son,
and 15-year-old son, who were all beaten to death by wooden clubs in front of
me. Then four of the soldiers took me and raped me. They told me that I’m
the wife of an FDLR and they can do whatever they want to me. I was able to
flee, but I’ve been very sick since then, and I have constant pains in my
stomach.

Many women and girls were raped during the attack, some of
whom were later killed.

After some five hours, the soldiers left the camp and burned
it to the ground. One
group of Congolese army soldiers took at gunpoint a group of 50 of the
refugees, mostly women and children. At Biriko, a short distance from Shalio
Hill, the soldiers beat 46 refugees to death with wooden clubs and shot three
men who tried to flee. Only one man in the group, who had been used by the
FARDC soldiers to transport goods from Shalio to Biriko, managed to escape.
According to an FDLR commander later interviewed by UN officials, the bodies of
the refugees were then thrown into the Nyabarongo River.

According to some reports, another group of soldiers took a
second group of refugees from Shalio to Kaleta to be presented to Lt. Col.
Innocent Zimurinda, the Congolese army commander in charge of the operations in
the area, before being sent on to Ngungu (see below).
Human Rights Watch, however, has been unable to ascertain their fate or confirm
whether they ever made it to Kaleta or Ngungu.

A third group of refugees comprising 40 women was taken from
Shalio to the nearby Congolese army military position at Busurungi, where they
were kept as sexual slaves, gang-raped and mutilated by Congolese army
soldiers. A week later, 10 of the women managed to escape. Human Rights Watch
interviewed several of these women. One bore marks of mutilation: her attackers
had cut chunks from her breasts and stomach. The
fate of the remaining 30 women is unknown.

In the days following the attack on Shalio, Congolese army
soldiers continued their attacks on the Rwandan refugees, targeting the
make-shift camp on the nearby hills of Bunyarwanda and Marok, which housed
hundreds more refugees. At Bunyarwanda, they killed at least 15 refugees,
including one man and fourteen women and children, though some reported that as
many as 35 refugees may have been killed.

One woman described the attack to Human Rights Watch:

We were in a group of about 60 refugees… After I had been
there for a little over a week, we heard gunshots and then realized the Tutsi
soldiers had come to attack us. There were no FDLR combatants around. I was
very pregnant so I tried to hide while watching the population fleeing… Then
the soldiers found me and took me to the side of the path and raped me. During
this time there were lots of gunshots and I heard the cries of people dying in
the forest without any help. I was able to escape when I asked the soldiers who
had taken me for authorization to relieve myself. As I fled, I saw the bodies
of one man and fourteen women and children who had been killed. When I
eventually found my husband, he rejected me because he’d heard that I had
been raped.

At Marok, Congolese army soldiers killed at least 15
civilians, and possibly as many as 40. According to witnesses interviewed by
Human Rights Watch, some of the victims were shot, and others were beaten to
death with wooden clubs or stabbed with bayonets.
After the attack, the soldiers set up a position in Marok and stayed there for
three days. Twenty women were held hostage and gang-raped, five of whom were
later killed with bayonets. Before the soldiers left, they burned the camp to
the ground. 

Individual Responsibility for Killings in Shalio area

Neither the Congolese armed forces nor MONUC has undertaken
an investigation into the April mass killings in the Shalio area. The Congolese armed forces have committed many acts of
murder, rape and other atrocities in several large-scale attacks targeting a
civilian population—Rwandan Hutu refugees. As such, Human Rights Watch
believes that offenses committed during these attacks may amount to crimes
against humanity as well as war crimes under international law.

Since the Shalio killings, some Congolese army officers
expressed concern to UN officials about the killings.
On May 12, MONUC sent a joint assessment mission to Hombo to look into the
allegations, but upon arrival the team was distracted by the Busurungi massacre
committed by FDLR forces (see above), which had occurred only two days earlier,
in a location that was easier to access than Shalio. Because the attack was by
FDLR combatants, survivors fled to government-controlled areas, making them
much easier for MONUC to access compared to the Shalio survivors, most of whom fled
into the forests and areas controlled by the FDLR and their allies, where MONUC
had limited or no access. While in the circumstances this was understandable,
it is less easy to understand why no subsequent MONUC investigation into the
events at Shalio has taken place.

On October 15, Philip Alston, the UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial
executions, issued a press statement following a 10-day mission to Congo, and
called for a thorough investigation into the killing of refugees in the Shalio
area.

The following Congolese army commanders should be
investigated for ordering alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity
committed by Congolese army forces in the Shalio area and as a matter of
command responsibility:

Lt. Col. Innocent Zimurinda

Lt. Col. Innocent Zimurinda, a former CNDP Tutsi officer
integrated into the Congolese army, played an important role in the Shalio
attack. Colonel Zimurinda was based in Gasake (between Ngungu and Remeka,
Masisi territory) and was responsible for the army’s 231st
Integrated Brigade, under the command of Col. Baudouin Ngaruye.
According to a Congolese army soldier who was in the 231st Brigade
at the time, Zimurinda sent the 2312 battalion under the command of Maj. Eric
Badege to carry out an operation against the FDLR in the Shalio area. Soon
after the operations began, Badege called Zimurinda to tell him they had
captured a refugee woman and her children. According to Congolese army sources
who were present Zimurinda replied that the refugees should not be spared. He
then gave an order via radio overheard by others, “I want no prisoners of
war in this operation.”

According to Congolese army sources, Major Badege was
unwilling to carry out the order he received from Zimurinda to kill the
refugees. Colonel Zimurinda sent an order directly to the battalion’s S2
(intelligence officer), Capt. Jules Hareremana, who was loyal to Zimurinda,
instructing him to lead an attack on the refugee camps along with some of Zimurinda’s
escorts who had accompanied the battalion.

According to credible reports received by Human Rights
Watch, including interviews with Congolese army soldiers present during the
attacks, Colonel Zimurinda directly ordered the killing of all persons taken by
their forces, including refugees. This
order, which appears to have been acted upon, violates the prohibitions under
the laws of war against ordering that no quarter be given to enemy troops,
against summarily executing persons taken into custody,
and failing to distinguish civilians from combatants during attacks.

Philip Alston’s October 15
press statement specifically cited the responsibility of Colonel Zimurinda for
the massacre of Rwandan Hutu refugees in Shalio on April 27.
The Congolese government spokesperson, Lambert Mende, responded that the
government was aware of the massacre but was not prepared to take action
against Colonel Zimurinda. Mende
added, “Zimurinda’s arrest would have had worse consequences than the
crimes of which he is accused.”

The government might have been reluctant to act against
Colonel Zimurinda because he is a cousin and close ally of Gen. Bosco Ntaganda,
the de facto deputy commander of operation Kimia II and the person
responsible for integrating former CNDP troops into the Congolese army. General
Ntaganda was in Ngungu during the Shalio massacre, not far from where Colonel Zimurinda
was based. Given the close relationship between Ntaganda and Zimurinda, there
is a strong basis for concluding that Ntaganda was aware of the massacre and possibly
gave the orders to Zimurinda to carry out the attack. Ntaganda is wanted on war
crimes charges by the International Criminal Court and is also listed in
MONUC’s internal report on officers responsible for gross human rights
violations. The
Congolese government said the “demands of peace override the traditional
needs of justice” to justify their refusal to arrest Ntaganda for fear of
upsetting the peace process and the integration of former CNDP troops into the
army.
Congolese civil society groups as well as Human Rights Watch had denounced
incorporating combatants from this highly abusive force into the Congolese
army.

Colonel Zimurinda also appears in another confidential
internal MONUC document from mid-2009, which lists 15 Congolese army officers
responsible for past gross human rights violations who continue to serve in Kimia
II operations. In the document he is listed as having taken part in the
March 2007 massacre in Buramba, North Kivu.

Other Killings and
“Disappearances” of Rwandan Hutu Refugees

In addition to the killings in the Shalio area, Human Rights
Watch also received unconfirmed reports that Congolese army forces killed 15
refugees in Mihanda (North Kivu) in late February,
20 refugees in May near Ramba (South Kivu), and 30
refugees in Rusamambo (North Kivu) in July.

Dozens of other Rwandan refugees, often held by Congolese
army soldiers under the pretense that they would be transferred to relevant
agencies for repatriation to Rwanda, have later “disappeared” and
not been presented to DDRRR or UNHCR repatriation centers. This was the case
near Luvingi, Uvira territory, where according to MONUC officials, 10 women and
15 children, possibly family members of FDLR combatants, were being held by
Congolese army soldiers for intelligence purposes. After direct intervention
with senior Congolese army commanders, MONUC officials were eventually informed
that the individuals were being transferred to the Kimia II operations center
in Bukavu, but they never arrived. Their whereabouts remain unknown.
One MONUC official who followed the incident later told Human Rights Watch,
“My fear is that this is just the tip of the iceberg… who knows what
else is happening in the forests and on the other side of the frontline in
areas we have no access to.”

Many of the Rwandan refugees in Congo feel targeted by all
sides. The despair of this community was vividly expressed by one refugee woman
interviewed by Human Rights Watch. She said,

I can’t go back to Rwanda because the situation
hasn’t changed, and we [the Hutu] are still treated like animals. Soon
after my brother went back [to Rwanda], he was put in prison without judgment
and then they killed him for unknown reasons. His wife also died in very
suspect circumstances. But here in Congo, we are all treated as FDLR and are
forced to hide in the forest to avoid being attacked. I want to be recognized
as a refugee, and I want to be able to leave the forest and live with honor and
dignity, either here in Congo, back in Rwanda, or in another country.

VII. Congolese Government and Army’s
Failure to Protect Civilians

The protection of civilians in Congo is primarily the
responsibility of the Congolese government and its security forces. Yet
Congolese government officials have failed to take adequate or effective steps
to protect civilians in eastern Congo. Congolese army troops have committed
widespread violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, but
few have been held to account.

During military operations in Umoja Wetu and Kimia
II, the Congolese armed forces made little if any planning for civilian
protection, integrated highly abusive militias into its forces, and failed to
seriously address the deeply entrenched problem of impunity. In some cases, the
Congolese army launched attacks in areas where they knew civilians and
humanitarian workers would be put at particular risk.

Inadequate

Civilian Protection Plan

ning

Before the Congolese government embarked on the military
operations Umoja Wetu and Kimia II, little or no provision for civilian
protection in conflict areas was put into place. Once operations were underway
and FDLR retaliatory attacks against civilians were launched, the government
and army officials made few, if any, adjustments to military operations to
account for the increased risk to civilians.

In July, several months after the operations began, instructions
were issued to troops that the government had “zero tolerance” for
human rights violations and that commanders would be held to account for the
behavior of their troops (see below), but there have been no other instructions
that would facilitate the protection of civilians from FDLR abuses. When asked
by Human Rights Watch researchers what measures were being taken to protect
civilians during the ongoing military operations, some senior army commanders
responded that civilian protection was the responsibility of MONUC.

The government should have foreseen and taken into account
that its military operations would be placing civilians at greatly heightened
risk of abuses from FDLR combatants and its own forces. Previous military
operations in North Kivu in 2007 and 2008, including a short-lived joint
operation in 2007 when CNDP troops temporarily “mixed” with
Congolese army soldiers to fight the FDLR, had
also resulted in FDLR retaliatory attacks against civilians and abuses by
government soldiers. But Congolese decision-makers appeared to focus entirely
on the offensive military operations against the FDLR without giving adequate, if
any, serious attention to the additional risks to civilians. Civilians suffered
tremendously because the Congolese government, with the support of its
international partners (discussed below), sought to achieve the twin goals of
making a peace deal with the CNDP rebels and weakening the FDLR by launching
military operations without adequate provision for the protection of civilians.
This had horrific consequences for the people of eastern Congo.

Integration
Problems Increase Risks

In a hasty “fast track accelerated integration”
process that was part of the arrangement struck between Congo and Rwanda, the
Congolese army welcomed an estimated 20,000 former rebels, mostly from the CNDP
but also other Mai Mai groups, into its ranks. After registering their names,
giving them Congolese army uniforms, and, for some, a cursory health check, the
Congolese government deployed them within days on military operations against
the FDLR alongside their existing soldiers. At the launch of operation Kimia
II, there were an estimated 50,000 government soldiers deployed on military
operations in North and South Kivu. The
rapid integration process provided no opportunity for vetting the rebels to
dismiss human rights abusers, nor were child soldiers removed from the rebel
ranks before being integrated into the government army. Once former rebels
became government soldiers, their conduct became the responsibility of the
Congolese army.

The rapid integration process led to immediate problems.
There was confusion over chain of command with newly integrated former rebels
and government soldiers who were already in the army often remaining loyal to
their old commanders rather than to their new officers. Soldiers’
salaries were seriously delayed or not paid at all, and there were inadequate
food rations for the troops. The government, already cash-strapped due to the
economic downturn, had not planned in its budget for an increase in troop
numbers nor for the cost of major military operations.
As troops deployed to frontline locations, there was also no clear record of
which soldier had been deployed where, making payments and food distributions
even more difficult. Within months, some of the soldiers and their families
began to protest, such as those in Kanyabayonga, Beni and Goma (North Kivu). In some locations they deserted or even mutinied. In at least one case, on
June 15, in Pinga, Walikale territory, the soldiers tried to kill their
commander for the failure to pay their salaries and then attacked a MONUC base.

The payment and logistical shortfalls played a significant
role in contributing to attacks on civilians as hungry, unpaid troops looted
and pillaged from local populations, often raping the women and girls they
attacked and sometimes killing those who stood in their way. Months into the
military operations, the Congolese government still had not resolved these
problems. While officials acknowledged that the problem existed, and that it
increased the risk to civilians, they
did not in any significant way curtail military operations while they sought to
find solutions.

Problems in the rapid integration process also led a number
of former rebel forces to withdraw altogether. Several Mai Mai groups, angry at
the lack of salary payments and what they perceived as preferential treatment
given to their former CNDP adversaries, dropped out of the process.Some of the groups ended up joining forces
with the FDLR.

Entrenched
Impunity

Several factors contributed to the numerous serious abuses
committed by Congolese army forces against civilians, including commanders who
ordered or tolerated atrocities, lack of discipline among the Congolese
national troops and the hastily inducted rebel forces, and the failure to pay
salaries and provide sufficient food for the troops on operations. Perhaps most
crucial was the government’s failure to hold to account those responsible
for war crimes and other violations. Impunity for serious abuses, already prevalent
in Congo, has intensified since the launch of military operations.

In January 2009 the government promoted Bosco Ntaganda,
wanted on an arrest warrant by the International Criminal Court for war crimes,
to the rank of general in the Congolese army. Since then he has become the de
facto deputy commander of operation Kimia II. The government also
promoted or permitted other known human rights abusers to play important
operational roles in the military operations, including former CNDP and other
commanders:

• Bernard Biamungu, appointed a colonel in charge of the 2nd
  Operations Zone in Mushake, who is accused of participating in dozens of
  summary executions in Kindu (Maniema province) in 2003 and Kisangani in
  2002;
• Jean Pierre Biyoyo, found guilty by a Congolese military
  court in March 2006 of recruiting children into a militia group, who was
  appointed to serve as a lieutenant colonel and the deputy commander of
  operations in the 32nd sector in Kalehe territory (South Kivu);
• Innocent Zimurinda, accused of participating in the
  massacres at Kiwanja in 2008 and Buramba in 2007, was appointed to be a
  lieutenant colonel and commander of the 23rd Operational Sector
  in North Kivu;
• Sultani Makenga, accused of child recruitment and
  participation in massacres at Katwiguru, Kiseguru, Buramba, and Rubare,
  was named colonel and deputy commander of Kimia II operations in
  South Kivu;
• Delphin Kahimbi, a colonel, was appointed Kimia II commander
  in South Kivu despite repeated allegations by MONUC officials, as well as Human
  Rights Watch, of his involvement in the arbitrary arrests, torture, and
  ill-treatment of detainees, especially Tutsi, in North Kivu and for
  ordering his troops to fire on UN peacekeepers.

When many of these commanders continued to commit the same
atrocities for which they were already notorious, as was the case of Colonel Zimurinda
mentioned above, the government claimed it was unable to act to arrest them for
fear of causing more harm to civilians should the peace process unravel.

Not only do such decisions violate the Congolese
government’s international and national legal obligations to investigate
and prosecute individuals responsible for war crimes, they are also horribly misguided.
Forgoing accountability effectively sanctions the commission of more grave
crimes and puts civilians at even greater risk. All too often a peace that is
conditioned on impunity for the most serious crimes is not sustainable.
As Philip Alston, the UN special rapporteur onextrajudicial executions, said at
the end of his mission to Congo in October 2009, “Peace will not come, nor will justice, until the
government and the international community take seriously the notion that those
accused of heinous crimes must be indicted immediately.”

Some
Good Intentions

The government has attempted to take some measures to tackle
abuses by its troops, including the establishment of a special military
tribunal and the adoption in July 2009 of a policy of “zero
tolerance” for abuses committed by government soldiers.

As noted above, in November 2008, the government established
and sent a special military tribunal, called the Military Operational Court (cour
militaire opérationnelle), to North Kivu to prosecute crimes
committed by its soldiers in the context of military operations. Between
January and September 2009, 35 army soldiers and officers, including two
commanding officers, were tried for crimes related to human rights violations
in North Kivu. The
government established a similar tribunal in South Kivu on July 12, which has
tried 10 soldiers.
Unfortunately, many of those charged escaped detention and were tried in
absentia, therefore limiting the tribunal’s impact.
The tribunal also lacks important due-process guarantees, including the right
to appeal.

Regular military tribunals have also tried some cases of
serious human rights violations. For example, in April 2009, a military
tribunal in Walikale sentenced 16 soldiers to life imprisonment for crimes
against humanity after the soldiers committed widespread rape, in some cases
resulting in the death of the victim. Three other soldiers received the death
sentence for rape and armed robbery and one soldier was sentenced to 15 years’
imprisonment for raping a minor. Ten of
the soldiers convicted had fled prior to the trial and were therefore tried in
absentia; two others escaped after sentencing.

Between February and August 2009, the Military
Prosecutor’s offices in North and South Kivu prosecuted fewer than 100
cases of sexual violence crimes, the vast majority lower ranking officers or
soldiers. In the handful of cases where mid-level or senior level officers were
prosecuted, sentences are rarely being carried out.

“Zero tolerance

”

On July 5, shortly after a meeting between Human Rights
Watch and President Joseph Kabila in Goma, the Congolese government issued a
policy of “zero tolerance” for human rights violations committed by
its soldiers, putting commanders on notice that they would be held to account
for the behavior of their troops, including for crimes of sexual violence.
The announcement marked an important policy shift and sent a strong signal that
human rights abuses would not be tolerated.

Soon after the announcement, on July 11, a Public Court
Martial was held in Kavumu (South Kivu) to try an army sergeant accused of
raping a pregnant woman in Mwenga a few days earlier. The soldier was convicted
and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment without the possibility of
parole. The one-day trial was attended by top army and police officials to show
their seriousness in tackling such crimes, though the speed of the trial and
the unusual official attention likely compromised the rights of the defendant.
On July 27, a high-ranking officer, Lt. Col. Ndayambaje
Kipanga, an integrated former CNDP officer, was tried in absentia and sentenced
to life imprisonment for crimes against humanity relating to the rape of three teenage
girls and illegal detention of two others by the military court in North Kivu. He had escaped two days after his arrest because of lax detention procedures
and remains at large. His
co-accused, Major NjolokoLusungu, was
sentenced to ten years in prison. 

The real impact of the zero-tolerance policy can only be
measured by its implementation. Despite a handful of more high-profile trials,
the vast majority of crimes described in this report have neither been
investigated nor prosecuted. Human Rights Watch has also not documented any
decrease in human rights violations by Congolese army soldiers since the policy
was announced in July.

Army
Response

As of November 2009, no investigations had begun by Congolese
military or justice officials into the large-scale human rights violations
documented in this report, including the massacres and killings in the area
between Nyabiondo and Pinga and the massacre of Rwandan Hutu refugees in the
Shalio area. None of the senior officers implicated in these crimes, such as
Lt. Col. Innocent Zimurinda, was suspended from operational command pending
investigations.

On July 1, Human Rights Watch met with Maj. Gen. Dieudonné
Amuli Bahigwa, the Congolese army overall commander of operation Kimia II, and
Col. Bobo Kakudji, commander responsible for operation Kimia II in North
Kivu, and informed them of many of the human rights violations documented in
this report, including the Shalio area massacre of Rwandan Hutu refugees.
The commanders said they were unaware of the Shalio incident, but committed to
looking into the allegations. During a second meeting with Col. Kakudji on
October 2, he informed Human Rights Watch that no investigation had yet been
launched.

On October 22, 2009, during a meeting hosted by MONUC, Human
Rights Watch again met with General Amuli and other senior Congolese military
and justice officials to inform them of the killings and other abuses by
Congolese army soldiers in the area between Nyabiondo and Pinga and to
reiterate calls for an investigation into the Shalio area massacre. General
Amuli told Human Rights Watch that new, clear orders had recently been given,
following instructions from President Kabila and Gen. Didier Etumba, the army
chief of staff, that commanders of military units were responsible for
arresting human rights violators among their troops, and that commanders would
be held responsible for massive human rights violations committed by their
units. General Amuli also committed to create a small team to work alongside
MONUC to identify incidents where the chain of command might have broken down
and where incidents were not reported to him. He further agreed to seek
MONUC’s direct assistance to investigate allegations in a timely fashion
in order to give meaning to the zero-tolerance policy. General Amuli
specifically committed to launching an investigation into the allegations of
killings and massacres in the area between Nyabiondo and Pinga.
On October 30, UN peacekeepers and the Congolese army established a joint
provincial committee in North Kivu to investigate human rights violations committed
by army soldiers, including those in the area between Nyabiondo and Pinga, and
to remove abusive commanders. At the time of writing, the investigations had
not yet begun.

While encouraging, it was not clear whether these new
commitments by General Amuli would result in genuine action. The continued failure
to investigate the killing of Rwandan refugees at Shalio and the failure to
arrest Gen. Bosco Ntaganda and other senior officers responsible for gross
human rights violations raise serious doubts about the political will to apply
the policy of zero tolerance to those most responsible who hold a senior military
rank. As long as such individuals remain untouchable, zero tolerance will
remain a policy only of good intentions.

VIII. MONUC and Civilian
Protection

Subject to horrific abuses from both the FDLR and the
government armed forces, civilians in  Congo looked to the UN peacekeeping
mission, MONUC, to bring them desperately needed protection. MONUC was first
established in 1999. With nearly 20,000 peacekeepers, MONUC is currently the
largest UN peacekeeping mission in the world,
with a strong mandate from the UN Security Council to protect civilians
“under imminent threat of physical violence” and to use force to do
so. In
December 2008, the Security Council specifically requested MONUC to attach
“the highest priority to addressing the crisis in the Kivus, in
particular the protection of civilians.”

Since 2004, MONUC’s mandate also authorized the
mission to participate in and support military operations led by and jointly
planned with Congolese army integrated brigades against foreign and national
armed groups, including the FDLR.The Security Council emphasized that such
operations must be “in accordance with international humanitarian, human
rights and refugee law and should include appropriate measures to protect
civilians.” 

MONUC has faced significant challenges in fulfilling this
mandate. In March 2009 it joined forces with the Congolese armed forces to
carry out the Kimia II military operations against the FDLR. But preparations
for the operation were hurried, permitting little time for full reflection on
how an international peacekeeping force could appropriately provide protection
to civilians while backing a national army with a terrible human rights record.
Well into Kimia II, the conditions around MONUC’s involvement were
not yet properly clarified and no concrete plan to provide protection to
civilians at risk was in place. To make matters worse, MONUC lacked the
necessary logistical resources and rapid response capabilities to effectively
carry out its mandate to protect civilians, and it had trouble grappling with
the fragmented and catastrophic conflict on the ground.

In spite of these and other obstacles, MONUC to its credit made
some notable and important efforts in 2009 to improve civilian protection,
which undoubtedly saved lives. However, in many other instances peacekeepers
arrived too late or not at all, leaving local populations exposed with nowhere
else to turn for their basic security.

Origin
of Operation Kimia II

During 2007 and 2008, MONUC had already supported Congolese
army military operations in North Kivu, but the focus then was countering the
CNDP rebels, whom the government viewed as the most important threat to its
authority in the east. MONUC repeatedly urged the Congolese government to
increase its military pressure on the FDLR as well, and had been training
Congolese army units to carry out military strikes against FDLR positions with
support from MONUC peacekeepers in what was known as Kimia I. But
throughout 2008, the Congolese government had no real interest in such
operations and as soon as peacekeepers finished training Congolese army units to
be deployed in an offensive against the FDLR, army officials diverted the new
units to attack the CNDP instead.

In January 2009 the political landscape changed
dramatically. After Rwandan forces intervened in Congo, the CNDP ousted their
leader, Laurent Nkunda, ended their rebellion, and agreed to integrate into the
Congolese army if the Congolese government agreed to launch joint military
operations with the Rwandan army against the FDLR (see background above). Congo agreed, and when Rwandan forces crossed the border later in the same month for the
launch of operation Umoja Wetu jointly with the Congolese army, MONUC
officials were caught off-guard. Not only had they not been informed of the
impending operation against the FDLR by either government, but MONUC officials
were excluded from the operational planning and the execution.
After protests and pressure from diplomats, six MONUC military officers were
eventually permitted to join the Congolese and Rwandan army planning and
command center in Goma with the objective of ensuring that civilian protection
was part of military operations. But the officers had minimal access to
information and limited influence. MONUC
continued some of its logistical support to the Congolese army and quickly
established a number of bases in strategic locations in North Kivu. But as one
frustrated MONUC military official told Human Rights Watch, “We were kept
in the dark.”

MONUC officials publicly hailed the improved relations
between Congo and Rwanda that brought about the joint operations against the
FDLR, but privately many MONUC officials were troubled at the turn of events
that saw Rwandan soldiers return to eastern Congo. Some were worried that the
international peacekeeping mission appeared out 0f the loop.  When Rwandan
troops in late February 2009 began their withdrawal from Congo, as had been agreed with the Congolese government, bothRwandan and Congolese
government representatives emphasized that the operation against the FDLR was
not yet completed, which raised expectations that MONUC would have to support
continued military operations to finish the job.Worried about again being excluded from the
planning and execution of future military operations, and the possibility of a
return of Rwandan forces if MONUC did not step in, MONUC officials agreed to
support further military operations by the Congolese army. “We were left
with no choice, either we were in or we were out,” one UN official later told
Human Rights Watch. “We believed that being on the inside would give us a
better chance to help protect civilians.”

Some UN officials also believed that the dramatic political
shift by the Congolese government to launch operations against the FDLR was an
opportunity that could not be missed, and the momentum launched by operation Umoja
Wetu had to continue.
“Finally Kinshasa agreed to fight the FDLR, something we have been urging
them to do for years,” one UN official told Human Rights Watch.
“Politically we had to support the continuation of military
operations.”

In March 2009, MONUC force commander, Gen. Babacar Gaye and
the Congolese army chief of staff, Gen. Didier Etumba signed a Joint Operations
Directive to engage in military operations against the FDLR to be known as Kimia
II. The
agreement thrust MONUC into a crucial role in the next phase of military
operations.

Concerns about Operation Kimia II

On March 2, the Congolese army with direct MONUC participation
launched operation Kimia II. MONUC’s role included logistical and
operations support such as intelligence and operations planning, fire support,
air strikes, transportation, joint patrolling, and medical evacuations.[412]
MONUC also agreed to supply daily rations for 16,000 soldiers, plus fuel for
FARDC vehicles and other transport support worth over $6 million for the first
six months of the operation.

The preparations had been rushed and gave no time for
adequate planning. One senior MONUC military official told Human Rights Watch
that MONUC was trying to get operations started as quickly as possible in order
to “harness the fighting spirit of the CNDP,”
a reference to the opportunity presented by the newfound allegiance of this
rebel group with the Congolese army. CNDP combatants were perceived as being
more experienced and better motivated fighters, especially against the FDLR.
While some MONUC officials were keen to progress quickly, others expressed
concern. A number of diplomats and MONUC officials recognized the potentially
catastrophic human cost of the planned operations and were aware of the serious
limitations in the Congolese army’s capacity to conduct the operations
effectively and in compliance with international humanitarian law.
Civilian staff members in MONUC told Human Rights Watch there was little to no
consultation between MONUC military and civilian staff before plans went
forward with Kimia II, giving those wary about MONUC’s support for
the operation little opportunity to voice their concerns or to develop advance
plans to enhance civilian protection.

One Western diplomat told Human Rights Watch that MONUC was
feeling “false pressure” to keep up the momentum on military
operations and questioned what results the military operations would achieve.
“Reprisal killings are what the FDLR do, and we should expect more of
[such attacks]. But are we ready to deal with this?” the diplomat asked. 

A senior MONUC military commander also voiced skepticism. In
an interview with Human Rights Watch on April 28, he said, “The United
Nations is saying we need a purely military solution…. It’s clear that
the Congolese army is not capable of succeeding in this operation, but at this
junction, how can we tell the FARDC to stop?” He then added,
“You’re living in a fool’s paradise if you think that we can
solve [the FDLR problem] purely militarily.”

There is no evidence that MONUC officials pressed the
Congolese government to address serious shortcomings before the launch of Kimia
II, including completing integration of the CNDP and other armed groups in
the Congolese army, resolving salary and logistical problems for the armed
forces involved in the operation, and putting into place a strategy for
adequate civilian protection. In an internal document in November 2009, MONUC
said that conducting military operations against the FDLR was a sovereign
decision by the Congolese government and insisted that if MONUC had not
supported the military operations, it risked a “chain reaction”
that could have unraveled the integration process, seen a re-emergence of armed
groups, and a deterioration of relations between Congo and Rwanda. The document
further said that the mission had to face “hard choices” in
managing “competing priorities of immediate protection with [seeking] longer-term
change.” MONUC
officials took the decision to provide substantial military support to
operation Kimia II with the apparent hope that in the short term, the
presence of peacekeepers in support to Congolese army soldiers would significantly
lower the risk to civilians, and that in the longer term, it would lead to
improved security for civilians. They were sadly mistaken on both counts.

Debates on conditionality

MONUC officials emphasized both publicly and privately that
the Kimia II operations should respect international humanitarian and
human rights law, but no formal conditions were put in place defining
MONUC’s role in the operations. It was not clear how respect for
international humanitarian law would be ensured—especially by Congolese
army forces with a record of war crimes—or under what circumstances MONUC
would withdraw its support if violations occurred. The dilemma led to intense
discussions within MONUC and also at the Department of Peacekeeping Operations
in New York. As some saw it, MONUC had entered into an agreement to support
military operations with one of Africa’s most abusive armies without
clear pre-conditions or clarity on how human rights violations would be
avoided.  

On January 13, March 6, and April 2, the UN Office of Legal Affairs
provided formal legal advice to MONUC. According to the confidential legal note
in April, MONUC “cannot participate in any form of joint operations with
FARDC units, or support an operation by those units, if there are substantial
grounds for believing there to be a real risk of them violating international
humanitarian law, human rights law or refugee law in the course of the operation.”
The legal advice added that should such violations occur, “MONUC must
immediately intercede with the FARDC at the command and operations levels, with
a view to dissuading the unit concerned from continuing such violations.”
If such action did not bring results and the violations were widespread and
serious, MONUC was advised “to cease its participation in the operations
as a whole.”

On June 2, the UN Policy Committee, which includes the heads
of all UN agencies, held a meeting in New York chaired by Deputy Secretary-General
Asha-Rose Migiro to discuss the situation in eastern Congo. At issue were the
difficulties of trying to balance MONUC’s mandate to protect civilians
with its support to the Congolese army to disarm Congolese and foreign armed
groups. Some participants voiced concerns that MONUC could be considered
complicit in the crimes committed by the Congolese army. The Policy Committee
endorsed advice from the Office of Legal Affairs and decided that MONUC should
not participate in any form of joint operations with FARDC units if there were
substantial grounds for believing there to be a real risk of human rights
violations.

Following this decision and the earlier legal advice, MONUC
officials belatedly began to develop a policy on conditionality. According to
MONUC officials, it was found difficult to implement the policy when military
operations were already well underway and human rights violations were being
regularly reported. The FARDC’s confusing chain of command and the lack
of information about which Congolese army troops were in which locations made
the task even harder. MONUC officials said that they did not have enough
information even to know whether the rations and fuel it was providing to
Congolese army soldiers were actually reaching individual units and, if they
did, whether those units knew that support was coming from the United Nations. 

In September 2009, several months into its joint operations
with the Congolese army, MONUC developed a draft policy note on conditionality,
which it presented to the Congolese government for comment. It sought to
present the proposed new conditions as helping the government implement its own
policy of “zero tolerance.” The draft policy stated that MONUC
would “seek to suspend its support to battalions who committed grave
violations of human rights and who, after notification from MONUC, took no
action and continued to commit such violations.” The policy note added,
however, that “such targeted measures would have no effect on the global
envelope of support from MONUC to the FARDC” and that the support taken
from the abusive battalion would be “redirected” toward another
battalion whose behavior was more exemplary. 

The UN Office of Legal Affairs advised that if MONUC had
reason to believe that such violations continued after intervention to stop
them, the mission “must cease its participation in [the operations]
completely.” In reviewing the draft policy note, the legal affairs office
said that MONUC’s continued support for the entire operation, even if
only certain units were repeatedly violating human rights, was in conflict with
MONUC’s mandate. 

MONUC officials worked to change the draft policy note on
conditionality to incorporate the legal advice. In an internal document from
November 2009, MONUC said that it was doing its best to incorporate the legal
advice in very challenging circumstances. “The mission has not had the
luxury of devising an airtight policy and then implementing it under controlled
conditions,” the internal document said. MONUC has had “to take
action to deal with a rapidly evolving situation on the ground.”
At the time of writing the draft policy note had not yet been finalized or implemented.

MONUC
and accountability for FARDC abuses

While internal discussions continued on the legal questions,
MONUC did seek to act on the abuses committed by Congolese soldiers in the area
between Nyabiondo and Pinga. On November 1, after eight months of support to
operation Kimia II, Alain Le Roy, the head of the UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations announced during a visit to Congo that MONUC would
suspend its support to the Congolese army’s 213th Brigade. MONUC’s
own preliminary investigations had revealed Congolese army soldiers had killed
at least 62 civilians in the Lukweti area, just north of Nyabiondo.
MONUC support, however, was not suspended to any other army units despite
credible information that gross human rights violations were occurring
elsewhere. Following strong protests from Congolese government officials about
the suspension, MONUC quickly responded that its overall support to Kimia II
operations would continue.

MONUC’s withdrawal of support to the 213th
Brigade consisted of halting all supplies of food rations for the soldiers for
the month of November. But since there is no system in place to track whether
the rations MONUC provides to Congolese army units participating in operation Kimia
II actually make it to the troops on the ground, it is unclear what, if
any, impact this suspension of support will bring. None of the commanders
responsible for the abuses in the Nyabiondo or Shalio areas, nor other
commanders known for previous serious human rights violations, had been removed
from involvement in Kimia II operations at the time of writing.

MONUC officials privately raised some concerns with
Congolese army commanders about the behavior of their troops and in an internal
document of November 2009, describing its support to the Congolese army, MONUC
said it had acted and would continue to act “on many fronts” to
prevent violations of human rights and bring perpetrators to justice. MONUC
said that where it “had reliable information, it is presented to military
and government authorities for them to take necessary action.”
But action by the government was not forthcoming and MONUC’s interventions
were not systematic, nor were they followed up by MONUC officials. In mid-2009,
for example, the MONUC human rights section drew up a list of 15 individuals
believed to be involved in operation Kimia II who had records of gross
violations of human rights documented by MONUC over a number of years. The
continued presence of such commanders dramatically increased the risk that
human rights violations would continue and that civilians would be put at risk
in areas where these commanders conducted operations. The list included Gen.
Bosco Ntaganda and Col. Innocent Zimurinda, among others, and was presented to
the MONUC leadership for action. It is not clear what action, if any, the MONUC
leadership took on the basis of this list. By December, nine months into the
military operations, the abusive commanders were still in operational command.

MONUC’s failure to use its leverage with the
government to prevent and punish abuses by these and other high-ranking army officials
increased the risk to civilians and contributed to rampant atrocities and
continuing impunity in eastern Congo.

Sexual violence

The UN Security Council in its various resolutions on MONUC
has specifically and repeatedly requested MONUC to pay particular attention to
the issue of sexual violence. This request has been reinforced by other UN
resolutions, including Resolution 1820, adopted in June 2008, which condemns
the use of rape and other forms of sexual violence during wartime, and
announces targeted measures against responsible parties to the conflict.
In September 2009, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1888, which urges
all parties to a conflict to ensure that all reports of sexual violence
committed by military personnel are thoroughly investigated and the
perpetrators brought to justice. This resolution requested that the secretary-general
appoint a special representative to provide coherent and strategic leadership
to address sexual violence in armed conflict.

In response to the Security Council’s various
resolutions, MONUC in April 2009 launched a comprehensive strategy to combat
sexual violence. It was swiftly adopted by all UN agencies as a joint platform,
and the Congolese government also welcomed it.
One of the strategy’s key pillars is an action plan on civilian protection
and the prevention of sexual violence. It sets out actions that should be
taken, including profiling patterns of sexual violence, introducing a risk
model, reviewing and possibly adjusting the MONUC force commander’s
directive to put special attention on sexual violence, and adjusting the rules
of engagement if necessary, among others. The
strategy also underscores the importance of prosecuting civilian and military
high-ranking officials implicated in sexual violence. The strategy was developed before the launch of
operation Kimia II, but not adopted until a month after the operation
began.

During operations Umoja
Wetu and Kimia II, sexual violence cases increased dramatically in
the areas of conflict. Yet MONUC gave little or no specific attention in
advance as to how operation Kimia II might affect this already
vulnerable section of society, nor were specific actions taken to help prevent
such attacks. By October 2009 a senior staff member due to lead the
implementation of MONUC’s comprehensive strategy on sexual violence had
still not arrived in Congo.

MONUC human rights officials
have made some efforts to support the Congolese military justice system in
prosecuting crimes of sexual violence by providing information on violations
and assisting during investigations. This has helped bring some perpetrators to
justice. Yet in the vast majority of cases, sexual violence crimes are never
prosecuted, or, as with Colonel Kipanga in Rutshuru (see above), those
implicated appear to have little difficulty evading punishment.[435]

The deeply troubling reality is
that sexual violence cases in Congo are increasing rather than decreasing
despite the adoption of a comprehensive strategy to combat sexual violence and
increased attention by the Security Council and other actors.

Insufficient
resources

The lack of sufficient resources has hampered MONUC’s
ability to protect civilians. The UN Security Council provided MONUC a strong
mandate to protect civilians, but UN member states did not back up this
commitment with adequate resources to ensure the full implementation of the
mandate. The 3,000 additional peacekeepers authorized by the Security Council
in November 2008 had still not arrived in eastern Congo by October 2009,
despite promises from council members that they would urge a rapid deployment. Alan Doss, the head of MONUC, repeatedly warned that, without such assets, MONUC’s
“capacity to respond quickly to emerging threats and protect civilians
would be curtailed.” 

On August 26, an advance team from Bangladesh arrived in
Congo. Egypt, Jordan, Tanzania
and Uruguay had pledged more troops but they were not yet operational as of
October 2009. The
Belgian government contributed one out of the two C-130 cargo planes requested
by MONUC, but as of October 2009 MONUC was still looking for the contribution
of 16 military helicopters to give troops greater mobility and allow them to react quickly to events on the
ground.

While these resources are still urgently needed, they are
unlikely to solve the structural problems within MONUC that constrain the
mission’s flexibility and ability to respond promptly to changing
situations. One important constraint on MONUC has been the limitations of the
agreements, known as memoranda of understanding (MOUs), which
troop-contributing countries sign with the UN in advance of deployment. Often
these agreements spell out the number of bases a troop-contributing country
will establish, their rough locations, and the minimum conditions required such
as electricity and water needs. Usually an MOU limits each troop-contributing
country to one permanent base and four satellite locations, which might not
match MONUC’s needs on the ground.

The constraints imposed on MONUC by the MOUs sometimes
result in bizarre yet very real problems. For example, MONUC troops require
generators to deploy to new areas where there is no electricity, a problem
encountered in most locations in eastern Congo, but the cost of generators is
only covered by some troop-contributing countries and usually only to a certain
limit. If the limit is exceeded, the UN should provide the generators, but
there are no budget allocations within MONUC for this type of expense.
As a result, for want of generators MONUC troops may be seriously delayed in
deploying to remote regions where they are desperately needed to protect
civilians.

There are also serious staffing problems within MONUC. Key
posts are often left vacant for many months. Staff also frequently are
constrained by UN security guidelines or do not wish to be deployed for
adequate lengths of time in remote locations where civilian protection needs
are most urgent. In September 2009, for example, MONUC had 109 unfilled
interpreter positions, including 40 in the Kivus.
According to a former senior UN official, the DDRRR unit, crucial to helping
FDLR combatants to return to Rwanda, was more than 50 percent understaffed in
June 2009.

Problems for demobilization

The Demobilization, Disarmament, Repatriation, Resettlement
and Reintegration (DDRRR) program is an essential component of the UN’s
mission, with an objective to encourage and facilitate foreign combatants,
particularly the FDLR, to voluntarily return to Rwanda. Between January and
October 2009, in part due to the military pressure from Kimia II operations,
the DDRRR program repatriated 1,274 FDLR combatants to Rwanda, representing a significant increase compared to previous years.
They have been joined by 1,798 family members and 12,387 Rwandan refugees. FDLR
combatants were also removed from many of their bases, although often only
temporarily.

Despite these developments, the UN Group of Experts
concluded in their final report in November 2009 that “operations against
the FDLR have failed to dismantle the organization’s political and
military structures on the ground in eastern DRC” and that the FDLR
militia “has regrouped in a number of locations in the Kivus, and
continues to recruit new fighters.” The
Group also found that the FDLR continues to benefit from support from certain
senior commanders in the FARDC, particularly officers in the 10th
military region in South Kivu, and has formed alliances with other Congolese armed
groups in both North and South Kivu. While
the FDLR have been pushed out of some mining areas and they no longer have
access to some markets they previously depended on, they continue to control
important gold and cassiterite (tin) mining areas in North and South Kivu,
providing them with crucial financial revenues.

The UN Group of Experts also found strong evidence of the
ongoing support from the FDLR diaspora leadership based in Europe, North
America and Africa, provided through “fundraising and propaganda
exercises and money laundering activities”
and said that significant weapons and ammunitions deliveries to the FDLR came from
Tanzania, smuggled across Lake Tanganyika to South Kivu. 
It further reported that Burundi is being used as a rear base for FDLR
recruitment and support networks. It is
unknown how many new combatants have joined the FDLR’s ranks since the
start of military operations in January.

The UN’s DDRRR program has also been deliberately
blocked from carrying out its work by former CNDP commanders newly integrated
into the Congolese army. The problem is not linked to FDLR combatants who wish
to return to Rwanda, but rather concerns those former CNDP combatants who are
Rwandan citizens and wish to return home. Throughout 2007 and 2008, the CNDP
actively recruited in Rwanda, including among former demobilized Rwandan army
soldiers, Rwandan army soldiers temporarily on leave from the army, Congolese
Tutsi refugees living in camps in Rwanda, and other Rwandan citizens, some of
whom were duped into joining by false promises of jobs in eastern Congo. Many of those recruited were children. Since
then, a significant number of these recruits have presented themselves at DDRRR
centers requesting to be repatriated to Rwanda, and as foreign combatants in Congo they are eligible to enter the program. From January 2007 through October 2008, the
DDRRR program repatriated over 150 former CNDP combatants to Rwanda, including 29 children. From
January to October 2009, the figure jumped to 448 former CNDP combatants
repatriated to Rwanda, including 83 children.

Fearful of losing these combatants, some of whom have
extensive military experience, and perhaps also concerned at the evidence this
presents of the extent the CNDP was linked to Rwanda, former CNDP commanders
have deliberately tried to block attempts to demobilize these combatants. As of
June 7, 2009, the DDRRR program had counted 10 hostile attempts by former CNDP
elements to interfere in their demobilization efforts, mostly in Walikale
territory. The
former CNDP commanders maintained that these soldiers were deserting and were falsely
claiming to be Rwandan citizens. On
June 17, the Congolese army commander in charge of operation Kimia II, General
Amuli, made an agreement with the DDRRR program that all soldiers who wished to
surrender and claimed to be foreigners would be jointly screened by DDRRR
officers and Congolese military intelligence officers. Despite this agreement,
former CNDP officers continued to disrupt DDRRR’s work.

For example, in early July, Lt. Col. Antoine Manzi, a former
CNDP officer deployed to Walikale territory, repeatedly attempted to block
DDRRR officials from transferring to Goma seven soldiers who claimed to be
Rwandan citizens and wished to return home. DDRRR officials insisted and were
eventually successful in transferring the combatants, but their staff were
later threatened, and some beaten, by former CNDP soldiers forcing the DDRRR
program to temporarily close its base in Walikale.
Also in Walikale territory, troops under Colonel Manzi’s command in
Musenge threatened to use force if MONUC did not hand back three former CNDP
soldiers, likely children, after they sought to voluntarily disarm. The
peacekeepers had to threaten the use of force before safely transferring the
combatants to the DDRRR program. 

As a result of these incidents and the threats to its staff,
the DDRRR program adopted a provisional measure on July 17 to no longer accept
any Congolese army soldiers into the program, regardless of their nationality.This decision undermines the very essence of
the DDRRR program to voluntarily disarm and repatriate foreign combatants to
their country of origin. It also violates the rights of Rwandan citizens,
including children, who may have been forced to join the CNDP or who joined
under false pretenses, to safely return home. By early September 2009, there
was still no clear strategy on how MONUC would resolve this problem; however, some
MONUC military commanders and DDRRR officials did continue to accept former
CNDP Rwandan combatants who fled to their bases for repatriation.

New Initiatives for Civilian
Protection

Despite the lack of a concrete protection plan, the disregard
of UN legal advice, and insufficient resources, MONUC took some important steps
in 2009 to improve the protection of civilians. It increased the number of
field bases, placing peacekeepers throughout North and South Kivu in locations
where they were better able to protect civilians and respond to incidents. By
August 2009, MONUC had 40 bases in North Kivu province, up from 25 bases in
September 2008, and had decreased the amount of time required to establish a
temporary base to a minimum of 14 days, though it still often took longer.

During operations Umoja Wetu and Kimia II,
MONUC peacekeepers tried to deploy to high-risk areas before offensives began.In some cases, they were able to escort
civilians out of conflict zones to safe areas before operations were launched.
This was the case, for example, in Pinga and Kashebere during operation Umoja
Wetu.MONUC peacekeepers have also launched foot
patrols on high-risk paths that civilians, and women in particular, frequently
used to access their farms, go to markets, and
collect firewood. During
national examinations in June, peacekeepers in some areas provided escorts to
students as they walked from their villages to the towns where exams were being
administered. These
important initiatives undoubtedly helped to save and protect civilian lives.

Some MONUC field base commanders, such as the commander in
Kiwanja (North Kivu), have made exemplary efforts in 2009 to communicate with
local authorities, civil society representatives, school directors, and
traditional chiefs in their areas of responsibility, and ensured that they had
information on how to contact the MONUC base in case of an emergency. But this
was not the case everywhere. In the majority of MONUC field bases visited by
Human Rights Watch researchers in North and South Kivu in 2009, commanders were
rarely in communication with members of the local population.

Joint Protection Teams

In an effort to overcome some of these challenges and bridge
the divide between MONUC peacekeepers and the civilian population, MONUC
established Joint Protection Teams (JPTs) in early 2009. These teams, made up
of members of MONUC’s civil affairs, human rights, political affairs, and
child protection divisions, are deployed to MONUC field bases for up to five
days at a time. Their mandate is to develop a greater understanding of local
dynamics in the area, create links between MONUC and the local population, and
act as an early warning mechanism by seeking to predict threats and suggest
courses of action to MONUC leadership. In
some cases, JPTs also work to mediate disputes between non-integrated armed
groups and the Congolese army or the local population, separate children from
armed groups and the Congolese army, provide protection advice for MONUC
military officers at their bases, and discuss possible protection responses in
the event of an attack. By
November 2009, MONUC had organized more than 50 JPTs.

JPTs have been limited in their effectiveness because of their
short stays in the field. Because of staffing limitations, MONUC civilian staff
members normally cannot be in the field for longer than five days.
As the North Kivu Brigade commander told Human Rights Watch, “Confidence
building can’t happen in five days. I would like for them to go to places
for two months at a time, instead of five days.”
There is also a shortage of civilian staff members who can be deployed on JPTs,
and even fewer qualified protection specialists. At any given time, only one
JPT can be deployed in all of North Kivu.
Because of these constraints, JPTs have acted more as fact-finding missions
that deploy to areas after major incidents, rather than early-warning
mechanisms to predict threats and quickly plan a protection strategy.

“Must
protect” areas

MONUC military and civilian officials have instigated
regular meetings with the DRC Protection Cluster, an official grouping of UN
agencies and other humanitarian and human rights actors who seek to coordinate
action on the protection of civilians. These monthly meetings, known as
“priority protection planning meetings,” are used to decide where
MONUC peacekeepers are most urgently needed and what action is possible, given
the often competing demands for MONUC’s limited resources. The
participants at these meetings analyze information they have received on
threats to civilians and categorize the threats into three protection
categories: (i) “Must protect”areas where MONUC troops
should be physically present with a base deployed to the area; (ii) “Should
protect” areas where MONUC should be physically present if the resources
are available, and if not, MONUC troops should at least do regular patrols to
the area; and (iii) “Could protect” areas where MONUC troops should
carry out patrols, especially on market days.

This methodology and the action that has resulted from it
have contributed to enhanced protection for civilians, especially through the
increase in bases and patrols in areas where civilians are at risk. But in a
number of cases, the system has been ineffective, often because it took too
long to establish a base in a “must protect” area. While sometimes
the delays were due to logistical constraints, in other cases it was due to inefficient
decision-making and internal bureaucracy that should have been overcome.

Remeka and Kibua, both in the Ufumandu area of Masisi
territory where significant human rights abuses were being committed (see
above), were designated as “must protect” areas in February 2009. A
MONUC temporary base was briefly established in Kibua for one week in February,
but it was later removed because of the difficulties in supplying the base,
leaving civilians in the area without protection. Despite two visits to Remeka
by the JPTs in March and their strong recommendation that a MONUC base be
established, no action was taken, again due largely to logistical difficulties
and an apparent lack of adequate water supplies. By the time the logistical
challenges were overcome, Remeka was no longer deemed a “must
protect” area because most of the population had fled.

Also in February, Itebero town in the Waloaluanda area of
Walikale territory, was designated a “must protect” area because of
the widespread atrocities being committed by FDLR combatants against civilians
there (see above). Yet no MONUC base was established in the area until July 9,
five months later, and after two massacres in Mianga and Busurungi by the FDLR
and one in the Shalio area by Congolese army soldiers, leaving scores of
civilians dead.

This remote area in North Kivu, close to the South Kivu border, fell under the Indian Brigade’s area of responsibility, but it was
physically impossible to access due to a number of destroyed bridges. The area
was, however, accessible from South Kivu, where Pakistani peacekeepers had a
base close to the North and South Kivu border at Hombo, some five kilometers
away. The Pakistanis argued, however, that it was not their area of
responsibility.
Debates over which peacekeepers had responsibility for patrolling and
protecting the civilians in the area persisted for months and created a
perception that this area was a “no man’s land” for MONUC
troops.

In May 2009 a MONUC joint assessment mission
highlighted the lack of protection in this area due to the
“jurisdictional” confusion and said it would urgently refer the
problem to MONUC senior management. The assessment mission lamented the
“peacekeeping vacuum,” concluding that the civilians had not seen
any MONUC presence “in the last 2 months in spite of the area being a
place of displacement with a high incidence of violence.”
The assessment mission also again raised the lack of advance planning for the
humanitarian consequences of operation Kimia II which, if it had been
done, it said, would “have dictated the importance of having peacekeepers
and JPTs operating in [this] area.”  

Despite these recommendations, as well as other urgent
warnings from within and outside of MONUC, no
base was established and there were no further MONUC patrols in the Waloaluanda
area until July 9, when Indian peacekeepers established a base in Musenge,
although they were still unable to reach the worst-affected areas because of a
broken bridge. On
July 20 the FDLR again attacked civilians in the area, killing some 30 people
at Manje. It took six days for MONUC peacekeepers to respond. On July 26,
peacekeepers from the Pakistani South Kivu Brigade carried out a one-day patrol
to assess the damage after the population had already fled.

Finally, on September 5, nearly seven months after the area
had been designated as “must protect,” the MONUC Indian Brigade
established a base at Otobora, a village south of Musenge, from which
peacekeepers could now reach some of the worst-affected areas.

The seven-month delay in establishing a base that could
reach civilians in need of urgent protection in the Waloaluanda area seriously
undercut MONUC’s claims that civilian protection was its highest priority.
One MONUC civilian official, frustrated at the slow response and the lack of
concrete protection plans explained to Human Rights Watch some of the
challenges in the system,

[The UN] needs to figure out how to institutionalize some
of these procedures so that “must protect” recommendations… are
then actually implemented.The force commander’s
directives are only directives. The military ultimately follow standard
operating procedures and their rules of engagement. But there is no one telling
them they need to follow our recommendations. That would require an entire
re-shaping of peacemaking. We would have to change the culture altogether…There is no guiding document on protection of civilians in field missions
anywhere in Goma. We all talk about it, but no one knows how to actually
implement it.

In June 2009, MONUC and the DRC Protection Cluster developed
a “Protection Handbook” for MONUC peacekeepers. While an
important initiative, there is no formal training on the
guidelines, no mechanism for monitoring and evaluation on whether and how
these guidelines are followed, and nothing in the MOUs, rules of engagement, or
force directives instructing troops to follow these guidelines.By
September 2009, there was still no clear document that spelled out
MONUC’s protection plan.

Challenges
for Human Rights Monitoring

As an integrated mission, MONUC’s human rights section
is joined together with the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
(OHCHR). Human rights section staff members have two reporting lines: one to
MONUC leadership in Kinshasa and another to the OHCHR in Geneva. MONUC’s participation
in operation Kimia II effectively makes the mission a party to the armed
conflict, creating a conflict of interest for MONUC human rights staff,
undermining their impartiality and thus their credibility when reporting on
human rights abuses, despite their reporting being done with utmost integrity. Furthermore,
because reporting on such abuses risks upsetting MONUC’s military
relationship with the Congolese army, publicly reporting on them has become
much more difficult. Since military operations began in January 2009, the MONUC
human rights section has not published a single report on the abuses committed,
although its staff members have worked hard to raise human rights concerns
internally.

Following an October 2009 mission to Congo, Philip Alston,
the UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial executions, raised concerns about
the problem of having a human rights monitoring section under the authority of
a peacekeeping mission which he said could delay, dilute, or discourage human
rights reporting if it was considered, as it often is, as a hindrance or
obstacle to securing political reform. He also raised concerns about the
perceived lack of independence of MONUC’s human rights reporting due to
its role in Kimia II and urged that “consideration be given to the
creation of a new mechanism to ensure that the necessary monitoring and
reporting roles are carried out independently, effectively, and
credibly.”

The MONUC leadership has in some cases inaccurately portrayed
the humanitarian and human rights realities in eastern Congo and disregarded information reported by MONUC’s own human rights division or other UN
agencies. In a letter to Alan Doss, the head of MONUC, on October 28, 2009, the
DRC Protection Cluster expressed their concern about the “inaccurate
picture of the humanitarian situation” described in the UN secretary-general’s
report on MONUC in September 2009. In the letter, the protection cluster said
the report presented to the UN Security Council was in contradiction with their
own findings during the same period and “present[ed] a picture far
removed from the realities our members have witnessed and reported on over the
same period.” 

International
Response

Encouraged by the historic rapprochement between Congo and Rwanda in late 2008 and early 2009, governments with interests in the region were
reluctant to raise any concerns that might upset the new relationship between
the former foes. Questions of accountability and respect for human rights in particular
were considered too troublesome to mention for fear of upsetting the peace
process. Only by September 2009, did some governments and regional
intergovernmental bodies, notably the US and EU, raise concerns about the
promotion of Bosco Ntaganda to the rank of general in the Congolese army,
despite an arrest warrant from the ICC. Many governments also chose to remain
silent when it was clear he would play an important role in the UN-backed
operation Kimia II.

Instead, in March the French president, Nicolas Sarkozy,
speaking before Congo’s parliament, hailed the “courageous
decision” by President Joseph Kabila to invite his former Rwandan enemies
into the country for joint military operations.
Western governments applauded the launch of operation Umoja Wetu, which
they said marked an important policy shift on the part of Kabila’s
government to finally break all ties with the FDLR. When operation Umoja
Wetu ended after five weeks, the UK and US governments, among others, pressed
for continued action against the FDLR. They supported MONUC’s decision to
push ahead quickly with operation Kimia II. 

These governments proved unwilling to call into question the
potentially catastrophic humanitarian and human right consequences of the
operations. “We believed we had to support the improved relations between
Congo and Rwanda which we saw as crucial to peace in the region,” one
diplomat later told Human Rights Watch. “This consideration took
precedence over everything else. In hindsight we should have given much more
attention to the horrible consequences military operations could bring.”

A number of high-level foreign delegations visited Congo, and Goma, in particular, during 2009. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, ambassadors
from the UN Security Council, President Nicolas Sarkozy of France, US Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton and a number of other African and EU ministers all
highlighted their concerns about the humanitarian and human rights situation in
eastern Congo and some, such as Clinton and Ban, specifically highlighted the
issue of sexual violence. But they all fell short of putting real pressure on
the Congolese government or MONUC to rethink their strategy and ensure that
civilians were protected and abusive commanders were removed.

By mid-2009, some diplomats, especially those from EU
countries, began to privately question the direction of operation Kimia II and
the Congolese army’s effectiveness, and the dire consequences for
civilians. 
The private concerns were rarely raised publicly, and few hard questions were
asked during UN Security Council discussions. In November 2009, US Special
Envoy for the Africa Great Lakes Region, Howard Wolpe, publicly raised concerns
about the human cost of the military operations.

The most vocal and detailed criticism of the lack of
accountability and the pervasive human rights abuses resulting from military
operations came from UN human rights officials. On September 9, the High
Commissioner for Human Rights, Navanethem Pillay, following publication of a
report into the killings in the town of Kiwanja that had occurred nearly a year
earlier, declared, “I am deeply concerned that
members of the CNDP who may be implicated in these crimes—especially Bosco Ntaganda, against whom there was already
an International Criminal Court arrest warrant—are either still at large, or have even been absorbed into
the FARDC.”

The UN special rapporteur on extrajudicial executions,
Philip Alston, was the most severe in his analysis of operation Kimia II.
Following a 10-day mission to Congo in October 2009, Alston was the first UN
official to publicly acknowledge that MONUC’s mandate and role in
operation Kimia II had transformed
the peacekeeping mission into “a party to the conflict in the
Kivus.” He condemned “the lack of planning, coordination and
cooperation in Kimia II,” which he said had led to
“predictable and repeated killings.”
In a stark warning, he said, “alarm bells are ringing loudly in the
DRC.” From a human rights perspective, Alston concluded, operation Kimia
II had “produced
catastrophic results.”

Annex I: Civilians Killed by
FDLR Combatants

January–September 2009

North and South Kivu

The information in the following tables is based on
eyewitness accounts, information from family members, and testimony from those
who helped to bury the dead. It was collected by Human Rights Watch during 23
field missions in North and South Kivu between January and October 2009. In
many cases, the victims were identified by name. This
information is on file at Human Rights Watch. We have made every effort
to corroborate our findings and dismiss accounts that we did not find credible.

This information is only partial and represents some of
those killed. Human Rights Watch received credible information about additional
civilians killed which we have not been able to verify nor were we able to
visit all areas affected by the military operations. 

Waloaluanda Area, Walikale Territory (North Kivu)

Date

Village

Territory

Number
of civilians killed

January
18, 2009

Malembe

Walikale

1

Late
January/ Early February

Nyamimba,
Katambira, Mianga, Malembe

Walikale

32

February
1, 2009

Nyakansinsi

Walikale

3

March 3,
2009

Lukaraba

Walikale

1

March 6,
2009

Kilambo

Walikale

2

March 7,
2009

Biriko

Walikale

2

March
7-12, 2009

Malembe
and Mumba

Walikale

6

March 12,
2009

Lukaraba

Walikale

10

March 13,
2009

Biriko

Walikale

1

March 23,
2009

Lukaraba

Walikale

1

April 6,
2009

Busurungi

Walikale

1

April 12,
2009

Mianga

Walikale

45

Mid-April
2009

Bikunje

Walikale

2

April 28,
2009

Busurungi

Walikale

4

Early May
2009

Bikunje

Walikale

1

May 1,
2009

Busurungi

Walikale

1

May 9-10,
2009

Busurungi

Walikale

96

July
19-20, 2009

Manje

Walikale

30

August 12,
2009

Malembe

Walikale

6

August 31,
2009

Kitchanga

Walikale

1

September
15, 2009

Kando

Walikale

3

September
15, 2009

Malembe,
Mumba, Miere, Kando

Walikale

4

Total

253

 

Ufumandu Area, Masisi Territory (North Kivu)

Date

Village

Territory

Number
of civilians killed

January
25, 2009

Kishonja

Masisi

2

January
25, 2009

Kishonja

Masisi

1

January
27, 2009

Kibua

Masisi

11

January
27, 2009

Kikoma

Masisi

4

Late
January 2009

Bukumbiriri

Masisi

1

Late
January 2009

Katoyi

Masisi

2

Late
January 2009

Kihundu

Masisi

1

Late
January 2009

Mangere

Masisi

6

Late
January 2009

Lushebere
(near Minova)

Masisi

3

Late
January 2009

Ngungu

Masisi

1

Late
January 2009

Nyakabasa

Masisi

1

Late
January 2009

Remeka

Masisi

7

Late
January 2009

Ufumandu

Masisi

9

Late
January/early February 2009

Bunyakagendo
(Katahunda)

Masisi

5

Late
January/early February 2009

Funguramacho

Masisi

1

Late
January/early February 2009

Katahunda

Masisi

2

Early
February 2009

Chirambo

Masisi

1

Early
February 2009

Katahunda

Masisi

2

Early
February 2009

Kishonja

Masisi

2

February
5, 2009

Kishonja

Masisi

1

February
8, 2009

Remeka

Masisi

1

February
10, 2009

Kitarema/Bongo

Masisi

3

February
12, 2009

Kitarema

Masisi

2

February
13, 2009

Kipopo

Masisi

17

February
17, 2009

Buhongo

Masisi

2

Late
February/early March 2009

Katahunda

Masisi

1

Early
March 2009

Kikoma

Masisi

1

March 5,
2009

Funguramacho

Masisi

9

March 15,
2009

Buhongo

Masisi

3

March 20,
2009

Buhuli

Masisi

5

Late
March/early April 2009

Katahunda

Masisi

1

April 20,
2009

Miano

Masisi

4

April 2009

Katahunda

Masisi

2

Early May
2009

Katahunda

Masisi

7

May 5,
2009

Kirambo

Masisi

2

May 7,
2009

Kirambo

Masisi

4

May 2009

Katahunda

Masisi

2

July 2,
2009

Remeka

Masisi

1

July 9,
2009

Bunyakagendo

Masisi

3

August 4,
2009

Bunyakagendo

Masisi

1

August 7,
2009

Byolo

Masisi

1

Total

135

 

Ziralo Area, Kalehe Territory (South Kivu)

Date

Village

Territory

Number
of civilians killed

January
28, 2009

Busheke

Kalehe

14

February
1, 2009

Lulere

Kalehe

4

February
4, 2009

Mpanama

Kalehe

1

February
7, 2009

Bunyangungu

Kalehe

1

February
7, 2009

Ramba

Kalehe

1

February
7, 2009

Makonge

Kalehe

1

February
8, 2009

Tushunguti

Kalehe

1

February
15, 2009

Mulunguzi

Kalehe

1

February
22, 2009

Ramba

Kalehe

3

February
2009

Shanje

Kalehe

2

February
2009

Bunyangungu

Kalehe

1

Early
March 2009

Lulere

Kalehe

1

March 7,
2009

Mihanda

Kalehe

2

March 13,
2009

Bukundu

Kalehe

2

March 18,
2009

Kalangita

Kalehe

1

March 25,
2009

Chambombo

Kalehe

1

March 31,
2009

Bukondo

Kalehe

1

April 5,
2009

Lulere

Kalehe

4

April 10,
2009

Shanje

Kalehe

1

April 27,
2009

Shanje

Kalehe

1

May 2,
2009

Mihanda

Kalehe

2

May 10,
2009

Kashebere

Kalehe

1

May 15,
2009

Tushunguti

Kalehe

7

May 20,
2009

Tushunguti

Kalehe

7

May 31,
2009

Lumbishi

Kalehe

1

Early July
2009

Bunyangungu

Kalehe

8

July 3,
2009

Lulere

Kalehe

2

July 11,
2009

Makoma

Kalehe

1

July 17,
2009

Tushunguti

Kalehe

2

July 30,
2009

Bwishi

Kalehe

9

Total

84

 

Other Areas, North and South Kivu

Date

Village

Territory

Number
of civilians killed

January
20, 2009

Kalinga
(near Buhimba)

Lubero

1

January
20, 2009

Kyandikiro
(near Buhimba)

Lubero

1

January
20, 2009

Mbombi
(near Buhimba)

Lubero

2

January
28, 2009

Masekeseke

Lubero

2

Late
January 2009

Mahanga

Masisi

2

Late
January 2009

Ntoto

Walikale

1

Late
January/ Early February 2009

Oninga

Walikale

2

Early
February 2009

Kibati

Walikale

1

February
14, 2009

Minova

Walikale

1

February
14, 2009

Pinga

Walikale

1

February
15, 2009

Mbwavinya

Lubero

2

February
20, 2009

Vusigho

Lubero

1

February
20, 2009

Sarambwe

Rutshuru

1

February
23, 2009

Mpeti

Masisi

3

February
23, 2009

Sarambwe

Rutshuru

1

Late
February 2009

Oninga

Walikale

1

February
2009

Ngululu

Masisi

3

February
2009

Busekere

Lubero

1

Early
March 2009

Hombo Sud

Kalehe

1

March 5,
2009

Mingazi

Walikale

1

Mid-March
2009

Kailenge

Walikale

1

March
18-19, 2009

Katambira

Walikale

1

April 1,
2009

Kanyatsi

Lubero

1

April 4,
2009

Musasa

Butembo

1

April 4-5,
2009

Ntoto

Walikale

3

April 5,
2009

Mungazi

Walikale

1

April 8,
2009

Ndoluma

Lubero

1

April 15,
2009

Kashala

Rutshuru

1

April 17,
2009

Kasiki

Lubero

1

April 17,
2009

Luofu

Lubero

6

April 23,
2009

Murangu

Kalehe

2

April 25,
2009

Katshiri

Kalehe

2

April 28,
2009

Kasiki

Lubero

1

April 28,
2009

Mikumbi

Walikale

1

April
26-May 2, 2009

Mikumbi/Muganzi

Walikale

5

Early May
2009

Bitumbi

Walikale

1

May 1,
2009

Ntoto

Walikale

1

May 3-9,
2009

Kalembe

Masisi

1

May 3-9,
2009

Mpito

Walikale

1

May 9,
2009

Oninga

Walikale

2

May 13,
2009

Mwenga

Mwenga

1

May 14-15,
2009

Mbongo

Kalehe

1

May 15,
2009

Mera

Walikale

2

May 15,
2009

Ntoto-Masisi
road

Walikale

1

May 15-18,
2009

Misoke

Walikale

5

May 18,
2009

Rudaga

Uvira

1

May 20,
2009

Between
Hombo and Bunyakiri

Kalehe

1

May 20,
2009

Kihito

Rutshuru

2

May 20,
2009

Kanjanja

Rutshuru

1

May 20,
2009

Kimba

Walikale

2

May 20,
2009

Mera

Walikale

2

May 20,
2009

Mirenge

Walikale

3

May 22,
2009

Burai

Rutshuru

12

May 26-27,
2009

Chiriba

Kalehe

10

May 28,
2009

Kinono
forest

Kalehe

2

May 29,
2009

Nyamimba

Walikale

10

Late May
2009

Luwamba

Shabunda

5

January-June
2009

Kaniola
groupement

Kabare

19

May-June
2009

Kayirengi

Kalehe

1

June 4,
2009

Nyamilima

Rutshuru

1

June 5,
2009

Kasegbe

Lubero

3

June 8,
2009

Kasegbe

Lubero

5

June 9,
2009

Mabungu

Kalehe

2

June 11,
2009

Kirumba

Lubero

1

June
11-16, 2009

Bingi,
Kamandi, Kitsumbiro

Lubero

2

June 14,
2009

Basilembo

Mwenga

2

June
17-18, 2009

Chiriba

Kalehe

1

June 20,
2009

Near
Rwindi

Rutshuru

3

June 27,
2009

Kiseguru

Rutshuru

1

June 29,
2009

Kasegbe

Lubero

4

July 11,
2009

Mulambula

Kabare

1

July 15,
2009

Lemera

Uvira

1

July
26-August 1, 2009

Mwenga

Mwenga

1

July 27,
2009

Irhegabarhonyi

Walungu

1

July 29,
2009

Kalambi

Mwenga

1

July 29,
2009

Kiyonvu

Mwenga

1

July 29,
2009

Kiloboza

Shabunda

2

August 3,
2009

Kalengera

Uvira

2

August 3,
2009

Nymukriri

Uvira

1

August 5,
2009

Kalengera

Uvira

1

August 5,
2009

Lulumba

Walungu

4

August 6,
2009

Rugari

Rutshuru

3

August 7,
2009

Nyamutiri

Uvira

1

August 9,
2009

Kitu,
Kalungwe

Uvira

2

August
10-16, 2009

Chulwe

Kabare

1

August 16,
2009

Kangole

Mwenga

1

August 18,
2009

Nyawarungo

Kalehe

1

August 18,
2009

Kanune

Lubero

3

August 30,
2009

Sugulu

Mwenga

1

August
2009

Ntoto

Walikale

19

August 31,
2009

Luzingu

Mwenga

3

September
10, 2009

Tshigoma

Kalehe

2

September
10, 2009

Bingi

Lubero

1

September
10, 2009

Kikuku

Rutshuru

2

September
16, 2009

Kamituga

Mwenga

2

September
19, 2009

Katwe

Rutshuru

2

Total

229

 

TOTAL CIVILIANS KILLED BY FDLR COMBATANTS

January–September 2009

701

Annex
II: Civilians Killed by the Congolese Army and Their Coalition Partner

January‒September 2009

The information in the following tables is based on
eyewitness accounts, information from family members, and testimony from those
who helped to bury the dead. It was collected by Human Rights Watch during 23
field missions in North and South Kivu between January and October 2009. In
many cases, the victims were identified by name. This
information is on file at Human Rights Watch. We have made every effort
to corroborate our findings and dismiss accounts that we did not find credible.

This information is only partial and represents some of
those killed. Human Rights Watch received credible information about additional
civilians killed which we have not been able to verify nor were we able to
visit all areas affected by the military operations. 

Operation Umoja Wetu

Civilians killed by Congolese and/or Rwandan army
coalition forces

,
late January–February 2009

Date

Village

Territory

Number
of civilians killed

January
22, 2009

Chirundo

Masisi

3

January
27, 2009

Masiza

Masisi

2

Late January
2009

Ngwenda

Rutshuru

7

Early
February 2009

Kitcho

Lubero

1

Early
February 2009

Langira

Walikale

20

February
6, 2009

Bunje

Kalehe

1

February
10, 2009

Kailenge

Walikale

1

February
18, 2009

Kamandi

Lubero

1

February
20, 2009

Matanda

Masisi

4

February
20, 2009

Murambi

Masisi

1

February
2009

Byarenga

Walikale

40

February
2009

Bulisi

Masisi

3

February
2009

Kyamatembe
(Mashango)

Masisi

3

February
2009

Mashango

Masisi

9

February
2009

Ndorumo

Masisi

90

February
2009

Nyabiondo-Lwibo
road

(villagers
from Misheeshe)

Masisi

13

February
2009

Bitonga
and Kiluku

Kalehe

2

 

Total civilians killed by Congolese and/or Rwandan army soldiers during Umoja
Wetu

Late January–February 2009

201

Operation Kimia II

Rwandan Hutu refugees killed by Congolese army soldiers,
March–September 2009

Date

Village

Territory

Number
of civilians killed

March 2009

Biriko
area

Masisi

13

April 27,
2009

Biriko
(abductees from Shalio)

Walikale

49

April 27,
2009

Shalio

Walikale

50

April 28,
2009

Marok

Walikale

10

April 29,
2009

Bunyarwanda

Walikale

15

April 29,
2009

Marok

Walikale

5

July 2009

Musanga

Lubero

1

 

Total Rwandan Hutu refugees killed by Congolese army soldiers during

Kimia II

March–September 2009

143

 

Congolese civilians killed by Congolese army soldiers,
March – September 2009

Area North of Nyabiondo

Date

Village

Territory

Number
of civilians killed

March 5,
2009

Lwibo

Masisi

5

March 2009

Lukweti

Masisi

4

March 2009

Nyabiondo-Lwibo
road (villagers from Misheeshe)

Masisi

2

April 17,
2009

Kilondo

Masisi

1

April 17,
2009

Lwibo

Masisi

1

April 2009

Mashango

Masisi

5

April 2009

Nyabiondo-Lwibo
road (villagers from Misheeshe)

Masisi

11

May 2009

Kaseke

Walikale

2

May 2009

Nyabiondo-Lwibo
road (villagers from Misheeshe)

Masisi

5

June 15,
2009

Nyabiondo-Lwibo
road (villagers from Misheeshe)

Masisi

6

July 2009

Kyamatembe

Masisi

22

July 2009

Lwibo

Masisi

1

July 2009

Majengo

Masisi

3

July 2009

Ndorumo

Masisi

5

July 2009

Nyabiondo-Lwibo
road (villagers from Misheeshe)

Masisi

7

Early
August 2009

Lwibo

Masisi

6

August 15,
2009

Ndorumo

Masisi

50

August 18,
2009

Lukweti

Masisi

3

August
2009

Mashango
(Bubangi)

Masisi

17

August
2009

Mashango
(Buboa)

Masisi

20

August
2009

Mashango
(Butsindo)

Masisi

7

August
2009

Mashango
(Katanda)

Masisi

9

August
2009

Mashango
(Mashango)

Masisi

28

August
2009

Nyabiondo-Lwibo
road (villagers from Misheeshe)

Masisi

16

September
2009

Nyabiondo-Lwibo
road (villagers from Misheeshe)

Masisi

9

September
29, 2009

Kilambo,
Kibuache, Myumba

Masisi

1

September
29, 2009

Kinyumba

Masisi

6

September
2009

Kilambo

Masisi

8

September
2009

Mashango
(Nyamatembe)

Masisi

3

September
2009

Ndorumo

Masisi

7

 

Total Congolese civilians killed by Congolese army soldiers in the area
north of Nyabiondo during Kimia II

March – September 2009

270

 

Other Areas of North and South Kivu

Date

Village

Territory

Number
of civilians killed

March 11,
2009

Mbwavinya

Lubero

2

March 12,
2009

Kasiki

Lubero

3

March 12,
2009

Mbwavinya

Lubero

1

March 15,
2009

Kashebere

Masisi

2

March 15,
2009

Kirumba

Lubero

1

March 17,
2009

Kanyabayonga

Lubero

1

March 18,
2009

Matsiva

Lubero

1

March 22,
2009

Mubugu

Kalehe

1

March 26,
2009

Paysana

Lubero

1

March 26,
2009

Vurumbya
farm

Lubero

1

March 29,
2009

Kamandi

Lubero

1

Late March
2009

Buhimba

Masisi

1

Early
April 2009

Kalungu

Kalehe

1

April 5,
2009

Kikoma

Masisi

2

April 8,
2009

Kakobero
hill

Lubero

1

April 13,
2009

Kirumba
farm

Lubero

1

April 14,
2009

Kashugo

Lubero

4

April 14,
2009

Kahunga

Rutshuru

1

April 16,
2009

Kiwanja
(Buhunda quartier)

Rutshuru

1

April 18,
2009

Kinyamuyaa

Rutshuru

1

April 20,
2009

Kiriba

Masisi

2

April 22,
2009

Rusinga
(near Mahanga)

Masisi

1

April 26,
2009

Katwiguru

Rutshuru

1

April 27,
2009

Bugaramana
(near Nyamasasa)

Kalehe

9

April 28,
2009

Kashugo

Lubero

4

April 28,
2009

Katwiguru

Rutshuru

1

April 29,
2009

Burai

Rutshuru

1

April 30,
2009

Nyamilima

Rutshuru

3

April 2009

Remeka

Masisi

2

May 6,
2009

Bulambika

Kalehe

1

May 20,
2009

Hombo Sud
farm

Kalehe

1

Late May
2009

Remeka

Masisi

2

May 2009

Hombo

Walikale

1

Early June
2009

Mitongo

Shabunda

1

June 12,
2009

Kibumba

Rutshuru

2

June 13,
2009

Nyamilima

Rutshuru

1

June 15,
2009

Nyamasasa

Kalehe

1

June 18,
2009

Between
Kahunga and Mabenga

Rutshuru

2

June 18,
2009

Buoye

Walikale

1

June 25,
2009

Ziralo

Kalehe

1

June
25-28, 2009

Chulwe

Walungu

2

June 30,
2009

Luzirantaka

Kalehe

1

July 8,
2009

Miano

Masisi

2

July 10,
2009

Katoyi

Masisi

1

July 14,
2009

Kishonja

Masisi

1

July 20,
2009

Kiwanja

Rutshuru

1

July
20-22, 2009

Katasomwa

Kalehe

1

August 4,
2009

Bitonga

Kalehe

2

August 6,
2009

Kiringye,
Nyamutiri

Uvira

1

August 8,
2009

Katwiguru

Rutshuru

2

August 9,
2009

Mabumbi,
Miriki

Lubero

2

August 21,
2009

Virunga
Park

Rutshuru

6

August 22,
2009

Kasugho

Lubero

1

August 23,
2009

Katiri

Masisi

3

August 25,
2009

Rubare

Rutshuru

6

August 30,
2009

Bilobilo

Walikale

1

August 30,
2009

Kalangita

Kalehe

10

September
3, 2009

Kanyabayonga

Lubero

1

September
3, 2009

Vutsorovia

Lubero

2

September
9, 2009

Chombo

Kabare

1

September
14, 2009

Kanyabayonga

Lubero

1

September
27, 2009

Kalangita

Kalehe

4

 

Total Congolese civilians killed by Congolese army soldiers in other
areas during Kimia II

March–September 2009

118

 

Total civilians killed (including refugees) by Congolese army soldiers
during Kimia II

March–September 2009

531

 

TOTAL CIVILIANS KILLED (including refugees) BY CONGOLESE AND/OR RWANDAN
ARMY SOLDIERS DURING UMOJA WETU AND KIMIA II

January–September 2009

732

Annex III: Civilians Raped by FDLR Combatants

January–September 2009

The information in the
following tables represents cases of rape documented by Human Rights Watch
through interviews with victims, their family members, witnesses, and
health-workers or rape counselors who interviewed the victims. It was collected
by Human Rights Watch during 23 field missions in North and South Kivu between
January and October 2009. This information is only partial and represents
just a fraction of the thousands of women, girls, and in some cases men and
boys, who were raped in North and South Kivu between January and September 2009.
UNFPA, the UN agency responsible for coordinating efforts on tackling
sexual violence in Congo, recorded that 7,500 women and girls were raped in
North and South Kivu between January and September 2009. We have made every
effort to corroborate our findings and dismiss accounts that we did not find
credible. We have not included cases where the victim or other witnesses were
not able to clearly identify the perpetrator.

 

Kalehe Territory (South Kivu)

Date

Village

Territory

Number
of civilians raped

January 1,
2009

Lulere

Kalehe

1

January 1,
2009

Rutshuru
village

Kalehe

1

January
20, 2009

Shanje

Kalehe

1

January
22, 2009

Busheke

Kalehe

13

January
30, 2009

Lumbishi

Kalehe

1

January
2009

Kusisa
locality

Kalehe

1

Late
January 2009

Katahunda

Kalehe

2

January
– February 2009

Kihonga

Kalehe

1

January
– June 2009

Ziralo

Kalehe

1

February
1, 2009

Chebumba

Kalehe

1

February
8, 2009

Chebumba

Kalehe

1

February
2009

Shanje

Kalehe

1

March 1,
2009

Shanje

Kalehe

9

March 1,
2009

Ziralo

Kalehe

1

March 2, 2009

Mulonge

Kalehe

4

March 2,
2009

Shanje

Kalehe

1

March 4,
2009

Lulere
village

Kalehe

1

March 7,
2009

Mihanda

Kalehe

3

March 22,
2009

Chiriba

Kalehe

2

March 25,
2009

Chebumba

Kalehe

1

March 25,
2009

Rutshuru
village

Kalehe

1

March 29,
2009

Mbunje

Kalehe

7

March 2009

Ziralo
area

Kalehe

5

April 4,
2009

Mbunje

Kalehe

1

April 5,
2009

Lulere

Kalehe

1

April 7,
2009

Shanje

Kalehe

1

April 10,
2009

Shanje

Kalehe

1

April 19,
2009

Chebumba

Kalehe

1

April
23-24, 2009

Rumono

Kalehe

2

April
27-28, 2009

Karali

Kalehe

1

April 27,
2009

Shanje

Kalehe

1

April 28,
2009

Kahunga

Kalehe

1

April 2009

Chebumba

Kalehe

1

April 2009

Nyamasasa

Kalehe

7

May 10,
2009

Kashebere

Kalehe

1

May 15,
2009

Mihanda

Kalehe

3

May 15,
2009

Tushunguti

Kalehe

1

May 16,
2009

Chiriba

Kalehe

1

May 17,
2009

Lumbishi

Kalehe

10

May 17,
2009

Tushunguti

Kalehe

1

May 24,
2009

near
Mihanda

Kalehe

1

May 31,
2009

Lumbishi

Kalehe

1

June 3,
2009

Rutshuru
village

Kalehe

1

June 10,
2009

Chilirimo

Kalehe

1

June 14,
2009

Chebumba

Kalehe

3

June 17,
2009

Burora

Kalehe

1

June 27,
2009

Shanje

Kalehe

18

June 30,
2009

Tushunguti

Kalehe

1

Early July
2009

Bunyangungu

Kalehe

1

July 5,
2009

Mihanda

Kalehe

1

July 12,
2009

Mbunje

Kalehe

1

July 15,
2009

Chirimiro

Kalehe

1

July 15,
2009

Nyamasasa

Kalehe

1

July 19,
2009

Manja

Kalehe

1

July 30,
2009

Bwishi

Kalehe

2

Early
August 2009

Lumbishi

Kalehe

1

Total

131

Walikale Territory (North Kivu)

Date

Village

Territory

Number
of civilians raped

January
26, 2009

Rambo

Walikale

1

January –
February 2009

Pinga area

Walikale

28

Early
February 2009

Mpemba

Walikale

1

February
15, 2009

Biriko

Walikale

2

February
7, 2009

Mukimbi

Walikale

1

April 1,
2009

Buenji

Walikale

5

April 25,
2009

Chambucha
area

Walikale

1

April 28,
2009

Busurungi

Walikale

3

April 2009

Lukaraba

Walikale

3

April 2009

Mianga

Walikale

1

May 2,
2009

near Mera

Walikale

1

Early May
2009

Malembe

Walikale

4

May 10,
2009

between
Mera and Nsindo

Walikale

1

May 15-18,
2009

Mirenge

Walikale

4

July 20,
2009

Manje

Walikale

1

Total

57

 

Masisi Territory (North Kivu)

Date

Village

Territory

Number
of civilians raped

January
24, 2009

Ngungu
area

Masisi

1

January
25, 2009

Lwizi

Masisi

1

January
27, 2009

Ngwilo

Masisi

1

February
9, 2009

Rwangara

Masisi

1

February
27, 2009

Remeka

Masisi

1

Late
February 2009

Kishonja

Masisi

1

March 1,
2009

Remeka

Masisi

1

March 18,
2009

Katoyi

Masisi

1

March 20,
2009

Miano

Masisi

5

April 20,
2009

Chilundu

Masisi

1

April 22,
2009

Luhanga

Masisi

3

April 24,
2009

Kashindi

Masisi

7

April 27,
2009

Ngululu

Masisi

1

May 5,
2009

Kirambo

Masisi

1

May 7,
2009

Kirambo

Masisi

6

May 17,
2009

Mutindi

Masisi

1

May 18,
2009

Katahunda

Masisi

1

May 28,
2009

Ngungu
area

Masisi

1

June 15,
2009

Mbunje

Masisi

1

July 2,
2009

Mbunje

Masisi

1

July 2,
2009

Remeka

Masisi

1

Total

38

 

Lubero Territory (North Kivu)

Date

Village

Territory

Number
of civilians raped

January
2009

Southern
Lubero

Lubero

2

Early
February 2009

Kasingiri

Lubero

2

February
11, 2009

Bwavinywa

Lubero

1

February
18, 2009

Kalevia

Lubero

3

February
18, 2009

Kanyatsi

Lubero

1

February
19, 2009

Kanyatsi

Lubero

3

February
21, 2009

Kalevia

Lubero

2

February
21, 2009

Kasiki

Lubero

2

February
24, 2009

Busekera

Lubero

2

February
24, 2009

Bwambali

Lubero

2

February
24, 2009

Kalevia

Lubero

1

February
2009

Miriki

Lubero

3

February
2009

Southern
Lubero

Lubero

1

March 11,
2009

Southern
Lubero

Lubero

1

March 13,
2009

Between
Miriki and

Luofu

Lubero

1

March 2009

Southern
Lubero

Lubero

5

March 17,
2009

Luhanga

Lubero

3

April 3, 2009

Bitimba

Lubero

1

April 11,
2009

Southern
Lubero

Lubero

1

April 12,
2009

Busavali

Lubero

1

Total

38

 

Shabunda Territory (South Kivu)

Date

Village

Territory

Number
of civilians raped

April-May
2009

Luyuyu

Shabunda

12

April-May 2009

Nduma area

Shabunda

1

May 2009

Makotano

Shabunda

1

Mid-May
2009

Nzovu

Shabunda

2

Mid-May
2009

Nzovu
(farm outside)

Shabunda

1

June 2009

Kaligi

Shabunda

3

June 2009

Kiluma
(near Kigulube)

Shabunda

3

Total

23

 

Rutshuru Territory (North Kivu)

Date

Village

Territory

Number
of civilians raped

Early May
2009

Kinyandoni

Rutshuru

1

Early May
2009

Nyarukongara

Rutshuru

1

Early May
2009

Nyongera

Rutshuru

1

Total

3

 

TOTAL DOCUMENTED CASES OF CIVILIANS RAPED BY FDLR COMBATANTS

January – September 2009

290

Annex
IV: Civilians Raped by the Congolese Army and Their Coalition Partner

January–September 2009

 

The information in the
following tables represents cases of rape documented by Human Rights Watch
through interviews with victims, their family members, witnesses, and
health-workers or rape counselors who interviewed the victims. It was collected
by Human Rights Watch during 23 field missions in North and South Kivu between
January and October 2009. This information is only partial and represents
just a fraction of the thousands of women, girls, and in some cases men and
boys, who were raped in North and South Kivu between January and September
2009. UNFPA, the UN agency responsible for coordinating efforts on tackling
sexual violence in Congo, recorded that 7,500 women and girls were raped in
North and South Kivu between January and September 2009. We have made every
effort to corroborate our findings and dismiss accounts that we did not find
credible. We have not included cases where the victim or other witnesses were
not able to clearly identify the perpetrator.

 

Operation Umoja Wetu

Civilians raped by Congolese and/or Rwandan army coalition
forces, late January–February 2009

Date

Village

Territory

Number
of civilians raped

January
2009

Kalehe

Kalehe

1

January
2009

Miyobwe

Lubero

1

January
22, 2009

Chirundo
village

Masisi

1

January
24, 2009

Bukimba

Kalehe

1

January
24, 2009

Bwanga

Masisi

2

January
25, 2009

Karasa

Kalehe

1

January
2009

southern
Lubero

Lubero

2

January
26, 2009

Remeka

Masisi

1

January
27, 2009

Lwizi

Masisi

1

February
1, 2009

Bwambari

Lubero

1

February
3, 2009

Luhanga

Lubero

2

February
6, 2009

Bunje

Kalehe

1

February
12-13, 2009

Luofu

Lubero

7

Mid-February
2009

Lumbishi

Kalehe

1

February
2009

Bwatsinge

Lubero

3

February
2009

Kashebere

Masisi

2

February
2009

Langira

Walikale

2

February
17, 2009

Numbi

Masisi

1

February
20, 2009

Murambi

Masisi

1

February
22, 2009

Bulembe

Lubero

1

Late
February 2009

Bitonga

Masisi

2

Total

35

 

Total documented cases of civilians raped by Congolese and/or Rwandan
army soldiers

January – February 2009

35

 

Operation Kimia II

Rapes by Congolese army
soldiers, March – September 2009

Masisi Territory (North Kivu)

Date

Village

Territory

Number
of civilians raped

March 1,
2009

Bitonga

Masisi

1

March 2,
2009

Bitonga

Masisi

1

March 3,
2009

Bitonga/Chebunda

Masisi

1

March 3,
2009

Chirundo
village

Masisi

1

March 5,
2009

Bweremana

Masisi

1

March 10,
2009

Bitonga

Masisi

1

March 16,
2009

Bwanga

Masisi

1

March 22,
2009

Kashebere

Masisi

2

March 25,
2009

Nyamatovu

Masisi

1

April 1,
2009

Kashebere
area

Masisi

10

Mid-April
2009

Bitonga

Masisi

10

April 22,
2009

Nyamasasa

Masisi

1

April
25-26, 2009

Mahanga

Masisi

15

April 26,
2009

Kihonga

Masisi

1

May 1,
2009

Masisi

Masisi

2

June 5,
2009

Remeka

Masisi

1

July 1,
2009

Majengo

Masisi

5

July 1,
2009

Ndorumo

Masisi

5

July 8,
2009

Miano

Masisi

1

July 10,
2009

Katoyi

Masisi

1

August 1,
2009

Mashango

Masisi

16

August 15,
2009

Ngungu

Masisi

9

September
28-29, 2009

Kinyumba

Masisi

20

Total

107

 

Walikale Territory (North Kivu)

Date

Village

Territory

Number
of civilians raped

April 24,
2009

Kangambili

Walikale

1

April 27,
2009

Shalio

Walikale

40

April 28,
2009

Bunyarwanda

Walikale

1

April 30,
2009

Marok

Walikale

20

Early May
2009

Kaseke

Walikale

15

Total

77

 

Kalehe Territory (South Kivu)

Date

Village

Territory

Number of civilians raped

March 10,
2009

Numbi

Kalehe

1

March 14,
2009

Bukaka

Kalehe

1

March 14,
2009

Kashovu

Kalehe

1

March 15,
2009

Maliba

Kalehe

1

March 17,
2009

Bishange

Kalehe

1

March 17,
2009

Luzirantaka

Kalehe

1

March 17,
2009

Shanje

Kalehe

1

March 18, 2009
Luzirantaka
Kalehe
1

March 20,
2009

Nyamatovu

Kalehe

1

March 24,
2009

Chebumba

Kalehe

5

March 24,
2009

Nyamatovu

Kalehe

1

March 26,
2009

Nyamatovu

Kalehe

1

March 27,
2009

Nyamatovu

Kalehe

1

Early
April 2009

Nyamasasa

Kalehe

1

April 3,
2009

Bishange

Kalehe

1

April 7,
2009

Nyamatovu

Kalehe

1

April 13,
2009

Kinyazire

Kalehe

1

April 15,
2009

Chebumba

Kalehe

2

April 17,
2009

Chebumba

Kalehe

1

April 25,
2009

Kihonga

Kalehe

1

April 25
– May 8, 2009

Ziralo

Kalehe

9

April 26,
2009

Bitonga

Kalehe

1

April 27,
2009

Rugarama

Kalehe

1

April 28,
2009

Karango

Kalehe

1

April 30,
2009

Kambale

Kalehe

2

May 1,
2009

Kambale

Kalehe

1

May 2,
2009

Bitonga

Kalehe

4

May 4,
2009

Kalungu

Kalehe

1

May 4,
2009

Kihonga

Kalehe

1

May 4,
2009

Minova

Kalehe

1

May 5,
2009

Karango

Kalehe

1

May 5,
2009

Kihonga

Kalehe

1

May 6,
2009

Karasi

Kalehe

1

May 11,
2009

Karango

Kalehe

1

May 20,
2009

Minova

Kalehe

4

May 25,
2009

Hombo Sud

Kalehe

1

May 30,
2009

Kalungu

Kalehe

2

June 2,
2009

Nyamasasa

Kalehe

2

June 13,
2009

Kitalimwa

Kalehe

1

June 21,
2009

Nyamatovu

Kalehe

1

June 25,
2009

Ziralo

Kalehe

1

June 30,
2009

Luzirantaka

Masisi

1

July 5,
2009

Between
Kalungu and Numbi

Kalehe

1

July 5,
2009

Nyamasasa

Kalehe

1

July 7,
2009

Bulenga

Kalehe

1

July 7,
2009

Nyamasasa

Kalehe

1

July 15,
2009

Chebumba

Kalehe

1

July 20,
2009

Nyamasasa

Kalehe

1

August 4,
2009

Bitonga

Kalehe

1

August 7,
2009

Bunje

Kalehe

1

August 11,
2009

Nyamasasa
area

Kalehe

1

Total

73

 

Lubero Territory (North Kivu)

Date

Village

Territory

Number
of civilians raped

March 1,
2009

Kanyabayonga

Lubero

1

March 1,
2009

southern
Lubero

Lubero

8

March 3,
2009

Kasiki

Lubero

1

March 9,
2009

Busekera

Lubero

2

March 9,
2009

Kasiki

Lubero

1

March 9,
2009

Kitcho

Lubero

1

March 11,
2009

Busekera

Lubero

1

March 11,
2009

Bwatsinge

Lubero

1

March 12,
2009

Busekera

Lubero

2

March 13,
2009

Luofu

Lubero

1

March 13,
2009

Miriki

Lubero

1

March 15,
2009

Miriki

Lubero

1

March 17,
2009

Kanyabayonga

Lubero

1

March 17,
2009

Kasiki

Lubero

1

March 18,
2009

Kasiki

Lubero

2

March 28,
2009

Kaholero

Lubero

1

April 1,
2009

southern
Lubero

Lubero

3

April 9,
2009

Miriki

Lubero

1

April 9,
2009

Miriki

Lubero

1

April 10,
2009

Busekera

Lubero

1

April 11,
2009

Luofu

Lubero

1

April 13,
2009

Luofu

Lubero

1

Total

34

 

Rutshuru Territory (North Kivu)

Date

Village

Territory

Number
of civilians raped

April 1,
2009

Mabenga
(farm nearby)

Rutshuru

2

April 25,
2009

Rutshuru

Rutshuru

5

May 2,
2009

Nyamalima

Rutshuru

1

May 5,
2009

Katwiguru

Rutshuru

8

May 5,
2009

Rutshuru

Rutshuru

1

July 16,
2009

Ngoroba

Rutshuru

1

July 17,
2009

Kamandi

Rutshuru

1

Total

19

 

Shabunda Territory (South Kivu)

Date

Village

Territory

Number
of civilians raped

April 1,
2009

Zanukusu
mine

Shabunda

2

May 1,
2009

Katchungu

Shabunda

1

May 1,
2009

Nduma

Shabunda

1

Total

4

 

Total documented cases of civilians raped by Congolese army soldiers

March – September 2009

314

 

TOTAL DOCUMENTED CASES OF CIVILIANS RAPED BY

CONGOLESE AND/OR RWANDAN ARMY SOLDIERS

January – September 2009

347

Annex V: Deliberate Burning of Civilian Homes and
Other Structures

January–September 2009

The information in the following tables is based on
eyewitness accounts. It was collected by Human Rights Watch during 23 field
missions in North and South Kivu between January and October 2009. We
have made every effort to corroborate our findings and dismiss accounts that we
did not find credible.

This information is only partial and represents only some
of the homes and other structures burned during military operations. Human
Rights Watch received further credible information about the burning and
destruction of other villages which we have not been able to verify nor were we
able to visit all areas affected by the military operations. 

 

Homes and other structures burned by Congolese and/or
Rwandan coalition forces during Operation Umoja Wetu

Date

Village

Territory

Number
of houses burned

Early
February 2009

Kashalala
(near Langira)

Walikale

26

Early
February 2009

Chumba
(near Langira)

Walikale

84

Early
February 2009

Langira

Walikale

160

Early
February 2009

Ntoto

Walikale

500

Early
February 2009

Majengo

Lubero

30

Early
February 2009

Mbuhi

Lubero

30

February
14, 2009

Lushoa

Walikale

97

February
14, 2009

Mashuta

Walikale

63

February
14, 2009

Numo

Walikale

13

February
15, 2009

Miriki-Kanune
road

Lubero

10

February
15, 2009

Bushalingwa

Walikale

170

February
15, 2009

Kishonja

Walikale

135

February
23-24, 2009

Bushalirwe

Masisi

30

February
2009

Ndorumo

Masisi

9

Total

1,357

Homes and other structures
burned by Congolese army soldiers during Operation Kimia II (up until September
2009)

Date

Village

Territory

Number
of houses burned

March 8,
2009

Miriki

Lubero

150

March 15,
2009

Biriko

Masisi

30

March 15,
2009

Mirandano

Masisi

30

April 23,
2009

Mahi

Masisi

7

April 27,
2009

Shalio

Walikale

50

June 5,
2009

Kanyabayonga

Lubero

35

June 9-10,
2009

Kanyabayonga

Lubero

100

June 11,
2009

Kinyondo

Lubero

16

June 12,
2009

Lusamambo

Walikale

23

June
30-July 1, 2009

Miriki

Lubero

137

August 29,
2009

Vusavali

Lubero

30

August 31,
2009

Luvungi

Uvira

20

August
2009

Katando
(Mashango)

Masisi

9

August
2009

Buboa
(Mashango)

Masisi

2

August
2009

Butsindo
(Mashango)

Masisi

3

August
2009

Mashango

Masisi

4

September
2, 2009

Busavali

Lubero

4

Mid-September
2009

Nyamatembe
(Mashango)

Masisi

12

September
27, 2009

Kalangita

Kalehe

67

September
30, 2009

Vutsorovia

Lubero

18

Total

747

 

Total homes burned by Congolese and/or Rwandan army soldiers

January–September 2009

2,104

Homes and other structures
burned by the FDLR, February – September 2009

Date

Village

Territory

Number of houses burned

February 13, 2009

Kipopo

Masisi

100

February 15, 2009

Lulere

Kalehe

10

Mid-February 2009

Buhongo

Masisi

17

February
22, 2009

Charamba

Kalehe

25

February
23, 2009

Remeka

Masisi

15

February
25, 2009

Buongo

Masisi

15

February
25, 2009

Mangere

Masisi

100

Early
March 2009

Luofu

Lubero

8

March 1,
2009

Mololo

Masisi

20

March 5,
2009

Kalonge

Kalehe

22

March 7,
2009

Biriko

Walikale

300

March 31,
2009

Bukondo

Kalehe

40

April 7,
2009

Bikunje (Remeka)

Masisi

14

April 8,
2009

Buruso

Masisi

30

April 8,
2009

Ndekomiko

Masisi

90

April 8,
2009

Biriko

Walikale

70

April 11,
2009

Mirenzo

Kalehe

23

April 12,
2009

Mianga

Walikale

50

Mid-April
2009

Bikunje (Remeka)

Masisi

150

April 17,
2009

Kasiki

Lubero

90

April 17,
2009

Luofu

Lubero

255

April 20,
2009

Kirumba

Lubero

10

April 23,
2009

Murangu
(Bunyakiri)

Kalehe

511

April 25,
2009

Masiba

Kalehe

200

April 25,
2009

Mwenga
(Kachiri)

Kalehe

50

April
26-27, 2009

Karasi

Kalehe

11

April 28,
2009

Limangi

Walikale

3

Early May
2009

Butalongola

Lubero

131

May 10,
2009

Busurungi

Walikale

702

May 15,
2009

Mihanda

Kalehe

135

May 20,
2009

Mera

Walikale

50

May 26-27,
2009

Chiriba

Kalehe

125

May – June
2009

Kayirenge

Kalehe

21

June 4,
2009

Kalenga

Masisi

15

June 7,
2009

Vuvua

Lubero

42

June 7,
2009

Kikuku

Lubero

60

June 8,
2009

Kaseghe

Lubero

40

June 8,
2009

Kinyondo

Lubero

5

June 10,
2009

Mabingu

Kalehe

3

June
12-13, 2009

Kashovu
and Ekunga

Kalehe

61

Mid-June
2009

Bingi,
Kamandi, Kitsumbiro

Lubero

20

June 18,
2009

Kasambura

Uvira

15

June 20,
2009

Mihanda

Kalehe

118

June 21,
2009

Chindunbi

Walungu

3

June 21,
2009

Chisaza

Walungu

3

June 22,
2009

Kaniola

Walungu

10

June 25,
2009

Lushebere

Kalehe

30

June 27,
2009

Kiseguru

Rutshuru

35

June 30,
2009

Miriki

Lubero

120

June –
July 2009

Mudaka,
Tshololo, Buhira, Kabuye II, Kalinganya, Lwizi and Kabona

Kabare

706

Early July
2009

Nyalusandula

Shabunda

40

July 4,
2009

Kinyandoni

Rutshuru

3

July 9,
2009

Mwenga

Mwenga

20

July 13,
2009

Itara

Uvira

13

July 13,
2009

Kalonge

Kalehe

12

Mid-July
2009

Kashohosho

Kalehe

7

Mid-July
2009

Chenga

Kalehe

17

July
20-21, 2009

Manje

Walikale

182

July 25,
2009

Miriki

Lubero

15

July 29,
2009

Kalambi

Mwenga

120

July 29,
2009

Lubumba

Uvira

10

July 29,
2009

Kiyonvu

Mwenga

63

July 30,
2009

Kingete

Masisi

99

Late July
2009

Buhimba

Lubero

17

August 3,
2009

Bwishi

Kalehe

12

August 4,
2009

Bunyakagendo (Katahunda)

Masisi

80

August 4,
2009

Katoyi

Masisi

64

August 4,
2009

Ndekomiko

Masisi

100

August 5,
2009

Butolonga/Bulindi

Lubero

135

August
5-6, 2009

Bushamba

Kabare

115

August 8,
2009

Isopo and
Kakanga

Mwenga

47

August 8,
2009

Nyamutiri

Uvira

10

August 9,
2009

Kitu,
Kalungwe

Uvira

4

August 11,
2009

Malembe

Walikale

600

August 12,
2009

Bungalama
Mawe

Mwenga

32

August 12,
2009

Ndolera

Uvira

10

Mid-August
2009

Ihembe

Kabare

115

Mid-August
2009

Mushaka

Kabare

115

August 15,
2009

Kasambura

Uvira

14

August 15,
2009

Katahunda

Masisi

5

August 15,
2009

Kishanga

Masisi

5

August 16,
2009

Kangole

Mwenga

37

August 17,
2009

Tanda

Mwenga

4

August 18,
2009

Kanune

Lubero

12

August 20,
2009

Kalungu

Masisi

3

August 24,
2009

Nyakabere

Uvira

53

August 25,
2009

Lwashoga,
Kalyola

Walungu

2

August 26,
2009

Kaboge and
Sugulu

Mwenga

32

August 30,
2009

Sugulu

Mwenga

32

August 30,
2009

Kibua

Walikale

20

September
15, 2009

Malembe,
Mumba, Miere, Kando

Walikale

80

Late
September 2009

Kakuku,
Mbuhi, Kilambo, Bese (Pinga)

Walikale

16

 

Total homes burned by the FDLR

January–September 2009

7,051

 

Homes and other structures
burned by unknown perpetrators, February – September 2009

Date

Village

Territory

Number of houses burned

March 12, 2009

Mahanga

Masisi

48

May 24-25, 2009

Mulonge

Kalehe

75

June 5, 2009

Ikobo and neighboring villages

Walikale

85

June 13,
2009

Lushoa

Walikale

42

June
17-18, 2009

Boote
(Ramba locality)

Kalehe

47

June 23,
2009

Kanyabayonga

Lubero

35

July
25-26, 2009

Luofu

Lubero

17

Total

349

 

TOTAL HOMES BURNED

January – September 2009

9,504

 

 

Acknowledgements

 

This report was researched
and written by Ida Sawyer and Anneke Van Woudenberg, researchers in the Africa
Division of Human Rights Watch. Additional research was provided by Gerry
Simpson of the Refugees Division and Juliane Kippenberg of the Children’s
Rights Division.

 

This report was reviewed and
edited by Rona Peligal, deputy director of the Africa Division; Andrew Mawson, deputy program director; and James Ross, legal and policy director. The report
was also reviewed by Janet
Walsh, deputy director of the Women’s Rights Division; Steve Crawshaw, UN advocacy director; and Juliane
Kippenberg, senior researcher in the Children’s Rights Division.
Production, coordination and research assistance was provided by Rachel
Nicholson, associate in the Africa Division. Anna Lopriore, creative manager
and photo editor assisted with the selection and layout of the photos, and John
Emerson designed the maps. Grace Choi, publications director, and Fitzroy
Hepkins, mail manager, prepared the report for publication.

 

This report was translated
into French by Danielle Serres and Françoise Denayer. The French
translation was vetted by Peter Huvos.

 

We especially wish to thank
our Congolese colleagues and partners for their assistance, commitment, and
dedication to defending the rights of others, as well as the hundreds of
victims and witnesses to abuses who spoke to our researchers. While they cannot
be named for security reasons, this report is a tribute to their courage,
perseverance, and desire for the truth to be known.